Intro to CogSci: Embodiment 2

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Intro to CogSci: Embodiment 2

  1. 1. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2 grounding language in embodiment Kristína Rebrová Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  2. 2. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Contents 1 Amodal versus perceptual symbols 2 Categorization 3 Cognitive Semantics 4 (some) Empirical Evidence Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  3. 3. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Amodal Symbols ... again internal (cognitive) structure does not resemble the perceptual states from which it originates Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  4. 4. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence The mind IS embodied nature of the (human) mind is largely determined by the form of the (human) body cognition arises from bodily interactions with the world cognition shares (neural) mechanisms with perception, action and introspection cognition is embedded in its environment amodal symbols represent knowledge (descriptive knowledge) Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  5. 5. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Perceptual Symbol Systems (Barsalou,1999) Perceptual symbols resemble (are a subset of) perceptual states from which they originate Simulation a core form of computation in the brain reenactment of perceptual, motor and introspective states acquired during experience as experience occurs, the brain captures the states across modalities and integrates them with a multimodal representation stored in memory Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  6. 6. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Effect of changing the reference Transforming a word or an amodal symbol fails to produce an analogous transformation in reference, whereas transforming a perceptual simulation does. Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  7. 7. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Categorization Lakoff’s “Woman, Fire and Dangerous Things: What categories reveal about the mind.” Categorization is one of the most basic ability of living beings. Even amoeba categorizes the things into food and nonfood. Animals categorize food predators, possible mates, members of their own species, etc. Why do we need categorization? reducting complex rich sensory input generalization, prediction How do we form concepts and categories? Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  8. 8. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Categories are no closed containers classic story: defining features (individually necessary and jointly sufficient features) Boolean membership - clear-cut boundaries prototype theory: family resemblances (Wittgenstein, 1953) Fuzzy sets (Zadeh,1965): a degree of membership prototypicality: some members are more typical of a category than others Rosh(1973): Prototypes of a category are the clearest cases of category membership defined operationally by people’s judgment of goodness of membership in the category Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  9. 9. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Color categorization Eleanor Rosch: research in New Guinea Dani language, only 2 color terms Mili = dark& cool (black, green, blue) Mola = light& warm (white, red, yellow) primary colors (basic color terms of English) are psychologically real even if they can’t name them focal colors = prototypes, i.e. best examples are learned more readily mutual agreement among speakers basic level categories Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  10. 10. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Color categorization Berlin and Kay (1969): basic color terms in a language name the universal set of basic color categories there exists a smallest final set of simple words with which the speaker can name any color properties: monolexemic, general, psychologically salient, common and generally known theory supported appr. 20 years later by the results from the World Color Survey why are color categories universal? fyziology of the eye - the shape of perceptual color space(s) (Jameson a D’Andrade, 1997) properties of daylight (Yendrikhovskij, 2001; Shepard, 1992) social negotiation (Steels & Belpaeme, 2005) Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  11. 11. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Basic level categories Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  12. 12. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Basic level objects (Rosch, 1976a) categories within taxonomies of concrete objects are structured such that there is generally one level of abstraction at which the most basic category cuts can be made I saw a [mammal | dog | greyhound] sitting on the porch short words, most commonly used labels the first terms to be learned by children and first to appear in a language (sooner than sub- and superordinates) gestalt perception: the highest level at which category members have similarly perceived overall shapes motor programs: the highest level at which a person uses similar motor actions for interacting with category members. knowledge structure: the level at which most of our knowledge is organized Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  13. 13. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Cognitive Semantics e.g. Lakoff & Johnson(1980), Lakoff (1987), Langacker (1987), Lakoff and Johnson (1999), Talmy (2000), ... semantic structure is conceptual structure conceptual structure is embodied meaning representation is encyclopaedic meaning-construction is conceptualisation Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  14. 14. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Language comprehension is embodied a sentence can evoke an imagined scene and resulting inferences Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  15. 15. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Embodied inferences syntax is not independent of semantics The scientist walked into the wall. The hobo drifted into the house. The smoke drifted into the house. Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  16. 16. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Image schemas Johnson (1987), Lakoff (1987) recurring structures within our cognitive processes which establish patterns of understanding and reasoning formed from our bodily interactions, from linguistic experience, and from historical context Boundary Contact Container Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  17. 17. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999) Classical theories viewed metaphors as novel or poetic linguistic expressions outside the realm of ordinary everyday language. Metaphor has is in many cases central to understanding the meaning of many abstract concepts. Many concepts that are important to us are either abstract or not well-defined in our experience (emotions, thoughts, time, etc.) We need to mediate access to them through the concepts that we understand more clearly (spatial orientation, objects, etc.) Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  18. 18. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Affection is Warmth Subjective Judgment: Affection Sensory-Motor Domain: Temperature Example: They greeted me warmly. Primary Experience: Feeling warm while being held affectionately. Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  19. 19. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Important is Big Subjective Judgment: Importance Sensory-Motor Domain: Size Example: Tomorrow is a big day. Primary experience: As a child, important things in your environment are often big, e.g., parents, but also large things that exert a force on you Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  20. 20. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Knowing is Seeing Subjective Judgment: Knowledge Sensory-Motor Domain: Vision Example: I see what you mean. Primary Experience: Getting information through vision Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  21. 21. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Time is Motion Subjective Judgment: The passage of time Sensory-Motor Domain: Motion Example: Time flies. Primary Experience: Experiencing the passage of time as one moves or observes motion Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  22. 22. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Embodiment and Cultural variance Núñez & Sweetser (2006) speakers of Aymara face the past and have their backs to the future Nayra = past (eye, sight, or front) Q”ipa = future (behind, back) Q”ipüru = tomorrow = q”ipa + uru (some day behind one’s back) every language has a system of markers which forces the speaker to pay attention to some aspects of the information being conveyed and not others Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  23. 23. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Grounded cognition grounded = anchored in the physical world (embodied + embedded) embodied: agent has a body that provides direct sensations and allows actions embedded: situated in an environment that provides stimuli language is grounded in perception and action as well ! Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  24. 24. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Mental imagery functional-equivalence hypothesis, supported by many cognitive psychologists (Farah, Finke, Kosslyn, Shepard, Rumelhart,...) visual imagery as functionally equivalent to visual perception shared neural substrates mental rotations (e.g. Shepard, Metzler, 1971) image scaling (Kosslyn, 1975, 1976) image scanning (Kosslyn, Ball, Reiser, 1978; Pinker, 1980) Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  25. 25. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Mirror Neurons motor neurons with perceptual properties (visual, auditory) facilitate (mediate) understanding understanding of the actions “from the inside” (e.g. Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010) empathy, mind-reading (Gallese et al., 2004) originally discovered in monkeys, recently confirmed in humans Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  26. 26. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Motor Resonance partial activation of motor circuits without producing motor activity triggered by various modalities: visual, auditory, linguistic might provide us with a simulation mechanism - understanding, prediction, empathy EEG mu-rhytm dominant frequencies in the 8–13 and 15–25 Hz bands (alpha like) typical for motor rest desynchronizes/supresses not only when subject produces, but also observes action first indirect evidence of mirror neurons in humans (Cohen-Seat et al.,1954; Gastaut and Bert,1954) Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  27. 27. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Motor Resonance the more closely the observed action maps onto the observer’s own motor repertoire, the more accurate will be the observer’s prediction of the course and the result of the action conclusions (see van der Wel et al., 2011) motor preparation enhances the performance in perceptual tasks stimulus-response compatibility (facilitation of reaction on the basis of congruence with the stimulus) ideomotor action: involuntary movement that tends to arise when observing another’s performance influence of familiarity: self-actions vs. actios of others influence of proficiency: more skilled individuals - better judgement (but only for moving percepts) influence of praxis: Triton effect example Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  28. 28. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Grounding language in action: neural evidence Pulvermueler et al. (2001): hearing/reading action verbs produces somatotopic activation in the primary motor cortex EEG study, movement vs. lexical decision task kick (leg), pick (arm), lick (face) Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  29. 29. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Grounding language in action: behavioral evidence Glenberg and Kashak (2002): comprehending a sentence that implies action in one direction interferes with real action in the opposite direction John gave you a pizza. You gave a pizza to John. Also with abstract transfer sentences (Glenberg et al., 2008) Mary told you a story. You told a story to Mary. Works also with rotation movement: Zwaan and Taylor (2006) John increased the speakers volume. Mary opened a jar of pickles. Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  30. 30. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence Embodiment effects Activating elderly stereotype causes people to walk slowly and to perform lexical decision slowly (Dijksterhuis and Bargh 2001) Engaging the smiling musculature produces positive affect (Strack et al. 1988) Standing upward and stretching arms helps to gain self-confidence, watch Amy Cuddy’s Ted talk: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4386jSnFEU Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
  31. 31. Amodal versus perceptual symbols Categorization Cognitive Semantics (some) Empirical Evidence The end Thank you for your attention kristina.rebrova@gmail.com Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2

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