Better lives through livestock
An update on the Epidemiology of African swine
fever in Africa
Michel Dione, Scientist
Animal and Human Health Program
International Livestock Research Institute, Dakar, Senegal
Global Alliance for Research on African swine fever (GARA) Webinar
Dakar, 24th August 2020

2
Outline
 Importance of pig keeping and socio-
economic impact of ASF
 ASF transmission cycles and distribution in
Africa
 Pig value chains and ASF
 Options for ASF control in Africa
 Lessons learned in East Africa and
recommendations for sustainable control of
ASF

Importance of pig keeping and impacts of ASF

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Importance of pig keeping
 Together with poultry, pig is one of the fastest growing
livestock sectors in Africa, and this trend is expected to
continue over the coming years (FAO, 2019).
 30% of households keep pigs in East Africa
 70-80% of pig producers in Africa are smallholder
farmers
 Limited data on the contribution of the pig sector to the
economy in African countries

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Importance of pig keeping
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Busia_Ke Teso Busia_Ug Tororo
Kenya Uganda
Proportion of annual cash income of pig keeping households from pig
keeping, by household income strata and District in project study region
Household cash income
<$1.25/day
Household cash income
$1.25-$5/day
Household cash income
>$5/day
Household cash income is based
on gross income estimates.
Income strata
Nantima et al

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Socio-economic impact of ASF
The impact of ASF outbreaks on farmers livelihoods and other value chain
actors is not well understood
 Rendelman and Spinelli (1999) assessed the social costs and benefits of ASF
prevention in the United States of America using a model with 5 outbreaks simulation -
the benefit cost ratio for the current prevention program is high, over 450. The net
benefit of prevention efforts was estimated to be almost $4,500 million at a cost of $10
million for the 10-year period considered.
 Fasina et al. (2012)- using a 122-sow piggery unit, an outbreak of ASF has potential to
cause losses of up to US$ 910,836.70 in a single year
 E.Swai and C. J. Lyimo (2014) assesed the impact of ASF epidemics in smallholder
pig production units in Rombo district, Tanzania - mortality losses arising from ASF
outbreaks were 84% of the revenue accrued from sales of live pigs and pork.

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Socio-economic impact of ASF
– High mortality
– Psychological fear that pigs
would die or have died
– Closure of markets
– Failure to restock
– Pigs sold early and at lower sale
prices
– Suboptimal production –income
foregone

Transmission cycles and distribution of ASF in
Africa

9
Cycles in which ASF virus is maintained in Africa
Sylvatic cycle between
common warthogs and tick,
Eastern and Southern
Africa (genotypes I–XXII,
XXIV)
Domestic cycle between domestic
pigs and tick for which they are the
preferred host;
Eastern and Southern Africa
(genotypes VIII, XXIV)
Domestic cycle without arthropod vector that
depends on circulation of the virus in pig populations
with high contact that offer a constant supply of
naïve pigs to infect, (genotypes I–X, XII, XIV–XXIV
in the area with the classic sylvatic cycle; genotypes
I or II elsewhere) – West Africa, Central Africa,
East and Southern Africa
Adapted from Penrith et al. 2020

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Global look at ASF in Africa
SENEGAL 1959
CABO VERDE ?1959
GUINEA BISSAU ?1959
COTE D’IVOIRE 1996-7, 2014
GHANA 1999, 2002
BURKINA FASO 2002
TOGO, BENIN 1997
NIGERIA 1977; 1997
CAMEROON 1982
Zambia 1912
S AFRICA 1928
Mauritius 2007-8
MADAGASCAR 1998
KENYA 1921
ETHIOPIA 2013
CRA. 2011
CHAD 2011
Penrith et al. 2020
Sylvatic cycle Domestic cycle
Most recent
notifications (OIE
reports 2007-2020)
Sierra Leone =2020
Namibia = 2019
Zimbabwe = 2019
Mali = 2016
Cote d’Ivoire = 2017,
2019
Cameroon = 2010
Tchad = 2018, 2019
CRA = 2010, 2012,
2015Namibia 1920s
Namibia 1979
Mozambique 1954
Zimbabwe 1970
Angola 1933
Tanzania 1914
Uganda 1983

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The increasing importance of the domestic pig cycle
Almost all outbreaks in recent
decades and spread in Africa and
beyond due to movement of
infected pigs and pork

Pig value chains and ASF

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The smallholder pig production
A large informal sector
 Mostly backyard systems, managed by women and
children (confined, tethered or free-range)
 Low productivity (breeds, feeds & health constraints)
 Uncoordinated trade & transport
 Predominantly unsupervised slaughter slabs, with no
meat inspection in local markets, road-side butchers,
pork joints
 Few medium and large-scale piggeries
 Few or no formal processing

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An example of a smallholder pig value chain in Uganda
Ouma et al., 2015

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Constraints/issues along the smallholder pig value chains
Production
Collection/bulking
Slaughter
Processing
Retail
Consumption
Inputs and services
 High disease burden – especially ASF, ecto and endo parasites
 Low bargaining power (farmers operate individually)/pig weight estimation
 Lack of capacity on low cost locally prepared feed rations
 Expensive, and of poor quality feeds (adulterated)
 Weak implementation of quality assurance systems
 Lack of designated areas for centralised slaughtering/ no meat inspection
 Poor waste management
 Lack of prerequisites for pork storage (lack of cold chain)
 Poor pork handling and hygiene practices
 High transaction costs (especially transport),
 Poor biosecurity measures resulting in disease spread
 Poor handling of pigs during transportation – affects pork quality
 Few formal processors despite high demand for pork/pork products
 Low supply of quality pigs
 Lack of awareness on pork zoonoses
 Evidence for presence of pathogens causing zoonotic diseases
Policy issues: poor enforcement of regulations (compensation, movement control and
quarantine)

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ASF associated with farming practices
Nantima et al 2015
Household clusters vulnerable to ASF
are those that practiced free range at
least some of the time
Households cluster least vulnerable to
ASF are those that have least number
of pig purchases, minimal swill
feeding, and less treatment of parasites
Result underscore need for biosecurity
practices

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Lack of feeds triggers free ranging
 Feed availability (quantity)
 Poor feed quality
 High cost of commercial feeds
 Extreme seasonal variations
 Knowledge gaps amongst
farmers to use local resources
Free ranging
Dione et al. 2015

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Pig movements and trade
Movement based on underlying
close social networks; family
ties, friendships and neighbours
Good community structure; easy
flow of knowledge, adoption of
attitudes and beliefs, but also
promote disease transmission
Disease easily reach every node
in a cluster of households
Kasiiti et al 2015; Dione et al. 2016
Traders are perceived as the
highest risk node by farmers in
Uganda

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Pig movements and trade localized
Kasiiti et al. 2015
Kasiiti et al 2015
Absence outbreak, pig
transactions were at a small
scale (<5km) and
characterized by regular
agistment.
During ASF outbreaks pig
sales were to traders or
other farmers from outside
the sellers’ village at a range
of > 10km.
Cross-border boar service
and between unmonitored
trade in both directions
along Uganda and Kenya
border observed.

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Why value chain actors would not be willing to report disease outbreak or
comply to animal movement restrictions
0 5 10 15 20
Lack of knowledge about onset of…
Jealousy
Fear of losing customers/buyers
Negligence
Fear of losing animals following culling
Lack of time to report
No action taken by authorities
High treatment cost
Don't know where to report
Lack of money
Disease has no cure
Limited access to vet. authorities
High financial cost of communication
Fear of quarantine/movt control
Other reasons
Outbreak reporting (%)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Fear of lossing business
Protect source of income
Lack of money
Others don't comply
Lack of feeds, housing
No action taken by authorities
Movement control not properly…
Other reasons
Compliance to animal movement control (%)
Dione et al. 2018
Farmers (n=960)
0 20 40 60
Fear of losing market
Lack of knowledge about…
Negligence
Not responsibility to report
Don't know where to report
Jealousy
Laziness/Too busy
Fear of blame
No action taken by authorities…
Fear business closure
Outbreak reporting (%)
0 10 20 30 40 50
Fear to interrupt business
Lack of knowledge/ignorance
Protect the only source of income
Others don't comply
Expensive movement permit
Malicious intent to spread disease
Movement control not properly…
Lazinness
Compliance to animal movement control (%)
0 20 40 60
Fear of losing market
Lack of knowledge about outbreak
Negligence
Not responsibility to report
Don't know where to report
Jealousy
Laziness/Too busy
Fear of blame
No action taken by authorities…
Fear business closure
Outbreak reporting (%)
0 10 20 30 40 50
Fear to interrupt business
Lack of knowledge/ignorance
Protect the only source of income
Others don't comply
Expensive movement permit
Malicious intent to spread disease
Movement control not properly…
Lazinness
Compliance to animal movement control (%)
Traders (n=81) Vets (n=71)

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The issue
Protection of business/source of
income and the lack of knowledge
about ASF control measures are
the key reasons for lack of disease
reporting and compliance to
movement control according to pig
value chain actors

Options for ASF control in Africa

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Options for control
• Validation of rapid pen-side tests
• Virus genotype characterization
Diagnostics and
Surveillance
• Biosecurity messages
• Communication channel
• Incentive for uptake
Formulation of best
bet biosecurity
packages
• National
• Regional
• Continental
Development of
ASF control
strategies

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Biosecurity - a key to successful pig production in an endemic
situation
 Biosecurity measures
implemented within 14 days of
the onset of an epidemic can
avert up to 74% of pig deaths
due (Barongo et al. 2016)
 The implementation of
biosecurity and its effective
monitoring can prevent losses
owing to ASF (Fasina et al.
2011)

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Lessons learnt for capacity building interventions in
biosecurity in Uganda
Intervention
– Participatory training of producers
on application of biosecurity
practices for control of ASF
Indicators for monitoring
– RCT with nearly 1000 farmers for 3
years
– Evidence of changes in farmer
Knowledge, Attitude and Practices
Dione et al. 2020

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Lessons learnt for capacity building interventions in
biosecurity in Uganda
Dione et al. 2020
Factor (reference level in bracket) Knowledge gain
Coef. (se) P>t
Trained (control) 0.18(0.088) 0.038
Baseline knowledge -0.70(0.03) 0.000
Female (male) 0.03(0.062) 0.7127
Lira urban (Lira rural) -0.02(0.12) 0.880
Masaka rural 0.32(0.12) 0.006
Masaka urban 0.52(0.12) 0.000
Not belonging to farmer group (belonging) -0.326(0.07) 0.000
No formal education (Primary or post-primary) 0.04(0.05) 0.471
Constant 0.05(0.12) 0.661
Village variance 0.041(0.017) CI (0.018; 0.090)
Residual variance 0.538(0.027) CI (0.488; 0.594)
Random effects linear egression model of knowledge gain (between baseline and
12 months) with baseline knowledge as covariate
Training improved
knowledge of
farmers about good
biosecurity
practices

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Lessons learnt for capacity building interventions in
biosecurity in Uganda
 No significant change in farmer’s attitude and practices
towards biosecurity after 2 years
 Farmers were most likely to adopt biosecurity practices that
are easy to apply by them and affordable
 There are socio-cultural factors that interfere with proper
implementation of biosecurity (esp. farm visit by neighbours;
burial of dead pigs)
Dione et al. 2020

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Biosecurity and market implementation
 Application of System Dynamics model to assess the impact of biosecurity
interventions on margins to value chain actors
 Average annual % change of value chain actors' cumulative profit relative to
baseline
 Benefits accrue for both ASF control and farmers margins when biosecurity and
business hub interventions are implemented together
Ouma et al. 2018
Scenario
Pig value chain actors
Producers Butchers Traders Collectors Wholesalers
ASF biosecurity Vs baseline -6.2 8.1 10.3 8.6 8
Pig business hub Vs baseline 11.3 5.3 8.8 7.3 4
Combined ASF biosecurity and
pig business hub
6.5 13.1 21.2 17.4 10.4

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Women play a key role in biosecurity
 Women play a key role in
pig husbandry and
application of biosecurity
 Successful training in
biosecurity should
consider both wife and
husband in the household

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Mobile phone as a good channel to relay biosecurity information
to farmers
 Pilot testing of Interactive Voice Recording - Mobile voice
service in Masaka, Uganda
 allows pig farmers to listen to advisory information and
report disease outbreak on their mobile phones
 RCT with 4 arms (and 840 farmers)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
P+V+ P+V- P-V+ P-V-
Knowledgescoregain
Treatment groups
Adjusted knowledge gain scores by group (P = group training; V = IVR
messaging) Dione et al. 2020, upcoming

Lessons learned and recommendations for
sustainable control of ASF

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Incentivize for behavioural change
 No value chain actor would want to incur the
cost associated with pig losses following
outbreak, if there is no compensation!
 Explore self-compensation options through
farmer business groups
 Explore ways for safe slaughtering of pig
affected by ASF

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Strengthen disease surveillance
 Develop alternative ways of disease reporting
by increasing the involvement of the
community with self-regulation system
 Use ICT for channeling information on disease
to cut on the current high cost of
communication
 Pen-side diagnostic tests

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Capacity building in biosecurity
 Improve access to knowledge/information on
biosecurity to value chain actors especially
traders and butchers
 Contextualize trainings to consider socio-
economic dimensions of the pig production
(gender norms and relations)
 Involve women in training on biosecurity

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Holistic approach to the pig enterprise: Herd Health Approach

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Regional approach to ASF control

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