Online Franchise Capturing Using IPv6 through Automated Teller Machines


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Slides used by Kausal for their presentation in ICRTIT 2013, MIT, Chennai.

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Online Franchise Capturing Using IPv6 through Automated Teller Machines

  1. 1.  Introduction  Existing Systems  Failures encountered  ProposedVote Capturing Model  Phases in the Proposed System  Remedies to Failures  Implementation
  2. 2.  Automated Teller Machine is currently operating in the private network of the financial intuitions for instant cash withdrawal. These systems have been given the secure way of authentication by providing a Personal Identification Number (PIN).  As all these transactions are now occurring in a private network, it is possible to state it as the one of the most secure transactions that could happen through the NFS.  The idea is to capture all the voting transactions through ATM terminals, reducing the load at the bank servers and routing overhead for NFS by exploiting the use of public network
  3. 3.  Gujarat e-voting system:  The main advantages rests in the fact of non-traceability of the votes and voters authenticity well established and minimized cost to conduct an election.  The main drawback that this system encounters is the non-availability of personal computers/laptop by any individual necessitates the set up of an e-pooling booth which might not reduce the cost of conducting an election in big deal.  Also the assumption of existence of internet connection by any individual in the home draws the crowd towards the e-voting booth.
  4. 4.  Exploiting the lack of cryptography.  Casting multiple votes, accessing administrator and poll worker functionality.  Tampering with the system configuration and tampering with ballot definitions.  Impersonating legitimate voting terminals, tampering with election results.  Linking voters with their votes and attacking the start of an election.  Accessing Poll Administrator Functionalities.
  5. 5. Figure 1: Architecture of Proposed System  Digital Certificates are mutually exchanged. Provided with Secret Code and asked to enter Voter Identification Number.
  6. 6.  Initial Handshake and Session Validation – First Phase of Voting Transaction S Figure 2: Initial Handshake between ATM Terminal and Bank Server
  7. 7.  Session Transfer Phase – Field Containing ATM_ID, Time Stamp, Digital Certificate of the Bank – Verification and Validation Figure 3: Session Transfer Message
  8. 8.  Voting Transaction Session: Session Termination and Smooth Handover Figure 4: Voting Transaction Session
  9. 9.  Complete Authentication and Confidentiality ensured with achieving Non- Traceability of the vote cast. Ballot Definition Tampering Impossible.  One Time Set-Up, thus minimizing cost to the Government.  Instant availability of results and biometric authentication is achieved.  Multiple Vote Cast becomes impossible with possibility of Reverse Secret Code.  Reduced Number of Transactions.
  10. 10.  Exposed Web Services: Bank Server and Election Authority Server – Implemented in RESTful Web Services. Figure 5: Exposed Web Services
  11. 11.  E-voting Flow – Reduced Number of Transactions. Figure 6: Implemented Functional Flow
  12. 12.  This model proposed helps in achieving the authenticity, non- traceability of vote cast and security with confidentiality also being enforced. Security models such as the voter-verified audit trail allowed for voting systems that produce a paper trail that can be seen and verified by a voter could be a future work.  In such a system, the correctness burden on the voting terminal’s code is significantly less as voters can see and verify a physical object that describes their vote and are allowed to vote in terminal only after their identity is proved.
  13. 13. 1. K. Malladi, S. Sridharan, “Contemplate for Online Plebiscite Capturing Using ATM Terminals,” in International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering, vol. 3, issue 4, pp. 540-544, April 2013. 2. A. D. Rubin, “Security considerations for remote electronic voting,” Communications of the ACM, 45(12):39–44, Dec. 2002. 3. Voting, “Gujarat online voting model system”. Available: 4. Voting, “What Is; What Could Be,” July 2001. Available: