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Better infrastructure institutions hale et al 2013


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Better infrastructure institutions hale et al 2013

  1. 1. Better Infrastructure Institutions A discussion paper September 2013 by Dr Chris Hale with Associate Professor Colin Duffield Mr Bernardus Djonoputro Mr Leith Doody
  2. 2. This paper reviews leading international practice and trends in the institutions and institutional arrangements that support effective policy, planning and delivery for contemporary infrastructure. We adopt an internationalist perspective, but centre findings and exemplars around applicability to the Indonesian context. In this paper, ‘infrastructure’ covers both urban and regional contexts. It covers core economic and social infrastructure - with an assumption of contemporary standards in sustainability and energy efficiency. We assume that high quality outcomes in infrastructure require robust capabilities across fields such as: urban and regional planning; civil engineering (including environmental engineering and water); urban design and architecture; housing and social infrastructure; ports and shipping; intermodal freight; airports; mass transit networks; project finance; governance and policy. It is suggested that middle-income status for a country like Indonesia implies and demands new standards in performance across these fields and comprehensive working inter-relationships among them. Page 1 The paper hopefully acts to stimulate thinking and discussion around the potential to establish a new multi-partner Indonesian Institute of Infrastructure. The writing of this paper has been supported with a project grant from INDII (Indonesian Infrastructure Initiative) but the views contained herein reflect only the current thinking of the authors - and are not related to official INDII positions.
  3. 3. Table of Contents 2. Background – infrastructure and the 21st century society Pg 4 3. Excellence in Planning and Delivery – international exemplar cities and regions Pg 5 4. Research Hubs and Units Pg 7 5. Professional Institutes Pg 9 6. Industry Associations & Lobby Groups Pg 10 7. NGOs & Not-for-profits Pg 12 8. Infrastructure in Government Pg 13 9. Seamless Delivery – a new paradigm of policy and projects Pg 15 10. Key Themes in Indonesian Infrastructure Pg 16 11. Workable Options Pg 18 12. Recommendations – a new institute that suits Indonesian circumstances Pg 23 13. Bibliography Pg 25 2 Pg 3 Page 1. Executive Summary
  4. 4. To arrive at this contention, the authors have initially reviewed international trends in infrastructure thinking, policy and investment – and suggest that infrastructure is now much more than a self-referential sector based on hard-edged engineering and construction outcomes. The authors contend that the ‘soft’ elements of policy, pricing, skills, planning, design, assessment and finance are evolving rapidly, and new support is needed to allow the infrastructure sector in any given country to keep up with the pace of international change. We then review the state of play among various institutional exemplars internationally. We break this analysis down according to the ownership or membership of such institutes – running across professional institutes, research units, business associations, NGOs and government units. The activities of the government units are offered for contextual purposes, to demonstrate the manner in which government postures toward infrastructure policy and delivery are changing rapidly. The other organisations are listed with a view to identifying salient attributes and activities that are either worthy of strong consideration for a potential new Indonesian infrastructure institute, or worth avoiding in some instances. The sense arises from the civil society exemplars that an institute focused on infrastructure-specific research, knowledgeexchange, intra-sector dialogue and trust-building is worthy of pursuit. Some of the advanced institutional exemplars distinguish themselves by focusing their infrastructure discussions under a ‘public interest’ rubric. In part 10, we review and group various technical themes and topics in infrastructure and policy. We suggest that the creation of topic-coherent ‘special interest groups’ may form an effective way to structure a new infrastructure institute in a manner that improves the relevance and personalised experience for institute members. The special interest groups could function as key units for proposing and initiating research and knowledge-exchange activities of a future institute. We then sketchout a potential institute structure, alongside a presumed resource base to deliver a critical threshold of industry-relevant activity. As with each part of the discussion paper, this sketch of resourcing and potential structure is mobilised as a hypothesis - and we hope that industry stakeholders will respond to suggestions with their own ideas, either confirming or disagreeing with the sketched concept as they see fit. In concluding, the paper touches on some advanced intellectual parameters for a potential institute, including the need to focus firstly on supporting broad-based economic development progress. We suggest an ‘independent but close’ relationship to government for the institute, and canvas various issues in resourcing, membership, focus, and policy direction with an encouragement for stakeholders to submit their own views in response. 3 This document puts forward a hypothesis – that a new multi-partner infrastructure institute would be valuable and beneficial to Indonesia’s infrastructure sector and hence to overall economic and social development objectives and outcomes. We then summarises an emerging concept of ‘seamless infrastructure delivery’, which draws on best practice approaches from policy development, through initiation of project concept planning, into assessment, detailed design, technical refinement, and then delivery. This open and transparent ‘process-based’ approach to infrastructure projects is currently seen as a key factor in better projects and more effective delivery. But the demands of a more advanced process presumably frame the knowledge needs of the infrastructure sector in developing countries – hence these demands frame the potential role and activities of a new infrastructure institute. Page 1. Executive Summary
  5. 5. Infrastructure can be taken in a narrow sense, to mean hard infrastructure such as ports, roads, buildings, electricity supply and water treatment systems. But these ‘hard’ elements and systems exist within a complex economic and social context. Therefore, more up-todate thinking recognises the role of ‘soft infrastructure’ such as policy, pricing, project assessment methods, governance, and capabilities for delivery. These soft infrastructures can exist in an ad-hoc and opportunist state at one end of a spectrum – or alternatively they can be ‘institutionalised’ in some fashion or other. We should recognise excessively inflexible institutionalisation of infrastructure outcomes and mechanisms as a problem in its own right. So - infrastructure institutions, settings and ‘soft’ or policy-related elements ultimately need to be positioned at some workable and practical space between excessive informality and opportunism on the one hand, versus excessive rigidity and stasis at the other end of our spectrum. Changed and changing economic, social and technological circumstances require Infrastructure work is, by definition, group work. Even the smallest infrastructure project requires a cast of hundreds from conception, through design and planning, into approval and endorsement, and then delivery. Risks are many, but so are rewards when well-conceived economic or social infrastructure is delivered effectively. Trust is a key element in successful infrastructure projects, while hard-edged elements of governance are required to guard against and manage the most difficult of project risks. Differing individual perspectives, organisational needs and professional capabilities demand opportunities for open discussion and trust-building. Research and evidence-based analysis plays an increasingly important role in informing policy choices and actual practice. Structured skills-development lies at the core of enhanced personal, institutional and sectoral capacity. A quality infrastructure program is inherently based on effective interrelationships between demographic and social need and chosen infrastructure solutions. This implies that transport infrastructure should be integrated with housing, recreational, work and shopping opportunities. Industrial land must be connected with freight-movement mechanisms. Metropolitan-scale growth needs to be balanced by regional-scale provision and protection of parkland, open space, agricultural, and forestry lands. Water resources are finite and crucial. Systems of movement should enhance and nurture city environments and streets rather than overwhelming them. And the very dynamism of cities means that opportunities abound for innovative financing of much-needed urban transport, electricity, water and other infrastructure. The society that grasps these elements and works with them effectively creates its own, much better future. 4 Great diversity is evident among contemporary societies the world over, but also much commonality in themes and influences. We can talk at a philosophical level of the elements that make up any given society. These include; inherited but evolving non-material culture such as language, ritual, and social norms; material culture and consumerism; the arts; systems of government; science and education; human settlements and dwellings – both traditional and contemporary; and trade, business and production. But increasingly, across all these elements of human society and many more – we recognise the role of infrastructure in sustaining, supporting, connecting and improving the social and material condition. institutions and arrangements that are flexible, responsive, socially and environmentally responsible, and economically progressive. Page 2. Infrastructure and the Contemporary Society
  6. 6. 3. Excellence in Planning & Delivery – international exemplar cities & regions benchmarking of infrastructure and planning approach against that achieved or targeted in other developing countries. Jakarta, as the Indonesian mega-city and powerhouse of the Indonesian economy, faces a difficult choice in terms of infrastructure and planning reference-points. Likewise, medium-scale cities such as Surabaya are presented with two essentially very different pathways and reference cases for economic development. The two ‘options’ in question involve a choice between an agenda for a high-quality medium to higher-income urban growth trajectory, versus a planning and infrastructure approach that entrenches low-to-medium income status into the future. By contrast, some cities in the developing world are captive to a dynamic of lower expectations and benchmarks. This is very understandable, given resource and delivery constraints – but carries its own specific implications, parameters and risks. Certain Latin American cities have charted a path toward rapid expansion of BRT infrastructure (for example). And a mega-city like Bogota now grapples with the 5 Conversely, medium-scale Indonesian cities can orient themselves around recognised planning and infrastructure reference exemplars like Washington DC, Melbourne, Munich, or any number of advanced European cities. Neighbouring Kuala Lumpur is another interesting reference case, in which the ambition seems to be about matching-up against the standards delivered in Singapore (for example), rather than a Picture: Yamanote Line, Tokyo. Tokyo is acknowledged as a world leader in mega-city infrastructure and economic power. But few pause to reflect on Tokyo’s past as a poor city, or the investment and development pathway that sustained its economic transition over time. Page The ‘high quality’ reference points for Jakarta include locations like; Tokyo, Osaka, Hong Kong, Seoul, London and perhaps the San Francisco Bay Area. Chinese mega-cities such as Shanghai and Guangzhou have also set an interesting direction, by aspiring to and developing first-world standard infrastructure, during a growth phase from low to middle income status (and ultimately beyond). Additionally, we recognise the important role that a location like Singapore has played, albeit at a lower population benchmark, in setting an agenda for long-term transition out of developing world status, through middle-income, and ultimately into higher-income living standards, infrastructure, and city conditions.
  7. 7. reality that ‘quick and reasonably low-cost’ roll-out of BRT systems has been achieved, but next phases of mass transit infrastructure development demand higher capacity and quality-of-service. South American cities clearly don’t have the same resources as many cities in the developed world. But those same South American locations increasingly recognise that a ‘limitation on expectations and standards’ across urban design, planning and infrastructure makes them a captive in future to those same lower standards. involves innovative and flexible approaches to project financing and implementation. India presents another intriguing paradigm. In locations like Delhi, rapid expansion of Metro transit is being achieved - but a choice to make marginal cost savings by limiting design and infrastructure quality of stations (particularly) seemingly entrenches another generation of developing-world status. This at the very time that economic growth would suggest emergence into middle-income standard urban environments is possible. Picture: BRT - Bogota, Colombia. Bogota achieved transformation of urban people-movement with bus rapid transit, but the system appears to be at-capacity just a handful of years after opening. The balance between cost and capacity is a common debate for developing cities. Page While Indonesian cities and infrastructure developers should be mindful of the needs of lower-income citizens – those citizens are seemingly best served by a rapid and sustained transition to middle and higher income status through a high-quality approach to urban infrastructure. This implies an emphasis on productive institutions, high professional standards and reference points, as well as effective planning processes, inter-organisational communication and co-operation, and independent assessment of competing projects and investment priorities. It also 6 We recommend deep consideration of the high-standard infrastructure, planning, and city design approaches that have successfully supported the transition to middle and higher income status among cities like Singapore, Hong Kong, Seoul, Nagoya, Tokyo, Osaka and more recently Shanghai or other large Chinese cities.
  8. 8. A research and learning facility such as UC Berkeley’s ‘City and Regional Planning’ unit has attained pre-eminent status within its areas of operation - through lengthy track record, a large faculty, and depth of resourcing. Berkeley CRP offers quality interaction between knowledge-creation (through research), and teaching/learning or publication activities (‘knowledge transfer’). Although there is anecdotally a significant and meaningful interaction between Berkeley CRP and industry or government – those links are not always overtly or clearly formalised, and tend perhaps toward the activities of individual academics. Berkeley’s main mechanism for overcoming the planning/engineering divide is through the activities of key staff members who have formal credentials in both of these inter-dependent fields. Berkeley CRP does not currently offer a high profile in infrastructure finance - which could render a perception of limitation into ‘traditional’ concepts and approaches of planning. Melbourne University’s architecture, building and planning department founded the GAMUT unit several years ago (‘Governance and Management of Urban Transport’). While GAMUT is thematically coherent, it has only a small permanent staff and has struggled somewhat to attain high levels of published output in recent times, especially after the departure of a particularly prominent individual lead The University of Wollongong founded the SMART infrastructure unit relatively recently. SMART’s launch was attended with high levels of publicity and the overt promise of something ‘new and comprehensive’ in infrastructure research. SMART has attained some level of relationships to industry and government – although these appear to be at the level of individuals more than formal institution-to-institution arrangements. SMART could be perceived to have a low research output (or impact) relative to its resource base – and it is not clear that the staffing of SMART is entirely in-line with ambitions to be a specialist infrastructure research organisation (rather than a group of diverse researchers turning their attention to infrastructure). SMART’s regional location could be perceived as something of a hindrance in the realm of urban infrastructure – but the unit does not seem to orient itself explicitly around the regional infrastructure context in which it could conceivably gain a clear competitive advantage. ARRB Group (originally the ‘Australian Roads Research Board’) has a 50 year history as a major not-for-profit research unit, after starting with a variety of Australian state and national government departments as foundation funding members. ARRB explains that the rationale for its creation was to collectively carry out road transport research exercises that could otherwise not be justified or resourced individually. ARRB’s core membership and funding currently comprises federal, state and local transport organisations – but has diversified significantly to encompass a wide variety of strategic, opportunistic, and purely commercial funding sources. ARRB’s activities have also now significantly diversified – and include; knowledge exchange and ‘information services’, road infrastructure and design expertise, transport strategy, road safety, and advanced technical equipment 7 Internationally, a number of infrastructure-related research ‘hubs’, ‘units’ or ‘institutes’ have emerged whose progress and agenda is worth tracking and discussing. Broadly, it is observed that these units can either follow ‘organic’ growth and development trajectories, or they can adopt a ‘big-bang’ approach based around heavy publicity and aspiration. researcher. GAMUT’s relationships with government and industry could be perceived as somewhat limited. Page 4. Research Hubs and Units
  9. 9. The Australian “CRC” (co-operative research centre) concept was inaugurated around1990 – with the intention of integrating industry interests with the research competencies of universities, under a hybrid multi-partner funding model. CRCs have been widely successful in delivering meaningful industry-university connections, and are recognised to have delivered valuable research and knowledge advances across a range of scientific and industry fields. On the other hand, CRCs are often criticised (by academics particularly) for having a top-heavy, highly managerial approach that is disproportionate to research budgets, and which can marginalise individual researchers of high standing into ‘research staff’ roles (while simultaneously being entirely dependent on their output for credibility). CRCs also receive criticism for their ‘equity’ stance across universities – and it is sometimes contended that We would suggest that a new multi-partner Indonesian institute of infrastructure needs a multi-university research capability at its core. It could conceivably become a high-profile research unit in its own right by commissioning research output from a handful of pre-committed Indonesian and international member university research teams. 8 Stuttgart University’s Centre for Transportation Research is noteworthy because it combines the transport-related research interests of a diverse variety of units and individual university researchers under one umbrella. In this manner, a range of competencies such as rail engineering, transport planning, geomatics, IT, and business (to mention but a few) are integrated around common or inter-related transport topics. Under the Centre, specific stand-alone units such as the Institute of Railway and Transportation Planning and Engineering offer important exemplars, through their longstanding profile and acknowledged competency across both technical, engineering-driven concerns alongside the broader social and economic contexts of rail transport infrastructure. lower-status regional universities are effectively learning from the larger or more established universities in the CRC, rather than contributing original research outputs in their own right. The strength of the CRC model lies in its flexibility – with different CRCs being variously housed in a particular university, existing as a stand-alone office (with input from a range of university researchers), or even existing in the ‘virtual’ sphere in some instances (rather than having a bricks-andmortar home). They span a long list of partner universities and have involvement from a wide variety of Australian jurisdictions, companies, and government departments. CRCs have become one of the key mechanisms for industry-university research connections in the Australian context. The CRC for Water Sensitive Cities is a recognised leading exemplar – whose activities seemingly hold resonance for the concept of an Indonesian institute of infrastructure. Page (including design thereof). ARRB offers a useful exemplar because of its rich history, diverse but coherent activities, up-to-date attitudes to funding and resourcing, leading-edge technical expertise, public interest agenda, and a universally high regard and standing in the national and international transport research community.
  10. 10. Engineers Australia offers ‘registered practicing engineer’ status to professionals across the civil and other engineering disciplines in Australia. Engineers Australia is to all intents and purposes a monopoly institute in this role – a phenomenon mirrored by similar institutes stemming culturally from the UK’s Institution of Civil Engineers. These institutes straddle mundane activities such as intra-industry networking with the quite different demands of a quasi-regulatory role. As an example – engineering programs at even the most prestigious of Australia’s universities require regular accreditation from Engineers Australia for those programs and degrees to be acceptable as a credential for establishing ‘practicing engineer’ status for the holder. Clearly this is a somewhat self-referential and circular dynamic - Similarly, the Planning Institute of Australia (PIA) provides ‘registered practicing planner’ status to holders of three year undergraduate degrees with threshold levels of workplace experience (tellingly, this experience must be completed under the supervision of another PIA member). A registered planner is, in the final analysis, credentialed mainly for the processing of development applications or various project approvals under pre-existing planning schemes (ie preparation, submission, or assessment). This role definition is very similar to that played in the United States by the American Planning Association (APA). Although we recognise the important current role of organisations like PIA or APA, there are broader questions as to whether their accreditation or ‘continuing professional development’ thresholds are appropriate for the demands faced in creating metropolitan-scale strategic plans, or in project development and implementation work for major infrastructure projects. Indeed, these organisations themselves face regular internal discussion around the standards expected of higher-level practitioners and experts – although no definitive solution has yet been tabled. As with organisations like Engineers Australia – many advanced practitioners or experts may transition into a career trajectory for which APA or PIA membership becomes less relevant or crucial over time. 9 Professional institutes offer a fulcrum for networking and exchange within a particular profession, alongside representation of that profession to key external stakeholders. The point-of-difference between professional institutes and the other organisations discussed in this document lies in their accreditation role, and hence they often also feature greater depth of membership (within a particular profession). The role of professional institutes is evolving – but a coherent critique of these institutes could revolve around their focus on minimum standards and entry into professional status. It could be suggested that these institutes don’t sufficiently distinguish between the credentials and standards applicable for early-career, entry-level professionals, versus those operating at higher levels of seniority, technical complexity, project scale, or social impact. There is seemingly no professional institute in the world that focuses explicitly on ‘major infrastructure’ or its planning, finance and delivery, But there is nothing to suggest at this stage that such an institute would not be useful in Indonesia – possibly even featuring some form of accreditation role in future. although at this stage the role of Engineers Australia faces no serious challenge in the regulatory sphere. The greatest question for such institutes perhaps lies in their relevance and applicability for advanced practitioners and experts – whose own individual credentials may lend them unassailable in roles outside the narrow confines of ‘signing off’ for plans or on-paper technical designs. Advanced practitioners may no longer see value in membership of an institute focused on lower-level credentials for specific technical roles and activities. Page 5. Professional Institutes
  11. 11. In summary it is mainly this ‘agenda-setting’ dynamic which renders the industry bodies worthy of review and consideration. While an Indonesian institute of infrastructure would need to be prominent, and have a clear role in public discussion or agenda-setting, we might hope it would be continuously mindful of public and taxpayer interests, and evidence-based in its approach to agendas and policy issues. Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (IPA) is a group with diverse membership but focused almost exclusively on the issue of PPPs. IPA is actually very small by staff numbers, and tends to operate mainly in the space of public and media debate, and through consistent involvement in government-sponsored ‘studies’ and ‘working groups’. Without being overly critical, it seems at times remarkable that IPA has been Urban Taskforce is another small (3 staff) Australian group which has arisen out of the perceived need for the real estate development industry (particularly) to intensify its communication on infrastructure-related issues. Urban Taskforce is, again, focused on media impact and profile (and internal member discussion to some degree) – rather than having a robust and coherent research, knowledge-development, policy formulation, or capability-building role. Its focus on themes of ‘private development profits supported by public funding for infrastructure’ could be perceived as counter-productive for any larger, broader and more co-operative sectoral discussion around better infrastructure outcomes (or collaborations). Urban Taskforce was part of a successful lobbying effort to overturn a widely-accepted ‘user pays’ infrastructure funding regime across Australia in recent years, in favour of a return to state and local government infrastructure subsidies for privatelydeveloped housing estates. Property Council of Australia self-describes mainly as a ‘champion of the interests of members’ and a ‘business ally’ of members, rather than specifically being an organisation based on professional standards, knowledge development, or knowledge transfer (although it lays contestable claims to such activities). Certainly, the Property Council 10 Industry bodies are a particularly pervasive phenomenon in a market like Australia – where small but well-resourced groups can be physically and philosophically prominent-enough to be relevant and active sounding-boards for both industry and government actors. It is not clear whether this dynamic of a very large number of small and diverse industry representative groups could be relevant in a market like Indonesia - where population is an order of magnitude greater. In any case, the role of these industry bodies is worth reviewing and canvassing. While they could be perceived as relatively weak on research and knowledge-transfer, their achievement in setting an agenda for public discourse and policy decisions is successful out of all proportion (and hence an interesting phenomenon in its own right). As a first point of contrast, it is clear that industry bodies are substantially less prominent in a larger, more diverse marketplace like the United States (the reputation for industry lobbying in Washington DC notwithstanding). successful in retaining government membership - as an organisation devoted mainly to furthering the interests of its private sector ‘big corporate’ stakeholders. IPA could be perceived as largely not relevant to harder-edged issues and developments in evidence-based infrastructure policy, governance, and financing. IPA tends to focus on re-iterating a set of clear and consistent messages around the desirability of private involvement in public infrastructure delivery where government resources are limited – and accordingly is invariably prominent in any corporate or private sector-led discussion around these topics. Page 6. Industry Associations
  12. 12. Urban Land Institute (ULI) is a prominent US organisation that seems to effectively balance a ‘big corporate’ membership base with a publically-spirited and responsible role in policy advocacy and policy development, plus the dissemination of progressive planning and real estate ideas. Urban Land Institute has around 80 years track record – and currently focuses on concepts of ‘smart growth’, and important contemporary housing and infrastructure issues with a social and environmental dimension, while retaining a mainstream membership base in the real estate and development sectors. ULI’s apparently substantive resource base seems to allow it the opportunity to engage In summary, the networking, events-management, and public advocacy roles of all these industry associations are worth noting. It is suggested that the US-based ULI exemplar provides better overall guidance, due to their inherent acknowledgement of the public interest in policy discussion. Correspondingly, ULI also appears to have a strong and proactive research capability at its core – which presumably forms an important component for any emergent Indonesian infrastructure institute. 11 highly-credentialed researchers to deliver its policy papers or analysis. ULI also offers a ‘panel’ formation role (essentially a clearing-house for technical input) and ‘technical assistance’ more broadly. As with many US-based NGOs, these roles tend to straddle into consulting – and there would clearly be a debate as to whether such roles are suitable in the context of a new Indonesian institute of infrastructure. We might comment that overall, ULI represents a similar sectoral membership base to an equivalent Australian organisation in the Property Council, but the tenor of its core ideas on planning and infrastructure are recognisably more up-to-date, progressive, evidence-based, and socially responsible. One can only assume that being up-to-date is a benefit to members, rather than a hindrance. Page holds no professional accreditation role. Overall, the Property Council is quite successful at walking a perceptual line between being an ‘industry group’ and being an outright lobbyist for industry interests – a role that it does indeed carry-out reasonably robustly. Property Council’s relevance to the Indonesian institutional context probably lies in its sustained success at attracting membership and resources, and its broad involvement in the property industry across all major cities of Australia. Property Council seems to have a lively and active membership, a regular agenda of events, and a high public profile – but articulates a reasonably narrow view on complex issues such as planning, urban design, infrastructure, infrastructure finance, or the appropriate role of public interests (broadly defined) when industry engages with government on policy questions.
  13. 13. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy is a US not-for-profit that focuses primarily on research, public and industry communication and policy advocacy. To carry out these functions, Lincoln relies on an endowment funded model – which in the classic American tradition renders it largely independent of industry or sectoral fashions. As with ULI, Lincoln provides a progressive, up-to-date, evidence-based view on metropolitan planning, sustainable infrastructure (such as mass transit) and land or housing policy. Lincoln has distinguished itself particularly through the popularising role of some of its staff – as noted writers and communicators for mainstream audiences. Lincoln also offers scholarships at PhD level for research into key policy or technical questions. These latter two roles may not be immediately obvious – but are worthy of initial consideration for a new Indonesian institute. Embarq is a not-for-profit focused on bus rapid transit (BRT) in developing cities. Embarq’s activities are oriented mainly to pro-BRT public relations and promotion, but also span research (loosely defined) and provision of technical support and expertise on a project basis. Embarq appears to be extremely well-resourced - with a large professional and technical staff base. Embarq’s exclusive emphasis on BRT can be seen as curious, in a world where public transport traditionally spans a diverse range of modes and options, and where This dynamic perhaps alerts us of the need for institutions that are broad-based, diverse, multi-party, independent, and which effectively balance specific technical options against a sense of policy choices. Enabling institutions need to prioritise ‘what is best for the taxpayer’ and demonstrate a strong orientation to the public interest. Presumably a new, multi-partner Indonesian institute of infrastructure fits into the ‘NGO’ mould in some manner or other. With relatively few infrastructure-focused NGOs around to provide a template, it falls to potential members and major stakeholders to proactively chart a course forward that is largely original, unique, and responsive to circumstance. 12 Beyond government and the commercial sector, the ‘institutional’ landscape of infrastructure sees strong representation from NGOs and not-for profit organisations. NGOs and not-for-profits are increasingly focused and professional in their approach -hence their impacts are growing. Undoubtedly, a new Indonesian institute of infrastructure will take on some of the roles, outlooks or activities represented among the organisations here below. ‘mode neutrality’ is valued. A review of Embarq’s membership and sponsors suggests a strong emphasis on heavy industry, bus and roadrelated interests, and representation from several of the world’s largest petroleum suppliers. Without being overly critical about Embarq’s wellintentioned work, there could be concerns around the promotion of particular options and technologies in-line with donor interests. Page 7. NGOs & not-for-profits
  14. 14. Infrastructure Australia (IA), when formed around 2008, had a defined role as an assessor and funder of nationally significant infrastructure projects, drawing on a ‘pool of funds’ as its resource base. More recently, the ‘pool’ has diminished and IA increasingly focuses on project assessment, and on working with government partners on a caseby-case basis to fund agreed projects. IA is interesting particularly because of this assessment and appraisal role. While IA is notionally ‘independent and expert‘, it has struggled to consistently maintain both of those challenging attributes. But the role and concept of “independent assessment” is worthy of consideration for any new Indonesian institute. Presumably a new institute might assist and support a move toward open, independent assessment. But it may also conceivably have a role in executing such assessments itself (if that capability were of interest to stakeholders). IA also maintains a ‘list’ of major projects – although is running into problems around transparency and the level of information provided to justify and clarify that list of projects. At present, IA merely suggests that various projects are more or less ‘preferred’ than others, without providing substantive justification behind that ranking (although The trend toward Government-Owned Corporations (GOCs) and quasi-private provision of infrastructure is worth tracking as an influential phenomenon in its own right. This trend seems to be occurring in Indonesia as quickly as anywhere else in the world. Hence the trend toward GOCs becomes a framing reality around which a new Infrastructure institute presumably arranges itself in Indonesia. GOCs, new and old, would also presumably become core members of a new institute. Some better practice among GOCs is identifiable in a leading exemplar like: Hong Kong MTR Corporation successfully straddles the worlds of government and commercial activity, and shapes Hong Kong as a city through real estate development, and the infrastructure needed to move large numbers of people daily. MTR is a profitable, stock market listed company with HK Government still retaining a large shareholding. In many respects, MTR is similar to the diversified business model of private and public railway companies present throughout Asia, including in Japan. The sheer success of MTR and similar firms in transport and commercial terms provides a pointer to the level of sophistication and policy nuance required to deliver world-beating infrastructure in a developing mega-city like Jakarta over time. The key finding here is that any new infrastructure institute would need to be capable of supporting and explaining far-reaching transitions in the role and capabilities of key infrastructure organisations (and indeed GOCs) toward advanced practice standards. 13 Government itself seeks to innovate and adapt its approach to infrastructure through its organisational units and structures. While it is difficult to position any given example as genuinely ‘best practice’, there are some roles, functions and trends worth considering in the context of a potential new Indonesian institute of infrastructure. A new multi-partner Indonesian institute would not replicate or deliver the same mainstream public sector activities represented below, but it might have a significant role in supporting progressive change and adoption of new approaches. It would lay the research, analytical, skillsdevelopment, and informational foundations to assist and explain substantive changes and innovations as required. claiming to perform such analysis out of the public eye). The idea of an infrastructure ‘list’ and a ranking of projects according to merit is probably also worthy of consideration among the potential roles of an Indonesian institute – with the institute supporting and sustaining a move in that direction at the very least, if asked to do so. Page 8. Infrastructure in Government
  15. 15. The Transbay Joint Powers Authority (TJPA) is a special purpose vehicle for a massive downtown renewal and station redevelopment project in San Francisco. A diverse array of state and local government arms and organisations combine themselves into the TJPA to create a commercially-focused delivery organisation built on equity contributions. The key issue here, again, is the rapid evolution and sophistication of new-era best practice infrastructure delivery arrangements. An Indonesian institute would presumably need to play a key role in researching and explaining these new and emerging delivery models to government, industry and even the general public. The Partnerships Victoria policy created a specialist PPP unit within the Department of Treasury and Finance, of the State Government of Victoria. The unit provides policy leadership and practice guidance in support of various agencies involved in project delivery. This team develops policy and project guidelines, provides advisory support to project teams, convenes training, and assists project teams in their interface with Victorian State Government. The model is generally considered to have been successful in raising the standard of projects and has provided the basis for similar arrangements in British Columbia (Canada), and at the national PPP unit in South Africa. Within the specific sub-topic of PPPs, there are a number of different government-owned or managed ‘centres of excellence’ around the world. The centres typically fall into two categories: a) government units that encourage and define best practice and provide guidance material, and b) specialist delivery units with high-end project management and finance skills. Examples of these groups include: Infrastructure Ontario (Canada) is a specialist delivery agency that implements PPP policy across Provincial Government. IO manages a diverse range of interests such as: integrating between the value of public infrastructure and real estate; managing government facilities; and financing the renewal of the province’s public infrastructure. The focus of the unit has primarily been around lending, project delivery and real estate management. The strength of this model is consistency, but questions remain around the depth of understanding provided for specific sector businesses, projects and activities. It has been suggested that lack of sectoral specialisation could hinder opportunities for project optimization. 14 Infrastructure UK is a specialist unit that concentrates on policy process and arranging finance for projects, but does not deliver projects directly. Prior to the GFC, this approach had generated a solid pipeline of projects. The Infrastructure Investments Unit within Scotland government is somewhat similar. Page Public-Private Partnership Center in the Philippines was established in its current form in 2010 with a charter to support the implementation of PPPs by facilitating, co-ordinating and monitoring PPP programs and projects. This is done via the provision of technical assistance and advisory services, capacity development, and policy formulation and evaluation. By itself this ‘professional service’ approach initially proved insufficient to stimulate the hoped-for level of in-country PPP activity. The Centre was then boosted and complemented by a multi-agency program to develop, package, competitively tender, and implement new PPP projects. This additional support facilitated new enabling capabilities, policy platforms, legal and regulatory reforms and supports, and institutional frameworks for PPP. Through these measures, the Centre is seen now to have effectively supported the creation of a workable pipeline of PPP projects.
  16. 16. Rapid changes in technology, society and economy in the early 21 century place ever-greater demands on government and industry to deliver an infrastructure outcome and city environment that is acceptable to residents, and which actively fosters better living and business conditions. At the same time, the profound economic impacts of decent, well-planned infrastructure mean that opportunities abound for projects that are either partially ‘self-sustaining’ at the very least, or fully ‘self-funding’ at best. But this effortless provision of quality infrastructure through a practical delivery and financing package depends absolutely on the support and efforts of a broad team of wellrehearsed infrastructure specialists. These specialists will invariably be working in concert across institutions and jurisdictions. Some may go so far as to say that great cities, with the best infrastructure, have become that way through application of high levels of skill and co-operation in infrastructure conception and delivery (more than though accident, happenstance, the actions of a single leadership figure - or through any other specific factor). Great societies and better cities demand exemplary infrastructure capabilities. st In the 21 century the process of effective delivery begins with advanced analysis and interpretation of existing conditions, the drivers and sources of change, and the current and future needs of the populace and businesses. Good planning demands brilliant analysis. Through good planning, we can identify agreeable policy parameters, and a shortlist of potential infrastructure initiatives and projects. These should then be assessed at arms-length, and the most compelling prioritised because of the social, economic, environmental and functional benefits they If we presume that we are selecting and working with the best project proposals, offering the greatest array of economic benefits – then project implementation and financing become radically more straight-forward and attainable. Conversely, selecting projects for reasons other than a clear and positive economic contribution implies great difficulty in financing and even in attaining multi-stakeholder agreement and commitment. With a compelling financial package and clear triple bottom-line rationale, the range of beneficiaries is invariably greater. This smooths the way for an array of institutions, levels-of-government and industry players to get involved, support, contribute and deliver from within their respective areas of influence and competency. But each and every element of this delivery process is entirely reliant on; individual technical skills, organisational capabilities, trust, open discussion, and the sharing of advanced knowledge. For these reasons, infrastructure specialists have often looked at the question of overall ‘institutional and sectoral capabilities’ and identified these as a preexisting requirement that precedes, but ultimately supports the creation of better infrastructure and better cities. We believe that for these reasons, the time has come to create the settings for sustained advancement of skills and capabilities in the infrastructure sector in Indonesia. Whatever is ventured into an initiative for developing the analytical, policy, finance and project capabilities of sectoral stakeholders is likely to be repaid many times over in the form of more effective, efficient project planning and delivery. Indonesia’s competitiveness and social dynamism depends on a major step-forward in the infrastructure sector. 15 st offer. The best projects will invariably match-up well against pre-agreed policy guidelines and directions. Page 9. Seamless Delivery – a new paradigm of policy and projects
  17. 17. SIG – Policy & Investment This SIG connects with Government of Indonesia objectives to accelerate delivery of needed infrastructure. A full variety of policy and financing innovations should be engaged and discussed, including but not limited to PPPs. Assume that accelerated, more effective project delivery demands increasingly effective governance and sectoral performance. This SIG then becomes a key hub for discussion, debate and research of policy change and investment innovation. Picture: Transport and urban planning conference in Colombia, 2013. Special interest groups could frame and initiate topic-specific discussions and events. SIG – Commercial Transport Infrastructure This SIG covers the movement of freight and commercial traffic at a regional scale. This SIG should be positioned at the interface between international, intra-national (and island-to-island), and localised 16 In this section, we canvas the idea that a new Infrastructure Institute could find strength in diversity – by providing a number of ‘special interest groups’ that link with key themes, fields of business activity, and the topical interests of organisations, government units, and professionals. Special Interest Groups (SIGs) may allow members to arrange their input into the institute in a more practical and meaningful manner, and allow a more personalised experience of membership. The SIGs may stand coherently as largely self-managing and self-actualising units within the overall institute, drawing on the leadership of champions and discipline experts. They could become the key interface for project-level research funding decisions. The following discussion is representative, but not exhaustive of the themes and topics that might form themselves into special interest groups. We envisage the institute will initially comprise those SIGs with greatest up-front support and momentum, but the inauguration of new or pre-nominated SIGs should be pursued as circumstances allow over time. SIG – Integrated Metropolitan Infrastructure This SIG covers distinct but inter-related fields such as metropolitan planning policy, housing and social infrastructure decisions, urban design, transport strategy, and mass transit networks. This SIG engages across the infrastructure required to support; quality of life, housing options that meet contemporary needs, livable attractive cities and neighbourhoods, and convenient 21st century urban people-movement. Page 10. Key Themes in Indonesian Infrastructure
  18. 18. movement of commercial vehicles and goods. It comprises a concern for ports, rail freight corridors, trunk roads, and distribution networks. SIG – Infrastructure Challenges in Informal Settlements This SIG addresses the unique and special challenges of providing better infrastructure and living conditions to informal settlements, and indeed the future planning and evolution of such locations. SIG – Airports This SIG addresses policy, planning, supportive infrastructure and business models for major and regional airports. SIG – Infrastructure for Major Regional Cities This SIG could cluster around urban infrastructure initiatives outside of Jakarta, particularly in the larger Indonesian cities. It recognises that medium and larger non-capital cities face their own demands and conditions. It is also conceivable that this SIG could see much of its member and group activity taking place outside of Jakarta. SIG – Communications This SIG addresses an interest in 21st century telecommunications infrastructure and uptake of advanced ICT services. SIG – Water & Sanitation This SIG clusters around water supply and sanitation infrastructure - and its planning, engineering, financing, pricing, governance and delivery. SIG – Energy Supply This SIG clusters around electricity and gas supply infrastructure - its planning, engineering, financing, governance and delivery. Picture: Jakarta’s varied pattern of urban development suggests a broad range of infrastructurerelated interests and topics need to be covered. Page SIG – Better Infrastructure for Women This SIG could provide a forum for driving research and exchanging information around infrastructure initiatives that enable better outcomes in women’s health and economic progress. It could also comprise a key form for women working in the infrastructure sector to meet and exchange knowledge and support. 17 SIG – Rural Infrastructure and Agriculture This SIG connects with the substantial population base in rural and regional Indonesia, and their infrastructure-related needs. It should cover agriculture, irrigation, social needs, rural supply chains, and settlement-based planning and infrastructure delivery solutions.
  19. 19. “To become known nationally and internationally for its high quality and independent evidence-based policy advice on infrastructure and the PPP approach to Indonesian governments at the national, provincial and local levels, and to Indonesian and international investors and businesses, and for its capacity building in the public and private infrastructure sector of Indonesia.” This mission statement could be rephrased to suggest the institute should be: a) independent, but collaborative and multi-themed – with a broad and diverse membership and support base b) marshalling highest-level expertise in technical and policy-based aspects of infrastructure – and in a position to regularly exercise this expertise through evidence-based research and advice c) a sustained driver of enhanced capabilities for infrastructure policy, planning, evaluation, finance, and delivery On the governance and direction of a new institution The University of Melbourne accepts most of the governance and organisational advice offered by Parikesit et al (2012, part 3) regarding the establishment of a new institute. Especially the scope of activities (pp 7-8) seems appropriate and comprehensive. On the other hand, there are a small number of recommendations in Parikesit et al (2012, part 3) where a contrasting view may prove valuable at this stage. Particularly the recommendation that the ‘board of management’ would be separate from the ‘board of researchers’ seems worthy of challenge. This separation and distinction appears arbitrary and counter-productive - and we recommend, by contrast, the creation of a single board which incorporates and intertwines high-level infrastructure research leaders with key partners, sponsors, and recognised leaders from government and business. We feel a better outcome is achievable where research, capability-development, and evidence-based analysis becomes the core focus of discussion for business and government leaders in board-level interactions with the institute - in direct consultation and partnership with research leaders. Neither should the institution’s organisational, governance and strategic decision-making be kept at a distance from skilled research practitioners – the best of whom bring track records in organisational governance and program management to the table, in addition to their technical or academic skills-base. The University of Melbourne team also recommends strongly that ‘specific research topics’ (see pp 9-11) should be kept at a thematic level at this stage, to be decided by the actual board, researchers, and government or private sector institute members on a case-by-case basis using a system of ‘matching funds and resources’ for specific proposals. While we accept many or most of the suggested ‘specific topics’ as 18 Parikesit et al (2012, p6) summarised a potential ‘mission’ for an Indonesian infrastructure institute or centre thus: These activities would include (in summary, and in-brief): research and development exercises on agreed topics; skills development and training; direct policy advice; stimulation of open, broad-based policy discussion (especially through regular events and publications); and a certain degree of self-responsibility for sourcing and growing the institute’s own diversified funding base into the future. Page 11. Workable Options
  20. 20. Roughly similar to the arrangement in Australian CRCs (co-operative research centres), we suggest that membership should involve twophases of commitment to research projects, and two types of resource contribution. Member organisations should perhaps contribute in the following manner:   an up-front annual cash commitment – the majority of which will cover basic institute operating costs, with another portion thereof ventured into a ‘base research funding pool’ matching cash commitment from members on a case-by-case basis for specific research projects that meet the needs and criteria of a quorum of members. This second-phase cash commitment to specific research projects is only enacted on the basis of an accepted, detailed research proposal, which initially The membership base The membership of the institute should be diverse and multi-faceted, but the role of key patron organisations is paramount – especially during early years of the institute’s operations. We suggest that a first-tier of 35 ‘gold patron’ funding partners is required. These partners could be committing in the order of $US 100,000 or more per annum in up-front membership fees, depending on the institute’s ultimate financing and ramp-up program. Beyond the top tier of funding partners, a larger selection of between 5-10 ‘silver’ member organisations could presumably contribute some $50,000 cash per year – as a mixture of upfront fees and ‘matching funds’ for research projects. And finally, a much larger pool again should be allowed for from individual medium and small-scale organisations, presumably involving an affordable annual subscription fee (providing basic access to events) for individual members. These ‘broader’ membership categories would presumably not have direct access to or involvement in research exercises, and would have no role in decision-making and governance. 19 A ‘matched’ funding mechanism for operations and research At this stage, we put forward the suggestion that specific research projects would be initiated through the SIG mechanism, on the basis of demonstrated support from institute partners and members. This holds implications for the nature of membership and financial contributions.  meets the approval of the SIG for which it is relevant. The ‘matching’ cash commitment can then be combined with pool funds to finance the research endeavour. There should be an annual minimum threshold for member’s cash commitment to research initiatives. This threshold can be exceeded a mixture of cash and ‘in-kind’ commitment overall (in both upfront annual commitments, and for specific research exercises). ‘In-kind’ contributions include important resources such as; staff time, use of facilities and equipment, sharing of data and expertise Page worthy and useful, it appears more important at this stage to work toward those specifics subsequent to the framing influence provided by the formation of topical special interest groups (SIGs). As such, a potential institute structure reflecting this thinking is put forward hereafter for initial consideration (broadly speaking, and subject to further input and refinement). Other themes, topics, and potential SIGs not listed above in part 11 might include: social infrastructure; legal practice and legal reform for infrastructure; land titling and acquisition; and tracking and publication of overall industry or sectoral performance analytics – including perhaps the regular publication of a presumed, projected or acknowledged ‘infrastructure pipeline’.
  21. 21. $US 400,000 Overall makeup, role and resourcing of the board The board may presumably comprise a maximum of around 12 persons – drawn from a mixture of government, NGOs, research organisations (primarily universities), private sector companies, and perhaps major international donor partners. It should also involve the director of operations/CEO. We presume that the majority of this staffing would be provided by partner organisations as an in-kind contribution, but it is reasonable to expect that the ‘research’ board members might be paid an honorarium, and there may be merit in appointing a professional chair on a fee basis. While it is possible that the board might be covered entirely from in-kind, we should countenance the idea of the above four $US 156,000 Makeup and role of operations and executive team We presume that an ultimate mature institute would require one full time director of operations and/or CEO, and one full time administrative staff member. Staffing beyond this level would only be countenanced and considered on need at a later stage. On the basis of 1.0 FTE for the CEO at $195,000 ($150,000 salary plus on-costs) and 1.0 FTE for the admin staff member at $65,000 ($50,000 salary plus on-costs), the annual operational staffing costs of the institute would be: $US 260,000 Office accommodation and general operations costs We presume (unless indications emerge otherwise) that office space and office-related overheads would be provided as part of the in-kind contribution from one of the main partner organisations - presumably either a government or a university wishing to ‘house’ a pre-eminent institute within their facilities. But a cash resource base for events, publicity and travel would presumably also be required. At this stage, we estimate that in mature phases an annual ‘general operations’ budget for the Institute would be in the order of 10% of operating costs, or: $US 80,000 20 Expectations for ongoing research endeavour and activity Identification and proposing of potential research projects should be resourced from a base of in-kind contribution from both the partner organisations and the university research providers. Beyond that, we expect that each individual ‘standard’ one-year research exercise could involve some $50,000 in cash payment for salaries and costs to research providers. If we presume eight projects per year, the implied cash demand is: positions (three research directors and a chair) being staffed professionally at a rate of around 0.2 FTE at $195,000 (including 30% on-costs). This equates to an implied annual cash demand of: Page A sustainable end position for institute staffing After several years of operation, we would expect the institute to be self-sustaining on the basis of an established and stable multi-tiered membership and funding base. In this context, it is timely to estimate the scale and resources required for sustained operation, and hence to some degree the expectations for partner and member contributions at that mature stage. Here below is a listing of basic institute activities, the personnel required to deliver presumed outcomes, and an early-stage estimate of cash resources required to deliver:
  22. 22. Indicative Organisational Structure Board & executive staff *strategy & governance *operations & budget *membership & publicity *management of events, training, knowledge exchange & dissemination *research contracts other SIG SIG SIG policy & investment commercial transport (example only) (example only) other SIG (example only) 21 SIG Page integrated metropolitan infrastructure
  23. 23. This amount presumably defines the cash contributions required from partner organisations and members, in both-up front and matched research funds. It also partly defines the number of cornerstone partners, and the scale of the membership base needed. The split of ‘operational overheads’ to ‘direct research activity’ under the figures described in previous pages is around 55/45 - and we suggest the desirability of this balance should be vigorously debated by potential partners. There may well be an expectation that overheads and staffing would remain largely stable while direct research endeavour expands as the institute matures, shifting the balance of ‘overhead’ to ‘core activity’ over time. In rough and generic terms, a budget in the order of $900,000 would imply a need for around four cornerstone ‘gold partners’ at $100,000 each, and some seven ‘silver’ partners at $50,000 each, plus the remainder from fees contributed by the broader membership pool. This seems, at face value, to be potentially workable and achievable. Start-up process: first-steps during year one The ‘mature’ financing and resourcing arrangement outlined above presumably occurs at around year 2-3 of operations, or perhaps for the 2016 calendar year or later – depending on circumstances. In initial phases, and if working on the presumption there is an interest in seeing Equally, the scale of research activity and budget allocation to general (non-salary) operating costs could and would presumably be substantively lower during year one particularly. We might also expect that provision for paid board members and a paid chair could be at least partially foregone or limited during year one. Development process for the institute business model These parameters and figures are put forward at this stage only as a starting point for discussion and debate among interested stakeholders. We would expect the eventual arrangements to be somewhat different to those outlined above, and determined through input and agreement from industry and government throughout the feasibility study process and beyond. Interested parties should make every effort to engage the University of Melbourne study team directly, provide a formal submission by the due date, and become involved in workshop discussions with other potential stakeholders. 22 $US 896,000 the institute initiated at some stage during 2014, we might imagine that many of the full-scale cost elements could be forgone in years one and two. Under this scenario, the institute could be ‘virtual’ in not drawing on specific office accommodation needs. We might also expect that there would not be a full time CEO or admin staff – and that these roles could be filled on a part-time basis initially and/or as a generous in-kind foundation contribution from key stakeholders. Page Preliminary annual total budget estimate during mature phases The sum total of these assumed annual cost elements comes to some:
  24. 24. A vehicle for sustaining broad-based economic development Any institute would need to demonstrate its worth by acting as a key mechanism for sustaining economic growth with responsible social and environmental characteristics. We suggest that any specific or sectional interest of a potential institute needs to be subsidiary to, contextualised by, and supportive-of this over-arching economic development rationale. Given the necessity of quality infrastructure for economic and social development, and its profound impacts, we suggest that an ‘economic development’ rationale for a new institute is natural and attainable, but this possibly represents an emerging nuance around which further discussion is needed. Relationship to government – separate but supportive Much discussion among the project team so far has surrounded the perceived needs and future directions of Government of Indonesia Core focus – value-adding through enhanced skills and capabilities We believe that a distinct and important role is available to a new institute where it focuses on ‘value–adding’ and improved productivity within the Indonesian infrastructure sector, and in specific infrastructure fields. At face value, public and private sector stakeholders currently agree a need for accelerated infrastructure delivery in Indonesia. This then suggests that a new institute can play a framing role through sustained support for skills and knowledge-development that enhances sectoral working productivity. A focus on value-add, capabilities, enhanced productivity, and new knowledge is aided by networking, but these outcomes exist as a higher rationale than networking per se. The institute can thus presumably distinguish itself by moving beyond networking and into the realm of focused and sustained sectoral performance enhancement. Membership base – strength in diversity There appears to be little value in a potential institute that does not balance effectively between all the stakeholders and partners that contribute to infrastructure thinking, policy and delivery in the Indonesian context. While the idea of public-private interaction is commonly advanced, the University of Melbourne team suggests that 23 During September and October, the authors of this document will seek feedback from stakeholders regarding the, need for, benefits, scope and nature of a potential new multi-partner Indonesian infrastructure institute. This document serves as a platform for early-stage discussion of important issues, with the hope that new ideas and further thinking from industry and government is stimulated, and then articulated in both the submissions, and the workshop series. Subject to these inputs, a final concept will be refined and tabled in the form of a feasibility report. At this stage though, the University of Melbourne team are willing to provide some early recommendations to guide and stimulate further discussion. These should not be read as final or conclusive, but are representative of questions to be discussed and debated further. ministries, organisations and stakeholders. It has taken a certain amount of time to become absolutely apparent that the role of a new multipartner institute would be to support skills-development, policy discussion, and research needs of GOI stakeholders, rather than anticipating or being directly involved in GOI activities and decisions. We believe the institute should have a strong working relationship and robust membership from GOI partners - but its activities need to be independent, and focused on sectoral capacity-building outcomes. The institute should be supportive of the needs of GOI members, rather than part of government. Page 12. Recommendations – a new institute that suits Indonesian circumstances
  25. 25. The role of commissioned research Another point of difference presumably arises where the new institute has research delivery capabilities at its core. Around agreed research projects, the clustering of policy discussion, knowledge-exchange, progressive new ideas and value-adding presumably falls into place. In the absence of the creation of new knowledge through research initiatives, an institute is presumably positioned further from the cuttingedge, and networking becomes an activity undertaken for its own sake, rather than a natural adjunct to learning, debate, and the introduction of new policy ideas. On the inherent & demonstrable need for an infrastructure institute The feasibility study represented in this document, at an early stage, is fundamentally engaged with a question of whether a new infrastructure institute is needed in Indonesia. Relatedly - if an institute is indeed needed, then what are its presumed benefits...? Further input will be taken from industry and government actors. But at this stage, we suggest that a new institute is needed at face value for the following reasons: a demand for acceleration of infrastructure delivery among GOI and other stakeholders (see World Bank 2012); the need for a platform of enhanced trust and policy awareness to sustain such an acceleration (see Parakesit et al 2012); and the question of quality outcomes in infrastructure design, specification, procurement and performance (see Bakker 2007) – for which sustained sectoral skill-enhancement and capability development appears to be the prime and logical answer. 24 Topics and themes – broad coverage across infrastructure There appears at this early stage to be sufficient depth and breadth of interest from government and industry to suggest that the institute can sustain a reasonably comprehensive coverage of infrastructure-related themes and topics over time. To counterbalance breadth, we suggest that depth of understanding can be achieved with attention to particular needs and issues among the specific ‘special interest groups’. By developing shared knowledge and experience among professionals with an interest in these specific topics, we suggest that ‘depth’ will be delivered alongside a more tailored, personalised and relevant experience of institute membership. The ‘Public Interest’ as driver The culture and activities of an institute will arise and define themselves over time from the perspectives and needs of members. But basic understanding of the nature of infrastructure-related activities seems to suggest that a new institute could gain greatest traction if ‘the public interest’ were adopted as a shared intellectual driver. Recognition of public interest perspectives and issues would seem to be of primary importance to GOI and academic stakeholders or NGOs particularly, but it also seems to connect with a more enlightened audience and discussion among private sector partners – who will presumably recognise that infrastructure investment flows more predictably when the public interest is addressed. It appears worth tabling this perspective in any case at this stage – with the expectation that potential stakeholders will frame their response through formal submissions and participation in upcoming workshops. Page NGOs and researchers (primarily university academics) are very much part of the mix in a diverse and robust infrastructure discussion. Equally, we distinguish between the roles and natures of private sector planners, technical consultants, financiers and project principals. The knowledge-related needs and contributions of consultants tend to be quite different from those of corporate construction professionals (for example), or government officials. In order to optimise sectoral knowledge exchange and policy discussion we suggest that an invitation be provided for each distinct stakeholder or professional group.
  26. 26. 13. Short Bibliography Embarq Documents Engineers Australia Bakker (2007) Trickle Down? Private sector participation and the propoor water supply debate in Jakarta, Indonesia. Geoforum 38 GAMUT (University of Melbourne) Parikesit, Black, Lea and Strang (2012) Towards a Refocused Indonesian National Delivery Process for Infrastructure: a concept for a Centre of Evidence-based policy analysis of infrastructure and PPP. GREAT initiative Hong Kong MTR Corporation American Planning Association Centre for Transportation Research – University of Stuttgart Co-operative Research Centres home page (Australian Government) CRC for Water Sensitive Cities Infrastructure Partnerships Australia Infrastructure UK Institution of Civil Engineers Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Ontario Infrastructure 25 Websites Infrastructure Investments Unit (Scotland) Page World Bank, Indonesia Office (2012) FY 2013-2015 Country Partnership Strategy for Indonesia. The World Bank, Indonesia Office Infrastructure Australia
  27. 27. Planning Institute of Australia Property Council of Australia Public-Private Partnership Center (Phillippines) SMART (at University of Wollongong) Transbay Joint Powers Authority University of California at Berkeley – City and Regional Planning Urban Land Institute Urban Taskforce Page 26 Victorian Government – PPPs at Department of Treasury & Finance