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Managing Dangerous Offenders


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Review and recommendations for London public protection.

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Managing Dangerous Offenders

  1. 1. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATEProtective Marking ConfidentialPublication Scheme Y/N NoTitle & version Version 1Purpose Information and Decision MakingRelevant to SCD/TPSummary Appraisal of Systems/Structures to manage dangerous OffendersCreating Branch Code and Directorate SCD3(2)Author (plus warrant/pay no) Insp James Cooke 172077Date Created October 2004Review date December 2004 Managing Danger “Joining the Dots” A Rapid Appraisal of Current Systems & Structures Version I September - November 2004 Specialist Crime Reduction Team SCD 3(2) Room 235, New Scotland Yard, Broadway, London SW1H OBG Telephone 0207 230 (6) 4216 E mail CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 1
  2. 2. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE CONTENTS PageEXECUTIVE SUMMARY……………………………………………………………..3INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND………….……………………………………16OBJECTIVES …………………………………………………………………………18METHODOLOGY……………………………………………………………………..19MAIN FINDINGS & SWOT ANALYSIS  Danger Definitions……………………………………………………………………21  Risk identification……………………………………………………………………..24  Risk referral……………………………………………………………………………27  Risk assessment……………………………………………………………………..29  Risk Management………………….…………………………………………………32  Risk monitoring and review………………………………………………………….34  Personnel and Training……………………………………………………………...35  Risk IT/Manual systems……………………………………………………………..38CASE STUDYHarrow Risk Management Structure and Process…………………………………41RECOMMENDATIONS……………………………………………………………..43APPENDICESAPPENDIX A - CORPORATE UNIT REVIEW  DCC2 Corporate Strategy Unit……………………………………………58  Bichard Project Team………………………………………………………62APPENDIX B - SCD UNIT REVIEW  SCD1 Homicide Prevention Unit………………………………………………….65  SCD5 Child Abuse Investigation and Paedophile Unit………………………...69  SCD7 Serious and Organised Crime…………………………………………….73  SCD 8 Trident………………………………………………………………………76  SCD 11(7) Prison Intelligence Unit………………………………………………81APPENDIX C - TP UNIT REVIEW  Sapphire……………………………………………………………………………84  Community Safety Units…………………………………………………………89  Prolific and Priority Offenders……………………………………………………94  Jigsaw and MAPPA……………………………………………………………….101APPENDIX D – Semi Structured Interview Format…………………………………..107APPENDIX E – Project Reference Group. ……………………………….………….109Glossary…..………………………………………………………………………………..110Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………..111 CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 2
  3. 3. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1. INTRODUCTION1.1 Danger is complex and dynamic. There are different degrees of dangerand the highest risk cases have become a major concern nationally after theSoham murders and other examples such as Copeland. Dangers have notbeen identified early enough and adhoc information sharing between policespecialist departments has exacerbated the effectiveness of our response.1.2 The Metropolitan Police recognises these dangers and the need to identifyearly signs of high risk in offenders, victims and locations alike, which togethercan cause a convergence of heightened danger. This requires full andappropriate use of NIM. Criminologists call this “joining the dots”.1.3 This review concentrates on the internal MPS position and theopportunities to link work and rationalise our structures and processes. This isthe first priority before considering any major changes in our workingrelationship with outside agencies, and many improvements can be madeover the short to medium term. This review clearly sets out how the entireorganisation including front line policing, Crime Desks, BIU, BOCU and SCDspecialist units can be engaged in this process more effectively, linking theirwork with that of YOTS, Prison and Probation Service.2. OBJECTIVES2.1 This appraisal has reviewed all of the main specialist units in TP and SCDthat manage aspects of high risk and danger. Assorted structures andsystems have been identified which are currently not integrated. The task nowis to introduce a new coherent framework, referred to as the “riskmanagement chain”, involving:  Early risk identification by front line police units and Borough Intelligence Units using standardised definitions of risk and danger.  Timely and appropriate referral of those risks for assessment.  To create a more scientifically rigorous assessment process for those identified higher risks which uses shared information more effectively.  To put in place a multi-agency intervention plan for high risk situations, which is measured and appropriate.  To properly monitor and review each case for changing circumstances which effect the risk level.3. METHODOLOGY3.1 This report comprises an audit, appraisal and recommendation section. Incompiling the report the following method has been used:  The identification of leading operational practitioners from each DCC, TP and SCD business area who manage or advise on high risk situations. These individuals form the reference group CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 3
  4. 4. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE  Desk top research behind each unit reviewed, collating annual reports, standard operating procedures, policy and guidance notes.  A semi-structured interview of the reference group members to help evaluate various aspects of the risk management chain.  A problem solving day at the John Grieve Centre, analysing key issues connected to danger. This included a work shop on danger domains led by Jonathan Crego, of the International Centre for Critical Incident Analysis4. MAIN FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONSDanger Definition4.1 FindingsThere is:  No common definition of danger across specialist departments or their main external partners  Differing focus and prioritisation between offenders, victims and locations by separate specialist police departments, founded on historical and legal factors.  Largely reactive police response to victims and offenders with very little proactive scanning of police indices.4.2 RecommendationsRecommendation 1. That all MPS units use a standard definition of dangermeaning “ There is a state of exposure to harm, risk or peril with a probabilitythat the harm will occur”Public Protection Project Board Lead (to be established). Short termRecommendation 2. That the MPS adopts a common danger rating systembased on a formula of impact multiplied by probability for offenders, victimsand locationsPublic Protection Project Board (to be established) Special Police Notice. Short term.Risk Identification4.3 FindingsThere is currently:  Reliance on „professional judgement‟ to identify risks in certain specialist units such as SCD7, 8 and Sapphire.  No systematic proactive processes of scanning multiple police indices for signs of early heightened risk  A lack of systematic information sharing between specialist units in TP and SCD where there are common domains of danger between them. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 4
  5. 5. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE  Variable and unsatisfactory community intelligence infrastructure at BOCU level to identify and collate intelligence outside the more formal police surveillance and DSU activity.  Lack of training for front line policing and BIU in identifying behavioural and situational danger signs in cases such as MISPERS or mental health where both an objective and subjective judgement is needed.  An imbalance between tackling volume crime and proactively distinguishing cases of high danger in victims, offenders and locations from the mass of TNO‟s.  A need to focus SCD1 HPU effort on producing specific indicative risk models for front line policing and BIU‟s in different domains of danger such as child abuse, gun and weapon criminality, hate crimes, serial offending and organised crime.  There is a clear opportunity to identify other dangerous high risk prisoners in addition to sex offenders amongst the prison population.  Proper regard needs to be given to the danger posed by psychiatric drivers as well as alcohol and drug abuse.4.4 RecommendationsRecommendation 3. SCD1 HPU in partnership with other specialist units todevelop and trial indicative risk models for different categories of dangerincluding: o Hate Crimes o Gun crime o Knife and other weapon use o Serial violent offending o Serious sexual offending o Child abuse o Serious and organised crimes of violence (Kidnap, contract killings, trafficking)To be used for initial scanning purposes by FLP, Crime Desks and BIU‟sSCD1 HPU to lead. Medium Term.Recommendation 4. To support and develop the Project Asset data miningsoftware to help the proactive scanning of various police indices by BIU‟s andspecialist public protection units.DCC2 to lead. Medium Term.Recommendation 5. Bichard Project Team to compile a corporate list of thehighest risk offenders across all specialists for a strategic NIM controlstrategy.DCC2 to lead. Medium Term.Recommendation 6. Support and develop the new DCC2 CRIS interrogationspreadsheet which determines the proximity between victim, offender andlocation in any London neighbourhood. thDCC2 to lead and launch at Crime Analysts Conference 11 November 2004. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 5
  6. 6. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATERecommendation 7. SCD11(7) Prison Intelligence is tasked to scan allprisoners in the prison system with a London address using project Asset,OASYS and new SCD1 HPU indicative matrices.Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium term .5. Risk Referral5.1 FindingsThere is a need to:  Establish a method of „thresholding‟ subjects and locations at which point risks are initially assessed by the BOCU Crime Desk and/or BIU.  The need to re-establish standards of data entry and flagging for CRIS and CRIMINT entries which need to be assessed by the specialist units.5.2 RecommendationsRecommendation 8. Develop and publish a special police notice setting out anew policy and standard operating procedures for the identification andreferral of high risks including: o Data entry standards o The different forms of risk and how to rate them o Flagging and QQ code standards and requirements o Information exchange between specialist police units o Supervision standards on CRIS and CRIMINTPublic Protection Project Board (to be established) to develop new policy and standardoperating procedures culminating in a Special Police Notice. Short term .Recommendation 9. SCD11(7) to promptly transfer all high risk subjectintelligence packs to local Jigsaw team where the prisoner will reside onrelease.Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Short term .6. Risk Assessment6.1 FindingsCurrently:  Complete disparity in assessment tools used between MPS and its main partners the Prison and Probation Service. MPS only use the accredited Matrix 2000 assessment process for sex offenders whilst our main partners in public protection use OASYS which is a generic first stage assessment system.  A need to focus SCD1 HPU effort on producing assessment tools which could compliment OASYS in assessing risks in different domains of danger as above.  Jigsaw appears to concentrate on too narrow a band of dangerous offender concentrating its efforts generally on sex offenders. There is a CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 6
  7. 7. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE clear opportunity to leverage in its well defined business framework for other equally dangerous violent offenders.  The specialist units in TP and SCD are not generally engaged in any cross domain assessment work for their subjects.  The PPO project has not used any scientific approach towards selecting subjects and has concentrated on volume PSA crimes without consulting SCD1 and DCC2  There is enormous potential to properly assess subjects whilst they are in prison and distinguish those that pose a significant threat in different danger domains. Currently prisons concentrate on those that declare themselves a risk or are category 1 sex offenders. Police are generally not asked to provide an intelligence profile towards the assessment.6.2 RecommendationsRecommendation 10. The formation of a new Borough based publicprotection hub to realign resources and exploit opportunities for integratedpublic protection work involving:  CAIT, CSU, Sapphire, PPO, Jigsaw and other Borough based serious crime units joining to form a new unit  Retaining the different specialisms but ultimately making personnel multi disciplinary and interchangeable  Accountability for local performance to BOCU Commander  Accountable to new central department for SOP, strategy and carrying out consistent policy  Enfold the new structure with the MAPPA framework of work, categorising subjects and implementing a new system of MAPPA level 1-3 meetings across all specialist high risk units  Expand the use of MAPPA to other danger domains in addition to sex offenders as allowed under the legislation.  Adopt the probation service generic OASYS assessment tool and supplement with complimentary tools from SCD1 HPU and Matrix 2000 for assessing different specialist danger domains.  Long term co-location of specialist units in one BOCU building for communication purposes supplemented by key external personnel from probation and psychiatric service clinicians.Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Short to Long term.Recommendation 11. Detectives from SCD1, 5, 7, 8 and 11 to be maderesponsible for their own nominals and directly supporting the new BOCUpublic protection hubs by:  Identifying high risk cases  Entering nominals onto the local BOCU MAPPA system after release from prison or as currently determined by their home address  Carrying out a risk assessment with the local PP team  Arranging multi agency MAPPA level 1-3 meetings to develop a bespoke action plan  Monitoring and reviewing their casesSCD T&CG to lead with SCD OCU Intel Units and SCD11 (7). Short term . CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 7
  8. 8. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATERecommendation 12. Lobby the Home office to take away the convictionrequirement in Category 3 MAPPA offenders leaving only the need toestablish clear indicative intelligence to incorporate the subject and meet ourduty of care responsibilities to manage the subject.MPA to lead. Short term.Recommendation 13. The adoption of „Thresholding‟ assessment techniquesfor BOCU BIU and Crime Desks to assess whether a particular case hasreached a trigger point for onward referral to professional assessment in theproposed Public Protection hubs.DCC2 Project Asset to lead. Medium Term.Recommendation 14. SCD11(7) to lobby Home Office to formally allow policeintelligence to be used as an element of prisoner risk assessment by thePrison and Probation service . Article 2 and 3 of the Human Rights Act andthe Data Protection Act allows for exchange in these circumstances to preventcrime.Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Short term.7. Risk Management Planning7.1 FindingsCurrently:  Jigsaw and MAPPA provides the most consistent, structured and systematic multi-agency framework to manage dangerous offenders which needs to be exploited to its full potential.  SCD1 HPU are developing a manual of intervention options for different domains of danger which will compliment and extend the use of the „critical few‟ manual produced by Jigsaw.  Failure to prioritise offenders and victims where there is a clear pattern of serial offending or vulnerability.  The need to get a much clearer sign off of actions eminating from MAPPA level 1-3 meetings. Each cooperating agency should be made much more accountable for agreed actions regarding a balanced plan of treatment, enforcement and diversionary measures.  There is a need for more internal level 1 MAPPA meetings between TP and SCD specialists about common interests in a subject and how to target them in a co-ordinated way. This has been commenced with the bi-weekly operational meetings. These need referring to the C&TG where appropriate.  There are clear opportunities to expand the use of pre release intelligence packs on potentially dangerous offenders (PDO) in Prison. SCD11(7) can provide Borough Jigsaw teams with these and their use would help in compiling an appropriate and effective action plan to help prevent further offending. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 8
  9. 9. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE7.2 RecommendationsRecommendation 15. SCD1 HPU to complete a manual of interventionoptions for high risk offenders and victims. To be produced as an intranet andhard loose leave binder product for public protection use. It will be designed toalso cater for OSMAN type threats and „near miss‟ cases and will complimentthe Jigsaw „critical few‟ menu of options manual.SCD1 HPU to lead. Short term.Recommendation 16. All units gathered under the recommended new publicprotection hub to commence using level 1-3 formal subject meetings for highrisk situations. This will provide a structured and regulated multi agency arenafor managing the risks. It will also harness the information exchangeobligations under the „duty to co-operate‟ clause of the Criminal Justice andCourt Services Act 2003, Human Rights and Data Protection Act.Jigsaw to lead. Short term.Recommendation 17. The new bi-weekly operational meeting betweenSCD5, SCD7, Sapphire, CSU and Jigsaw should become a formal MAPPAlevel 1 type meeting.Jigsaw to lead. Short term.Recommendation 18. To incorporate a new MAPPA level 1-3 meeting signoff arrangement for all contributing units internal and external, acceptingresponsibility for agreed actions and completion deadlines.Jigsaw to lead. Short term.Recommendation 19. Expand the current police MAPPA focus from justcategory 1 sex offenders to consider other types of dangerousness such asdomestic violence, gun criminality or hate crimes involving violence.Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Short term .Recommendation 20. Arrange supporting services to the new publicprotection hub including:  An experienced psychiatric clinician to assist the completion of OASYS and other complimentary assessments for high risk offenders providing the best predictive advice possible.  Advocacy services for high risk victims to help them choose the most appropriate protective options.  Mentoring project officers to help divert offenders and reassure repeat victims. (See Canadian example)  Access to the Sapphire Havens for a wider scope of violent crime particularly domestic violence and child abuse.Public Protection Project Board(to be established) Lead. Medium term.Recommendation 21. Prolific and Priority Offenders scheme to assess theirsubjects with new SCD1 HPU assessment products and in high risk casesfully assess using OASYS. This process should take the form of systematicscanning using project Asset to identify high risk subjects. These should beplaced on MAPPA register.Public Protection Project Board (to be established) and PPO scheme. Medium term . CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 9
  10. 10. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATERecommendation 22. New SCD arrangements to provide a case officer toeach high risk subject, making them responsible to work with the prison andlocal public protection unit in which they live, including:  Initial identification of high risk subjects  Placing subject on local MAPPA register  Arranging formal assessments  Arranging formal multi agency and single agency MAPPA level 1-3 meetings  Being responsible for monitoring and review arrangementsSCD C&TG Group led. Short term.Recommendation 23. Give the new Safer Neighbourhood Teams an activerole in helping to develop an action plan and gather intelligence on high risksubjects living in their ward and involve them in MAPPA level 1-3 meetings.Give them a role to monitor the subject through regular home visits.Jigsaw to lead. Short term.Recommendation 24. Guidance to be provided in new public protection policyand procedures as to how to prioritise different high risk situations, focussingon offenders who are involved in multiple serial violent offending with multiplevictims.Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Special Police Notice. Short term.Recommendation 25. SCD11(7) to prepare PDO pre release intel packs onall high risk prisoners before release for the information of the local Jigsawteam where the prisoner will reside. This will help the Jigsaw team prepare abespoke prevention action plan based on activity and behaviour whilst inprison.Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Short term .8. Monitoring and Review8.1 FindingsCurrently:  No consistent and structured review mechanisms are in place and only SCD5, PPO and Jigsaw operate any formal procedures and these were considered to have weaknesses. The Murder Review Group (MRG) also has a role but this is a reactive in nature after the murder has occurred.  VISOR provided an opportunity to monitor and review cases using automated scheduling based on time, anniversary and trigger events.8.2 RecommendationsRecommendation 26. Segment the MAPPA level 1-3 meetings into differentdomains of danger and place each existing subject onto the agenda as astanding item to be reviewed formally and make the existing MRGteam(SCD2) responsible for assessment and management reviews.Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Led. Short term . CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 10
  11. 11. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATERecommendation 27. The new VISOR IT system should be usedcomprehensively by the new public protection hub to:  View the agreed action plan against behaviour in the reporting period  Pre set key anniversary dates into the system that may cause heightened risk. The programme could automatically prompt the case officer and trigger a review before and after the anniversary to help adapt the action plan to the circumstances. The programme should provide automated check lists.Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Led. Medium term.9. Personnel and Training9.1 FindingsCurrently:  There is an adhoc level of compulsory and voluntary training between different specialist units, which is either delivered centrally, by the Crime Academy or through individual BOCU team development.  There is a lack of front line police training in behavioural and situational high risk danger signs.  SCD1 HPU are developing a new module for SIO‟s to be delivered by the Crime Academy.  Personnel responsible for public protection are resourced differently between BOCU‟s, with varying levels of prioritisation to PP work.  Personnel are fixed into different specialisms at both a Borough and central level with limited cross disciplinary co-operation leading to missed risk identification, assessment and management opportunities.  There is a clear view that detective and risk management expertise at the centre in SCD is insufficiently aligned with Borough needs to manage dangerous offenders.9.2 RecommendationsRecommendation 28. Give CAIT, Sapphire, PPO and CSU staff Jigsawstatus (ie. enabled to use MAPPA) whilst preserving their specialisms. Poolthe staff together with the existing Jigsaw personnel into a new Boroughbased public protection hub creating a centre of excellence. This shouldinclude:  Ring fencing personnel strengths with a new common minimum strength and BWT for supplementary staff appropriate to demand levels.  Accountability to BOCU Commander for local performance standards on local high risk situations.Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium to Long term .Recommendation 29. Make Jigsaw central responsible for co-ordinating thenew structure and developing a new policy and SOP with other keydepartments such as TPHQ and SCD3(1). Place this new Business area CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 11
  12. 12. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATEunder DCC to overarch SCD, TP and SO commands with common standardrequirements. Supplement the central Jigsaw team with specialists fromDCC4, DCC2, Sapphire Central, PPO central and SCD5 thereby creating atwo level structure:  Borough operational public protection department  Central public protection department overseeing policy, SOP, training and evaluationPublic Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium term .Recommendation 30. Give a clear responsibility and operating standardrequirement for handling the risk management chain by developing a newpolicy and SOP police notice for:  Risk Identification, Threshold Assessment and Referral – Response officers, CID Borough Detectives, Telephonists, Station Reception Staff, Safer Neighbourhood Teams, Crime Desk and BIU  Risk Assessment, Management and Review – New public protection hubPublic Protection Project Board (to be established) Police Notice. Short term .Recommendation 31. Integrate the existing training packages for CSU,Jigsaw, Sapphire, CAIT with the new SCD1 HPU training package into a newpublic protection accredited course. This should be modular and include:  Behavioural and situational sciences  Risk Identification and assessment  MAPPA processes and structures  Multi Agency action planning  Monitoring and review processes  Use of VISOR IT system  Problem solvingPublic Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium term .Recommendation 32. Pool all the training staff from SCD5, CSU, CAIT,Sapphire and Jigsaw into a new public protection training and developmentdepartment based in the central office. Make this team responsible fordeveloping the course in liaison with the Crime Academy and seekingaccreditation. Deliver using Crime Academy and distance learning.Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Short term .Recommendation 33. Training team to be made responsible for developingadditional modules for FLP in risk identification and threshold assessments.To be delivered through direct area training and distance learning usingintranet.Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium Term . CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 12
  13. 13. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE10. IT and Manual Management Systems10.1 FindingsCurrently there is:  Poor data entry and flagging standards on CRIS, CRIMINT and MERLIN IT systems  The development of data mining tools to proactively scan for danger signs in various police indices. This is being led by DCC2 and project Asset.  Over reliance in Jigsaw on Matrix 2000 as the only MPS electronically supported assessment tool  The opportunity of using VISOR by all the specialist units to manage the case load of high risk subjects and share information electronically between them and other police service units nationally.  The need to develop electronically supported threshold assessments for incidents. Risks can then be referred on after being filtered by the Crime Desk and BIU.  The need for electronically supported indicative and assessment models from SCD1 HPU for different domains of danger.10.2 RecommendationsRisk IdentificationRecommendation 34. To develop a series of indicative risk matrices fordifferent domains of danger. These should be in the form of a manual form124 series which is also electronically supported on CRIS, AWARE, CRIMINTand MERLIN. These should set out the indicative signs and heightened riskfactors together with a simple method of quantifying them for thresholdassessment purposes.  Knife and other weapon use  Gun Crime  Hate Crime  Domestic Violence (existing 124D and SPECSS)  Child Abuse  Serial Crimes  Sex Offending  Serious and Organised Crime (Kidnap, contract killings and trafficking)Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium term .Recommendation 35. Support the development and introduction of projectAsset to enable proactive scanning of various police indices for signs ofbehavioural and situational danger. Software to be provided electronically foruse of:o Borough BIU (12 hot spot Boroughs first)o Selected central Higher AnalystsAsset should be able ultimately to scan CAD, CRIS, CRIMINT, STOPS,CUSTODY, HOLMES and DNA database and provide a scoring mechanism CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 13
  14. 14. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATEfor each incident to help make threshold assessments. This methodologyshould take account of the current SCD5 “one key” data search mechanism.DCC2 to lead. Medium term.Risk ReferralRecommendation 36. Reinforce training and standard procedures forentering flag and QQ codes onto CRIS and CRIMINT in order that appropriatereferrals can be made to the respective public protection department on eachBoroughPublic Protection Project Board (to be established) Police Notice. Short term .Recommendation 37. Develop and introduce a new electronic docket forthreshold assessments to be used by BIU‟s to refer subjects onto publicprotection department if they reach a cumulative trigger score. This should beVISOR based eventually and a VISOR terminal should be provided to theBIU‟sPublic Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Short-Medium term.Risk AssessmentRecommendation 38. Make VISOR the principal IT platform for casemanagement and risk assessment for the new PP hubsPublic Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium- Long term.Recommendation 39. Interface the OASYS assessment tool onto VISOR asthe first stage generic risk assessment model.Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium term .Recommendation 40. Interface Matrix 2000 and other complimentary riskassessment tools being developed by SCD1 HPU and SCD8 onto VISOR.Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium term.Risk Management and ReviewRecommendation 41. Make VISOR the principal IT platform for riskmanagement and review of all high risk subjects held by the PP hub. This willenable all the specialist units within the PP hub to share information andmonitor progress easily. VISOR is likely to be the only area of financialexpenditure, requiring additional network and terminal supplies to:  Borough BIU‟s  Sapphire  CSU  PPO  SCD7 Intel  SCD8 Intel  SCD5 CAIT units  SCD11(7) Prison Intelligence UnitPublic Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium-long term. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 14
  15. 15. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATEWAY FORWARD1. Presentation of report to DAC Griffiths (SCD Operations).2. Presentation to TP/SCD ACPO leads on the findings and recommendations.3. Circulation to the reference group members ASAP4. Inclusion of key findings in MPS response to Sir Michael Bichard5. Meeting of reference group and compilation of report to Management Board recommending the formation of a Project Implementation Board and Executive Team (This could potentially be the existing Bichard Project Team) in early 2005.6. Project Plan by end March 20057. Project implementation April 2005 – March 2008 (staged short, medium and long term objectives)8. Formation of a pilot site Harrow Borough April 2005 CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 15
  16. 16. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATEINTRODUCTIONThe term danger means different things to different people. Wrapped up in theexpression are elements of risk, harm, injury, death together with thelikelihood they will occur. Danger is a mixture of these and is undoubtedlycomplex and dynamic. What is clear however, is that there are differentdegrees of danger and certain situations involving offenders, victims andlocations have a higher risk of causing serious harm or even death.After the Soham murders many issues were identified in the collation,maintenance and sharing of police intelligence within the police service aswell as externally. The Bichard Inquiry made a number of recommendations inthis area.Whilst certain volume crimes have decreased, every day violence on thestreets and at home is a growing central Government concern which has nowbecome a priority for future activity in such schemes as the Prolific andPriority Offenders project.The Metropolitan Police recognises these trends and has moved vigorously tocounter them.  Management Board commissioned work in July 2004 to profile the threat of lethal and serious violence and how this could be better countered. This has resulted in a report from DCC2 and development work in proactively scanning police indices for danger signs.  Since the beginning of 2003, before the Soham murders, SCD1 have been engaged on a major Homicide cold case review to identify behavioural and situational aspects which could help in the long term prevention of murders across a number of different danger domains.  SCD itself manages a great many of the most dangerous offenders in London such as child abusers, gun criminals and those that exploit distinct communities through trafficking people, drugs and firearms. The Directorate has made the reduction of serious violence a key priority in objectives 1, 4, 5 and 6 of their 2004-5 policing plan.The task is immense but achievable through a structured and systematicapproach to the problem. This requires the organisation at all levels todistinguish high risk situations from the mass of total notifiable offences, earlyenough to make effective interventions. The science of this involvesidentifying patterns of serial offending, victim vulnerability and locational riskthat cause a convergence of danger.Criminologists call this “joining the dots” CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 16
  17. 17. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATEBACKGROUNDOn the 17th August DAC Griffiths tasked SCD 3(2) at the SCD Co-ordinationand Tasking Group Meeting to:  Review, appraise and make recommendations as to how violent and potentially dangerous SCD nominals could be better risk managed at a Borough level. This would include the Borough Jigsaw (formerly Public Protection Units) teams and MAPPA arrangements.This was prompted by the need of SCD7 Serious and Organised Group toidentify more effective methods of managing commercial armed robbers onrelease from prison.It was quickly apparent that the review had important implications for theentire organisation at a time when a more co-ordinated and structuredresponse is required to manage potentially dangerous offenders, identified inthe „Bichard‟ inquiry.On the 11th October the appraisal was formerly integrated into the Bichardwork programme as a key piece of foundation research requiring:  A comprehensive examination of all projects and units within the MPS undertaking risk management responsibilities for dangerous offenders, victims and locations  A SWOT analysis of their relative internal strengths and weaknesses together with the threats and opportunities apparent to the organisation as a whole.  Make recommendations for rationalising and improving the current arrangements.This appraisal highlights the immense opportunities of streamlining the entireproactive process of identifying, referring, assessing and managingsituations that pose a high risk.Currently there are many units, projects and systems in place across the MPSand partner agencies used in different aspects of managing danger. Theseinclude:  The Homicide Prevention Unit (Commander Baker) which is profiling offenders involved in thirteen different categories of murder including Honour Killings, stranger attacks, mental health, gay murders, elderly people, sex workers and knife killings. The outcome of this research will be to help put in place some predictive models for use in assessing offenders and the probabilities of them committing homicide in the future.  The PRISM system used by SCD8 to assess and prioritise gun criminals for proactive surveillance and management  SCD5 Child Abuse Group (DCS Peter Spindler), which manages the Child Abuse Investigation Teams in each Borough together with two CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 17
  18. 18. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE MIT teams and the Paedophile Unit. These units use the Thornton risk assessment model.  SCD7 Serious and Organised Crime Group (DCS Sharon Kerr) who are assessing and prioritising proactive police interventions for commercial robbers and “Middle Market” drug suppliers.  DCC2 Corporate Strategy Unit (Betsy Stanko) o This unit is developing IT software (Project ASSET) to enable the collation of data from several unconnected police systems including CRIS, Custody, HOLMES, DNA match and Stops. This will support research into prolific and dangerous offenders. o Research to categorise different forms of “dangerousness”  DCC4 Diversity Unit. This unit is involved closely on risk management systems associated with domestic and mental health violence.  Jigsaw Team and MAPPA. There is a Jigsaw team on each Borough, which is responsible for managing sex and other violent offenders. They come under the Borough Commanders line management. The team works with three categories of offender: o Those on the sex offenders register o Violent and sexual offenders who are not registered. o Any other offender who poses a serious threat to the public.  Community Safety Units. These are based on each Borough and investigate domestic violence and hate crimes. They come under the Borough Commanders line management.  Sapphire Teams. These are based in each Borough and investigate cases of sexual assault both inside and outside the family unit.  The Prolific and Priority Offender Project. This is a three stranded Home Office initiated project managed by TPHQ under each Borough CDRP. It involves: o Targeting the worst offenders in each Borough who cause most harm. “Catch and convict” o Rehabilitation and Re-settlement of the above offenders o Putting in place a strategy to manage those young people who are at risk of starting an offending lifestyle. This uses the risk and protective model designed by Communities that Care. This strand is called “Prevent and Deter” There is a high degree of flexibility in the choice of offenders targeted under this initiative and it can include violent and dangerous people, not just those involved in low level anti social behaviour.ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES and MAIN DEVELOPMENT AREAS1. To establish corporate systems and training for frontline TP/SCD staff to identify and report risks associated with victims, offenders and locations2. To establish corporate systems and training for BOCU and SCD designation desks to assess risks associated with victims, offenders and locations CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 18
  19. 19. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE3. To establish a clear criteria for case referral, resource levels and training for key high risk management hubs such as the Jigsaw network across the MPS4. Establish corporate information exchange protocols across MPS commands and with key partner agencies listed under the “duty to cooperate” provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, to enable timely and informed decisions to be made by professionals dealing with dangerous or at risk offenders.5. To establish corporate risk assessment models for “devnoms” , “promnoms” and repeat victims formed out of the qualitative research currently being undertaken by SCD1 Homicide Prevention, DCC2 and other key units handling dangerous offenders.6. To compile and maintain a corporate list of the most dangerous offenders drawn from the nominal indices of all the key units working in this area using an appropriate and practical selection criteria.METHODOLOGYIn compiling this appraisal I have used the following methods:  The formation of a reference group made up of key operational practitioners representing each area of work. The purpose of this was to: o Identify suitable individuals in each area, who could be interviewed about key aspects of their risk management work. o Provide a group of leading practitioners, with which a future modernisation programme could be planned.  The use of ‘desk top’ research to collect key reference material from open sources such as the MPS intranet and Global internet, about each specialist area, in particular: o Legislation on which the unit bases its operation o Annual reports from the representative units o Codes of practice and other good practice guidance o Standard operating procedures  The design of a semi structured interview format involving questions on eight key areas of risk management including: o General questions about the interviewees interpretation of what dangerous meant to them. o How risk is initially identified for offenders, victims and locations within their remit of responsibility o How that identified risk is referred on for more formal assessment CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 19
  20. 20. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE o What assessment techniques were in place to quantify the degree of risk posed. o How was the situation then managed to remove or reduce the apparent risks using a multi agency intervention plan. o How was the action plan monitored and reviewed. o Were there sufficient personnel to manage the work load and were the trained to a competent and suitable standard. o What IT and manual systems were in place to help the management process. Twelve semi- structured interviews were completed (See Appendix B) lasting between 1-2 hours each and a written record was made at the time. The interviewees were given a copy of the questions at least a week before the interview together with a briefing note on the purpose of the project. It was explained that answers should be given from the perspective of their own unit‟s work. This report contains an appraisal of each individual unit covering the eight key areas above, drawn from the interview results and desk top research. A case study has also been included to highlight some of the good practice identified in the London Borough of Harrow. A problem solving day on „Managing Danger‟ was held on the 29th October at the John Grieve Centre to discuss some of the key factors and this enabled the research to be tabled and different tactical and strategic issues were debated within a panel including: o Professor John Grieve - Chair o Sir Ronnie Flanagan - HMIC o Professor Jonathan Crego – Director Centre for Study of Critical Incidents o Commander Andy Baker – Homicide Commander Scotland Yard o Laura Richards – Senior Behavioural Psychologist Scotland Yard o Gerry Marshall – National Probation Service o Bruce Davison – Her Majesty‟s Prison Service The report then assesses the overall results in the form of a SWOT analysis comparing and cross referencing between the different units to form an overall perspective on our corporate capacity and capability for managing dangerous situations. The report concludes with a number of recommendations to rationalise and improve our capability in managing dangerous situations CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 20
  21. 21. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE MAIN FINDINGS & SWOT ANALYSISIntroductionThe following section examines each component part of the risk managementprocess and highlights the main findings across all the specialist unitsreviewed together.Each part concludes with a brief SWOT analysis of the main areas ofimportance divided into internal organisational strengths and weaknesses andexternal opportunities and threats which emanate from the findings.General Interpretation of What Constitutes DangerMain Findings  There is a wide interpretation on the term dangerous across all the units reviewed with no common definition. This is further complicated by definitions used by outside partners such as the Probation Service, who are vital in the work to identify and contain aspects of danger.  The main interpretations cited were: o The threat of lethal and serious violence and danger from and to offenders, victims and locations where there is indicative intelligence. (DCC2 ) o Potential to render lethal or near lethal terror to a person or group either physically or psychologically.(DCC2) o The impact of a potential incident multiplied by the probability that it will occur. (Jigsaw and Health & Safety) o The risk is life threatening or traumatic and from which recovery whether physical or psychological will be difficult or impossible(OASYS definition used by Jigsaw, Probation Service, Prison Service) o Individuals that pose a significant risk to themselves or others(Jigsaw) o Potential lethality indicated by the severity and frequency of violent attacks(SCD1) o The pattern of offender attacks and the degree of victim vulnerabilty are crucial considerations (SCD1)  At the John Grieve centre conference on Dangerousness (Friday 29 th October) Laura Richards (SCD1 Behavioural Psychologist) highlighted the distinction between those that make a threat from those that are a threat. The quality and pattern of their offending behaviour was essential in distinguishing danger from those who commited a large quantity of offences but were not necessarily lethally dangerous.  John Morrison the former head of British Government Intelligence Analysts defined threat as requiring both the capability and propensity to carry it out.  Some units focus on either the offender or victim, very few include location dynamics in any meaningful way. SCD1, 7, 8, the PPO CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 21
  22. 22. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE scheme and Jigsaw are focussed on the detection and management of offending behaviour whilst SCD5, CSU and Sapphire are primarily focussed on the protection of the victim. Some of this difference is probably due to the legal „duty of care‟ required to victims who are exposed to „continuing danger‟ in the latter units. This situation is and will change with the fundamental impact of OSMAN type situations where a threat to a victim has been clearly identified forcing all units to become much more proactive in their victim considerations. Some units particularly SCD5 and 8 felt that the application of „professional judgement‟ was required to assess the degree of danger particularly with regard to issues of capability and propensity. This involved for instance offenders access to guns and the degree of vulnerability of the victim. This judgement should be based on experience and knowledge and not on detailed systems of risk analysis and management. This view appeared to be backed up by the statement from Jonathan Crego (Director of International Centre for the study of Critical Decision Making) at the John Grieve Centre conference that “More experienced decision makers make better decisions if they learnt the lessons from previous incidents”. The latter part of this is crucial. Less experienced and knowledgeable decision makers may be in positions of responsibility. SCD5 felt that a problem solving approach should be taken to danger in individual cases rather than a more bureacratic risk management systems led approach. This allowed for a multi agency consensus on the levels of danger and how to control them. SCD5 Paedophile Unit also made it clear that many highly dangerous offenders they managed were not violent but were engaged in the systematic „grooming‟ of children for consensual sex or sexual exploitation. Should this nevertheless be considered dangerous? The full dynamics of the relationship between the victim, offender and location within a formal problem analysis triangle approach had not been incorporated within any of the operational units reviewed. DCC2 and the Homicide Prevention Unit were the only units who were examining this relationship. DCC2 neatly described this as: o Locations are the facilitators where dangers converge o Victims levels of vulnerability o Offenders behavioural signs of irrationality DCC2 are now actively pursuing this approach with a new CRIS interrogation spreadsheet which highlights the „proximity‟ levels between these factors for any given area of London.o Jigsaw provides a very powerful framework of approach to dangerous offenders involving multi agency action planning and information exchange. However categories of offender inclusion are partly based on conviction history rather than indicative intelligence. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 22
  23. 23. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATESWOT SummaryStrengths o In individual cases the application of „professional judgement‟ as to the degree of danger posed by the offender and the comparitive vulnerability of the victim. This was based on experience and knowledge of the area.Weaknesses o No common definition of what dangerous means and how to apply it to police work. o Focus on separate offender and victim approaches with limited locational considerations. No combined analytical work on the dynamics between all three parts of the Problem Analysis Triangle. o The largely reactive response to individual incidents to assess the continued risk to both the offender and victim. There is very little proactive scanning to assemble patterns of offending from separate police indices.Opportunities o To develop a more generic and dynamic definition of danger which includes: o Potential of serious harm to both individuals and the public as a whole o The likelihood that the harm will occur o Serious harm can include physical or psychological damage which is difficult to recover from o The danger involves a threat which is credible ie capability and propensity o Danger should include victim, offender AND locational issues o The degree of danger should be categorised based on the patterns and severity of preceding incidents connected to each part of the PAT. o There is a real opportunity to realign with the OASYS definition used by Probation and Prison Service under which would be police application standards and methods involving victim, offender and location elements. o To adjust the category 3 MAPPA offender criteria dropping the conviction requirement and clarifying the second criteria factor about risk of serious harm.Threat o The disparity between police specialist unit danger definitions and those of outside agencies with a prime responsibility for dealing with aspects of danger, particularly Probation and Prison Service. They both use the OASYS interpretation. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 23
  24. 24. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATEIdentification of RiskMain Findings o There is a clear need to develop further indicative risk models and NIM compliant knowledge and profile products for different categories of danger. The value of this had been highlighted for Domestic Violence using the SPECSS and 124D. This now needed to be expanded into areas such as armed criminality, child abuse, hate crime and homicide prevention. There was enthusiasm to get such products from the SCD1 HPU and SCD8 Analyst „upstream‟ to FLP where they could be used. o There was general agreement that front line policing needed training in the behavioural and situational signs of danger which could be properly identified using the products discussed above. All parts of FLP should be included in this such as Station Reception Staff, telephonists, response teams and the new Safer Neighbourhood Teams o There was a clear distinction between proactive and reactive risk identification with most units relying on post incident research and analysis to identify further risks. Systematic proactive scanning of different police indices did not take place looking for signs of behavioural and situational danger sufficient to distinguish individuals and locations of particular risk. DCC2 had started to address this area with Project Asset and the CRIS interrogation spreadsheet. BIU‟s would need new standards of operation and training to meet these challenges. o It was evident that the specialist units reviewed were NOT in any structured and systematic relationship with each other with a marked lack of linked working practices and information sharing. An example of this is the interlinked work of CAIT, CSU and Sapphire in dealing with different aspects of domestic violence. o DCC2 and the plenary session of the John Grieve Centre conference emphasised the need to address „disproportionality‟ and „wheat from the Chaff‟ issues by concentrating on those offenders who were involved in different domains of serious offending thereby focussing resources in areas of best return. The art and science of this would be identification of those cases out of the volume of TNO‟s. o Several units highlighted the appalling state of data entry standard, particularly onto CRIS, which compromised the research techniques described above. o Non of the SCD operational units reviewed used any formal risk identification model. However SCD7 MIU monitored SCD7‟s response to OSMAN warnings which are graded into 8 categories of response thereby allowing an assessment of proactivity effectiveness to manage the danger. SCD8 and Sapphire used a matrix to prioritise cases which had already been identified to allow efficient deployment of police resources. SCD 5 relied heavily on the timely submission of form 78‟s and social service referrals. o SCD 8 highlighted concerns over culpability if risks were more formally analysed and documented whereby the police were held accountable CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 24
  25. 25. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE in cases of death and serious injury where the danger had been correctly identified but the attack had occurred nevertheless.o SCD1 highlighted, at the John Grieve Conference, the need to o Develop systems that were not dependent just on the experience and motivation of individuals o The need to look for patterns in different police indices which together indicated danger o To allow the victim to play an active part in identifying the danger and degree of risk. o Identify the key signs of danger which included capability, emotional triggers, organised, credible threat and family knowledgeo CSU and Jigsaw highlighted the need for documented defensible decision making using models such as SPECSS and not just „professional judgement‟o The PPO scheme could have a vitally important role in identifying offenders whose offending behaviour was not just of concern because of its volume impact on the community but also those offenders who showed signs of dangerousness. Currently this was not the case and no scientific models had been included to the selection criteria. Selection was based on PSA targets regarding street crime, vehicle crime, residential burglary and domestic violence. The original government guidelines allow for a broader criteria of violent offending and also driving factors such as mental health, a key HPU concern.o Jigsaw and the MAPPA framework provided an excellent model of multi agency work and information sharing which all the units reviewed respected and admired. However there was one caveat being the restrictive nature of category 3 offender requiring a conviction indicating potential for serious harm rather than just indicative intelligence. Many Jigsaw teams had overcome this by including such cases as an additional agendas item in their level 1 and 2 meetings.o Jigsaw is predominantly focussed on category 1 sex offenders but there is a clear opportunity to broaden out the different types of dangerous offender they manage. For example gun criminals have been included in Harrow and Waltham Forest and SCD7 are planning to include commercial armed robbers released from prison onto Borough MAPPA.o DCC2 highlighted the need for a new community intelligence infrastructure to allow effective engagement and collection of intelligence and information from different sources such as tenant associations, housing officers and Hospitals/GP surgeries. Currently we are reliant on police surveillance operations and DSU‟s to collect this. The entire community needs to be harnessed and galvanised. The Safer Neighbourhood Teams should have a pivotal role in co-ordinating this. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 25
  26. 26. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATESWOT SummaryStrengths o OSMAN identified threats to victims requiring graded response to help prevent harm o The effective use of the Domestic Violence Indicative risk matrix SPECSS o The developing knowledge, profile and indicative risk products being prepared by SCD1 HPU and SCD8 o The strength of the MAPPA process in allowing a formal statutory arena for information exchange and co-ordinated multi agency action planning.Weaknesses o Over reliance on individuals personal skills, knowledge and experience in exercising professional judgement. Growing need to put in place structures and systems not so dependent on this but are resilient to staff turnover which is huge in the MPS. o No systematic proactive scanning of police indices to identify danger signs and assembles a comprehensive picture. o No community Intelligence infrastructure integrated into the MPS CRIMINT system to identify dangerous offenders, vulnerable victims and problematic locations. o Lack of co-working and information sharing between specialist units at TP and SCD level o Lack of training for FLP and Specialist Units in basic behavioural sciences to pick up danger signs in individuals who come into contact with policeOpportunities o Expansion and exploitation of the MAPPA structure and process to deal with a broader range of dangerous offenders under police management. Lobby to take away the category three conviction requirement. o SCD to lobby the PPO scheme and Borough CDRP‟s to include some dangerous offenders on their list AND to build in indicative risk models from SCD1 HPU and 8 into their monitoring arrangements to flag up individuals who could pose a serious lethal risk in the future. o Develop data mining tools such as project Asset to scan separate indices automatically using defined ontology on danger signs.Threats o Inability of the organisation to adopt a balanced approach between tackling volume crimes and managing offenders, victims and locations which pose the greatest threat and danger. There is a clear opportunity CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 26
  27. 27. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE to do both at the same time with the right structures, training and systems. o The probation and prison service use a generic first stop risk identification tool called OASYS for all offenders coming under their control. The police do not and are now relying on the Thornton Matrix 2000 to carry out this role. This is designed for sex offenders alone and the likelihood of further conviction.Risk ReferralMain Findings  The two main systems used for internal referral of cases to the specialist units reviewed are CRIMINT and CRIS. However, there are considerable inconsistencies and variations.  SCD5 rely on the timely and appropriate completion of form 78 by FLP concerning all incidents directly or indirectly involving children which indicate that they are exposed to risk or harm. These are meant to be put on the MERLIN database within the AWARE system. The ICG scoping study 2004 highlighted the adhoc nature of this with many appropriate cases not being reported due to cited work loads and lack of understanding of the criteria and process. What makes this worse is that there are few CRIMINT entries about child abuse albeit there is a clear QQ code and the indices is scanned daily by SCD5 Intel. Most of the current work load is referred in from local social services departments using a form 87 docket. Of concern is the high number of domestic violence incidents attended which have children on the same premises. Proportionately such incidents are not being reported on Form 78.  CSU, Sapphire, SCD8 and SCD7 require the completion of a CRIS report and referral to them using the CRIS flag markers in cases of specific threat or clear crime. Only in fast time situations involving critical incidents are referrals made via SCD Reserve or the local MIT by telephone and even then this needs to be followed up with CRIS and CRIMINT entries.  The PPO scheme and Jigsaw rely on CRIMINT entries to report intelligence about any subject already on the case file or with whom there is concern. QQPPO, QQPPU and QQMHO applies.  The Borough crime desk has a pivotal role in screening CRIS reports and ensuring that they are allocated and referred appropriately but due to the sheer work load there is a need to ensure FLP are trained, supervised and process incidents correctly at source to avoid major gaps in referral.  There appears to be a major practical issue in FLP partly due to work pressures and partly awareness of the appropriate use of both CRIMINT and CRIS. CRIS is given the priority with limited time available leading to vital intelligence being missed or not recorded. This is then not available for the specialist units. Both DCC2 and SCD1 HPU expressed serious concern about these issues whilst reiterating the need for vastly improved standards of data entry on both systems. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 27
  28. 28. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATESWOT SummaryStrengths  The ability of the crime desks in each borough and the specialist Unit Intel Units to scan CRIS and CRIMINT for appropriate cases either directly referred to them or which should be managed by that unit but is not flagged.  The growing willingness of outside agencies to refer appropriate cases to the police to investigate.Weaknesses  FLP not following any SOP‟s with regard to: o Data entry standards on CRIS or CRIMINT o Flagging CRIS and CRIMINT appropriately o Not making CRIS and/or appropriate CRIMINT entries where required in the circumstances This puts a heavy onus on the crime desk and BIU to correct these issues later which is impossible to control effectively due to work load volume.  No clear Standard Operating Practices or policy in this area  Specialist Units are not referring appropriate cases between themselves so they are aware of connected issues and work together.Opportunities  New SOP and Policy developed by TPHQ and SCD3(1)  New training programme for FLP based on SOP and Policy involving initial training, regular training days and distance learning. This could be connected to enhanced competency payments on successful completion.  An incentive scheme is devised for quality and appropriate CRIS and CRIMINT completion by FLP  Front line supervisors are held to account for quality standards.  If CRIS is being given the priority on FLP the BIU needs to take an active and structured role in scanning reports for intelligence and completing CRIMINT reports where they are absent.Threats  Due to the adhoc nature of current referral mechanisms it is inevitable that key signs of danger will be missed. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 28
  29. 29. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATEAssessment of RiskMain Findings  DCC2 emphasised the need for SCD1 HPU to develop the knowledge, profile, indicative and assessment products for different domains of danger and get these out for Borough use as soon as possible in a similar way to the SPECSS model for DV.  DCC2 interestingly made comment on the need for the CDRP‟s to take a much more active role in co-ordinating different agency risk assessments thereby sharing the work load but ensuring focus and consistency on the main areas of danger.  HPU mentioned the opportunity of utilising experienced clinicians in the MAPPA arrangements at Borough level to allow more predictive capacity on the case load. This was already in operation within certain areas such as Brent and Enfield.  SCD5 and the new London Child Protection Procedures used a very interesting concept called „Thresholding‟ whereby Police and Social Services scanned their respective lists of reported allegations for „Threshold Characteristics‟. If the case revealed a requisite number of characteristics the case was referred on for „Initial and Core Assessment. These assessments were operated under the „Common Framework of Assessment‟ involving a multi agency case conference to assess: o Childs development needs o Parents Capacity to respond to a care plan o Impact of wider family and environment factors  SCD 8, Sapphire and the PPO scheme operate a different form of prioritisation assessment for their subjects. This is designed to select cases which warrant the most urgent police attention but indirectly they allow for a certain degree of generic assessment about risk. Selection however is on vastly varying criteria between them and SCD1 HPU have not been involved in their design.  SCD8 expressed the desire that some of their „less dangerous‟ gun nominals are managed on Borough with early intervention programmes or go onto the PPO scheme. This would allow SCD8 to concentrate on the most dangerous who move between Boroughs.  Although Sapphire deal with the most dangerous sex offenders they do not use Matrix 2000 for risk assessment purposes as Jigsaw do. The only assessments are made reactively by the IO who completes a decision log in critical incidents, within which he is expected to consider victim protection measures. Only the SIO‟s are properly trained in this aspect.  Apart from SPECSS the CSU uses Form 2 of the DV model to interview victims about various aspects of their situation. This enhances the initial scanning under SPECSS and allows for a more considered grading of the threat from standard to high.  Harrow put some of their PPO subjects onto the MAPPA framework to allow for multi agency action planning and assessment. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 29
  30. 30. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE  PPO uses no formal ongoing risk assessment models scientifically devised except the second strand work on deter and prevent which uses the CtC Risk and Protective risk model  Jigsaw assessments are founded on the quality of the local information exchange about subjects and does not use any other assessment tool except Matrix 2000. This is specifically designed for category 1 sex offenders.  Jigsaw is particularly interesting as the other two responsible authorities Probation and Prison Service use the OASYS assessment tool. This is a first stage generic assessment from which other more specialist assessments such as matrix 2000 can be recommended. It could be well argued that the police should also be using this alongside an expansion in the different categories of dangerous offender they manage. Reliance on matrix 2000 is caused by the predominant focus of most Jigsaw teams on Category 1 sex offenders. OASYS could be interfaced with the new VISOR case management system together with Matrix 2000. Police training would be needed.  Project RAMP (Risk Assessment Management Panel) was mentioned by SCD1 HPU, CSU and Jigsaw as being a potential mechanism for dealing with risk cases which did not meet the MAPPA criteria, particularly category 3 type cases. Each Borough would have such a panel which would be non statutory and multi agency in nature providing the function of MAPPA but on cases where there was only indicative intelligence and not necessarily conviction history. This was discussed at the John Grieve Centre Conference and the following points were made: o The bureaucracy of setting up another tier using probably the same people as in the MAPPA framework o The non statutory nature of the structure which could leave it under powered and unaccredited o The opportunity of lobbying government to change the definition of category 3 offenders dropping the conviction requirement or creating a new category. o The current expanded use of level 2 MAPPA meetings to deal with other cases not strictly within the definition. There was a clear „duty of care‟ to do this.SWOT SummaryStrengths o SCD5 use of „Threshold‟ scanning techniques to determine which cases went on for further assessment. This performed the function of a filter allowing defensible decision making. o Jigsaw and MAPPA framework for assessing cases using respected and accredited tools such as Matrix 2000, OASYS and ASSET o SCD 1 HPU new assessment tools being developed for Borough use o CSU SPECSS and form 2 model use for assessing risks in DV cases with initial and secondary screening by FLP and IO. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 30
  31. 31. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE o Police resource prioritisation matrices used by SCD8, Sapphire and PPO to grade subject importance and risk.Weaknesses o Jigsaw concentrates on too narrow a band of dangerous offending dealing primarily with category1 offenders. This is reinforced by the use of only one specialist assessment tool Matrix 2000 for sex offenders o Apart from Matrix 2000 and SPECSS there are no accredited and bespoke police assessment tools that can be used by the specialist unit hubs to comprehensively assess their danger and propensity for further lethal offending behaviour. o Non of the units work together except within the context of MAPPA and MPS has largely confined itself to managing sex offenders in this framework. o There is a distinct lack of information exchange between MPS specialist units internally let alone the wider external exchange needs. This has become a particularly dysfunctional weakness requiring urgent action.Opportunities o The need for a combined hub at Borough level managing the assessment requirements of identified dangerous offenders with accredited tools and procedures. This should include: o Co- location and/or linking of CSU, CAIT, Sapphire, PPO and Jigsaw teams and work areas.into a new hub of integrated public protection. These hubs should be linked to SCD1, 7, 8, DCC2 and DCC4 using VISOR as the primary IT platform o Establishing a new SOP for information exchange between the above units with one shared case file on each subject used by all units possibly using the VISOR IT system as a platform for all cases that pass a threshold of risk characteristics. o Introduce a new universal threshold standard for high risk cases used by all specialist units in TP and SCD o Introduction of new risk assessment tools to these hubs from SCD1 HPU overlaid on the OASYS basic system of assessment. o Put OASYS and HPU models onto new VISOR system. o Making MAPPA the main framework for all the high risk units to work within utilising its established information exchange system and multi agency arena for action planning o Make the specialist units personnel multi disciplinary whilst keeping the specialist desks thereby allowing personnel to circulate to create a large pool of public protection expertise.Threat o Project RAMP may create an unnecessary tier which will divert resources and destabilise common systems within the existing MAPPA CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 31
  32. 32. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE arrangement. Re-configuration of MAPPA and new PP hubs will address most of the issues RAMP would be set up for.Managing the RisksMain Findings o DCC2, SCD8, SCD7 and DCC4 CSU made it clear that they considered that MAPPA provided an excellent opportunity of managing different categories of dangerous offender ranging from DV offenders, gun criminals and others identified within the DCC2 and SCD1 HPU police indices scanning recommendations. o SCD1 HPU were preparing a menu of intervention options for different categories of danger which could be used by the MAPPA and the other specialist units. This could also be used for OSMAN and other „Near Miss‟ cases o Only SCD5 and Jigsaw used formal statutory multi agency forums to manage high risk cases. The others used informal forums such as the Domestic Violence Forum, Homicide Strategic Working Group, or PPO CDRP meetings. Others such as SCD8 and Sapphire relied on Police Gold Groups or SOIT officers to co-ordinate an action plan albeit that outside agencies were sometimes invited. o CSU DCC4 stated that there was a clear role for the new Safer Neighbourhood teams in being an active participant in developing the action plan and then being responsible for victim and offender official visits for monitoring purposes. o The PPO scheme was heavily reliant on the maturity and effectiveness of the local CDRP in developing and co-ordinating the action plan. In reality the CJS and YJS was largely responsible for this area with fast tracking and intervention planning. o CSU reiterated the DCC2 perspective of „disproportionality‟ and the need to prioritise those subjects involved in multiple serious violent offending. o Jigsaw had a very well defined multi agency management plan process at three levels: o Level 1 Ordinary single agency directed interventions o Level 2 Local Inter Agency Co-ordinated meetings to develop a bespoke intervention plan o Level 3 Full MAPPP to manage the most dangerous „Critical Few‟ at multi agency CEO level Comment was made that the multi agency action plan needed more formal sign off by individual agencies against agreed actions. o Jigsaw had also developed a very comprehensive manual of options to help the intervention plan for all three levels although it was originally designed for the critical few. o Sapphire had established three safe „Havens‟ at key hospitals in the region providing 24/7 services for sexual assault victims. This provided a form of one stop service with medical care, forensic examination, investigation and counselling provision. This was their main multi agency forum in a very practical sense of the word. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 32
  33. 33. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE o A new Operational Bi-weekly meeting had been established between Jigsaw, SCD5, SCD7, Saphire and CSU to select targets for proactive police attention o DCC4 mentioned advocacy services in some Boroughs to help victims select care and protection options and these could be used in a new PP hubSWOT SummaryStrengths o Jigsaw and MAPPA currently provide the most consistent, structured and systematic multi agency framework to manage dangerous offenders. This needs full exploitation with MPS expanding the types of danger categories included, as allowed in the legislation and government guidelines. o Bi weekly operational meeting between specialist units to prioritise targets for proactive police action. o SCD1 HPU Menu of interventions developed out of HSWG‟s for use in MAPPA and other specialist unitsWeaknesses o Jigsaw concentration on sex offenders and need to give the MPS an effective internal forum to discuss level 1 MAPPA type cases across all the specialist units o PPO intervention plans not consistently of a high standard and reliant on effectiveness of CDRP o Failure to prioritise and manage offenders with multiple offending patterns policed by different specialist MPS units. o Varied focus between victim and offender action planning. The offender is key as the more dangerous subjects are involved in various violent offending domains with multiple victims. o Some units work largely alone such as SCD8 and Sapphire but have identified offending patterns which cross domains such as Burglary and Rape and Trident crime with sexual offending. This needs multi internal unit coordination as well as multi external agency co-ordinationOpportunities o The creation of a new public protection hub on each Borough co- locating and integrating specialist units CSU, CAIT, Jigsaw and Sapphire. o New MAPPA level 1 structure to allow high risk subjects listed by multiple specialist police units to be discussed internally formalising the Bi weekly meetings within the statutory MAPPA structure. o New sign off mechanism for agreed actions in level 2 and 3 multi agency meetings to formalise process and make agencies accountable. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 33
  34. 34. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE o SCD5, 7 and 8 high risk targets to be identified and placed on new Borough public protection hub where they live. SCD case officer to be made responsible for identifying subjects, assessing and co-ordinating the action plan process thereby supplementing the Borough hub with SCD resources and expertise. o Consider placing medium and high risk PPO subjects onto MAPPA for close supervision, tailored action plan and close monitoring.Threat o Unidentified subject commits homicide due to lack of internal coordination and effective information exchange with external partners.Monitoring and ReviewMain Findings  Out of all the units reviewed only the PPO scheme, SCD5 and Jigsaw undertakes any meaningful review and monitoring work on their cases  The PPO scheme requires: o Monthly return from all the PPO Borough liaison officers to PPO Central Office detailing the current CJS status of the subject, offending behaviour and review of the intervention plans effectiveness o An ongoing review requirement is in place between the liaison officer and the local police tasking and coordinating group for police activity and the CDRP for overall performance o The review determines whether existing subjects should stay on the scheme or if new subjects should join all dependent on fluctuating offending patterns.  Jigsaw Teams are accountable to the London Strategic Management Board and both are required to: o Provide a quarterly report on level 3 subjects. o The Board itself is responsible for monitoring training and development needs. o The Board has to complete an Annual report on activity o The Jigsaw teams have a standing agenda item to review existing cases at level 2 and 3 at the regular inter agency meetings. However the effectiveness of this was questioned by Jigsaw central. It is hoped that the new VISOR system will provide a much more effective case monitoring and review mechanism.  SCD5 Child abuse cases are reviewed every six months as a requirement under the new London Children Protection Procedures. This process is led by the Social Services Department locally.  Sapphire were undertaking a form of review into historical rape cases going back to 1995 to re investigate incidents where there had been a clear DNA identification made by SCD4. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 34
  35. 35. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE  All the other units are largely dependent on the standard and skilled commitment of their respective supervisors in putting in place informal local review arrangements. This was clearly very adhoc and unsatisfactory.SWOT SummaryStrengths  PPO, SCD5 and Jigsaw monitoring and review arrangements were partly successful with some areas still needing improvement.Weaknesses  No structured and systematic procedures in place for other units and largely dependent on quality of local supervision at that time.  Jigsaw inter agency actions not signed off formerly to hold respective agency to account for its agreed actionsOpportunities  Expand the implementation of VISOR to ALL specialist units grouped in a new public Protection hub on Borough. This could then automatically remind case officers to review and set out a structure to complete this with on screen check lists.  Place review firmly into the context of a formal NIM monthly meeting of all the specialist units with tactical and strategic assessments including a review section.Threat  Circumstances with dangerous offenders change constantly and a trigger event could raise their risk level dramatically without anyone noticing.Personnel and TrainingMain Findings  All the units reviewed undertook training for their staff except SCD8 and SCD7 who relied on the experience and knowledge of their staff being determined before they were selected to join. The training provided however varied dramatically in type, duration and quality.  DCC2 made it very clear that initial training was required for FLP and BIU staff at Borough level in basic behavioural and situational sciences to identify and isolate those people and locations they encountered as being high risk or showing signs of danger. Distinguishing the „extraordinary from the ordinary‟. This training should include: o Asking the right questions o Actively involving the victim in assessing the degree of danger they felt CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 35
  36. 36. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE o Understanding and being aware of multiple offending behaviour  SCD1 HPU were preparing a training package in homicide prevention and risk management for the Crime Academy targeted at SIO‟s. HPU highlighted the need for FLP and specialist units to be aware of the various indices that could be used for assessing dangers.  CSU and Jigsaw provided formal accredited training with a four week course in two parts for CSU staff and a two module course for Jigsaw staff including a written exam. The latter was delivered by the Crime Academy.  Sapphire and SCD5 had central training officers who provided a comprehensive development training programme to their respective Borough teams. In Sapphire case this was voluntary with a varied uptake. The SOIT officers received basic training which was also given to staff manning the „Havens‟  The PPO liaison officers only received training in problem solving and operating the CJS J track IT system. This is of concern as they have an integral role in identifying and assessing different forms of danger in a wide spectrum of offenders. Some of the Boroughs have established a focus desk with a Superintendent, DS and Intel officer. The CDRP‟s have been asked to appoint a multi agency coordinator but most have so far declined often relying on the police liaison officer to undertake this complicated role.  DCC4 made it clear that they would like to see the creation of a new centre of excellence in public protection on each Borough with bespoke training, career path and ring fenced resources.  All of the units except SCD 5, 7 and 8 were reliant on the support of their respective BOCU to resource them properly and this commitment varied widely from Borough to Borough. Although strategy and policy was determined at TPHQ in these cases, standards of actual operational delivery was determined at a local level. The ongoing team development of these BOCU specialist units was very much dependent on the quality of the officer i/c.  Many respondents also commented on the fluctuating work loads in different specialisms and between Boroughs. This often meant the teams were overwhelmed and had to resort to reactive „fire brigade‟ tactics. FLP, crime desks and BIU had a key role in filtering cases and only referring on those cases of high risk to help regulate the flow of workSWOT SummaryStrengths o Jigsaw and CSU core accredited initial training for staff o Centrally delivered development training for Sapphire and CAIT Borough teams. In the latter case this is based on „learning and demonstrating competence‟ criteria o Experience and knowledge of SCD8 Intel and Operational staff CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 36
  37. 37. CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATEWeaknesses o No training for FLP, crime desks and BIU in behavioural and situational danger awareness which would enable them to scan and filter high risk cases for onward referral. o Heavy reliance on professional judgement in SCD8 and 7 with no documented systems to demonstrate defensible decision making. o Voluntary nature of some development training for specialist units o Wide fluctuation in staffing levels between Borough specialist units with comparable work loads. o No specialist input to the identification, assessment and management of PPO subjects except CSU on DV subjects. o Lack of CDRP input to share the personnel and training requirements of public protection work across agencies in their respective BoroughOpportunities o The creation of a new Borough Public Protection Unit linking all the specialist units such as CSU, CAIT, Jigsaw and Sapphire into one integrated hub but retaining the specialisms. This will provide a pool of specialists who should be ring fenced. A new BWT should be developed for each Borough based on population and offending profile. o The new PP unit should operate under common SOP‟s and policy determined in a new central unit within DCC. Borough Commanders will remain responsible for acting on the assessments of the new units. o A new training programme should be developed but tailored to different parts of an integrated PP function: o Training for FLP, Crime Desks and BIU in identifying and reporting signs of high risk in victims, offenders, and locations. This should include SOP for entries onto CRIS and CRIMINT with standardised flagging. The training should include modules from SCD1 HPU and DCC2 on risk indicative models and indices scanning. (This should be developed by the Crime Academy and delivered through the Borough Training Units) o Training for the new Borough PP Unit personnel in assessing, managing and reviewing high risk cases. Developed and delivered by the Crime Academy) o Make the central specialist units such as SCD1, 7 and 8 responsible for placing identified dangerous subjects onto the respective Borough PP unit indices (where the subject lives) and overseeing elements of the MAPPA assessment and management planning with other agencies. This will counter the concern of centralised detective expertise away from the Boroughs.Threat o The increased vulnerability of the MPS to an unidentified or mismanaged high risk situation „exploding‟ with enormous public confidence implications such as the Climbie incident. Currently there is a focus on PSA volume crimes leading to a demand led culture. The CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 37