ILC-UK Future of Ageing Conference

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On the 24th November 2015, we held our first annual conference on 'The Future of Ageing'.

During this full day conference we painted a picture of the future of ageing and explored the challenges and opportunities ahead. Through our unique lifecourse focus we explored the potential impact of ageing not just on today’s older population, but also on tomorrows.

We heard presentations from:
- Steven Baxter (Partner, Hymans Robertson);
- Lord Filkin (Chair of the Centre for Ageing Better and Chair of the House of Lords Committee on Public Service and Demographic Change);
- Lord Willetts (Executive Chair at Resolution Foundation, and former Minister of State [Department for Business, Innovation and Skills]);
- Paul Johnson (Director, Institute for Fiscal Studies);
- Baroness Altmann (Minister for Pensions);
- Professor Jane Elliott (Chief Executive, Economic and Social Research Council);
- Professor Sir Mark Walport (Government Chief Scientific Adviser [GCSA] and Head of the Government Office for Science);
- Jim Boyd (Director of Corporate Affairs, Partnership);
- Elaine Draper (Director, Accessibility & Inclusion, Barclays);
- Mario Ambrosi (Head of Communications and Public Affairs, Anchor);
- Baroness Kay Andrews (Member of the House of Lords Built Environment Committee, Former Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Communities and Local Government) 2006-2009);
- Professor Ian Philp (Deputy Medical Director for Older People’s Care, Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust).

The conference was chaired by Baroness Sally Greengross (Chief Executive, ILC-UK) and Lawrence Churchill (Trustee, ILC-UK).

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ILC-UK Future of Ageing Conference

  1. 1. The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change. The Future of Ageing ILC-UK 2015 Conference
  2. 2. The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change. With thanks to the following for their sponsorship of this conference: And to the following for providing inserts for delegate packs:
  3. 3. The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change. How long will we live? Steven Baxter Partner, Hymans Robertson LLP
  4. 4. Hymans Robertson LLP is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority How long will we live? The future of ageing Steven Baxter 24 November 2015
  5. 5. 5 150 and beyond?
  6. 6. 6 120 and beyond?
  7. 7. 7 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 Life expectancy from birth (period life exectancy, 1840-2013) Women Men Rising life expectancy Infectious diseases Circulatory disease Source: ONS & Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org)
  8. 8. 8 Premature deaths (largely) eradicated? Deaths relate to England & Wales civilian population Source: Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org) 150 years ago Now 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Age at death Age at death
  9. 9. 9 A changing population profile 1965 2015 2065? Source: ONS 2104-based principal population projections (2015 & 2063); Human Mortality Database (1965)
  10. 10. 10 The future of longevity Today’s big killers 15% 7% 7% 13% 9% 8% Source: ONS
  11. 11. 11 The future of longevity ‘Accelerants’ and ‘decelerants’ Slowing longevity Increasing longevity
  12. 12. 12 The future of ‘observed’ life expectancy
  13. 13. 13 The future of ‘observed’ life expectancy
  14. 14. 14 The future of ‘observed’ life expectancy
  15. 15. 15 The future of ‘observed’ life expectancy 83.5 86.0
  16. 16. 16 How long will we live? (on average, assuming reach age 65) 65 today 55 today 45 today 86.6 87.8 88.9 89.3 90.4 91.5
  17. 17. 17 How long will you live? Mr Average 4 years6 years Health Wealth Lifestyle Source: Club Vita
  18. 18. 18 Encouraging realism People underestimate how long they might live for by between 5 and 8 years 1 in 10 people will live 10 years longer than the average Source: Hymans Robertson & Club Vita Survey of 1,000 people aged 50-65.
  19. 19. 19 Planning for retirement Transition Certainty Care Drawdown Annuities Fuller Working Lifetimes State Pension Long Term Care Part time working Paying off debt Equity release? Retirement savings House?
  20. 20. 20 The role of the home?
  21. 21. Any questions? Thank you
  22. 22. The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change. The future of ageing – yours and mine! The Lord Filkin CBE Chair, Centre for Ageing Better
  23. 23. The Future of Ageing – Yours and Mine! Longer lives – how can all of us benefit? ILC Future of Ageing Conference 24 November 2015 Geoff Filkin
  24. 24. Ready for Ageing? 24 We have not all understood that: We will live much longer Later life can be a time of happiness It requires big shifts in our attitudes and how we plan and prepare What we do before we are older affects our later life Society has not recognised the opportunity: See it as a crisis not a great gift We under-estimate the asset of older people And the potential for more collective action Government has so far: Not gripped the significance or benefits Seen it mainly as a fiscal threat Been short term, siloed and reactive Not set out the changes we all must make
  25. 25. 25 Living longer – the greatest gift of our lives: Life expectancy has risen greatly and is still rising Men live 7 years longer than 30 years ago 50% of girls born in 2011 will live to 97 or more A later life can be a very good one In ten years there will be many more older people: 19% more people 65+; 40% more people 85+ A profound, certain and persistent change Affects society, the economy and every one of us. The Opportunity
  26. 26. What people want for a better later life should set our societal goals 26 What makes a better later life? Good enough health and financial security Sustain our identity and independence To live in a home and neighbourhood good for later life To have relationships, meaning and purpose But many are missing out Inequalities in life and healthy life expectancy and frailty 11 million people are not saving enough into a pension Only 3% of homes are mobility accessible Striking differences in people’s well-being
  27. 27. Who may be at risk in the future? 27 People at risk of a poorer later life in future include those: without decent employment pensions unable to save sufficiently who cannot sustain employability have not adopted healthy life-styles have premature chronic long term conditions are unable to get the care and support they need are socially isolated How can we reduce these risks for better later lives?
  28. 28. What can we do ourselves? 28 What we do before we are old greatly influences later well-being: Planning and preparation Keeping in employment Saving enough Keeping active, nutrition, weight, smoking, alcohol Our relationships and meaning in our lives Resilience to face major life changes Change is not easy; how do we support it?
  29. 29. Three Policy Risks for Better Later Lives 29 1. Our voluntary pension’s savings system High housing costs, downwards pressure on wages and denial mean many will not save enough. Future older people are at risk 2. NHS demand, funding and re-modelling We have a National Illness System, hospital centric, it fails to join up; and demand is rising fast. The current system will fail today’s older people. 3. Social care - a crisis now, where will we be in 5 years? These significant risks need to be addressed
  30. 30. Care for Ageing 30 The current system is in crisis and need is growing Social care needs have increased, public funding has reduced The social care market is shrinking; serious concerns about care quality, workforce skills and supply Many more people will be frail or have long term conditions: People aged 85+ in England: - 17% more by 2020 - and 40% more by 2025 We need commitment to transform social care: To build the workforce numbers and skills To produce more domiciliary care and care homes To help those who cannot pay for themselves To support carers and families better To build community responses to support informal care
  31. 31. Health for Ageing 31 The NHS Five Year Forward View defined three key changes: • Prevention • Service re-configuration and innovation • Funding to support change Are they happening? Wanless Report 2002 • Vital to engage people in living healthier lives for a sustainable NHS. • Vital too for better later lives Thirteen years after Wanless little has been done to address this What action is needed? • Preventing illness and expanding community action to provide support for others are both essential • Funding for service change and prevention, not to prop up the old system • The funding has to be raised in ways fair to all generations
  32. 32. 32 Realising the benefits of longer lives should be our collective goal Individuals We need information and advice of what works We need help to make changes in our attitudes and behaviours We must prepare and plan for a later life We need older people themselves to have a stronger voice And be much better at listening to them An Agenda for Ageing Better
  33. 33. Better later lives cannot be achieved just by the state 33 Communities Community action, particularly to support the frail and ill Volunteering by many willing older people Private sector Better products and services Realise the growth opportunities from the “silver society” Voluntary sector Work more together; consider future older people as well as today’s Academia Research that is likely to be useful. Innovations that generate useful evidence. Funders, academics, older people, policymakers and practitioners jointly explore where evidence and research is needed.
  34. 34. Government Leadership is crucial 34 Affirm the benefits of longer lives Give leadership to the agenda for change Transform health and care systems for an ageing society Address housing supply failures for old and young Maximise the benefits of the silver economy, longer working, GDP growth How can we all work to realise better longer lives?
  35. 35. Annex – Centre for Ageing Better 35 A What Works Centre, promoted by Government, endowed by BIG, independent of both, funded for ten years. We start with the person; driven by evidence; focused on change, independent, open and collaborative. We will use evidence and our voice and to help make change, working with older people and organisations to improve later life. Next week we will publish: - Our review of what makes for a good later life, and who is experiencing it - How we will work to help everyone prepare better and ensure fewer people miss out - Our initial programme areas and how everyone can get involved We look forward to exploring how we may work together to help people enjoy their longer lives.
  36. 36. Contact Centre for Ageing Better 33 Greycoat Street London SW1P 2QF 020 3829 0113 ageing-better.org.uk Registered Company Number: 8838490 & Charity Registration Number: 1160741 36 Thank you Geoff Filkin Geoff.filkin@agebetter.org.uk 020 3829 0113
  37. 37. The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change. The economics of ageing The Rt. Hon the Lord Willetts Executive Chair, Resolution Foundation
  38. 38. The Pinch How the baby boomers took their children’s future – and why they should give it back David Willetts November 2015 @resfoundation 38
  39. 39. Britain has gone through baby boom and bust 39 Definitions of generations vary But the period of births/year topping 800,000 (or even 1m) post- war was clearly exceptional
  40. 40. A greater demographic strain is set to emerge, though the UK remains better placed than others 40
  41. 41. 41 THE WELFARE STATE
  42. 42. We pay in and take out at different parts of our lives 42 …
  43. 43. But baby booms can break the contract 43 • “Giving goods to an older person is figuratively giving goods to yourself when old.” (Paul Samuelson, 1958) • Balancing the budget across the economic cycle with stable public spending commitments benefits the baby boom
  44. 44. As a result, some generations have received much more from the welfare state than they put in 44 … Source: J Hills, ‘Distribution and redistribution’, Inequality and the state, 2004.
  45. 45. And the burden on younger generations appears to have grown over time Source: T Papworth and A Corlett, ‘Intergenerational fairness: What is it? Does it matter?’ 2014. The difference between the 1997 and 2008 calculations may suggest that changes over the intervening decade have turned even those who were previously expected to be in surplus into a burden on future generations
  46. 46. Pensioner benefits have been protected (and then some) while others’ benefits have been cut 46 The pension triple lock already costs £6bn pa more than a straight earnings link
  47. 47. This may be reflected in the generational divide in views on the welfare state 47 Older generations, including the baby boomers, have a much more positive outlook on the creation of the welfare state than Generations X andY
  48. 48. 48 THE LABOUR MARKET
  49. 49. Employment of older workers has reached a record high and of under 25s a record low 49 Much of the fall for the young is a positive trend, with education continuing for longer
  50. 50. Recent cohorts are earning significantly less than they might have expected Successive cohorts tend to earn more than their predecessors – but that hasn’t applied for those currently in their 20s Members of the 1988 cohort are earning around £50pw less on average than those who entered the workplace 10 years earlier
  51. 51. And the DB pension scheme deficits of yesterday’s workers are weighing on the wages of today’s 51 Taking the period since 1983, a 23ppt gap has opened up between productivity and median pay The distribution of pay accounts for around 70% of this ‘wedge’ Means wage disappointment since 2002 is only a little over half due to productivity stagnation
  52. 52. Only 26 per cent of the liabilities of defined benefit relate to currently employed workers 52Source: PPF / The Pensions Regulator Work by Brian Bell shows that a significant share of the ‘non-wage compensation’ of employees actually relates to employer pension contributions designed to plug the gap in closed DB schemes While many of those classified as deferred may still be in employment in other firms, the potential burden on wages is not spread evenly across employers and industries
  53. 53. Younger people are more likely to report having financial difficulties 53 Source: Understanding Society
  54. 54. But important to remember that not all older people are better off Though the proportion of pensioners in poverty has fallen, 16% find themselves in poverty after housing costs Persistent poverty is also highest among the over 65s 54 Source: Households Below Average Income
  55. 55. 55 WEALTH
  56. 56. Property and pension wealth form the majority of older households’ wealth 56 Today’s less generous pension schemes raise questions around whether this will continue to be the pattern with younger cohorts Source: Wealth and Assets Survey, 2010-12
  57. 57. The time required to save for a deposit has grown from 3 years in 1983 to 24 years today 57 Number of years required for low to middle income households to save typical first time buyer deposit: UK 1983 -2017 Source: RF analysis of CML, OBR, BoE, Halifax House Price Index
  58. 58. Though opposition to house-building has softened in recent years 58 Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 2014
  59. 59. Why do the boomers own so much? • Inflation came at the right time to wipe out their debts • Improvements in life expectancy at the right time too • Pension regulation has helped possessors • Who gained the most from the bank bail out and who pays for it? 59
  60. 60. The Inter-generational contract – What governments do, by Edmund Burke “Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure – but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee... It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.” 60
  61. 61. The Pinch How the baby boomers took their children’s future – and why they should give it back David Willetts November 2015 @resfoundation 61
  62. 62. The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change. The future of retirement income Paul Johnson Director, Institute for Fiscal Studies
  63. 63. © Institute for Fiscal Studies The future of retirement income Paul Johnson
  64. 64. © Institute for Fiscal Studies Introduction • People living longer and incomes in retirement rising – Incomes higher than non-pensioners on average – Next decade likely to see continued rise in pensioner incomes • Longer term future looks less certain – Lower state pensions – Collapse of private sector DB schemes – Falling home ownership • Retirement age will be key • We have got ourselves into a difficult place on private pensions
  65. 65. Good news • Life expectancy has been rising – Unexpectedly © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  66. 66. Good news • Life expectancy has been rising – Unexpectedly • Incomes in retirement have been rising fast – And much more than for working age population © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  67. 67. The remarkable catch-up in pensioner incomes © Institute for Fiscal Studies 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 105% 110% chart shows median after housing costs incomes of pensioner households as % of overall median (HBAI income definitions)
  68. 68. Income by age 1978-80 to 2012-13 © Institute for Fiscal Studies 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% Percentageofoverallmedianincome (measuredAHC) Age 1978–80 2007–08 2012–13 Median income by age compared to overall median income (measured AHC) Source: Figure 3.7b of Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2014 http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7274 Notes: Household income is equivalised and measured after housing costs are deducted
  69. 69. Poverty rates by age © Institute for Fiscal Studies 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 1978-80 Source: Figure 6.3a of Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2013 http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/6759
  70. 70. Poverty rates by age © Institute for Fiscal Studies 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 1978-80 2011-12 Source: Figure 6.3a of Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality: 2013 http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/6759
  71. 71. Pensioners doing better before the recession © Institute for Fiscal Studies -2.0% -1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 0s 10s 20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s 2001-02 to 2007-08 Annual real income change by age
  72. 72. ...and after © Institute for Fiscal Studies -2.0% -1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 0s 10s 20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s 2001-02 to 2007-08 2007-08 to 2013-14 Annual real income change by age
  73. 73. Good news • Life expectancy has been rising – Unexpectedly • Incomes in retirement have been rising fast – And much more than for working age population • Reflecting rising state and private pensions – And also later retirement and increased earnings © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  74. 74. Male employment rates slumped but have been rising for some time © Institute for Fiscal Studies 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Employmentrate 65-69 (LFS)
  75. 75. Male employment rates slumped but have been rising for some time © Institute for Fiscal Studies 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Employmentrate 60-64 (LFS) 65-69 (LFS)
  76. 76. Male employment rates slumped but have been rising for some time © Institute for Fiscal Studies 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Employmentrate 50-54 (LFS) 55-59 (LFS) 60-64 (LFS) 65-69 (LFS) Chandler and Tetlow (2014) http://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/comms/R98.pdf
  77. 77. Good news • Life expectancy has been rising – Unexpectedly • Incomes in retirement have been rising fast – And much more than for working age population • Reflecting rising state and private pensions – And also later retirement and increased earnings • And our projections suggest continued improvements over the next decade – http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7251 © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  78. 78. Equivalised family income projections: 65+ population © Institute for Fiscal Studies £0 £10,000 £20,000 £30,000 £40,000 £50,000 £60,000 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 Realfamilyincome (£pa,2014–15prices) Median 10th percentile 90th percentile Source: Figure 5.1, Emmerson, Heald and Hood (2014)
  79. 79. But are we doing too well? • One way of thinking about that is to ask how well off people are in retirement relative to during their working life • Traditionally looked at how much of gross final earnings are replaced by pensions – This was the basis for much of the Pension Commission’s work • But is this a good measure? – Should be interested in net, not gross incomes – Why just consider pensions and not other wealth? – And aren’t we interested in incomes compared to average over a working life, not just final earnings? © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  80. 80. Replacement of average lifetime earnings • For couple households born in the 1940s we define: 50-20ageearningsrealdequivaliseAverage 65ageatincomerealEstimated ratetReplacemen  Consider several definitions of income Taking into account household size Adjusting for inflation; considering average purchasing power Source: Table 6.2, Crawford & O’Dea (2014): Retirement sorted? The adequacy and optimality of wealth among the near-retired?
  81. 81. Replacement of average lifetime earnings Percentage of couple with: Total pension income <=67% replacement 20% <=80% replacement 35% <=100% replacement 59% • For couple households born in the 1940s we define: 50-20ageearningsrealdequivaliseAverage 65ageatincomerealEstimated ratetReplacemen  Source: Table 6.2, Crawford & O’Dea (2014): Retirement sorted? The adequacy and optimality of wealth among the near-retired?
  82. 82. Replacement of average lifetime earnings Percentage of couple with: Total pension income ... plus annuitised non- housing wealth <=67% replacement 20% 10% <=80% replacement 35% 20% <=100% replacement 59% 41% • For couple households born in the 1940s we define: 50-20ageearningsrealdequivaliseAverage 65ageatincomerealEstimated ratetReplacemen  Source: Table 6.2, Crawford & O’Dea (2014): Retirement sorted? The adequacy and optimality of wealth among the near-retired? http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7358
  83. 83. Comparing ‘optimal’ and actual (private) wealth © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  84. 84. For the current generation of pensioners • A remarkable triumph – Despite longer lives and earlier retirement incomes are higher than they were during working life for most • Down to a combination of – Increasing state pensions – More generous means tested benefits – Occupational pensions – House prices © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  85. 85. What about the future? • For the next decade at least things still look quite positive • Further ahead things may look less rosy – Earnings have fallen and savings rates were lower © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  86. 86. Incomes are dipping © Institute for Fiscal Studies 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 Realhouseholdincome (£perweek,2011-12prices) Age 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s Source : Authors’ calculations using FES/EFS/LCF, various years
  87. 87. As are savings rates © Institute for Fiscal Studies -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 Realhouseholdsaving (£perweek,2011-12prices) Age 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s Source : Authors’ calculations using FES/EFS/LCF, various years
  88. 88. What about the future? • For the next decade at least things still look quite positive – We can model incomes really quite well that far ahead given what we know about pensions, health, working patterns etc • Further ahead things may look less rosy – Earnings have fallen and savings rates were lower • The state pension is becoming less generous for many – The single tier is worth less than basic pension plus SERPS/S2P © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  89. 89. What about the future? • For the next decade at least things still look quite positive – We can model incomes really quite well that far ahead given what we know about pensions, health, working patterns etc • Further ahead things may look less rosy – Earnings have fallen and savings rates were lower • The state pension is becoming less generous for many • The single tier is worth less than basic pension plus SERPS/S2P – Home ownership rates are declining © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  90. 90. Recent cohorts are also less likely to own a home © Institute for Fiscal Studies 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 Homeownershiprate(%) Age Born 1963–67 Born 1973–77 Born 1983–87
  91. 91. What about the future? • For the next decade at least things still look quite positive – We can model incomes really quite well that far ahead given what we know about pensions, health, working patterns etc • Further ahead things may look less rosy – Earnings have fallen and savings rates were lower • The state pension is becoming less generous for many • The single tier is worth less than basic pension plus SERPS/S2P – Home ownership rates are declining • The collapse in DB scheme membership outside the public sector is huge – A double whammy on earnings © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  92. 92. Declining private sector DB coverage 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Millions Close d © Institute for Fiscal Studies Source: Occupational Pension Scheme Survey. Active members of private sector defined benefit schemes
  93. 93. Pension costs have played a big role in average wages rising less quickly than productivity © Institute for Fiscal Studies http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Productivity-briefing.pdf
  94. 94. To recap... • The current generation at and near retirement are doing very well • To some extent at the expense of younger generations – Who can expect lower retirement incomes • What about policy? © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  95. 95. The recent history of state pensions • SERPS was introduced in 1978 • Governments have spent the whole period since un-introducing it – A long and tortuous path given the complexities around contracting out • Any link between contributions and entitlement has effectively ended • The single tier is the logical final step – Very close to a flat rate “citizens’ pension” based on history of residence – Note that it reduces expected future generosity for almost everyone © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  96. 96. Remaining policy issues • Pension age – Rising over coming decades – We know that increasing female SPA is increasing employment • http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7323 – Commitment to raise with life expectancy so people live a third of adult life (over 20) in retirement © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  97. 97. Remaining policy issues • Pension age – Rising over coming decades – We know that increasing female SPA is increasing employment • http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7323 – Commitment to raise with life expectancy so people live a third of adult life (over 20) in retirement • Level and indexation – Triple lock adds more than 1% of GDP to costs by 2060 relative to earnings indexation – Introduces an element of pure randomness into pension level – Makes no sense as a policy © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  98. 98. Effects of triple lock and pension age on spending © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  99. 99. Recent history of private pensions • Regulation and demise of private sector DB schemes – This looks irreversible • Spread of DC • Introduction of auto-enrolment – Successful so far (but minimum default contributions very low) • Ending of compulsory annuitisation – Effects unknown • Chaotic changes to tax treatment – And continual change to tax treatment of other forms of savings © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  100. 100. Policy priorities for private pensions • Risk sharing – No risk sharing in DC schemes – None now in retirement without annuitisation – This CANNOT be optimal • In my view the overwhelming priority must be to find some way of achieving more risk sharing – Defined ambition? • Also to limit the windfall to those with accrued rights – Move from RPI to CPI indexation – (note this was easily the biggest change to public service pensions) • http://www.ifs.org.uk/budgets/gb2012/12chap5.pdf © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  101. 101. The formula effect © Institute for Fiscal Studies [http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7513]
  102. 102. Policy conclusions • State pensions – Stick with single tier but move away from contributory fiction and make dependent on, say, 30 years residence – Get rid of triple lock: link to earnings, raising in line with prices when they rise more but claw back later – Raise pension age at least in line with longevity • Private pensions – Focus on finding a way to reintroduce some risk sharing – Consider reducing DB benefits by enforcing CPI indexation – Move to rational, stable EET tax system – Over time increase employee auto enrolment contribution rates © Institute for Fiscal Studies
  103. 103. The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change. The future of ageing research Professor Jane Elliott CEO, The Economic and Social Research Council
  104. 104. The Future of ageing research: the known knowns and the known unknowns Professor Jane Elliott CEO of ESRC (@JaneElliott66)
  105. 105. Structure ▶ The Third age and the Fourth Age ▶ What we know about ageing – Importance of early life – Trajectories in later life – Predicting dementia ▶ Issues & Dilemmas in research on ageing ▶ Mapping the future – European roadmap – Foresight project
  106. 106. Laslett (1989) A new map of life • There is a principle which I believe we should adopt as we contemplate the facts of growing old. We have to conduct our lives as far as possible, not simply in remembrance of our former, but in the presence of our future, selves.’(Laslett 1989, p22) A Fresh Map of Life: The emergence of the third age. Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London. • The concept of planning (life plans and strategies) is central to the notion of the third age
  107. 107. Laslett’s characterisation of the life course ▶ First age: dependence, socialization; immaturity and education ▶ Second age: independence, maturity & responsibility, earning and saving ▶ Third age: personal achievement, fulfilment; ‘apogee’ of personal life ▶ Fourth age; dependence, decrepitude and death. Leisure is distinct from idleness, concept of rest should be dissociated from that of retirement; importance of activism rather than disengagement
  108. 108. Laslett’s characterisation of the life course ▶ First age: dependence, socialization; immaturity and education ▶ Second age: independence, maturity & responsibility, earning and saving ▶ Third age: personal achievement, fulfilment; ‘apogee’ of personal life ▶ Fourth age; dependence, decrepitude and death. Leisure is distinct from idleness, concept of rest should be dissociated from that of retirement; importance of activism rather than disengagement
  109. 109. Longitudinal studies with data on ageing ▶ English Longitudinal Study of Ageing ▶ MRC National Study of Health and Development (1946 cohort) ▶ 1958 British Birth Cohort Study ▶ Whitehall II study ▶ Hertfordshire Cohort Study ▶ Understanding Society ▶ Potential for the use of linked administrative and health data (and imaginative secondary analysis)
  110. 110. (International) consortia of longitudinal studies ▶ HALCyon (NDA funded) Healthy Ageing across the lifecourse (led by Diana Kuh) ▶ NIH-funded Integrative Analysis of Longitudinal Studies on Aging and Dementia (IALSA) research network (led by Scott Hofer) ▶ Family of studies based on the Health and Retirement Study NIH-funded; including ELSA, KLOSA, TILDA, CHARLS, SHARE (http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/index.php?p=sister s)
  111. 111. Findings from HALCyon ▶ Childhood cognitive ability and other aspects of early experience are associated with adult cognitive capability and wellbeing. ▶ There is robust evidence that those in better socioeconomic circumstances in childhood as well as adulthood have better capability at older ages. ▶ Growth in early life is associated with later life capability, most likely through its influence on the maximum level of function achieved at maturity.
  112. 112. CLOSER: bringing longitudinal evidence together ▶ Childhood socioeconomic circumstances are associated with physical capability in adulthood, even when controlling for other mediating factors. ▶ In middle age, the gap between men and women’s physical capability increases dramatically. ▶ People enter later life with greater socioeconomic inequalities in physical functioning – studies have shown that the gap
  113. 113. 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 Wave 1 (2002) Wave 2 (2004) Wave 3 (2006) Wave 4 (2008) Wave 5 (2010) Wave 6 (2012) m / s Walking speed (age 70-74 in wave 1) Men Women 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Wave 1 (2002) Wave 2 (2004) Wave 3 (2006) Wave 4 (2008) Wave 5 (2010) Wave 6 (2012) Sedentary or low physical activity (%) (age 70-74 in wave 1) Men Women Trajectories in later life: results from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (1)
  114. 114. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Wave 1 (2002) Wave 2 (2004) Wave 3 (2006) Wave 4 (2008) Wave 5 (2010) Wave 6 (2012) Numberofitemsrecalled Item recall (age 70-74 in wave 1) Men Women 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-80 80+ Item recall (Wave 6) Men Women Trajectories & cross sectional comparisons in later life: results from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (1)
  115. 115. Inequalities
  116. 116. Figure 5. Male life expectancy at age 65 for expanded NS- SEC classes including the unclassified and England and Wales, 1982-86 to 2007-11(Source ONS population projections October 2015) (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_420190.pdf)
  117. 117. Figure 12. Female life expectancy at age 65 for expanded NS-SEC classes including the unclassified and England and Wales, 1982-86 to 2007-11 (Source ONS population projections October 2015)
  118. 118. Inequalities in healthy life expectancy ▶ Clear evidence of large inequalities in health and well- being in later life, which relate to dimensions of socio- economic position, ethnicity, gender and area ▶ the wealth differences in levels of frailty are stark. The trajectory of frailty for an individual in the richest tertile at age 80+ years is comparable to that for a 70–74 year old in the poorest tertile ▶ Similarly, in the age group 61–70, 34% of White English people report fair or bad health, compared with 63–69% of Indian, Pakistani and Caribbean people and 86% of Bangladeshi people. ▶ Source: Addressing inequalities in healthy life expectancy, James Y. Nazroo University of Manchester April 2015 ▶ https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/455811/gs-15-20-future-ageing-
  119. 119. Source: Marshall, A., Nazroo, J., Tampubolon, G. and Vanhoutte, B. (2015) Cohort differences in the levels and trajectories of frailty among older people in England. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 69, 316–321.
  120. 120. Predicting dementia (CFAS study) ▶ Female sex and particularly increasing age were more strongly associated with dementia ▶ More years of education were associated with lower-levels of dementia. ▶ Poor self-perceived health increased the risk for incident dementia ▶ Alcohol and smoking (never, past and current) were neither strongly protective nor predictive. ▶ Stroke was strongly related to incident dementia as was Parkinson’s disease ▶ Exposure to general anaesthesia (GA) was inversely associated with dementia development with a trend with increasing GA exposure. The association of increasing age with the development of dementia is several magnitudes greater than the other factors in the study (OR of 25.6). Ageing of populations is likely to result in an increase in the number of people dying with dementia even in the presence of preventative programmes. Source: MRC Cognitive Function and Ageing Study, Agustin G. Yip, Carol Brayne, and Fiona E. Matthews. Risk factors for incident dementia in England and Wale: The Medical Research Council Cognitive Function and Ageing Study. A population-based nested case-control study.
  121. 121. Issues & dilemmas in research on ageing ▶ Need for prospective longitudinal research to understand how early life factors influence later life experiences ▶ Need for detailed longitudinal data on later life trajectories of decline ▶ but…each cohort is likely to have distinct experiences ▶ Given the heterogeneity of experiences of ageing, desire to understand ‘Healthy’ or ‘Successful’ ageing, ▶ but…how to encourage a focus on success without implying individuals are ‘to blame’ ▶ Longitudinal research can lead to a focus on the individual – need to understand the broader context of
  122. 122. The future of ageing research in Europe: a roadmap ▶ FUTURAGE two-year project funded by the European Commission (completed 2011) ▶ Priorities – Healthy Ageing for more life in years – Maintaining and regaining mental capacity – Inclusion and participation in the community and in the labour market – Ageing well at home and in community environments – Unequal ageing and age related inequalities – Bio-gerontology: from mechanisms to interventions – Source: http://futurage.group.shef.ac.uk/
  123. 123. Foresight project on the Future of Ageing ▶ Independent evidence review due to report March 2016 (led by Prof Sarah Harper) ▶ Government office for Science with collaboration from Research councils to understand gaps in knowledge ▶ Basis for a range of policies and actions to: – maintain wellbeing throughout life, for all individuals regardless of their generation – improve quality of life for older people and enable them to participate more fully in society – ensure everyone can access the tools and facilities to help them live a long and healthy life
  124. 124. Foresight project on Ageing ▶ Independent evidence reviews including: – Future of ageing: inequalities in healthy life expectancy – Future of ageing: emotional and personal resilience – Future of ageing: relationships between the generations – Future of ageing: effect of technology on support networks – Future of ageing: health and care infrastructure – Future of ageing: workplace infrastructure
  125. 125. Conclusions & further evidence needed ▶ Frailty & Causes of the loss of function in later life ▶ Unequal Ageing ▶ Comparative research & global ageing ▶ Ageing and prevention – what works and why? ▶ Multidisciplinary work important ▶ Contexts of ageing and not just individual perspective ▶ Understanding trajectories of ageing and
  126. 126. Annex
  127. 127. Ageing research funding by Research Councils Long history of funding ageing research in the Research Councils Approximately £200m spend on ageing research in current CSR plus large underpinning ageing-related portfolio • Vast majority in response-mode by individual Councils • Strategic initiatives including in partnerships • Relatively small proportion in joint Council programmes – NDA and LLHW ERA/SAGE
  128. 128. Ageing research: New Dynamics of Ageing New Dynamics of Ageing – interdisciplinary programme (£20M over 10 years) Examples of projects funded through NDA: Ageing and Biology (http://www.newdynamics.group.shef.ac.uk/stress- and-immunity.html) Fiction and the cultural mediation of ageing (http://www.newdynamics.group.shef.ac.uk/ageing-and-fiction.html) Dynamics of cardiovascular ageing (http://www.newdynamics.group.shef.ac.uk/assets/files/NDA%20Findings %2019v.pdf) HALCYON (Healthy Ageing Across the Lifecourse) http://www.newdynamics.group.shef.ac.uk/assets/files/NDA%20Findings _33.pdf
  129. 129. Ageing research: LLHW Since 2008 LLHW has committed £51m, funded 54 awards and 60 PhD and post docs. Examples of projects funded through LLHW: • Inequalities in later life frailty and wellbeing: an interdisciplinary approach to causality (Nazroo) • The menopausal transition and healthy ageing and wellbeing (Lawlor) • Engaging with Older People to Develop and Deliver Interventions for the self management of Chronic Pain (Smith) • Uncertain Futures: Managing Late-Career Transitions and Extended Working Life (Vickerstaff) • Extending Working Lives in the National Health Service: Opportunities, Challenges and Prospects (Nolan) • Mobility, Mood and Place: a user-centred approach to design of built environments to make mobility easy, enjoyable and meaningful for older people (Ward Thompson) • Over-Hear: assessing functionality of hearing aids in complex listening environments (McAlpine/Brimijoin) • http://www.mrc.ac.uk/research/initiatives/lifelong-health-wellbeing/research- activities/
  130. 130. Ageing research: non-LLHW CIMA: The Centre for Integrated research in Musculoskeletal Ageing MODEM: Modelling outcome and cost impacts of interventions for dementia Social Connections and Wellbeing in older adults Dementia and imagination: connecting communities and developing well-being through socially engaged visual arts practice MARQUE: Managing Agitation and Raising Quality of Life in dementia Centre for Musculoskeletal Health and Work The health and wellbeing of grandparents caring for grandchildren Pensions, health and wellbeing of older people in developing countries
  131. 131. What next? • Two big and successful cross council ageing programmes but we have also funded a lot more besides through other routes. • An outcome of the success of our large programmes is that ageing research becomes embedded in our wider portfolio. • Opportunities continue to exist for ageing research funding:  Responsive mode – CCFA and remit (remit@esrc.ac.uk)  Other existing schemes – SDAI, Large Grants, Future Research Leaders, Transformative  Calls in specific areas • Age and Ageing is relevant to many areas e.g. Mental Health
  132. 132. Future Opportunities The Future of Ageing Research: Post REF 2014
  133. 133. The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change. Ready for ageing – where next? Professor Sir Mark Walport Government Chief Scientific Adviser and Head of the Government Office for Science
  134. 134. The Government Office for Science Sir Mark Walport Chief Scientific Adviser to HM Government The future of an ageing population International Longevity Centre - UK Sir Mark Walport Chief Scientific Adviser to HM Government
  135. 135. 135 • Wellbeing, health, security & resilience • Knowledge translated to economic advantage • The right science for emergencies • Underpinning policy with evidence • Advocacy and leadership for science The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser
  136. 136. 136 • Response to ‘Ready for Ageing?’ report • Expert-led and evidence-based • Collaborative across Whitehall and underpinned by public engagement • Identify policy challenges and opportunities across the ageing population The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 ‘Evidence Safari’ at a workshop with policy-makers Future of an Ageing Population Foresight project
  137. 137. 137 The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 • 1854 cholera outbreak in Soho • Dominant theory that cholera caused by ‘bad air’ • John Snow traced outbreak to one pump on Broad Street • Established the link between contaminated water and cholera© Justinc 1854 Broad Street cholera outbreak
  138. 138. 138 The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 Increased life expectancy is the result of many such scientific successes
  139. 139. 139 Housing Health and care Education and work Technology The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 Project focuses on four inter- connected areas
  140. 140. 140 Growth in households in England to 2037. Source: DCLG The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 Households in 2010: 21,919,022 Households in 2010: 5,892,194 Households in 2010: 844,097 • Increased number of single occupier homes • Increased demand for specialised housing • More demand for homes that can be adapted through the life course • Potential rise in cost of inadequate housing to the NHS (currently £1.4bn in England across all age groups) The number of older households is expected to increase
  141. 141. 141 Older people in the future are less likely to be home owners Homeownershiprate(%) Home ownership rates by birth year and age. Source: Family expenditure survey and family resources survey The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 • More older private renters • Due to low interest rates and historic rent increases - private renters spend twice as much (30%) of income on housing than mortgage payers • Fewer people will have homes to use as assets in retirement
  142. 142. 142 The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 • Places of healthcare – reducing NHS pressure and maintaining independent living • Workplaces – older people more likely to work at home, technology (i.e. teleworking services) can facilitate this Smart home technology has great potential
  143. 143. 143 1. Housing stock appropriate for older people 2. Supporting choice – ‘rightsized’, specialised or adapted housing 3. Design neighbourhoods for wellbeing, services, community through the life course The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 Policy challenges
  144. 144. 144 • ‘Oldest old’ (80+) to double as a proportion of the population by 2040 • Increased multi- morbidity • Healthcare may increasingly need to focus on prevention and management of disease The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 ‘Oldest old’ (80+ years) as a percentage of the entre population. Source: Foresight Changing health and care demands
  145. 145. 145 • Transfer of chronic disease management from secondary to primary care • Projections suggest 400,000 more older people receiving unpaid care by 2031 • Unpaid carers face difficulties in the workplace and are more likely to experience stress and poor health The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 Changes to the demand and nature of care
  146. 146. 146 The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 Robotics – including therapeutic robots Bio-medical – including stem cells, nano-technology and 3D printing of body parts Wearables – including health monitors and sleep enhancement© Aaron Biggs Medical technology has great potential
  147. 147. 147 1. Configuration of health and care services for increasing prevalence of chronic diseases 2. Homes to enable wellbeing and care to reduce pressures on the NHS 3. Support unpaid carers to maintain quality of life and balance employment and care The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 Policy challenges
  148. 148. 148 • Proportion of workers aged 50+ to increase from 25% to 31% between 2005 and 2020 • 58% of people regard workplace ageism as widespread • Physical challenges, e.g. eyesight • Increasing responsibilities as carers The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 Older workers face particular challenges
  149. 149. 149 The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 • Increased UK demand for health and tech skills • Changes in jobs and skills demand as technology advances • Training through the lifecourse will be key to responding to these changes • Workers age 50+ are less likely to receive training The demand for skills will change
  150. 150. 150 1. Adapting workplaces – and the role of employers 2. Supporting flexible working practices to extend working lives 3. Awareness and appetite for investing in training for older workers The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 Policy challenges
  151. 151. 151 The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 Broadband performance, May 2013. Source: Ofcom Projected proportion aged 65 and over, 2037. Source: ONS Technology has great potential to improve the lives of older people but access is an ongoing challenge
  152. 152. 152 • Attitudes – older people less likely to agree with the statement ‘new technologies are very useful’ (Ofcom 2015) • Accessibility – challenges include fonts and layouts on web- based application and cumbersome wearable technology • Cost – recent studies question the current cost effectiveness of telecare and telemedicine The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 Other barriers to technology uptake include:
  153. 153. 153 1. Access and uptake of technology – across the population 2. Innovative business models aimed at deploying technology for older people The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 Policy challenges
  154. 154. 154 … and this exposes future challenges for government and for science The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 Our response to these ‘multi-dimensional’ issues is crucial… Important to recognise that the challenges and opportunities are ‘multi-dimensional’ – e.g. public health
  155. 155. 155 • Understand how different factors throughout the life course come together • Work across departments in government • Develop the case for long-term interventions The Future of an Ageing Population – 24 November 2015 • Respond to regional and local differences To ensure the UK fully benefits from the ageing population, we must…
  156. 156. Every effort has been made to trace copyright holders and to obtain their permission for the use of copyright material. We apologise for any errors or omissions in the included attributions and would be grateful if notified of any corrections that should be incorporated in future versions of this slide set. We can be contacted through go-science@bis.gsi.gov.uk . @UKScienceChief @foresightgovuk www.gov.uk/go-science
  157. 157. The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change. The future of financial services in an ageing society Jim Boyd Director of Corporate Affairs, Partnership
  158. 158. The Future of Financial Services in an Ageing Population November 15 Jim Boyd Director of Corporate Affairs
  159. 159. Agenda • What does an ageing population need? • What does financial services do? • What needs to change? • Will it happen?
  160. 160. What does an ageing population need?
  161. 161. • Easy to slip into working out what an elderly population needs from our industry in a lazy way • All of that is true but it misses some of the broader policy agenda, some of which we need to support What does an ageing population need?
  162. 162. What does financial services do in these areas?
  163. 163. • Lets do it broadly chronologically • Reducing Future Dependency • Helping Forward Planning • Helping People Stay in Work • Decumulation / Managing Uncertain Longevity What does financial services do?
  164. 164. 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% Up to 5 years 6 - 10 years 11 - 15 years 16 - 20 years 21 - 25 years 26 - 30 years 31 - 35 years Over 35 years Estimate **Source: Projected lifespans are derived from the ONS 2012-based principal projection for the UK population Actual projected life span** How long do people expect to live? *Source: Partnership survey (2014) Bit of a gap!
  165. 165. • Access to Liquidity from Property Assets • Insure the Cost of Care • IHT Planning What does financial services do?
  166. 166. What needs to change?
  167. 167. • Perception is probably the biggest thing • Then it needs to solve the impediments to doing what customers need • Finally we need to engage people before its too late • Regulation needs to change • This becomes a bigger issue as populations age What needs to change?
  168. 168. • Its time for a proper public debate about the balance between regulation and affordability What needs to change?
  169. 169. Will it happen?
  170. 170. • Hard to say how much and when! • Most people I meet in insurance care about their customers and want to do the right thing • The framework we operate in is complex and inflexible and that makes it hard • Catalyst may come from outside industries coming into industry • I do worry a lot that industry is too stuck in legacy and short term results • And politicians time horizons too short term to support the required investment Will it happen?
  171. 171. Thank you 171 November 15 Footer Partnership is a trading style of the Partnership Group of Companies, which includes: Partnership Assurance Group plc (registered in England and Wales No. 08419490), Partnership Life Assurance Company Limited (registered in England and Wales No. 05465261), and Partnership Home Loans Limited (registered in England and Wales No. 05108846). Partnership Life Assurance Company Limited is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Partnership Home Loans Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. The registered office for these companies is 5th Floor, 110 Bishopsgate, London, EC2N 4AY.
  172. 172. The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change. The future challenges and opportunities of health in an ageing society Professor Ian Philp CBE Deputy Medical Director for Older People’s Care, Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust
  173. 173. Challenges and Opportunities for Health in an Ageing Society Professor Ian Philp CBE ILC-UK, London November 2015
  174. 174. Priorities in Health and Care Older People: Their families: Advocacy: Policy: Providers of care: independence and well-being respect for dignity opportunity/relief of suffering financial sustainability meeting quality standards
  175. 175. Preventive care EASYCareHealth: 25 Years, 44 Countries, 80 Publications
  176. 176. History and Development
  177. 177. EASYCare Assessment 1 • Seeing, hearing, communicating 2 • Looking after yourself 3 • Getting around 4 • Your safety 5 • Accommodation and finance 6 • Staying healthy 7 • Your mental health and well-being
  178. 178. Top Four Concerns Loneliness Finance Memory Pain
  179. 179. What Could be Achieved From welfare and care… …to empowerment and capability www.easycarehealth.org.uk
  180. 180. The International Longevity Centre-UK is an independent, non-partisan think-tank dedicated to addressing issues of longevity, ageing and population change. The Future of Ageing ILC-UK 2015 Conference

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