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Jarrod Overson
Director of Engineering at Shape Security
HOW CREDENTIAL STUFFING IS EVOLVING
And where do we go from here?
Who am I?
And should you trust me?
• Director of Engineering at Shape Security
• Google Developer Expert.
• Old school video game hacker.
• @jsoverson everywhere
Why credential stuffing is evolving
How credential stuffing has evolved
Where do we go from here?
1
2
3
Jarrod Overson
Why credential stuffing is evolving1
The same reason anything evolves. Incentive + adversity.
If there are no defenses in place, the cost is nearly zero.
valuecost
Jarrod Overson
Any defense increases the cost by forcing a generational shift.
valuecost
Generation 1
Jarrod Overson
Enough defenses will tip cost/value in your favor
valuecost
Generation 1
Generation 2
Generation 3
Jarrod Overson
The cost of entry for all technology decreases over time.
valuecost
All technology gets cheaper as it becomes better understood and more generalized.
Jarrod Overson
While the value of successful attacks only goes up.
valuecost
Jarrod Overson
CREDENTIAL STUFFING: A HOW-TO GUIDE
1 Get Credentials
2 Automate Login
3
4
Defeat Existing Defenses
Distribute Globally
1. Get Credentials
CREDENTIAL
STUFFING
1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login
CREDENTIAL
STUFFING
1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login
CREDENTIAL
STUFFING
1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login
3. Defeat Defenses
CREDENTIAL
STUFFING
1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login
3. Defeat Defenses
CREDENTIAL
STUFFING
1. Get Credentials
2. Automate Login
3. Defeat Defenses
4. Distribute
CREDENTIAL
STUFFING
$0
2.3 billion credentials
$0-50
For tool configuration
$0-139
For 100,000 solved
CAPTCHAs
$0-10
For 1,000 global IPs
100,000 ATO attempts can be tried for less than $200 USD
<$0.002
per ATO attempt.
Jarrod Overson
$2 - $150+
Typical range of account values.
The rate of return is between 100% and 150,000%+
0.2% - 2%
Success rate of a typical credential
stuffing attack.
$0.002
Cost per individual attempt.
Value * Success Rate
Cost
– 100% = Rate of Return
1
2
3
Why credential stuffing is evolving
How credential stuffing has evolved
Where do we go from here?
Before Modern Era
Generation 0: Basic HTTP requests with common tools
SentryMBA
• Performs basic HTTP requests.
• Extensible and highly configurable.
• Tailored towards specific attack use cases.
Early defense: IP Rate limiting.
0k
50k
100k
150k
Iteration 1 : Rotate through proxies
Defense: Text-based CAPTCHAs
Iteration 2: Use CAPTCHA Solvers.
Defense: Dynamic sites and JavaScript heavy defenses.
Iteration 3: Scriptable WebViews
Defense: Header Fingerprinting & Environment Checks
Modern Era
Iteration 4: Scriptable Consumer Browsers
Started with developer libraries like
Puppeteer and Selenium.
Now attack tools drive the browsers directly.
Browser Fingerprinting
Data like screen size, fonts, plugins, &
hardware combine to produce a unique
value.
Defense: Browser Fingerprinting
Iteration 5: Randomizing Fingerprint Data Sources
Defense: Behavior Analysis for Negative Traits
Iteration 6: Human Behavior Emulation
Defense: Browser Consistency Checks
Iteration 7: Use real device data
This keeps going but the direction is clear.
We're calling these Imitation Attacks
Imitation attacks indicate sophisticated fraud from dedicated adversaries.
The aim is to blend in and bypass risk & automation defenses.
Not all automation is an imitation attack, not all imitation attacks are automated.
The end goal is perfect emulation of humans and their environments.
1
2
3
Why credential stuffing is evolving
How credential stuffing has evolved
Where do we go from here?
Valid Accounts
The value in our accounts is not going away.
As we raise the cost of credential stuffing there is greater incentive to diversify attacks.
Credential Stuffing ???
Genesis is an early example of what's next.
Malware that resides on the victim to scrape account and environment details.
Photo
Bot detail page
Genesis can generate the fingerprints of your exact target.
This bypasses many risk-scoring mechanisms that look for activity from new devices.
Select the fingerprint you are looking for
And load it into the Genesis Security Plugin
Voila! You are now your target.
93970994-EC4E-447B-B2BD-DE2F4215A44E
This is a human problem, not a technical problem.
Advanced credential stuffing is sophisticated fraud. It is more than simple
automation. Fraud teams aren't staffed for this, they need help.
Imitation attacks are designed to blend in. Look deeply even if you think you don't
have a problem.
Attackers are economically driven. We need to attack the economics. Every defense
will fail if the value is still there.
THANK YOU
Jarrod Overson
@jsoverson on twitter, medium, and github.

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AppSecCali - How Credential Stuffing is Evolving