Protecting pastoralists against mortality losses due to severe forage scarcity

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Presented by Andrew Mude at the Workshop on The Future of Pastoralism in Africa: International Conference to Debate Research Findings and Policy Options, Addis Ababa, 21-23 March 2011.

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Protecting pastoralists against mortality losses due to severe forage scarcity

  1. 1. Index Based Livestock Insurance<br />Protecting pastoralists against mortality losses due to severe forage scarcity<br />Andrew Mude<br />The Future of Pastoralism in Africa<br />Addis Ababa, March 21-23, 2011<br />
  2. 2. Setting the Context<br />Pastoralist Risk Management CRSP (PARIMA): Among its many lessons we learn that….<br />…..Pastoralists are very vulnerable to widespread forage scarcity<br />…. livestock mortality due to forage scarcity is by far the biggest risk.<br />Causes of Livestock Mortality<br />Borena Zone<br />Marsabit District<br />
  3. 3. Responding to Risk<br />Basically there are two ways to deal with risk:<br />Reduce the impact of Risk<br /><ul><li>Mitigation (ex-ante): Transhumance, Diversification, etc.
  4. 4. Management(ex-post): Traditional system of support (not very effective for shared risks), productive safety nets, restocking etc.</li></ul>Risk transfer<br /><ul><li>Shifting the burden of that risk to a different entity – for a fee.
  5. 5. This basic idea behind INSURANCE.</li></li></ul><li>The Case for Index Insurance<br /><ul><li>Sustainable insurance can:
  6. 6. Prevent downward slide of vulnerable populations
  7. 7. Stabilize expectations & crowd-in investment and accumulation by poor populations
  8. 8. Induce financial deepening by crowding-in credit supply and demand
  9. 9. But can insurance be sustainably offered in remote infrastructure deficient areas and to smallholders?
  10. 10. Conventional (individual) insurance unlikely to work, especially among pastoralists:
  11. 11. Transactions costs
  12. 12. Moral hazard/adverse selection</li></li></ul><li>The Case for Index Insurance<br /><ul><li>Index insurance avoids problems that make individual insurance unprofitable for small, remote clients:
  13. 13. No transactions costs of measuring individual losses
  14. 14. Preserves effort incentives (no moral hazard) as no single individual can influence index.
  15. 15. Adverse selection does not matter as payouts do not depend on the riskiness of those who buy the insurance
  16. 16. Available on near real-time basis: faster response than conventional humanitarian relief
  17. 17. Index insurance can, in principle, be used to create an effective safety net to alter poverty dynamics and help address broad-scale shocks in pastoral areas.</li></li></ul><li>From Theory to Practice<br /><ul><li>Prerequisites and Challenges of Sustainable Index Insurance:</li></ul>DEFINING THE RISK<br />Area-based product  the risk must be covariate in nature<br />Risk must be quantifiable and predictable<br />Risk must be ‘indexable’<br />IDENTIFYING THE INDEX<br />Index is a single-valued, specific measure associated with insured-risk upon which payment decisions are made<br />Must be: i) Easy to Measure, ii) Precise Indicator of Insurable Risk, iiI) Cannot be Easily Manipulated iv) Consistently Available<br />
  18. 18. From Theory to Practice<br />DESIGNING THE INDEX<br />Need to model a relationship between the risk to be insured and the index  The Response Function<br />The challenge of data availability<br />
  19. 19. From Theory to Practice<br />TESTING INDEX PERFORMACE<br />Minimizing “BASIS Risk”: <br />How well does the index correspond to the outcome it is measuring?<br />How well does the index correspond to individual outcomes? <br />
  20. 20. From Theory to Practice<br />CONTRACT FEATURES: SPATIAL COVERAGE<br />How wide a geographic area can a single index-cover?<br />What is the spatial precision range of the response function? <br />At what level of resolution is the necessary data available?<br />Administrational considerations<br /><ul><li>Two Separate NDVI-Livestock Mortality Response Functions
  21. 21. Five Separate Index Coverage Regions</li></li></ul><li>From Theory to Practice<br />CONTRACT FEATURES: TEMPORAL COVERAGE<br />Over what time span should an index cover?<br />Function of the production system/risk profile being modelled<br />Administrational considerations<br />
  22. 22. From Theory to Practice<br />CONTRACT FEATURES: RISK COVERAGE AND PRICING<br />Need to select an index strike point to trigger indemnity?<br />Trade off: Higher Strike  Lower Risk Coverage  Lower Cost<br />Conditional or Unconditional?<br />Payoff structure: Linear, Segmented, All or nothing, No claims bonus?<br />ations<br />
  23. 23. From Theory to Practice<br />INNOVATIONS INCENTIVES<br />Catalyzing the Market<br />Enabling Regulation<br />Engaging Stakeholders<br />Private vs. Public, or Partnership?<br />
  24. 24. From Theory to Practice<br />ESTABLISH INFORMED EFFECTIVE DEMAND<br />Insurance is a difficult product to sell<br />Insurance is a foreign concept to relatively uninformed target<br />Initial significant investment in extension and marketing <br />Simulation games with real information and incentives<br />
  25. 25. From Theory to Practice<br />LOW COST DELIVERY<br />Identify mechanism to deliver product to client<br />What sales delivery platform?<br />What information delivery platform?<br />IMPACT ASSESSMENT<br />Does Index-Insurance deliver the social and economic benefits it promises?<br />Need a rigorous research design to allow quantification and attribution of impacts?<br />M&E to guide scale-up<br />
  26. 26. Thank you<br />For more information please visit:<br />www.ilri.org/ibli/<br />
  27. 27. Contract Sales for Marsabit for the 2010<br />
  28. 28. Index Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI)<br /><ul><li>New innovation in insurance avoids problems that make traditional insurance unprofitable for small, remote clients:
  29. 29. Policy holders paid based on external “index” that triggers payments to all insured clients
  30. 30. Suited for risks affecting a large number of people simultaneously and for which a suitable index exists.
  31. 31. No transactions costs of measuring individual losses
  32. 32. Preserves effort incentives (no moral hazard) as no single individual can influence index.
  33. 33. Adverse selection does not matter as payouts do not depend on the riskiness of those who buy the insurance
  34. 34. Problem of “basis” risk</li></li></ul><li>Potential Benefits of IBLI<br />IBLI is designed to compensate client holders from livestock losses due to severe and prolonged forage scarcity.<br />We hypothesize that such sustainable insurance can help minimize the social and economic costs of risks in the following ways?<br />Stabilizing expectations & crowding-in investment and accumulation by poor populations<br />Preventing downward slide of vulnerable populations<br />Inducing financial deepening by crowding-in credit supply and demand <br />
  35. 35. Piloting in Marsabit and Borena<br />4-pronged effort to develop, implement and evaluate IBLI<br />FEASIBILITY STUDY<br />CONTRACT DESIGN<br />PRODUCT DELIVERY<br />IMPACT ASSESSMENT<br />
  36. 36. Feasibility Study<br />Basic prerequisites to feasibility need to be made:<br />Is the relevant data available?<br />Are necessary stakeholders interested and committed (government, regulators, insurance companies, client representatives)<br />Is this something the community will embrace and desire?<br />Is the community willing to pay for the product?<br />

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