Kuhonga Program Logic and Pre-evaluation                                             Produced by Lewis Kirvan and Nathan W...
Introduction       Kuhonga is a non-profit tech start-up that incorporated in January of 2012. Theorganization is the brai...
The purpose of this white-paper is to provide a description of the Kuhonga’s plannedprogram logic as onepart of a broader ...
governance are often addressed by non-profits but only infrequently are they addressed as aseparate social problem. Instea...
success in putting good rules in place.xi However they have consistently failed to createinstitutions that effectively ser...
At Kuhonga we believe that technological change offers a great opportunity to cutthrough the intractable problem of corrup...
collect and centralize the ongoing conversation about corruption. Kuhonga believes thatproviding a trustworthy outlet for ...
Program Theory and Logic       The following several pages present schematic representations of the variouscomponents that...
FIG. 1 Kuhonga Logic model                             9
Besides privacy controls for whistleblowers we will also have to develop a judgmentanalytic of some sort that protects the...
The sequencing of specific privacy controls will also depend on how the programdevelops. Depending on reporting volume and...
that could be developed within Kuhonga or procured from third parties.3 Kuhonga may alsoneed to develop additional applica...
capability to sort and prioritize betweenvarious acts of corruption, to distinguish between thoseactivities that are in ne...
FIG. 4 Non-Governmental Consulting Model                                           14
Give an extremely high level of corruption the health services NGO might reconsiderinvesting its resources in this clinic ...
FIG. 5 Data Sharing                      16
Besides providing direct consulting services Kuhonga could also produce moregeneralized market reports that could be used ...
rewards that we can give to our whistleblowers. Figure 6 presents some of the limitedmotivators that we can utilize to enc...
FIG. 6 Citizen Logic Model                             19
Theory of Causation        Besides the outputs mentioned above Kuhonga hopes that it will contribute tofundamental behavio...
East and North Africa are not ideal. Frequently bad institutions survive revolutions, resulting inthe substitution of one ...
FIG. 8 Theory of Change                                                                                                   ...
Kuhonga may selectively forward reports of bribery to the EACC rapid response team.The decision to forward reports will re...
FIG. 9 Governmental Reporting ModelPotential Benchmarks and Evaluation Metrics       Having examined the Kuhonga’s program...
considerations we will want to begin recording other qualitative measures such as thepercentage of entered reports that ar...
time. When Kuhonga reaches a stable level of influence it would be possible to begin toevaluate overall corruption using i...
arise when we attempt to secure a stable SMS number from the Kenyan CommunicationsCommission. Ironically it may be difficu...
Conclusion       This program description and pre-evaluation is part of an ongoing effort to improveKuhonga’s program logi...
Appendix A: Technical ComponentsUshahidiUshahidi is an open source platform for democratizing information, increasing tran...
that we could potentially generate, and the potentially longer time frame over which Kuhongawill be operational.          ...
Brand Monitoring:Managing social media campaigns by setting up streams that search       for mentions of Kuhonga online.  ...
32
Appendix B: Full Version of Logic Models                                           33
User Reports               34
Verification and Privacy ControlsAnalytics & Research                                    35
36
Governmental Partnerships Model                                  37
Non-governmental Consulting Model                                    38
Citizen Motivational Model                             39
Media Strategy                 40
Appendix C: Endnotes and SourcesiArticle Available at (http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2011-04-11-japan-social-me...
xi The World Bank (2000)“Reforming Public Institutions and StrengtheningGovernance.”Available at (http://www1.worldbank.or...
xx Story Available at (http://allafrica.com/stories/201209080204.html)Additional SourcesAkers, R. L. (2000). Criminologica...
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Program Logic Models

  1. 1. Kuhonga Program Logic and Pre-evaluation Produced by Lewis Kirvan and Nathan WangusiContentsIntroduction .................................................................................................................................................. 2Need .............................................................................................................................................................. 3Opportunity................................................................................................................................................... 5Client-Centered Service Delivery Model ....................................................................................................... 6Program Theory and Logic ............................................................................................................................ 8 Inputs, Activities and Outputs................................................................................................................... 8 Theory of Causation ................................................................................................................................ 20Potential Benchmarks and Evaluation Metrics ........................................................................................... 24Implementation and Sequencing ................................................................................................................ 26Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 28Appendix A: Technical Components ........................................................................................................... 29 Ushahidi .................................................................................................................................................. 29 SwiftRiver ................................................................................................................................................ 30 Frontline SMS .......................................................................................................................................... 31 Database Stack ........................................................................................................................................ 31 Social Media Aggregation ....................................................................................................................... 31Appendix B: Full Version of Logic Models ................................................................................................... 33 1
  2. 2. Introduction Kuhonga is a non-profit tech start-up that incorporated in January of 2012. Theorganization is the brainchild of Nathan Wangusi an environmental engineering Ph.D. candidateat the University of Florida. Nathan is also a Kenyan expatriate. It utilizes Ushahidi’scrowdsourcing capabilities as its core engine. Two things contributed to Nathan’s founding of Kuhonga. In 2009 after living in theUnited States for several years Nathan returned to the Kenya. Nathan was forced to pay threebribes before he left the airport. Needless to say the endemic nature of the corruption in Kenyawas shocking even to one of its native sons. During the same trip Nathan also met with thefounders of a new crowd-sourcing application, Ushahidi, which had been developed for the2007 election cycle in Kenya. Ushahidi is a web and phone based application that is designed toallow real time mapping of crowd sourced data. The application has been used to improvedefficiency in emergency relief situations including the recent Japanese tsunamii and theMumbai bombing attack.ii Kuhonga’s essential insight is that data crowd-sourcing canalso be used to tackle theslow-motion crisis of endemic corruption. Social media has proven integral to revolutions in theMiddle East and social movements like the Occupy movement in the United States. Kuhongahopes to extend the success of social media by using its capabilities to tackle a different sort ofproblem. Rather than facilitating a short term social need, such as organizational support for asocial movement or a disaster response team, Kuhonga hopes that a simple and efficient meansof reporting corruption will lead to more permanent social change. 2
  3. 3. The purpose of this white-paper is to provide a description of the Kuhonga’s plannedprogram logic as onepart of a broader program of pre-evaluation process that will develop andassess Kuhonga’s program logic, theory of causality and plausibility. These considerations alongwith budget projections and strategic planning are being undertaken to aid the difficult processimplementation planning. The first two sections of this paper will briefly explore corruption inKenya as a social problem. They will also address the moment of opportunity that currentlyexists. The third and fourth sections will address Kuhonga’s proposed customer service modeland present a working model of Kuhonga’s program logic along with its theory of causality. TheFifth section discusses potential evaluation metrics for different elements. Section sixbrieflyaddresses implementation and sequencing challenges in light of our current proposed programmodel. An appendix discussing possible technical components is also included as appendix A.Most elements of Kuhonga’s technical development are already fairly well established whileothers need additional internal development, for the purposes of this paper these technicalchallenges will be largely ignored.Need Much has been written about the root causes of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. Scholarspoint to factors as diverse as the lingering effects of colonialism,iii the tropical diseaseenvironment,iv ongoing public health crises, lack of transportation infrastructure and problemswith education. Accordingly donor groups have directed funds towards remedying theseproblems. Along with direct poverty assistance, public health, transportation infrastructure andeducation spending have all been big winners in the fight for donor funds. Corruption and 3
  4. 4. governance are often addressed by non-profits but only infrequently are they addressed as aseparate social problem. Instead groups working in different sectors struggle individually todeal with the problems that corruption imposes on their organizations. Kuhonga’s guidingprinciple is that the issue of corruption is a “first problem” and that it should be addressed as aseparate social issue. We believe that before other problems can be permanently solved civilsociety needs to turn away from and extractive corrupted model and towards an inclusivepublic service model.v Corruption and bribery, because of their pervasive nature, because they underminetrust in institutions, and because they are regressive makedealing other social problemssubstantially more difficult. Although individual programs are capable of success, in anenvironment where corruption is the norm, successful programs are unlikely to thrive andspread without constant infusions of cash and personnel.The average Kenyan makes only $737dollars a year.vi Meanwhile, Transparency International has estimated that the average Kenyanpays as many as 16 bribes per month.viiKenyans report encountering bribery in more than 50%of their interactions with institutions.viii For some institutions encountering bribery is a virtualcertainty. More than 75% of Kenyan’s report encountering bribes when dealing with theimmigration department.ix Given this constant extractive demand on Kenya’s population eventhe best organized and most efficient organizations will often fail to thrive and succeed. There is renewed recognition of the role that institutions play in creating economicsuccess.x However success in achieving institutional reform has been limited. Put in the simplestterms good institutions enable private forces to succeed—while bad institutions stand in theway of their success. Historically donors such as the World Bank and the IMF have had some 4
  5. 5. success in putting good rules in place.xi However they have consistently failed to createinstitutions that effectively serve the needs of private individuals. At Kuhonga we believe thisfailure is at its base a failure to give voice to private individuals—it is a failure to create ademocratic decision-making structure. In Kenya repeated failures to improve institutions hasfrequently resulted in a larger and more corrupt public sector. Thepublic sector utilizes itscentralized lines of authority in order to maintain power through corruption and patronagewhile ignoring the needs of the majority of citizens. But, before these institutions can besuccessfully reformed there must be a mechanism to expose corruption and to give voice toindividuals. Exposing and interrupting the problems of corruption in a way that changesbehavior is an incredibly difficult task. At Kuhonga we think that the place to start is withempowering citizens and decision makers to directly affect the problem themselves.Opportunity Kenyan culture recognizes that corruption is a central problem. As Eric Wainaina’s songproclaims Kenya is “NchiYaKituKidogo” (The country of the petty corruption). According toTransparency International’s 2011 East Africa Bribery index, 80% of Kenyans believe that Kenyais either extremely corrupt (40%) or corrupt (40%). Some sectors require bribes in as many as50% of all their interactions with citizens yet only 7% of bribes are reported to any official.Perhaps most disturbing is Kenyan’s belief that reporting bribes will be pointless. 40% of thosewho don’t report bribes identified a belief that reporting bribes will not result in any actionbeing taken as there principle reason for failing to report bribery incidents.xii 5
  6. 6. At Kuhonga we believe that technological change offers a great opportunity to cutthrough the intractable problem of corruption. New technologies have been instrumental inorganizing and providing momentum for recent social movements. The Arab Spring andsubsequent uprisings, which began as a response to endemic corruption amongst police officersin Tunisia, xiii provide a paradigmatic example of how technology creates the potential forincredibly fast growth and organization of new social movements. Mobile phone penetration inKenya has reached above 75% of the population.xiv Internet penetration, including mobileinternet penetration, now reaches 44.12% of the population.xvThe percentage of Kenyan’s withinternet access has nearly doubled in a one year period as a large number of individuals havebegun to utilize internet enabled phone. This trend is very likely to continue as internet enabledphones become more widely available and more inexpensive. This rapid technological expansion and Kenyans’ widespread cultural recognition thatcorruption is a major problem represent a major opportunity for change. Kuhonga hopes totake advantage of this technological opportunity to create a private framework for corruptionreporting that is effective, transparent, safe, and trustworthy.Client-Centered Service Delivery Model We at Kuhonga believe that the non-profit sector can play a more interventionist role inthe ongoing struggle against corruption. Kuhonga’s model is not primarily that of issueadvocacy. Rather than focusing primarily on awareness or education Kuhonga’s model isfocused on delivering useful and timely data to its clients and to the public. As noted above,there is no lack of awareness of the issue of corruption in Kenya. What is lacking is a way to 6
  7. 7. collect and centralize the ongoing conversation about corruption. Kuhonga believes thatproviding a trustworthy outlet for corruption reporting could focus the large amounts offrustrated energy caused by corruption and transform itinto meaningful outputs. Figure 1captures the basic structure of our client service model in one page. The corpus of our data willcome from motivated citizens and non-governmental organizations. Our primary clientswill bemotivated citizen whistleblowers. Developing these clients is the most challengingaspect of ourproject. Our next set of clients includes various non-governmental entities, both not-for-profitand for profit. We hope to be able to provide these clients with direct anti-corruptionconsulting services and meaningful corruption marketplace reports that improve their decisionmaking capabilities. Finally our third set of potential clients includes government entities.Although government entities are to a large degree responsible for the environment ofcorruption in Kenya, the Kenyan government is not monolithic and various forces within thegovernment work to reduce corruption. In particular we may be able to provide informationand support for both the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) and the Office of PublicProsecutions. 7
  8. 8. Program Theory and Logic The following several pages present schematic representations of the variouscomponents that we think are necessary for Kuhonga to succeed. This section also presents atheory of causation and potential behavioral model for citizen reporting. The purpose of thesemodels is not to lock the program into any particular structure; rather it is a means ofexpressing the program’s theory so that we can assess the plausibility of various componentsand whether, given adequate resources, the programs logic can successfully drive change in theways that we predict. Performing a thorough assessment of program logic will also help us toidentify priorities, to develop a full plan for implementation sequencing, and to identify targetbenchmarks and evaluation metrics. This effort is part of an attempt incorporate the capabilityfor effective self-evaluation and self-improvement into Kuhonga’s organizational D.N.A. Inputs, Activities and Outputs As you can see the overall program model is not incredibly complex. The program willaggregate various existing inputs, including existing corruption reporting channels such as thenews media, and will attempt to develop and additional input: user reports. These channels ofdata will be verified for accuracy and have identity information removed. In order to protectthe privacy of citizen whistleblower, other indirectly identifying information will be removed ormasked before reports are published in any non-aggregate form. 8
  9. 9. FIG. 1 Kuhonga Logic model 9
  10. 10. Besides privacy controls for whistleblowers we will also have to develop a judgmentanalytic of some sort that protects the identity of people who ask for bribes. To preventreprisals and vigilantism the default rule will be removal of all identifying information for bothwhistleblower and briber. It may be appropriate to retain the identifying information of somebribers for inclusion in specific reports targeted to NGO’s or government anti-corruptionagencies.Kuhonga is not in any way an attempt to target the individuals who ask for bribes. Forthe most part the behavior of these individuals is the result of systemic pressure and notindividualized corruption.For some high level public officials, as well as for some who occupypositions of trust in NGO’s, it may be appropriate to turn this presumption on its head. To theextent that high level corruption incidents are reported to Kuhonga, those reports will behandled differently than low level corruption incidents. FIG. 2 Verification and Privacy Controls 10
  11. 11. The sequencing of specific privacy controls will also depend on how the programdevelops. Depending on reporting volume and data quality we may find that it is appropriate toreplace identifying information with non-identifying user tags for specific users or reports.At aminimum reports will be flagged with time, place, location, categorical sector data, transaction-type data and an intensity filter that measures the monetary amount bribes.1FIG. 3.Analytics and Meta-analysis These predicates will be used to populate a relational database2 that can bequeriedusing Swiftriver as an analytic platform. The transition from temporary crisis mappinganalytics to stable long term market monitoring might demand additional data mining tools1 A variety of other pieces of data could prove helpful. Demographic data from users that submit data could behelpful in understanding how and why people are chosen for bribes. Details such as the official rank and title ofpeople who ask for bribes could also prove useful in modeling bribing behavior.2 Not sure which RDBM software to use, there are plenty to choose from though(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_relational_database_management_systems) 11
  12. 12. that could be developed within Kuhonga or procured from third parties.3 Kuhonga may alsoneed to develop additional application programming interfaces to make the data it producesmore accessible to the variety of users that we seek to serve. Kuhonga will use these activities to produce three primary outputs. First it will serve as apublic database and research resource for those that are attempting to understand corruption.The data Kuhonga produces will be substantially different than survey data or other types ofsocial science data normally used to study corruption. Because of this it will be important forKuhonga to attempt to determine how its data equates to reality. It will be necessary todevelop accurate estimates of reporting rates, to attempt to understand the demographics ofour reporters and how those demographics affect the data that we produce. We will also makeattempts, through our an inclusive marketing approach, to ameliorate these possible flaws byallowing users to submit reports with a variety of technologies from SMS to app basedreporting. Even given these limitation the data that we collect could provide value toeconomists and other social scientists attempting to model the structure of corruptioneconomies. The second major output that may become part of Kuhonga’s operation is more akin totraditional law enforcement mechanism. Kuhonga could come to serve as a clearinghouse for abroad range of corruption acts. Given the range of activities that fall under the umbrella ofcorruption, it is probable that Kuhonga will receive large amounts of information on criminalactivity with varying degrees of potential seriousness. Kuhonga would need to develop the3 Ideally we need a data mapping tool that allows us to track incidents, relationships and properties with minimumhardcoding. This would require a flexible data platform of some type. Palanti’s Gotham platform would be a greatoption http://www.palantir.com/platforms/. 12
  13. 13. capability to sort and prioritize betweenvarious acts of corruption, to distinguish between thoseactivities that are in need of immediate action, those that may be important because they arepart of an emerging trend or development and the mass of other incidents that can be ignoredfor reporting purposes.Various reports may be relayed to official governmental anti-corruptionauthorities, or, where appropriate, to non-governmental partners.4 The third major output that Kuhonga will try to develop is the provision of specificconsulting and market reporting activities for clients. These consulting services could take avariety of forms. Traditional market analysis might play some role (i.e. some form of quarterly“corruption report”), however it seems likely that issuing more traditional sector andgeographic reports will not serve the needs of decision makers. Consultingwill need toconsist ofproviding unique tools to allow NGO’s to make better decisions and better track theirresources. Besides providing reporting and tracking, other services such as data sharing will alsobe provided.We think that the most important use for our data will come from its ability to aidin the decision making process. For this service to work we will have to provide clients with veryspecific toolboxes that will allow them to quickly find and understand useful data. Imagine a health services provider that is attempting to decide whether to investsignificant funds to develop an existing medical clinic. The health services provide might query adatabase to find any and all corruption incidents that mention the clinic. A simple query couldprovide detailed data on the level of corruption at a given clinic over time and the ability tocompare this data with data from other similar clinics.4 We haven’t yet come to an internal consensus as to what type or relationship with existing media sources weshould develop. Certainly our aggregate data will be made available to media outlets. It is less clear when, if ever,it would be appropriate to use data to tip-off the media to potential stories or even to provide background. 13
  14. 14. FIG. 4 Non-Governmental Consulting Model 14
  15. 15. Give an extremely high level of corruption the health services NGO might reconsiderinvesting its resources in this clinic and might instead choose to develop a new clinic from theground up.Or, the NGO might decide that given current levels of corruption it would be worthinvesting some amount of money in an anti-corruption program or training. In thiscircumstance Kuhonga would also allow the same NGO to more easily evaluate the success ofits anticorruption programming all at little or no cost. Development of consulting services willalso be one of the best ways for Kuhonga to get comprehensive sector data. Although our initial target would be public sector bribery, it is easy to see how ourdatabase could grow to include other sorts of important corruption information. Kuhonga’sdata might be useful in information more accurately estimating costs in other sectors wherebribery is common. If sufficient incident reports existed on two major construction firms,forinstance, knowledge of a corruption differential between these two firms could be a decidingfactor in the contracting process. This kind of increasing certainty could potentially makeinvestment easier and more certain. Increasing transparency will also begin to provide anincentive for existing NGO’s to compete for funds on the basis of their ability to avoid loss offunds to corruption, leading to a procompetitive virtuous cycle that should begin to slowly pushout firms that are unwilling or unable to reduce the funds lost to corruption. Figure 5demonstrates how data sharing will take place. 15
  16. 16. FIG. 5 Data Sharing 16
  17. 17. Besides providing direct consulting services Kuhonga could also produce moregeneralized market reports that could be used to help investors and others determine how bestto spend charitable resources. These market reports will produce additional competitivepressure on non-profit firms. Non-profits already compete for funds based on their ability toprovide a larger percentage of donations ‘to the cause’ and a smaller percentage tooverhead.xviInternational non-profits might begin to compete on their ability to avoidcorruption. This sort of competition will have a twofold effect. Firms will be able to argue boththat they are more efficient at delivering resources and also that by participating less incorruption they are contributing to other ameliorative effects that follow from a moretransparent and honest marketplace. The success of this model depends to a large degree on our ability to change thebehavior of individuals. As mentioned above this will likely be the biggest and earliest challengeKuhonga will have to surmount and it will occupy much of the initial expense and energyrequired to turn Kuhonga into afunctioning operation. In some ways Kuhonga is like othernetworks in that it can benefit from positive externalities. Kuhonga’s success is tied to its abilityto attract a network of people that use it.5 The more people that use Kuhonga the better it willoperate and the more useful it will become for each user. Kuhonga is also unique ways that make developing its network more challenging. Unlikemost other networks our model requiresanonymity. This severely limits the range of options for5 In business and economics these network externalities are often referred to as demand-side economies of scale.The essential insight is that some types of programs and business become more valuable as they grow their userbase. Phone service and the Internet are good examples. See e.g. Katz, Michael and Carl Shapiro, NetworkExternalities, Competition, and Compatibility, The American Economic Review Vol. 75. No 3 pp. 424-440. 17
  18. 18. rewards that we can give to our whistleblowers. Figure 6 presents some of the limitedmotivators that we can utilize to encourage bribery reporting. Because of these limitations wewill need to develop a proactive marketing approach to promoting Kuhonga’s use. Thisapproach will require a detailed analysis that is beyond the scope of this paper. Thefundamental approach will involve developing Kuhonga as a trustworthy and ubiquitous brandthrough a mostly traditional marketing approach. Securing an easily identifiable SMS reportingnumber will also be an important part of this strategy. Other network effects, outside of our own marketing approach, could work toKuhonga’s advantage. Kuhonga will be able to scale with the adoption of social networking inKenya. Although it will be initially important to provide access to Kuhonga’s reporting servicesvia SMS. Rapidly increasing mobile internet adoption will allow us to utilize existing socialnetworks and socially connective applications (such as twitter). Widespread adoption of thesemeans of communication will give birth to new economies and alternatives to the current top-down bureaucratic power centers that dominate Kenyan public life.xvii Kuhonga may be able topiggyback on the success of other social networks such as Twitter and Facebook by using themas both a means to reach people and a separate source of corruption data. 18
  19. 19. FIG. 6 Citizen Logic Model 19
  20. 20. Theory of Causation Besides the outputs mentioned above Kuhonga hopes that it will contribute tofundamental behavioral change. If Kuhonga can achieve widespread adoption the presence offrequent reporting may begin to directly change behavior patterns. Evidence from psychologyand criminology suggest that social learning can play a role in the development of criminalbehavioral patterns.xviii Kuhonga’s model is designed to shortcut existing environmental factorsby increasing the perceived self-efficacy of individuals, by inculcating a sense of collectiveagency and by increasing the social pressure on people that ask for bribes. These socio-culturalchanges have the potential to interrupt the current extractive and bureaucratic model of publicinstitutions in Kenya. Much has been written about extractive economic and political institutions in thecontext of African colonialism and the reproduction of these institutions in the post-colonialperiod. xix Oligarchic, extractive institutions have proven incredibly stubborn and difficult toeliminate in a top down fashion. Technocratic attempts to reform institutions in weak andextractive states have inevitably failed.6 Kuhonga is designed to interrupt extractive stateeconomies by empowering citizens. Increasing the efficacy and cohesiveness of bottom uppressure is, we think, the most effective strategy for institutional reform. The ability of coordinated action by citizens to effect radical political change is not inquestion. It is also clear that political revolutions like those that recently took place in the Mid-6 See e.g. Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, Pablo Querubin, James A. Robinson. WHEN DOES POLICY REFORMWORK? THE CASE OF CENTRAL BANK, Working Paper 14033 National Bureau of Economic Research.Available athttp://www.nber.org/papers/w14033.pdf. 20
  21. 21. East and North Africa are not ideal. Frequently bad institutions survive revolutions, resulting inthe substitution of one set of elites for another. Revolutions also unleash the potential forcatastrophic violence. We think that technological change offers a third way betweenmaintenance of the status quo and outright revolution. Changes in behavior and expectationscan begin to exert upward pressure on institutions and slowly begin to reduce their ability toself-replicate. Although this sort of change may not be sufficient to reform political institutionsit will tend to create the type of conditions that are conducive to fundamental change andreform. FIG. 8 presents this theory in graphical form. The combined force of horizontal pressure among institutions—aided by increasedtransparency and better information for decision-makers—and increased upward verticalpressure should create the potential for real change. Besides these structural changes Kuhongahas the potential reduce corruption by increasing the certainty and celerity of punishment. 7 TheKenyan Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) has its own anonymous whistleblower feature.They have implemented what is essentially an anonymous whistleblower dropbox, similar tothose in place at many large corporations. In total the EACC receives around 300 monthlyreports of which it chooses to act on less than 50%.8 Although this represents an improvementover previous anti-corruption efforts, structural limitations on the ability of most citizens toreport mean that the EACC is not likely to begin receiving significant reports anytime in the nearfuture.7 Criminal deterrence theory focuses on the certainty, severity and celerity of punishment.8 Detailed monthly reports for the EACC’s reporting and investigation activities are available at(http://www.eacc.go.ke/default.asp?pageid=95) 21
  22. 22. FIG. 8 Theory of Change Reduced power and efficacy Elected Officials for big men as their patrons Officials at the top wield massive power. They operate the become less loyal. Reduces levers of government to favor their own interests. By power of elected officials and exercising control over officials below them the top uses the big men to extract resources bottom to control state resources. Consider the $3000 using infrastructure of state parliamentary chairs made in Kenyan Prisons. power. Big Men These positions are doled out on the basis of loyalty not performance. Big Men are able to maintain power only so long as they are obedient. They frequently Reduced ability to ask for facilitate the large scale acts of corruption that make the headlines. They may for bribes redirects the instance be responsible for bidding for government contracts and then sharing pressure of bribe takers the sums paid by the government. Even They in turn depend on webs of loyal upward patrons to facilitate their continued power. They need complicity from both private and public sector little big men. Bribe Takers These underpaid low level bureaucratic operators depend on their ability to ask for and receive Upoward pressure bribes. Since they depend on those above them for their positions in the first place they are not Reduce the able to exert upward pressure on those above them to ask for improvements in work conditions. opportunity for bribe Rather they depend on their small areas of power to leverage bribes from other members of takers to ask for society. Public sector officials end up preying on the private sector rather than helping them to bribes succeed CitizenryMost Citizens face significant barriers when seeking basic services. Getting an education, seeking healthcare orstarting a business all require paying for the effects of the above system. The system is inefficient because the consumers of services do not have transparent pricing and because the costs of the government are very regressive. This increases distrust in the government and reinforces a reliance on familial or ethnic bonds. Change the behavior patterns of citizens 22
  23. 23. Kuhonga may selectively forward reports of bribery to the EACC rapid response team.The decision to forward reports will require human decision-making and investigation, howeverthere will certainly be a role for analytics to play in identifying potentially forward-able reports.Other divisions of Kenya’s government may offer similar opportunities to selectively utilizegovernment prosecution and investigation resources. The current government has made acommitment to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions9 and has recently committedto doubling its staff.xxThere may also be room to work with local governments as well as mediaoutlets in a similar vein. Although interactions with Kenyan government agencies,depending on the politicalsituation, may not be an option Kuhonga’s approach to them will be inclusive. Creating realconsequences for corrupt officials at the top and in the middle will certainly tend to reduce theincidence of corruption over time. The resolution of reported corruption incidents could also beone potential evaluation metric. Since it represents a full cycle, from report tofinalconsequence; it provides a more catholic metric of the Kuhonga’s ongoing success thanother potential measures.9 This organization is the equivalent of the DOJ criminal division in the United States. 23
  24. 24. FIG. 9 Governmental Reporting ModelPotential Benchmarks and Evaluation Metrics Having examined the Kuhonga’s program model and theory of change it is necessary tobriefly consider potential success metrics and implementation challenges in light of our currentmodel. The most obvious metric of early success will be some simple measure of reportvolume. This measure will allow us to judge the efficacy of our marketing strategy and will allowus to track our influence geographically and in different reporting medium. Along with these 24
  25. 25. considerations we will want to begin recording other qualitative measures such as thepercentage of entered reports that are subsequently verified. During the initial implementationperiod it will be necessary constantly tweak and double check our data filters to insure theirvalidity. Developing a volume of past data on the data verification rates will also be a first steptowards insuring data quality over time. As we begin to implement other facets of the program will need to develop appropriatemeasures of success. Once we begin offering consulting services we will want to find somemeasure of data utilization. Measuring the volume of database queries would give us some ideaof the overall use of our consulting services. However it seems likely that their will need to beother measures. It may be appropriate to institute client survey’s very early on in order todevelop tools with impact. Some measure of report resolution or utilization might offer a more holistic appraisal ofprogram efficacy. Creating a follow up or report back feature would allow us to measure thenumber of reports that are resolved in some manner. This feature will almost certainly becomea part of any consulting services that we offer but could also potentially be integrated into thecitizen reporting feature. Finally, over the long term, several international standard corruption indexes areproduced regularly.10 These indexes can provide a holistic measure of the Kenya’s progress over10 The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Available athttp://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/media_advisory_launch_corruption_perceptions_index_2012.Isone example.theWorldbank’s governance database, available athttp://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp, also includes useful data. 25
  26. 26. time. When Kuhonga reaches a stable level of influence it would be possible to begin toevaluate overall corruption using internal data, however this would likely take some time.Implementation and Sequencing Having fully described Kuhonga’s program structure and theory of change, it is nowpossible to begin the incredibly difficult task of organizing and planning programimplementation and sequencing. Although a full treatment of these issues is beyond the scopeof this paper it will be helpful to catalogue some of the various implementation and sequencingissues that may arise. Implementation planning is currently compounded by our lack of reliable fundingsources. Thus it seems clear that our first task (besides additional planning and development) isto find a stable source of funding. Assuming that we can surmount that particularly formidablebarrier the following few paragraphs approximate our implementation priorities. The first wave of funding should be used to perfect and test our existing technicalcomponents against the program model that we have developed to insure that the technicalcomponents are working and scalable. Fortunately all of the technical components necessary tobegin accepting reports are open source. Server space will eventually be required but is notprohibitively expensive. The most daunting aspects of this first wave of implementation is incoordinating between various developers and insuring interoperability. Fortunately Ushahidiand Swiftriver’s development teams are constantly innovating and creating new capabilitiesmany of which will be helpful to Kuhonga’s deployment. A second possible impediment may 26
  27. 27. arise when we attempt to secure a stable SMS number from the Kenyan CommunicationsCommission. Ironically it may be difficult to secure an SMS code without being forced to paysome form of bribe. However we believe that we should be able to work with Safaricom tosecure free or low cost text messaging services. It may also be possible to utilize their phonebased money transferring service M-Pesa as a means to incentivize bribery reporting.11 Once these components are in place and scalable our second priority will be to beginincreasing the volume of data that we receive. Increasing utilization of Kuhonga will requiremajor investment of time, energy and money. Developing a culturally relevant strategy thatmaximizes our reach will be Kuhonga’s biggest challenge. We already know that some means ofcommunication tend to be highly effective in the Kenyan market. If we were able to use localmusicians, a group that in Kenya is already devoted to stopping corruption, we could stretchour impact with minimum cost. Our final priority would be to secure nongovernmental partnerships. These partnershipswill provide additional data. They will also help to make us more visible and thus more likely toreceive funding. Program sustainability will be an ongoing challenge, as it is for many not-for-profit startups. Developing strong links to a variety of sectors may help us to surmount thesesorts of funding challenges by allowing us to reach out to many funding sources.11 It might be possible to create a system of incentives that does not result in large amounts of phony bribereporting. For instance using some form of lottery reward system could lead to increased utilization of Kuhonga’sservices as an interim promotion. Each verified report could become part of an anticorruption lotto, the moreverified reports you submit the greater the chance that you win the anticorruption lotto. This kind of incentivesystem could motivate people without seriously increasing the number of phony or bogus reports. 27
  28. 28. Conclusion This program description and pre-evaluation is part of an ongoing effort to improveKuhonga’s program logic and implementation strategy. The social problem that Kuhonga hopesto combat has been a persistent feature of Kenyan government institutions for many years. Thecapacity of Kuhonga to significantly impact this problem depends on a large number ofcontingencies. Despite these uncertainties mass adoption of new technologies and widespreadcultural recognition of the harms caused by bribery and corruption present an opportunity forchange and adaptation. Kuhonga’s mission is to facilitate these changes and provide ameaningful platform for citizen’s to engage with and stand up to the corruption in their midst. 28
  29. 29. Appendix A: Technical ComponentsUshahidiUshahidi is an open source platform for democratizing information, increasing transparencyand lowering the barriers for individuals to share their stories. The Ushahidi platform wasdeveloped to respond to natural disasters by allowing rapid implementation of a citizen basedreporting system. Kuhonga is a deployment of the Ushahidi platform adapted to the slowmotion disaster of government corruption and forced bribery. Our deployment of Ushahidi willallow individuals to report corruption incidents via email, through our website, through twitteror, by text message. We will also utilize the capabilities of Ushahidi’s analytic component SwiftRiver, to protect the identities of citizens who report corruption incidents. The Ushahidiplatform has been used for projects focusing on local governance, environmental monitoring,public health mapping, human rights monitoring, citizen-based election observation, nonviolentprotest, gas-price monitoring, disaster response and crisis mapping in various parts of theworld. Internet penetration via computers in Kenya is light (less than ten percent) but nearlyfifty percent of Kenyans have access to mobile phone internet access. Kuhonga will attempt todevelop this element of Ushahidi’s capability further to allow for the massive amounts of data 29
  30. 30. that we could potentially generate, and the potentially longer time frame over which Kuhongawill be operational. Figure 1. Kuhongas Beta Ushahidi Deployment.SwiftRiverKuhonga will use the superior data analytics capabilities of SwiftRiver, another free and opensource partner of Ushahidi, to verify the validity of reports and to mine data from reports.SwiftRiver enables the filtering and verification of real-time data from channels like Twitter,SMS, Email and RSS feeds. SwiftRiver is capable of filtering natural language reports to mine thedata from the various streams and make sense of it based on keywords and semantic structure.This eliminates the need to use forms or reporting codes. SwiftRiver specializes in: Gathering Intelligence from the Web: Curating real-time information on topics such as corruption and bribery 30
  31. 31. Brand Monitoring:Managing social media campaigns by setting up streams that search for mentions of Kuhonga online. Analysis and Insight:Helps discover relationships and trends in various data streams Addition of Context to Content: Adds context by auto-categorizing and flaggin data from Twitter, SMS, Email and RSS feeds Crowdsourcing and verification: Collects information from known and trusted sources through the use of simple verification algorithms.Frontline SMSFrontline SMS is a free open source data collection client which will allow us to collect SMSdata. Unlike other mobile data collection programs, which require forms, Frontline SMS acceptsnatural language input from JAVA enabled handsets. This allows bribery incidents to bereported by those with no training vastly increasing our potential to crowdsource corruptionreporting.Database StackWe will eventually need some kind of database server and software. There are a large numberof free and open source options but will most likely go with some form of LAMP stack.Social Media AggregationUshahidi allows for aggregation of existing social media. Easy cross platform integration ofexisting social media conversations increases Kuhonga’s scalability significantly. Any user ofTwitter can report directly by simply tweeting with the hashtag #kuhonga. Similar functionalityis possible with Facebook. As social media impact grows Kuhonga can grow commensuratelywith no additional inputs required. 31
  32. 32. 32
  33. 33. Appendix B: Full Version of Logic Models 33
  34. 34. User Reports 34
  35. 35. Verification and Privacy ControlsAnalytics & Research 35
  36. 36. 36
  37. 37. Governmental Partnerships Model 37
  38. 38. Non-governmental Consulting Model 38
  39. 39. Citizen Motivational Model 39
  40. 40. Media Strategy 40
  41. 41. Appendix C: Endnotes and SourcesiArticle Available at (http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2011-04-11-japan-social-media_N.htm) Last Retrieved 12/1/2012.iiArticle available at (http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/07/online-crisis-management) Last Retrieved 12/1/2012.iii Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail, Crown Publishing (2012)iv Diamnond, Jared. (2005 ed.)Guns, Germs and Steel: the Fate of Human Socieities. Norton.v We aren’t alone in thinking that institutional development is a central problem that cutsacross all sectors of a nations development. See The World Bank. (2000).“Reforming PublicInstitutions and Strengthening Governance.”Available athttp://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/Reforming.pdf.Last Retrieved 12/1/2012.vi Country Data available at (http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=kenya) LastRetrieved 12/1/2012.vii Transparency International report available at:http://www.ethicsworld.org/publicsectorgovernance/PDF%20links/KenyanSurveyAug22.pdfLast Retrieved 12/1/2012.viii Transparency International report available at:http://www.ethicsworld.org/publicsectorgovernance/PDF%20links/KenyanSurveyAug22.pdfLast Retrieved 12/1/2012.ix Transparency International report available at:http://www.ethicsworld.org/publicsectorgovernance/PDF%20links/KenyanSurveyAug22.pdf.Last Retrieved 12/1/2012.x Acemoglu, Darn and James A. Robinson.(2012).Why Nations Fail.Crown Publishing. 41
  42. 42. xi The World Bank (2000)“Reforming Public Institutions and StrengtheningGovernance.”Available at (http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/Reforming.pdf) at pagexiv. Last Retrieved 12/1/2012.xii 2011 East African Bribery Index Report Available athttp://www.tikenya.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=73&Itemid=67. LastRetrieved 12/1/2012.xiii An interactive timeline of the Arab Spring is available at(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline.)The first event in the timeline is the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in responseto corrupt police officers seizing his vegetable cart. Last Retrieved 12/1/2003.xiv Kenyan Communication Report available at:http://www.cck.go.ke/resc/downloads/SECTOR_STATISTICS_REPORT_Q2_2011-12.pdf. LastRetrieved 12/1/2012.xv Kenyan Communication Report available at:http://www.cck.go.ke/resc/downloads/SECTOR_STATISTICS_REPORT_Q2_2011-12.pdfLastRetrieved 12/1/2012.xvi See e.g. The Harvard Business Review’s online series on charitable efficiency.(http://blogs.hbr.org/pallotta/2009/06/beware-of-highly-efficient-cha.html) Last Retrieved12/1/2012.xvii Serrat, O. (2010) Social Network Analysis. Washington, DC: Asian Development Bank.Discussing how power no longer resides exclusively in states or corporations or largeinstitutions.xviii Akers, R.L.; Krohn, M.D.; Lanza-Kaduce, L.; Radosevich, M. (August 1979). Social Learning andDeviant Behavior: A Specific Test of a General Theory. American Sociological Review, 44(4),636–655xix Acemaglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. (2008).The Colonial Origins ofComparitiveDevelopment : And Empirical Investigation, American Economic Review 91:1369-1401. 42
  43. 43. xx Story Available at (http://allafrica.com/stories/201209080204.html)Additional SourcesAkers, R. L. (2000). Criminological theories. Los Angeles:Roxbury Inc.Katz, Michael and Carl Shapiro.Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, TheAmerican Economic Review Vol. 75. No 3 pp. 424-440.Patton, Michael Quinn. (1997). Utilization-Focused Evaluation.3rd Edition. Sage Publications, Inc.Rossi, Lipsey, Freeman. (2004). Evaluation: A Systematic Approach. 7th Edition. SagePublications, Inc.Witkin, Belle Ruth and James Altschuld. (1995). Planning and Conducting Needs Assessments: APractical Guide. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 43

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