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Queen's Brexit Clinic 30 August presentations


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Queen's Brexit Clinic 30 August presentations

  1. 1. Professor David Phinnemore Setting the Scene @DPhinnemore
  2. 2. Article 50 Process – A Timeline2017 29 March Notification X 29 April European Council (EUCO) adopts guidelines X 22 May Council Negotiating Mandate X 19 June Negotiations start X 19-20 October EUCO – consider move to second phase 2018 October Negotiations to conclude December Withdrawal agreement signed 2019 January UK Parliament votes February European Parliament Consent March Council Decision 30 March UK Withdraws from the EU
  3. 3. Article 50 Negotiations The main purpose of the negotiations will be to ensure the UK’s orderly withdrawal so as to reduce uncertainty and, to the extent possible, minimise disruption caused by this abrupt change. To that effect, the first phase of negotiations will aim to: • provide as much clarity and legal certainty as possible to citizens, businesses, stakeholders and international partners on the immediate effects of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the Union; • settle the disentanglement of the United Kingdom from the Union and from all the rights and obligations the United Kingdom derives from commitments undertaken as a Member State. The European Council will monitor progress closely and determine when sufficient progress has been achieved to allow negotiations to proceed to the next phase.
  4. 4. 11. The Union has consistently supported the goal of peace and reconciliation enshrined in the Good Friday Agreement in all its parts, and continuing to support and protect the achievements, benefits and commitments of the Peace Process will remain of paramount importance. In view of the unique circumstances on the island of Ireland, flexible and imaginative solutions will be required, including with the aim of avoiding a hard border, while respecting the integrity of the Union legal order. In this context, the Union should also recognise existing bilateral agreements and arrangements between the United Kingdom and Ireland which are compatible with EU law. European Council, Guidelines following the United Kingdom's Notification under Article 50 TEU, Brussels, 29 April 2017 European Council Guidelines for Negotiations: Northern Ireland and Ireland
  5. 5. Council Negotiation Directives: Northern Ireland and Ireland 14. In line with the European Council guidelines, the Union is committed to continuing to support peace, stability and reconciliation on the island of Ireland. Nothing in the Agreement should undermine the objectives and commitments set out in the Good Friday Agreement in all its parts and its related implementing agreements; the unique circumstances and challenges on the island of Ireland will require flexible and imaginative solutions. Negotiations should in particular aim to avoid the creation of a hard border on the island of Ireland, while respecting the integrity of the Union legal order. Full account should be taken of the fact that Irish citizens residing in Northern Ireland will continue to enjoy rights as EU citizens. Existing bilateral agreements and arrangements between Ireland and the United Kingdom, such as the Common Travel Area, which are in conformity with EU law, should be recognised. The Agreement should also address issues arising from Ireland’s unique geographic situation, including transit of goods (to and from Ireland via the United Kingdom). These issues will be addressed in line with the approach established by the European Council guidelines. Council of the European Union, Directives for the negotiation of an agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union, Brussels, 22 May 2017
  6. 6. UK Government Position Paper (August 2017) Areas • Upholding the Belfast (‘Good Friday’) Agreement in all its parts • Maintaining the Common Travel Area and associated rights • Avoiding a hard border for the movement of goods • Aiming to preserve North-South and East- West cooperation, including on energy Proposals • New UK-EU customs partnership • Customs exemption for smaller traders (<250 employees) (80% trade) • Continued peace funding • Continued operation of Single Electricity Market
  7. 7. Professor Lee McGowan Views from the EU @leemcgowan3
  8. 8. EU Reaction to Position Paper (August 2017) European Commission ‘Magical Thinking’ UK needs to make political commitment ‘where the UK accepts responsibility for the consequences its decision to leave will have on the island of Ireland.’ “The decision to leave was the UK’s decision, not the decision of Ireland and not the decision of the EU, and the UK has to take responsibility for that,” the official said in Brussels. European Parliament "To be in and out of the Customs Union & "invisible borders" is a fantasy. First need to secure citizens’ rights & a financial settlement (Verhofstadt)
  9. 9. Reaction from Member States (August 2017) ‘Making it up as they go along’ ‘Farcical’ ‘A disgrace’ View of German politicians on UK Treasury’s response to Brexit Juncker – none of the papers presented so far are ‘satisfactory’ Barnier – ‘start negotiating seriously’ Ireland ‘Ireland will not be used as a pawn in any bigger negotiations between the UK and Europe ….we will be stubborn in defending Ireland’s interests’ (Coveney) “Brexit is England’s biggest policy blunder since George III fumbled away the American colonies,” Daniel McFadden, Nobel Prize Winner stated at meeting with senior Germany officials last week
  10. 10. Dr Katy Hayward Implications for the Border @Hayward_Katy
  11. 11. 1998 Agreement Clearer • Particular themes • the constitutional context and framework for North-South and East-West cooperation; • the border; • citizenship rights; • the importance of economic prosperity to sustaining peace process. • Irish citizenship • “Irish citizenship also confers EU citizenship, with all the rights that go with this. ” • Continuation of PEACE IV • Potential future programme post- 2020, protecting position of SEUPB Still unclear • Particular arrangements for “close engagement” throughout negotiations and afterwards • ‘In all its parts’.. • What potential for new or enhanced N/S, E/W bodies, or new scope for devolved matters (NB tension with EU withdrawal bill) • Whether willing to use this as a basis for new relationships and structures • Citizenship • How rights of Irish citizens as EU citizens will be upheld (role for Irish state) • Funding • How will PEACE V relate to the EU? • Enforceability
  12. 12. Common Travel Area Clearer • British-Irish cooperation • “Continuing joint programme of work on CTA external border” • Inc. data sharing, investment in border procedures • No passport checks at land border • “CTA can continue to operate as it does, no restrictions on Ireland’s obligations to EEA nationals” • It is not about right of entry but right to work/benefits • “Controlling access to the labour market and social security have long formed an integral part of the UK’s immigration system.” Still unclear • Security • How will link into EU security measures/cooperation • Rights • What rights for family members • What rights for non-Irish and non-British residents in NI, or cross-border workers • Plan for full legal framework for the CTA and rights of Irish citizens as necessary • Checks • What ‘point of contact’ controls may look like
  13. 13. The Border Clearer • Territorial differentiation • “the UK and the EU should consider this in a flexible way rather than one that assumes a uniform approach” • BUT no new customs barriers within the UK • Cross-border trade exemptions in island context • For small traders • Waivers from security and safety declarations • No requirement for product standards checks or intellectual property rights checks at the border • UK-wide approach • Membership of Common Transit Convention • Continued waiver from the requirement to submit entry and exit summary declarations for goods being moved between the UK and the EU • Mutual recognition of Authorised Economic Operators • Integrated nature of agri-food industry • An ‘agreed reciprocal solution’ for sanitary- phytosanitary checks. • “the island of Ireland to be treated in policy and operational terms as a single epidemiological unit” Still unclear • What type of differential arrangements sought from EU? Willing to allow differentiation within the UK? • Sectoral differences • How citizens and consumers in UK will be protected from effects of smuggling • How regulatory equivalence to be maintained and enforced • Institutional management of the single unit for animal health and welfare • Specific technological tools to be applied, costs of compliance
  14. 14. Customs: the two ‘proposals’ • “A highly streamlined customs arrangement between the UK and the EU, streamlining and simplifying requirements, leaving as few additional requirements on UK-EU trade as possible.” • This would require: • Regulatory equivalence (monitoring and enforcement) • Coordination of customs procedures • Ensuring matching of systems of customs declarations and administration • Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement • “A new customs partnership with the EU, aligning our approach to the customs border in a way that removes the need for a UK-EU customs border” • This would require: • [UK membership of the Single Market] • UK accepting terms of EU Free Trade deals with third countries • An agreed arbitrator • Need to prevent goods that meet UK but not EU standards from finding their way into the EU market
  15. 15. Dr Viviane Gravey @VGravey
  16. 16. QPOL Brexit Clinic “Some Dismal Science” Dr Graham Browlow @GrahamBrownlow
  17. 17. Kinsella’s (2017) “weasel phrase translation rubric” regarding the NI and Ireland position paper.
  18. 18. “Gains” “Losses” Less regulation Possible tariffs on exports to the EU Savings on EU contributions Loss of access to the single market Ability to strike new trade deals Damage to the City of London Skills-based migration policy Drop in investment caused by uncertainty Table 1: Predicted sources of possible gains and losses from Brexit (UK level) (source: Woodford, 2016)
  19. 19. Some unpleasant Brexit arithmetic • EU membership and the UK’s supply-side “tug of war” (1972-2019) (Crafts 2012; 2016). NI? • Official documents (what’s not stressed in them in them) Future Customs arrangements (p.4 apart, EU membership & productivity?) Northern Ireland and Ireland ( a lot of detail, but feasibility?) • Eichengreen (2017) Brexit and potential UK slowdown 1. Sterling depreciation led consumers to bring forward spending to avoid higher import prices; 2. But while consumers spent first half 2016, now with additional debt consumer spending will not continue to grow; 3. Inflationary pressures will force up interest rates.
  20. 20. State of play August 2017 and clues on the future • Clues from the LSE/Centre for Cities July 2017 (NI not included because of data gaps). Covers 62 Primary Urban Areas (PUAs) in GB (see Dhingara et. Al, 2017). • On average economic output of the GB cities/PUAs (as measured by GVA) compared to if UK remained in the UK: ‘Hard Brexit’ (UK-EU trade under WTO rules) 2.3 per cent lower in cities (2.0 in non urban LAs ) ‘Soft Brexit’ (UK-EU form a free trade area zero tariffs) 1.2 per cent lower (1.1 in non urban LAs ) • Extending to NI: Budd (2015) 3 per cent figure plausible, Border trade costs? Agrifood? Multiplier? Greater Belfast vs rest? Dynamic?)
  21. 21. Some tentative findings • So regarding “gains” • Little evidence deregulation & trade deals will easily occur • EU contributions may end but compensation will not • Migration still an issue • Regarding “losses” • Investment? Trade deals, City? Single market? • Regardless of balance between “gains “ and “losses” probability of losses appear more certain. • Policy bit • Brexit needs to be supplemented with ‘horizontal’ industrial policy (Pryce, 2012; Moretti, 2012).
  22. 22. CROSSCUTTINGTHEMES (Equality,balancedsub-regionalgrowth,sustainabledevelopment) WEALTH AND EMPLOYMENT CREATION EXPORT-LED ECONOMIC GROWTH IMPROVING EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES & EMPLOYABILITY (e.g. promoting employment and labour market participation and addressing wider barriers to employment, particularly those facing the inactive) PROMOTING EMPLOYMENT (e.g. protecting sustainable jobs in the aftermath of the recession, and promoting investment offering accessible job opportunities in areas of disadvantage) INCREASED PRIVATE SECTOR PRODUCTIVITY COMPETING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (e.g. attracting FDI, growing / diversifying exports) ENCOURAGING BUSINESS GROWTH (e.g. entrepreneurship, rural economy, social economy, green economy, access to finance, planning) STIMULATING INNOVATION, R&D AND CREATIVITY (e.g. R&D and absorptive capacity, wider innovation, business to business / HE / FE collaboration) IMPROVING EMPLOYABILITY AND THE LEVEL, RELEVANCE AND USE OF SKILLS (e.g. Improving relevance / quality of education / training, increasing skill levels and tackling barriers to employability ) DEVELOPING ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE (e.g. transport links, energy, telecoms, tourism product, water & sewage) Short, Medium and Longer Term Rebalancing Themes Short to Medium Term Rebuilding Themes INCREASED EMPLOYMENT IN EXPORT FOCUSSED SECTORS Strategic Aim BUILDING ECONOMIC & LABOUR MARKET STABILITY Providing stable economic base for …