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Your Attention, Please: Optimizing for Humans

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Your Attention, Please: Optimizing for Humans by John Feminella

Operators of large distributed systems often try to optimize for scarce computational resources — memory, network bandwidth, and CPU cycles. However, research shows that if we want to maximize the health of our systems, there’s another scarce resource we should be prioritizing instead: the attention of our users.

In this talk, I’ll show how we can use machine learning to improve how we present data and information and tell a story to our users, optimizing for their attention and holistic understanding, instead of overwhelming them with a barrage of low-level metrics. More intriguingly, we’ll see how this approach has produced massive improvements in several real-world systems at large Fortune 100 institutions. By the end of the talk, we’ll hopefully have convinced you that happier and more informed operators isn’t merely a good outcome, but rather is the most ethical thing to do if we don’t want to lead people astray.



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Your Attention, Please: Optimizing for Humans

  1. 1. blockchains and distributed apps a detailed primer on the world’s most overhyped technology by: John Feminella at: Craft in: Budapest, Hungary on: May 10th, 2018
  2. 2. JOHN FEMINELLA Pivotal http://pivotal.io http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  3. 3. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Should I use a blockchain for my app? Probably not.
  4. 4. in the beginning http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  5. 5. http://jxf.me · @jxxf "A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer- to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers."
  6. 6. http://jxf.me · @jxxf "A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer- to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers."
  7. 7. http://jxf.me · @jxxf "A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer- to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers."
  8. 8. http://jxf.me · @jxxf "A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer- to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers."
  9. 9. http://jxf.me · @jxxf "A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer- to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers."
  10. 10. http://jxf.me · @jxxf "A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer- to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers."
  11. 11. before money http://jxf.me · @jxxf 0
  12. 12. http://jxf.me · @jxxf $
  13. 13. a transaction http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  14. 14. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice
  15. 15. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 🍰⋯
  16. 16. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 🍰? Bob
  17. 17. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 🍰? ⌚?
  18. 18. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 🍰? ⌚?
  19. 19. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 🍰? ⌚?
  20. 20. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 😃 😃 ✓
  21. 21. a failed transaction http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  22. 22. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 🍰? ⌚?
  23. 23. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 🍰? ⌚?
  24. 24. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 🍰? ⌚? ✗
  25. 25. fixing a failed transaction http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  26. 26. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 🍰? ⌚?🐌?
  27. 27. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 😃 😃😃
  28. 28. “double coincidence of wants” http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  29. 29. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 🍰?
  30. 30. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 🍰? ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
  31. 31. money http://jxf.me · @jxxf 1
  32. 32. http://jxf.me · @jxxf // money.ts class Money { amount: number currency: string }
  33. 33. what’s not money? http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  34. 34. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  35. 35. http://jxf.me · @jxxf { ? }
  36. 36. http://jxf.me · @jxxf disintermediation? fungibility? resiliency? measurable? debt instrument?
  37. 37. http://jxf.me · @jxxf disintermediation? fungibility? resiliency? measurable? debt instrument?
  38. 38. http://jxf.me · @jxxf disintermediation? fungibility? resiliency? measurable? debt instrument?
  39. 39. http://jxf.me · @jxxf disintermediation? fungibility? resiliency? measurable? debt instrument?
  40. 40. http://jxf.me · @jxxf disintermediation? fungibility? resiliency? measurable? debt instrument?
  41. 41. http://jxf.me · @jxxf poor disintermediation poor fungibility low resiliency not easily measurable not a debt instrument
  42. 42. can we do better? http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  43. 43. fiat currency advocates think so http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  44. 44. http://jxf.me · @jxxf fiat: “it shall be”
  45. 45. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  46. 46. http://jxf.me · @jxxf disintermediation! fungibility! resiliency! measurable! debt instrument!
  47. 47. transactions with money http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  48. 48. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 🍰? ⌚/$?
  49. 49. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 🍰? ⌚/$?
  50. 50. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 😃 😃 ✓
  51. 51. but money requires trust http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  52. 52. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  53. 53. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  54. 54. http://jxf.me · @jxxf ?
  55. 55. a recipe for money http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  56. 56. http://jxf.me · @jxxf trust rules history
  57. 57. making fiat currency http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  58. 58. http://jxf.me · @jxxf trust rules history
  59. 59. http://jxf.me · @jxxf trust rules history
  60. 60. http://jxf.me · @jxxf trust rules history
  61. 61. http://jxf.me · @jxxf trust rules + + history
  62. 62. http://jxf.me · @jxxf these details are abstracted from users
  63. 63. can we do better? http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  64. 64. http://jxf.me · @jxxf "A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution."
  65. 65. cryptocurrency advocates think so http://jxf.me · @jxxf 🔒
  66. 66. http://jxf.me · @jxxf trust rules history 🔒
  67. 67. http://jxf.me · @jxxf trust rules history 𝐻 𝑡 ≡ ⋯ 🔒
  68. 68. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 𝐻 𝑡 ≡ ⋯ 🔒 0101 0010 1010 1110 0110 0101 1000 0011 trust rules history
  69. 69. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 0101 0010 1010 1110 0110 0101 1000 0011 𝐻 𝑡 ≡ ⋯ 🔒 trust rules history
  70. 70. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 0101 0010 1010 1110 0110 0101 1000 0011 trust rules history + +𝐻 𝑡 ≡ ⋯ 🔒
  71. 71. http://jxf.me · @jxxf these details are abstracted from users (?) 🔒
  72. 72. http://jxf.me · @jxxf each currency’s rules and history make it unique 0101 0010 1010 1110 0110 0101 1000 0011 rules history +
  73. 73. http://jxf.me · @jxxf blockchain as history is not very interesting 0101 0010 1010 1110 0110 0101 1000 0011 rules history +
  74. 74. http://jxf.me · @jxxf rules about how things work is what’s interesting 0101 0010 1010 1110 0110 0101 1000 0011 rules history +
  75. 75. a very different kind of money http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  76. 76. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 0101 0010 1010 1110 0110 0101 1000 0011 trust rules history 𝐻 𝑡 ≡ ⋯🔒
  77. 77. a very different kind of money http://jxf.me · @jxxf is it really money at all?
  78. 78. a very different kind of money http://jxf.me · @jxxf is it really money at all? we’ll come back to this
  79. 79. let’s build a cryptocurrency http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  80. 80. http://jxf.me · @jxxf // money.ts class Money { amount: number currency: string }
  81. 81. ledgers http://jxf.me · @jxxf 2
  82. 82. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice Bob Carol
  83. 83. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C
  84. 84. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C Alice paid Carol $15
  85. 85. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C Bob paid Alice $20 Bob paid Carol $30
  86. 86. shuffling cash is cumbersome http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  87. 87. can we do better? http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  88. 88. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C
  89. 89. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C $
  90. 90. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C Ledger
  91. 91. http://jxf.me · @jxxf our ledger records our transactions Ledger
  92. 92. Ledger http://jxf.me · @jxxf our ledger doesn’t run out of room
  93. 93. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice gets $100 Bob gets $100 Carol gets $100 (...) Ledger
  94. 94. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C Alice paid Carol $15
  95. 95. http://jxf.me · @jxxf our protocol describes how we use the ledger
  96. 96. http://jxf.me · @jxxf protocol: 1. anyone can add valid lines
  97. 97. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice gets $100 Bob gets $100 Carol gets $100 Alice paid Carol $15 (...)Ledger
  98. 98. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C Alice paid Carol $15 Ledger
  99. 99. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C Bob paid Alice $20 Bob paid Carol $30
  100. 100. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice gets $100 Bob gets $100 Carol gets $100 Alice paid Carol $15 Bob paid Alice $20 Bob paid Carol $30
  101. 101. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C Bob paid Alice $20 Bob paid Carol $30 Ledger
  102. 102. what about big transactions? http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  103. 103. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C Alice paid Carol $1,500 Ledger
  104. 104. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C Ledger Alice paid Carol $1,500 overspending!
  105. 105. http://jxf.me · @jxxf protocol: 1. anyone can add valid lines 2. settle up every week
  106. 106. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C $1,500?
  107. 107. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C ¯_(ツ)_/¯
  108. 108. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C ¯_(ツ)_/¯
  109. 109. http://jxf.me · @jxxf protocol: 1. anyone can add valid lines 2. no overspending
  110. 110. ledger is now its own currency (🔒) http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  111. 111. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Ledger
  112. 112. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice gets 🔒100 Bob gets 🔒100 Carol gets 🔒100 Alice paid Carol 🔒15 Bob paid Alice 🔒20 Bob paid Carol 🔒30 (...)
  113. 113. problem: malicious actors http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  114. 114. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice gets 🔒100 Bob gets 🔒100 Carol gets 🔒100 B
  115. 115. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice gets 🔒100 Bob gets 🔒100 Carol gets 🔒100 Carol paid Bob 🔒100 B
  116. 116. problem: can’t trust the ledger forgery: actors can add lines that aren’t valid erasure: actors can remove lines that are valid http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  117. 117. how do we stop forgery? http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  118. 118. securing the ledger http://jxf.me · @jxxf 3
  119. 119. http://jxf.me · @jxxf "Digital signatures provide part of the solution."
  120. 120. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice paid Carol 🔒15 Bob paid Alice 🔒20 Bob paid Carol 🔒30
  121. 121. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice paid Carol 🔒15 Alice Bob paid Alice 🔒20 Bob Bob paid Carol 🔒30 Bob
  122. 122. physical signatures can be copied http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  123. 123. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice paid Carol 🔒15 Alice Bob paid Alice 🔒20 Bob Bob paid Carol 🔒30 Bob Alice paid Bob 🔒50 Alice B
  124. 124. let’s use digital signatures instead http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  125. 125. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(⋯) sign lines to authorize transactions verify(⋯) verify signed lines to ensure signature is valid
  126. 126. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A
  127. 127. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A public key (pk) secret key (sk)
  128. 128. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A public key (pk) secret key (sk)
  129. 129. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m,sk) sign lines to authorize transactions secret key (sk)message (m) Alice paid Carol 🔒15
  130. 130. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m,sk) sign lines to authorize transactions secret key (sk)message (m) Alice paid Carol 🔒15
  131. 131. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m,sk) sign lines to authorize transactions
  132. 132. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m,sk) sign lines to authorize transactions signature 0101 1101 1110 1010 0001 0111 [⋯] =
  133. 133. http://jxf.me · @jxxf changes in m produce unpredictable signatures sign(m’,sk) sign lines to authorize transactions signature 1010 1101 0010 0110 0111 0101 [⋯] =
  134. 134. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m,sk) sign lines to authorize transactions verify(m,s,pk) sign lines to authorize transactions = signature 0101 1101 1110 1010 0001 0111 [⋯]
  135. 135. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m,sk) sign lines to authorize transactions verify(m,s,pk) sign lines to authorize transactions = signature 0101 1101 1110 1010 0001 0111 [⋯]
  136. 136. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m,sk) sign lines to authorize transactions verify(m,s,pk) sign lines to authorize transactions = signature 0101 1101 1110 1010 0001 0111 [⋯]
  137. 137. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m,sk) sign lines to authorize transactions verify(m,s,pk) sign lines to authorize transactions = signature 0101 1101 1110 1010 0001 0111 [⋯]
  138. 138. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m,sk) sign lines to authorize transactions signature 0101 1101 1110 1010 0001 0111 [⋯] verify(m,s,pk) sign lines to authorize transactions = = validation {true, false}
  139. 139. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m,sk) sign lines to authorize transactions = signature 0101 1101 1110 1010 0001 0111 [⋯] virtually impossible very easy!
  140. 140. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m,sk) sign lines to authorize transactions = signature 0101 1101 1110 1010 0001 0111 [⋯] virtually impossible very easy!
  141. 141. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m,sk) sign lines to authorize transactions = signature 0101 1101 1110 1010 0001 0111 [⋯] computationally infeasible very easy!
  142. 142. http://jxf.me · @jxxf protocol: 1. anyone can add valid lines 2. no overspending 3. must sign lines to be valid
  143. 143. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice paid Bob 🔒50 0111⋯ B
  144. 144. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice paid Bob 🔒50 0111⋯ B
  145. 145. can no longer forge lines… http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  146. 146. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice paid Bob 🔒50 1011⋯ B
  147. 147. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice paid Bob 🔒50 1011⋯ Alice paid Bob 🔒50 1011⋯ B
  148. 148. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Alice paid Bob 🔒50 1011⋯ Alice paid Bob 🔒50 1011⋯ B
  149. 149. but can duplicate legitimate lines! http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  150. 150. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m,sk) sign lines to authorize transactions secret key (sk) 1 Alice paid Carol 🔒15 message (m) add id to message
  151. 151. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 1 Alice paid Bob 🔒50 1011⋯ 2 Alice paid Bob 🔒50 1011⋯ B
  152. 152. http://jxf.me · @jxxf B 1 Alice paid Bob 🔒50 1011⋯ 2 Alice paid Bob 🔒50 1011⋯
  153. 153. http://jxf.me · @jxxf protocol: 1. anyone can add valid lines 2. no overspending 3. must sign lines to be valid 4. lines have unique identifiers
  154. 154. problem: ledger is centralized http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  155. 155. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C Ledger
  156. 156. distributing the ledger http://jxf.me · @jxxf 4
  157. 157. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C LedgerLedgerLedger
  158. 158. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C Ledger Ledger Ledger
  159. 159. broadcast our ledger updates http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  160. 160. http://jxf.me · @jxxf A B C Ledger Ledger Ledger
  161. 161. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Ledger Ledger Ledger B
  162. 162. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Ledger Ledger Ledger 2 Bob paid Alice 🔒50 1011⋯ B
  163. 163. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Ledger Ledger 2 Bob paid Alice 🔒50 1011⋯2 Bob paid Alice 🔒50 1011⋯2 Bob paid Alice 🔒50 1011⋯ LedgerB
  164. 164. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Ledger Ledger 2 Bob paid Alice 🔒50 1011⋯ 2 Bob paid Alice 🔒50 1011⋯ 2 Bob paid Alice 🔒50 1011⋯ LedgerB
  165. 165. http://jxf.me · @jxxf protocol: 1. anyone can add valid lines 2. no overspending 3. must sign lines to be valid 4. lines have unique identifiers 5. distribute the ledger
  166. 166. problem: what order to use? http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  167. 167. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 2 Alice paid Dave 🔒30 1001⋯ 2 Alice paid Carol 🔒30 0101⋯ LedgerB
  168. 168. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 2 Alice paid Dave 🔒30 1001⋯ 2 Alice paid Carol 🔒30 0101⋯ LedgerB double spending!
  169. 169. http://jxf.me · @jxxf protocol: 1. anyone can add valid lines 2. no overspending 3. must sign lines to be valid 4. lines have unique identifiers 5. distribute the ledger (how?!)
  170. 170. trusting the ledger http://jxf.me · @jxxf 5
  171. 171. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  172. 172. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  173. 173. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  174. 174. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  175. 175. how do we know it’s valid? http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  176. 176. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  177. 177. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m ⋯)
  178. 178. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m + n) nonce
  179. 179. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m + n) 01011101101⋯nonce
  180. 180. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m + n) 01011101101⋯nonce
  181. 181. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m + n) 01011101101⋯ ~1 2nonce
  182. 182. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m + n) 00101101101⋯ ~1 4nonce
  183. 183. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m + n) 00001101101⋯ ~ 1 16nonce
  184. 184. http://jxf.me · @jxxf sign(m + n) 000000000000⋯ ~ 1 2 𝑛nonce
  185. 185. http://jxf.me · @jxxf signature
  186. 186. http://jxf.me · @jxxf signature nonce
  187. 187. http://jxf.me · @jxxf signature nonce
  188. 188. http://jxf.me · @jxxf signature nonce 175 <network> paid Dave 🔒50 1001⋯
  189. 189. http://jxf.me · @jxxf $ $$$ $$ $$$ $ $$
  190. 190. http://jxf.me · @jxxf signature nonce previous
  191. 191. http://jxf.me · @jxxf signature nonce previous signature nonce previous signature nonce previous
  192. 192. http://jxf.me · @jxxf signature nonce previous signature nonce previous signature nonce previous
  193. 193. consensus: trust longest chain http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  194. 194. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  195. 195. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  196. 196. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  197. 197. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  198. 198. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  199. 199. building with blockchains http://jxf.me · @jxxf 6
  200. 200. http://jxf.me · @jxxf Should I use a blockchain for my app? Probably not.
  201. 201. can I wait a while for consensus? http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  202. 202. is this better for me than a database? http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  203. 203. does my app need to be distributed? http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  204. 204. do I need to trust people? http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  205. 205. blockchain challenges http://jxf.me · @jxxf 7
  206. 206. a very different kind of money http://jxf.me · @jxxf is it a good kind of money?
  207. 207. cryptocurrencies aren’t currency… http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  208. 208. cryptocurrencies aren’t currency… right now http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  209. 209. http://jxf.me · @jxxfblockchain.info price graph [source]
  210. 210. http://jxf.me · @jxxfblockchain.info price graph [source] $7,000 $1,000 2014 2017
  211. 211. deflation discourages production http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  212. 212. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  213. 213. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  214. 214. http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  215. 215. http://jxf.me · @jxxf $
  216. 216. http://jxf.me · @jxxf $ $$$
  217. 217. http://jxf.me · @jxxf $ $$$ 🔒 🔒
  218. 218. http://jxf.me · @jxxf $ $$$ 🔒 🔒
  219. 219. PoW is ecologically problematic http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  220. 220. http://jxf.me · @jxxfVice Motherboard [source]
  221. 221. the future http://jxf.me · @jxxf 7
  222. 222. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 0101 0010 1010 1110 0110 0101 1000 0011 trust rules history + +𝐻 𝑡 ≡ ⋯ 🔒
  223. 223. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 0101 0010 1010 1110 0110 0101 1000 0011 trust rules history + +𝐻 𝑡 ≡ ⋯ 🔒
  224. 224. http://jxf.me · @jxxf 0101 0010 1010 1110 0110 0101 1000 0011 trust rules history + +𝐻 𝑡 ≡ ⋯ 🔒
  225. 225. takeaways blockchain applications offer trustless, permissionless rules cryptocurrency lets us trustlessly exchange value many protocols have some serious problems blockchains have enormous potential … if we get it right http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  226. 226. takeaways blockchain applications offer trustless, permissionless rules cryptocurrency lets us trustlessly exchange value many protocols have some serious problems blockchains have enormous potential … if we get it right http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  227. 227. takeaways blockchain applications offer trustless, permissionless rules cryptocurrency lets us trustlessly exchange value many protocols have some serious problems blockchains have enormous potential … if we get it right http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  228. 228. takeaways blockchain applications offer trustless, permissionless rules cryptocurrency lets us trustlessly exchange value many protocols have some serious problems blockchains have enormous potential … if we get it right http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  229. 229. Thanks! ★ questions? email: jxf@jxf.me Twitter: @jxxf http://jxf.me · @jxxf
  230. 230. 3px shadow should be visible above shadow test ⇖ bleed ⇗ bleed ⇘ bleed⇙ bleed 28: λx.t(λt).x 36: λx.t(λt).x 44: λx.t(λt).x http://jxf.me · @jxxf Sample purple text. Sample blue text. Sample green text. Sample yellow text. Sample orange text. Sample red text.

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