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  • Somalis have been given automatic refugee status in Yemen since 1991. 170,000 are officially registered as refugees, while the Yemeni government estimates the true figure could be as many as one million. However fluctuations in the numbers travelling suggest that Yemen is the middle link in a chain, and the destination country is very important: numbers leaving Somalia decreased dramatically when in 2009 the Saudis closed the border and the new president in Puntland promised to crack down on the trade. In spring 2010 the Saudi border reopened and numbers began to rise again. The route has also changed, with refugees making the crossing to Yemen from Djibouti – a much shorter, safer route. The proportion of Ethiopians is rising, now estimated to be ¾ of those making the crossing. The majority of Ethiopians are smuggled straight to Saudi Arabia. With sea passage costing around $150 and crossing the Saudi border costing around $150, this migration economy could be worth $20m a year, encompassing 5 countries.
  • Master Presentation

    1. 1. SOMALI PIRACY(updated November 2012)Prepared by:Dr. Alec Coutroubis &George Kiourktsoglou, PhD Candidate
    2. 2. ... So, what does it take for Piracy to go “Critical” ?1. User-Friendly Geography and2. Lack of a robust Central Government and3. Lawlessness, (Somalia is the “Wild-Wild- West” of East Africa...) and the Most Important Ingredient ...4. Continuous Traffic of Commercial Vessels !
    3. 3. … So, why do we care about Somali Piracy ?• It’ s a Crime, “Hostis Humani Generis” ;• It’ s an Expensive Crime (annual costs of $7 - $12bil., projected to reach $15bil. by 2015) ; And the Most Important...• It ravages (and sometimes claims) human lives (7 dead and 34 injured in the first quarter of 2011, excluding Pirates…) ;
    4. 4. The “Theater of Action”
    5. 5. Global Maritime Trade“Cinderella of the East” and lately the “Pirate Alley”…
    6. 6. Area of Interest (broader view)
    7. 7. Indian Ocean: Area of Interest>50% of the globalcontainer traffic>70% of the globalpetroleum trafficGulfs of Aden andOman, (annually):>21.000 – 23.000ships 2,200 Nautical Miles>11% of global crudeoil traffic and 33% ofEurope’s Oil Supplies>$1 Trillion worth ofTrade1,800 Nautical Miles
    8. 8. The Scale of the Problem Latitude: 12°S Longitude: 70 78°E
    9. 9. N M m i l. N M . sq The “Tyranny of Distance”: 2,6 2.00083 Helicopter equipped vessels are needed to provide effective 1 hour response in the area.
    10. 10. Shipping Patterns, I < 200 N.M. from India Latitude: 12°S Longitude: 70 78°E
    11. 11. Shipping Patterns, II Latitude: 12°S Longitude: 70 78°E
    12. 12. Somalia:a failed State but not a failed Society
    13. 13. A Friend’ s description of Somalia:• Where God has long ago turned a Blind Eye…• Where Evil reigns Unchallenged… and• Life at Night buys less than a Bullet !
    14. 14. Somalia Surface Area: 637.657 (almost half the size of France) ; Coastline: 2.896 Km. ; Population (2007, U.N.): 8.699.000 ; Ave. L.E. (2007, U.N.):Source: Central Intelligence Agency, C.I.A. Women: 49,4 yearshttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_so.html, [Accessed 24 February 2010] Men: 46,9 years ;
    15. 15. Somalia Surface Area: 637.657 (almost half the size of France) ; Coastline: 2.896 Km. ; Population (2007, U.N.): 8.699.000 ; Ave. L.E. (2007, U.N.): Women: 49,4 years Men: 46,9 years ;
    16. 16. Failed States Index 2010, ISource: The Fund For Peace, http://www.fundforpeace.org , [Accessed 24 May 2011]
    17. 17. Failed States Index 2010, II Source: The Fund For Peace, http://www.fundforpeace.org , [Accessed 24 May 2011]
    18. 18. Food Security Risk IndexSource: Maplecroft, http://maplecroft.com/about/news/food_security.html , [Accessed December 2011]
    19. 19. Terrorism’s Risk Index MapSource: Maplecroft, http://maplecroft.com/about/news/terrorism_index_2011.html, [Accessed August 2011]
    20. 20. The Map of Drought The Map of Famine
    21. 21. The Map of Famine
    22. 22. The Map of Drought
    23. 23. Ground Facts:1. Largest Number of Refugees after Afghanistan and Iraq (614.000 by the end of August 2010) ;2. Every day more than 1.350.000 Somalis depend on World Food Programs to feed ;3. Highest Child-Malnutrition Rate in the World: 1 out of every 5 children is malnourished (a total of 240.000) ;
    24. 24. The Face of Destitution
    25. 25. G.N.I. per Capita10.000 9.000 8.000 7.000 6.000 5.000 4.000 3.000 2.000 1.000 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Per capita GNI at current prices - US dollars / Somalia Per capita GNI at current prices - US dollars / World U.N. POVERTY CUT OFF LINE Source: U.N. Data, http://data.un.org/Browse.aspx?d=WorldStat , [Accessed 24 February 2010]
    26. 26. Gross Value Added3.0002.5002.0001.5001.000 60% 500 0 1991 1994 1997 1998 2001 2004 2007 2008 1990 1992 1993 1995 1996 1999 2000 2002 2003 2005 2006 Gross Value Added by Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing at current prices - mil. US dollars Total Gross Value Added at current prices - mil. US dollars Source: U.N. Data, http://data.un.org/Browse.aspx?d=WorldStat , [Accessed 24 February 2010]
    27. 27. The Yemen – Somalia “Trade”, IArms Migrants Source: Central Intelligence Agency, C.I.A. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_so.html, [Accessed 30 November 2010]
    28. 28. The Yemen – Somalia “Trade”, II1. Somalis have been given automatic refugee status in Yemen since 1991 ;2. 170,000 officially registered Somalis as refugees, (estimates of one Million) ;3. With sea passage costing around $150 and crossing the Saudi border costing another $150, this migration economy could be worth $20m a year, encompassing 5 countries ;
    29. 29. The Yemen – Somalia “Trade”, III1. The proportion of Ethiopians is rising, now estimated to be ¾ of those making the crossing ;2. With sea passage costing around $150 and crossing the Saudi border costing around $150, this migration economy could be worth $20m a year, encompassing 5 countries ;
    30. 30. Smuggling RoutesSource: Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Challenges, Stimson, April 2012
    31. 31. Maritime Trafficking, ISource: Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Challenges, Stimson, April 2012
    32. 32. Triggers of global supply chain disruptionsSource: New Models for Addressing Supply Chain & Transport Risks, Stimson, World Economic Forum 2012
    33. 33. Maritime Trafficking, IISource: Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Challenges, Stimson, April 2012
    34. 34. The “Nature” of Somali Piracy
    35. 35. Number of Attacks off Somalia250 ATTACKS AGAINST ALL TYPES OF VESSELS200 HIJACKS / RATES OF SUCCESS150 ATTACKS AGAINST FISHING TRAWLERS100 50 In 2011: Two Attacks every Three Days… 42 / 38% 47 / 22% 49 / 22% 25 / 14% 11 / 21% 0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Source: Compilation based on I.M.O. & I.M.B. annual Reports
    36. 36. Number of Attacks & Hijacks off Somalia In 2011: Two Attacks every Three Days… Source: Compilation based on I.M.O. & I.M.B. annual Reports
    37. 37. Number of Ships held Source: EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta
    38. 38. Age Profile of Attacked / Pirated Vessels AVERAGE AGE OF ATTACKED & PIRATED VESSELS AGE PROFILE OF ATTACKED VESSELS (2007 - June 2010) 25,0 0,35 21,0 20,0 0,30 % of International Fleet 17,9 18,0 17,1 0,25 Relative FrequencyAGE (in years) 15,0 13,3 13,5 13,4 12,7 0,20 StatTools Student Version 10,0 0,15 For Academic Use Only 0,10 5,0 0,05 0,0 0,00 0 5 10 15 20 30 35 50 25 40 45 2007 2008 2009 2010 Age of Attacked Vessel (Years) AVERAGE AGE OF ATTACKED VESSELS AVERAGE AGE OF PIRATED VESSELS AGE PROFILE OF PIRATED VESSELS (2007 - June 2010) 0,20 % of International Fleet 0,15 Relative Frequency 0,10 StatTools Student Version For Academic Use Only 0,05 0,00 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 40 35 Age of Attacked Vessel (Years) Source: Compilation based on I.M.O. & I.M.B. monthly Reports
    39. 39. Vessel Types Involved in Incidents off Somalia (01/01/07-30/06/10)40% Vessel Type Age per DWT (years)35% 35.1 % 35.1 % Bulk Carriers 14.2 Tankers 10.730% Container Vessels 9.0 27% 25% Gen. Cargo 22.025% 20% % of Vessel Type within the World Fleet (2009)20% 18% 16% 15% 15%15% 13% 13% 13.6 % ATTACKED 11% 10% PIRATED10% 9.1 % 8% 6%5% 3% 0.7 %0% BULK TANKER CONTAINER G. CARGO VARIOUS CHEMICAL FISHING CARRIER VESSEL TANKER TRAWLER Source: I.M.B.
    40. 40. Evolution in Time and Space, I Source: U.S. National Geospatial Agency & MARLO
    41. 41. Evolution in Time and Space, II Source: U.S. National Geospatial Agency & MARLO
    42. 42. Geographical Evolution Source: E.U. NAVFOR
    43. 43. Geographical Evolution Source: E.U. NAVFOR
    44. 44. Geographical EvolutionMost Northern Attack:25:01N - 060:26EMost Southern Attack:21:55S – 035:36EMost Eastern Attack:09:25N – 073:02E
    45. 45. Evolution of 8 Major Registries from 2000 till 2009, (% of International Fleet in vessel units) 16% 14% Panama % of International Fleet (vessel counts) 12% Liberia St. Vincent & 10% Grenadines Marshall Islands 8% Bahamas 6% Antigua & Barbuda 4% Hong Kong Singapore 2% 0% 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport from 2000 till 2009
    46. 46. Number of Attacks (2000-9) per Flag 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Panama Liberia Hong Kong Malta Marshall Islands United Kingdom Cyprus Singapore Antigua & Barbuda BahamasSt. Vincent & Grenadines U.S.A. Italy Denmark France Turk ey China Greece Norway Netherlands Germany Bermuda Source: Compilation based on I.M.O. & I.M.B. annual Reports
    47. 47. Number of Suez Canal Passages (2000-9) per Flag 0 5.000 10.000 15.000 20.000 25.000 30.000 35.000 Panama Liberia United Kingdom Malta Germany Bahamas Hong Kong Cyprus Greece Singapore Marshall Islands Denmark Norway Italy U.S.A.Antigua and Barbuda Netherlands China Turkey France Grenadines Source: Canal Suez Authority, Annual Reports from 2000 till 2009
    48. 48. Remember the Golden Rule of Statistical Analysis:Correlation does not mean Causation
    49. 49. The D.N.A. of The D.N.A. of (Linear)Randomness (statistical Correlation (statistical footprint) footprint) 80 70 60 50 40 StatTools Student Version Fit For Academic Use Only 30 y 20 li p irac a 10 Som 0 0 20 40 60 80 100
    50. 50. The D.N.A. of Somali Piracy (statistical footprint) 80 70 60 50 40 StatTools Student Version Fit For Academic Use Only 30 20 10 0 0 20 40 60 80 100
    51. 51. Flag’s Probability (Risk) of Attack High Risk Group, Av. Pr. Of Attack = 0,70%1.00%0.90%0.80%0.70% Low Risk Group, Av. Pr. Of Attack = 0,37%0.60%0.50%0.40%0.30%0.20%0.10%0.00% s ly ey De ria us s k . lI y m a Ba es a ay ce No e ta as a Ba ng G land A nd H b ud in n ec ar m Ita Ne gdo in rk pr al an S. m rw in arsh ma be o Ch re la na ite nm M ad K U. ha Tu Cy Fr s Li r er G er in Pa g tig ren th K on G al & d ua & Un M nt ce An .V StSource: A. Coutroubis, G. Kiourktsoglou Paper: “Somali Piracy vs Flag of Attacked Vessel”, Jan. 2010 (updated in Feb.2012)
    52. 52. The “Panama Effect” 2007 2008 2009 COUNTRY ORTERRITORY NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER OF OF OF OF DOMICILE VESSELS % VESSELS % VESSELS %JAPAN 2.082 51,6 2.236 54,5 2.292 53,3CHINA 460 7,2 501 9,0 558 9,5GREECE 546 10,2 511 8,8 503 8,1KOREA 297 7,3 302 7,3 324 8,0TAIWAN 306 4,7 296 4,5 332 5,3GERMANY 34 2,4 39 2,2 95 3,1HONG KONG 159 4,9 137 2,9 127 2,0SWITZERLAND 234 4,3 32 0,3 32 0,3 SUM 3.122 71,4 3.287 74,5 3.448 74,0 Countries with Naval presence around the Horn of Africa Source: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport from 2007-09
    53. 53. ….. and the “Liberia Effect” 2007 2008 2009 COUNTRY ORTERRITORY NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER OF OF OF OF DOMICILE VESSELS % VESSELS % VESSELS %GERMANY 659 31,1 770 32,5 857 34,0GREECE 288 19,5 360 20,2 387 19,9RUSSIA 86 7,5 90 7,1 95 6,9SAUDI ARABIA 26 6,9 24 5,6 28 6,3TAIWAN 76 6,0 84 5,8 92 6,2JAPAN 102 5,8 114 6,2 115 6,0SINGAPORE 42 5,0 39 4,0 36 3,8U.S.A. 105 3,7 122 3,8 105 3,2HONG KONG 23 1,2 59 3,4 60 3,2ITALY 19 1,2 43 2,5 48 2,5NORWAY 40 2,8 41 2,2 49 1,9U.K. 34 1,2 27 0,7 30 1,2CHINA 51 3,1 15 0,3 12 0,3 SUM 1.384 75,9 1.582 75,5 1.698 75,9 Countries with Naval pres ence around the Horn of Africa Source: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport from 2007-09
    54. 54. Piracy Tactics
    55. 55. Latest Developments in Somali Piracy’s Tactics 1. Stealth ; 2. Swarming ; 3. “Smiling” ;
    56. 56. The Human Factor (Seafarers) “Man is the Ultimate Measure of Everything”,Protagoras the Philosopher, (ca. 490 BC – 420 BC)
    57. 57. Facts I1. More than 100.000 Seafarers (at any given time) are preparing for, or transiting through, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.2. 4.185 Seafarers attacked3. 1.090 Seafarers held hostage,ig uresnever F 70% 2010Release went back to Sea after their4. 342 Seafarers used Citadels5. 516 Seafarers used as Human Shields
    58. 58. Facts II6. Approximately 3.500 People (mainly Seafarers) held hostage between 2007 and 2010;7. 62 among them… never made it back…;8. 225 Hostages at sea (as of 02/Feb/2012), Average Duration of Captivity: 8 months9. 26 Hostages ashore (as of 02/Feb/2012), Average Duration of Captivity: 10 months
    59. 59. Average Days in Captivity 800 Longest Duration of Captivity 700 • Panama-flagged MV Iceberg 1 600 • hijacked on March 29, 2010 20 10 ; e in sed stag suicide while 500 • with 24 crew members • One of the hostages committedr Ab ho o uDays e d rementally ill… hto lbecome d 400 300 ew others were said Cr e Tor tu 0 200 109 wer 100 33% 0 09 09 09 09 10 10 10 11 G ER 20 20 20 20 10 20 20 20 EB 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 R Q Q Q Q Q Q Q A IC YE V M Source: I.M.B.
    60. 60. Average Days in Captivity (Ransomed & Released Vessels) 250 200 150Days 100 50 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 (until Sept.) Source: AEGIS London, http://goo.gl/Lbpkm, [Accessed 11 November 2012]
    61. 61. Statistics1. 52% of the Seajacked Crews come from 5 Countries: Philippines, India, China, Thailand and Ukraine ;2. It seems that the presence of a Country’s Naval Forces off Somalia has no impact on the Seajacks of Crews which include any number of its Nationals ;3. Although 1 out of every 4 Seafarers victims of Somali Pirates comes from the Philippines, the Island Nation has no Naval Force off East Africa;
    62. 62. % of Nationals in Crews of Seajacked Vessels 30% INCIDENT LEVELS 2010 INTERN. LEVELS 25% 10 COUNTRIES, 70 % OF 5 COUNTRIES, 52% OF SEAJACKED POPULATION SEAJACKED COUNTRIES WITH 20% POPULATION NAVAL PRESENCE 15% 10% 5% 0% a ia a nd es a ia a e ey m a ia A. di in in ssi y nk r in an s na rk S. la en Sy In ne Ch ra Ru pp La ai U. m et Tu K do Uk Th Ro Vi ili ri In Ph ShSource: Incidents between Jan/2007 and Dec/2011, The Global Labour Market for Seafarers onboard Merchant Cargo Ships (2010)
    63. 63. Kidnap and Ransom (K & R)
    64. 64. Ransom Logistics, I
    65. 65. Ransom Logistics, II
    66. 66. Ransom Logistics, III
    67. 67. Ransom Logistics, IV
    68. 68. Ransom Logistics, V
    69. 69. Smuggling Routes Source: “Indian Ocean Rising”, Stimson 2012
    70. 70. Ransom Payments vs U.S. Aid1. 2009: $177 mil. $411 mil.2. 2010: $238 mil. (+36%) $133 mil. (-68%)3. 2011: $160 mil. (+50%) $85 mil. (-36%) One Earth Future Foundation / United States Agency for International Development
    71. 71. The Tally of Criminal Proceeds Source: Somalia Report 2011
    72. 72. Number of Ships held Source: EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta
    73. 73. Seafarers attacked in 2011, I Source: “The Human Cost of Somali Piracy 2011”, Oceans beyond Piracy 2012
    74. 74. Seafarers attacked in 2011, II Source: “The Human Cost of Somali Piracy 2011”, Oceans beyond Piracy 2012
    75. 75. Number of Hostages Source: EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta
    76. 76. Hostage Deaths in 2011Source: “The Human Cost of Somali Piracy 2011”, Oceans beyond Piracy 2012
    77. 77. The League of Crime Rates Source: "The Human Cost of Somali Piracy“, One Earth Future Foundation, 2011
    78. 78. A rather “meteoric” Growth…Source: 2007-July 2011 figures from the FCO; December 2011 figures from NATO at Northwood
    79. 79. Piracy’s Ransom and Kidnap “Poles” Country of Citizenship Seafarers PiratesBusiness Interests Source: Classified Somalia
    80. 80. Cause of Death for 111 Som. Pirates Source: “The Human Cost of Somali Piracy 2011”, Oceans beyond Piracy 2012
    81. 81. Prosecutions ISource: “The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy”, Geopolicity 2011
    82. 82. Prosecutions IISource: “The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy”, Geopolicity 2011
    83. 83. Business Model
    84. 84. … So, why do we care about Somali Piracy ?• It’ s a Crime, “Hostis Humani Generis” ;• It’ s an Expensive Crime (annual costs of $7 - $12bil., projected to reach $15bil. by 2015) ; And the Most Important...• It ravages (and sometimes claims) human lives (7 dead and 34 injured in the first quarter of 2011, excluding Pirates…) ;
    85. 85. The Fight against Piracy The Stakeholders Tactics Na s st tio re te na and In Work on l In s es te in re s stBu s Supra-National Interests Strategy
    86. 86. An Alternative View…What if, Somali Piracy is not just a Crime…?What if, it is Something More Elaborate…a (Criminal) Business maybe…?
    87. 87. Pr. Michael E. Porter• Appointee by former U.S. President Ronald Reagan to the Commission on Industrial Competitiveness• C. Roland Christensen Professor of Business Administration at the Harvard Business School
    88. 88. “The Competitive Advantage of Nations” and The “Million Dollar” Question…:“Why do some nations succeed and others fail in international competition...?”
    89. 89. Competitive vs Comparative Advantages• Competitive Advantages are developedprogressively over the Business Cycle(s) andas time goes by... ;• Comparative Advantages are naturallyendowed... ;
    90. 90. Porter’s Diamond Piracy’s DiamondContext of a Company’sCreation, Organization,Context of Somali PiracyManagement and RivalsHumanPiracy’s Resources ofKnowledge Resources “Derived” Demand for Local Demand,Physical SortsVarious & Piracy’s “Product” Market Features,Capital Prevailing Marketing Mechanism(s) Business Ecosystem Piracy’s “Satellite” Source: The Competitive Advantage of Nations Industries
    91. 91. 1. Factor Conditions or Factors of Production1.1. Human Resources: Kingpins, Investors, Negotiators, Pirates ;1.2. Knowledge Resources: Information & Intelligence on Vessels & Trade Patterns ;1.3. Physical Resources: Equipment & Paraphernalia ;1.4. Capital Resources: “Seed Capital” ;
    92. 92. 2. Demand Conditions2.1. “Derived” Demand for the “Product” of Piracy, which is...: Income for Locals and Profit for International Investors ;2.2. Mechanisms through which the “Derived” Demand reverberates... ;
    93. 93. 3. Relating and Supporting Industries “If Somalia is the so called ‘Hive’ of Piracy... then its ‘Relating and Supporting Industries’ are responsible for its ‘Business Pollination’...”3.1. Financial Industry (Banking, “Hawala” etc.) ;3.2. Industry of Legal Services ;3.3. Industry of Logistical Services ;
    94. 94. 4. Structure and “Domestic” Rivalry International Community nium om es um m n Neighboring el l a o T.F.G. Countries B tr Militias con Clans “Domestic” Rivalry:
    95. 95. Somali Piracy’s Competitive vs Comparative Advantages“Competitive” Adv. Comparative Adv.1. Unstable T.F.G ; 1. Geography ;2. Lawlessness ; v al ries Ri tic”3. Utter Povertys/ Destitution ; Do me “mil. trained personnel ;4. Quasi5. Geographical Concentration ;6. Corruption ;
    96. 96. So, what can we do in terms ofStrategy, to eradicate (over time)a Criminal Business like Piracy...? le... d higher s… nab yd’l être”, ines stio lways• Attack Piracy’s “Raison ie Que will a e Bus itimat Profit n Legwhich is...:rime C s tha Return• Attack Piracy’s “Main Driver”, whichis…: ?
    97. 97. Somali Piracy’s Competitive vs Porter: “the “Main Driver” behind every competitive Advantages Comparative business is always the same”...: Comparative Adv.“Competitive” Adv.1. Unstable T.F.G ; 1. Geography ;2. Lawlessness ; Competition... in other Words:3. Utter Poverty / Destitution ;4. Quasi mil. trained personnel ; “Domestic” Rivalries5. Geographical Concentration ;6. Corruption ;
    98. 98. To Reduce Somalia’s “Domestic” Rivalries focus on: Most Importantly though:1. a Progressive Scaling-Down of outside military Intervention… “Somalia inoculated from foreign Jihadist Movements”, (2007Do“Constructive; Disengagement” not give up Counter-Terrorism a West Point Report) Activities !2. a Gradual Promotion of Grassroots National Reconciliation ;3.1. Humanitarian Aid and 3.2. Development ;
    99. 99. A Criminal Business• 2010 Turnover: $238 mil., (projected to rise to a whopping $400 mil. by 2015) ;• Profit Margin of Pirates: 25-30% ;• Firmly Structured P&L (Profit & Loss) Statement ;• Stock Exchange (Harardere) ; Source: Geopolicity 2011
    100. 100. The Tally of Criminal Proceeds Source: Somalia Report 2011
    101. 101. The Value Chain of Somali Piracy Source: Geopolicity 2011
    102. 102. The Economics of Criminal Motivation• A Somali Pirate’s AnnualCost of $33.000 - Risk Adjusted Income: $79.000 ;• Lifetime Earnings: $168.000 - - $1.350 ; being a Pirate: $1.650 $394.000• 67 to 157 times Somalia’s Average Income ;• Next Best Alternative: $500 (Annual), $14.500 (Lifetime) ; Source: Geopolicity 2011
    103. 103. Maritime Security: a wicked problem
    104. 104. The Context of Maritime Security The Stakeholders Tactics Na s st tio re te na and In Work on l In s es te in re s stBu s Supra-National Interests Strategy
    105. 105. Types of Problems ble m atic : ro itime d t P“Simple” ProblemsType 1: Is Mar Wicke 1s enjoy a consensus a rity m…? bothecu otheir definitions & on ble solutions; S Pr Example : A machine breaks down…Type 2: “Complex” Problems introduce conflict to the problem-solving process; Example : Best Way to Improve Student learning…Type 3: “Wicked” Problems engender a high level of conflict among the stakeholders. No agreement on the problem or its solution; Example : Rural community facing water shortages, unemployment and unaffordable housing. Influx of wealthy people who are buying up avail. land... Source: “Coping with Wicked Problems: the Case of Afghanistan”, Nancy Roberts
    106. 106. Distinguishing Properties of Wicked Problems, I1. There is NO Definitive Formulation of a wicked problem; Example : What is the definition of the problem of Somali piracy ?2. Wicked problems have NO Stopping Rule; Example : When can one claim a FINAL solution to Somali piracy ?3. Solutions are NOT True-or-False, but Good- or-Bad; Example : Are there any conventionalized criteria for a True or False solution to the problem of Somali piracy ? Source: “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”, Horst W.J. Rittel, Mervin M. Weber
    107. 107. Distinguishing Properties of Wicked Problems, II4. No Immediate & No Ultimate Test of a Solution to a wicked problem; Example : Any solution to Somali piracy generates long term consequences ;5. Every solution is a “One-Shot Operation”; Example : Any solution to Somali piracy is consequential. Every Trial counts!6. No Enumerable Set of Pot. Solutions, Nor a Well-Described Set of Permissible Ops; Example : Any good idea for an anti-piracy measure may be a candidate ; Source: “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”, Horst W.J. Rittel, Mervin M. Weber
    108. 108. Distinguishing Properties of Wicked Problems, III7. Every wicked problem is essentially Unique; Example : Somali piracy bears similarities with Nigerian piracy. Then again, each one is unique ;8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a Symptom of another Problem; Example : What is the Proximate Cause of Somali piracy…? Source: “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”, Horst W.J. Rittel, Mervin M. Weber
    109. 109. Distinguishing Properties of Wicked Problems, IV9. The Existence of a “Discrepancy” representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. The choice of Explanation determines the nature of the problem’s resolution; Example : The choice of explanation (of Somali piracy) is arbitrary in the logical sense. Stakeholders chose explanations most plausible to them ;10. The planner has NO Right to be Wrong; Example : Stakeholders are liable for the consequences of their actions ; Source: “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning”, Horst W.J. Rittel, Mervin M. Weber
    110. 110. Copying Strategies em : atic lem bl ob Pro ked Pr y be nd Use Collaborative 2 Wic ecurit No the S Strategies Can aritime using Yes of M solved Power Contested ? ra tive Use Competitive abo s…? Coll egie No Strategies t Stra Yes Power Concentrated ? Use Authoritative Strategies Conflict over Problem & Solution: Type 3, Wicked ProblemConflict ? Conflict over Solution: Type 2, Complex Problem Agreement on Problem & Solution: Type1, Simple Problem Source: “Coping with Wicked Problems: the Case of Afghanistan”, Nancy Roberts
    111. 111. “Solving” the Problem using a Collaborative StrategyA. Advantages B. Disadvantages1. Share Costs; 1. Increased ot on n d Costs”; “Transaction luti tee2. Strength in numbers; So ran Gua 2. “Challenging”3. Elimination of Synergies; Redundancies; 3. Collaboration is4. Enhance Efficiency; Time-Consuming;
    112. 112. “Solving” the Problem using a Collaborative Strategy, Basic Steps I1. Set up a Strategy of Collaboration;2. Development, Validation & Implementation of a Strategic Framework of Principles and Policies;3. Seek Common Ground; avoid dwelling on Differences;
    113. 113. “Solving” the Problem using a Collaborative Strategy, Basic Steps II4. “Fail into Collaboration”;5. “Get the Whole System in the Room” and in doing so create a “Community of Interest”;6. Be open to “Self-Organization” and “Co- Evolution” in other words “Trust the Process”;
    114. 114. Response of the International Community
    115. 115. Two Distinctive Levels:1.Tactical (the “no Silver Bullet” principle) ; “Protecting a vessel from piracy is like protecting a marriage from divorce... Many “little” things need to be Done !”2. Strategic ;
    116. 116. 1. Tactics on a:1.1. Business Level ;1.2. National Level ;1.3. Supra-National Level ;
    117. 117. 1.1. Business Level1.1.1. Adopt I.M.O’s “Best Management Practices” ;1.1.2. Armed Guards (Vicarious Liability ?), “Equipping the Man” (Priv. Sec. Comp.) vs “Manning the Equipment” (Military) ;1.1.3. Take a detour, (Northern Passage, Cape of Good Hope, “Sirius Star” Nov/2008) ;
    118. 118. 1.2. National Level1.2.1. Participate in a Naval Task Force off Somalia ;1.2.2. Update Counter-Piracy Legislation (prosecution), Djibouti Code, Equipment Articles ;1.2.3. Adoption by National Flag Registries of I.M.O’s “Best Management Practices” ;
    119. 119. 1.3. Supra-National Level1.3.1. Coordinate National Counter-Piracy Efforts ;1.3.2. Address the “Prosecutorial Vacuum” (“Catch-and-Release” Policy, over 70% of the pirates captured are released within hours) ;1.3.3. Use “technically competitive” vessels for the transportation of Humanitarian Aid (U.N.) ;
    120. 120. 2. Strategy Just wait for the “Game Changer”...Ter ror ism Pi racy y Org genc . CrimIn sur e to Partially Overlap
    121. 121. Please do not Forget!This is not just a Battle Between the Shipping Community and Somalia’s Pirates...... But rather a War between the Civilized World and the Forces of Darkness (Extremists).... Thus, it will get far worse before it gets better !
    122. 122. The P&I Parameter
    123. 123. What is a Protection & Indemnity Club?• It is a Mutual Association of Shipowners and Charterers ;• It covers Liabilities, Risks and Expenses of its Members ; and• Every Club has its own Set of Rules ;
    124. 124. A typical Cover provided by a P&I Club includes…1. “Injury, Illness and Death of Seamen” ; ng? issi2. “Repatriation & Substitute Expenses” ; gm thin anyUnemployment3. “Wages & Shipwreckere Is th Indemnity” ;4. “Loss of Damage to the Effects of Seamen and Others” ;5. “Life Salvage” ;
    125. 125. Yes! One Liability and… one Condition…• Liability: “Piracy Unemployment Indemnity” (unpaid wages while in captivity) ; and• Condition: “Settlement of Liabilities” ;
    126. 126. Framing the Problem(s)… 1. Wages paid while crew in captivity ; and2. Wages paid directly to the families of the crew ;
    127. 127. “Brainstorming” potential Solution(s)…• Set up a Fund ;• Managed by the I.T.F ;• Paid Contributions by Shipowners and Charterers ;• Paid Contributions by Seafarers ;• Donations ;
    128. 128. Piracy, Insurance &Ransom Recovery
    129. 129. Piracy & Insurance, I (Vessel)• Piracy is a peril normally covered (for now at least) as a Marine Risk (Hull policies) ;• A Hijacking might also (or alternatively) constitute a Riot or a Civil Commotion (in the latter cases coverage only under War or Strikes risk policies) ;• Hijackers might be Terrorists or persons acting Maliciously ; “Maritime Fraud and Piracy”, 2nd Edition, Paul Todd
    130. 130. Piracy & Insurance, II (Cargo)• Coverage of Cargo only under an all risk cargo policy ; “Maritime Fraud and Piracy”, 2nd Edition, Paul Todd
    131. 131. Ransom recovery, (vessel with cargo)• Ransom paid by the Owner ; • If the Owner is insured, he can recover from his Insurers (Sue & Labour clause) ; • If the Owner is not insured, he can declare General Average ; • If the Owner is insured, he can potentially recover from his Insurers and declare General Average (right of Subrogation) ; “Maritime Fraud and Piracy”, 2nd Edition, Paul Todd
    132. 132. Back-Up Slides
    133. 133. Economic Impact
    134. 134. Total cost of Som. piracy 2011 Source: “The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy”, Geopolicity 2011
    135. 135. Source: “The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy”, Geopolicity 2011
    136. 136. Source: “The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy”, Geopolicity 2011
    137. 137. Naval Issues
    138. 138. The Military FactorSource: “The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy”, Geopolicity 2011
    139. 139. JAPAN P3C 250500Z – 251300Z IRTC Z FEB 400 T 250 EAS FEB BO 00Z 415 ON T2 EAS TR AN ORE O HK M T SOU CH SE ANE T JAP M FS H G ESE EM CHIN ST AL FEB 00Z T2506 WES Convoy TF 465 (EU)TF 151 (CMF) IRTC Coverage Example TF 150TF 508 (NATO) NATIONAL
    140. 140. Nato Counter-Piracy BackgroundSNMG2 Out of Area Deployment Op Allied Provider Oct – Dec 08 Dec 08 Op Atalanta (EU NAVFOR) Coalition Maritime Force SNMG1 Out of Area Deployment Op Allied Protector Mar – Aug 09 Aug 09 Op Ocean Shield 2012 Ongoing
    141. 141. OCEAN SHIELD Campaign Plan Lines of Operation Tactical End State1 Disrupt pirate operations at sea Piracy in Gulf of Aden and2 Integrate international counter-piracy efforts Somali Basin at acceptable level3 Build maritime community counter-piracy ability without NATO operations4 Develop regional counter-piracy capacity
    142. 142. Naval Costs to the International Community (rough calculation)1. 28-32 Naval Vessels off Somalia ;2. Yearly (additional) cost of a Frigate / Destroyer: $50-60 mil. ;3. Total Yearly Costs: $1,4 – 1,92 bil. ;
    143. 143. Miscellaneous
    144. 144. Alternative Routes Gulf of Aden, 11.000 NM ;From Korea via the: Cape of Good Hope, +3.300 NM (+3 1/2 Weeks) ; Northern Sea Route: -4.000 NM ;
    145. 145. Protective Measures, “Hardening the Vessel” Source: Der Spiegel, “EU To Target Pirates Up to Two Kilometers Inland”, March 2011
    146. 146. Will Oil be a Bane or a Blessing? Source: Somalia Report, http://www.somaliareport.com, [Accessed 4 February 2012]
    147. 147. Shabeel-1, Puntland’s Dharoor Val. Source: United Nations Security Council, Somalia Monitoring Group, [July 2012]

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