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Handling sovereign debt crises: a proposal

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Handling sovereign debt crises: a proposal

  1. 1. Handling Sovereign Debt Crises: A Proposal January 2014 Richard Gitlin & Brett House Senior Fellows The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) rgitlin@cigionline.org bhouse@cigionline.org
  2. 2. Agenda I. II. III. IV. V. VI. Context: relevance, diagnosis of problem An SDF: what, why, when? SDF focus: research, early consultation Concerns and limits of the SDF Links with complementary approaches Next steps P. 2 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF
  3. 3. I. Sovereign Debt Crises: Here to Stay Easing of pressure in Europe, but… • • • • • Advanced country debt burdens up 30 ppts GDP since 2008 to 105% GDP Global markets still highly correlated: risk on, risk off Capital flows pro-cyclical, delinked from fundamentals EMs vulnerable to Fed taper, stronger USD Small island states cannot be made sustainable on existing conventional Paris Club terms P. 3 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF
  4. 4. I. Problem: too little, too late Costs to addressing sovereign distress: 1. Ex ante 2. In media res 3. Ex post Three major connected issues: 1. Overlending and overborrowing 2. Incentives to delay addressing insolvency 3. Tendencies toward insufficient restructuring in market approach • Not too much restructuring, too soon. • Reality: too little, too late. • Need to lower cost of dealing with debt distress • Preserve value for creditors and debtors P. 4 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF
  5. 5. I. TLTL: Post-SDRM status quo doesn’t work • • • • Non-system does not optimize outcomes Each crisis requires reinvention, delays, ad hoc-ery Information flow is too slow, limited, asymmetric CACs helpful, but can only do so much: – – – – They facilitate inter-creditor coordination But they are reactive, not proactive Do not bring together stakeholders early to find solutions CACs are not a restructuring/bankruptcy regime • Lessons from private debt restructuring: – Clear, transparent process: faster deals, greater preservation of value P. 5 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF
  6. 6. I. Greece is Not a Model “The system needs to be fixed. We should have a predictable framework for restructurings that ensures that other countries do not have to go through what Greece did.” — Petros Christodoulou, fmr head, Greek debt office “I hope Greece was a one-off but I am not sure it was. If you look at all the debt out there it is hard to conclude that there isn’t a problem. State bankruptcies have not gone away. In fact they are likely to get worse.” — Phillip Wood, Allen & Overy P. 6 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF
  7. 7. I. 7 Specific Issues to Address Ex ante • Lack continuous effort to refine processes of dealing with distressed sovereigns • No venue to bring creditors and debtors together proactively In media res • Absence of an automatic standstill mechanism • Creditor moral hazard Ex post • Pari passu thrown in doubt • Payment systems vulnerable • CACs are being circumvented P. 7 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF
  8. 8. III. An SDF: What is it? Sovereign Debt Forum (SDF): Addressing ex ante costs • Non-statutory, uncodified but incorporated body • Neutrality in practice, venue and staff • Provides ongoing research, institutional memory • Standing discussion of surveillance, incipient crises, and, when necessary, debt treatments • Transparent joint analysis of DSA, capacity to pay • Fair, balanced, and comprehensive representation • Dovetails with existing IMF and/or Troika processes • Learns from private sector experience P. 8 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF
  9. 9. II. Why an SDF? Light: • Paris Club shows this type of ‘non-institution’ can be effective • EITI, APEC, GATT, CGAP, WEF precedents Pragmatic: • No political support for treaty- or statutory-based approaches Complementary: • Enhances existing processes and institutions Supportive: • Aid other incremental improvements to debt treatment regime • Reduce trigger problem • Dampen political & creditor pressure on IMF staff Fills gap • Dedicated to proactive treatment of sovereign financing issues P. 9 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF
  10. 10. II. An SDF: When? Before 2008 crisis • 2002‒03: SDRM discussions fail • 2003: Wider introduction of CACs • 2003‒08: No demand for restructuring framework After 2008 crisis • 2010: Greece program; Merkel/Sarkozy - Euro SDRM • 2011: European CACs, EFSF/ESM, Greek debt exchange • 2012: Greek buyback • 2013: Cyprus Now: • Crisis stabilized, can work on improving system • Status quo not a sustainable equilibrium – Failure of Greek CACs – Exposure of NY payments system to holdouts by NML vs Argentina – Small island states cannot be restructured on conventional terms P. 10 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF
  11. 11. III. An SDF: How do we do it? Creation • Incorporate as nonprofit organization • Informal secretariat at existing public institution • Expand existing body such as Paris Club, which has already initiated outreach to new members through Paris Forum • Create stand-alone unit at IMF or BIS Initiation • Build research on best practice, create institutional memory • Weave into IMF and/or European surveillance process • Assists in next sovereign workout: small island states (?) P. 11 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF
  12. 12. III. Expand on PC Paris Club permanent membership P. 12 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF
  13. 13. III. More inclusive membership Private creditors/ IIF ILA IMF Creditor Sovereigns Debtor Sovereign P. 13 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF IIF SDF ISDA
  14. 14. III. SDF = early consultation Status quo Economic distress Adjustment programme Public financing Debt treatment Growth & sustainability Stakeholder consultation With SDF Economic distress SDF Stakeholder consultation P. 14 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF Debt treatment Growth & sustainability Public financing
  15. 15. IV. Concerns & limits of the SDF Not a panacea • Cannot enforce participation • Need to demonstrate incentives for involvement • Confidentiality necessary? • Neutrality possible? • Needs regular consultation to avoid trigger stigma • No forced stays, does not provide a standstill • No certainty in binding creditors SDF proposed as a part of a menu of pragmatic, incremental reforms P. 15 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF
  16. 16. V. Complements existing principles 1/ IIF Principles • • • • Transparency and timely flow of information Close debtor-creditor dialogue to avoid restructuring Good faith actions Fair treatment 2/ Review of IMF Lending into Arrears Policy • Supports prompt Fund support • Venue for good faith efforts to reach collaborative agreements P. 16 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF
  17. 17. V. Pragmatic reform agenda SDF plus… 1/ Define pari passu • Rule out ratable payments to nonparticipating creditors. 2/ Enhanced CACs with aggregation Ex post • Make aggregation more effective: – lower threshold within issues (‘two-step’) – Institute comprehensive threshold across all debt outstanding (‘one-step’) 3/ Immunize payments systems • Model legislation after Belgium/Euroclear protections In media res 4/ Sovereign CoCos, indicator-linked warrants • Automatic rollovers, maturity extensions and contingent debtservice reductions P. 17 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF
  18. 18. VI. Next steps Focus on ‘do-able’ reforms: • G20 deferral of issues to IMF • IMF Board paper in June 2014 • Define model contractual language, adopt it • Issuance of contingent debt • Test SDF concept with small island states? P. 18 │ Gitlin & House │ CIGI │ SDF

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