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Power, politics, and governance in the food system: Applications to Africa

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PIM Webinar with Danielle Resnick (IFPRI) on May 8, 2019. For more information visit http://bit.ly/2UI3Hjb

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Power, politics, and governance in the food system: Applications to Africa

  1. 1. More Crowded Policy Agenda for Agriculture in Africa Climate smart Nutrition sensitive Employment generating Gender inclusive 25 million farm households practice CSA by 2025 (Africa Climate Smart Agricultural Visions 25x25) Reduce stunting to 10% and underweight by 5% by 2025 (AU Malabo Declaration) Address urban obesity (Milan Urban Food Policy Pact) Create job opportunities for at least 30% of the youth in agricultural value chains (AU Malabo Declaration) 20% of rural women are empowered in agriculture by 2023 (AU Malabo Evaluation Framework)
  2. 2. More Attention to the Agrifood System to Achieve these Goals Components of Food System Productivity enhancing Regulatory Market-based Transfers Behavioral Farming Processing Retail Consumption Infrastructure, Ag R&D expenditures, input subsidies Land policy, labor policy, intellectual property guidelines, food safety Fiscal policy, procurement policies, trade policy Cash transfer programs, food subsidies Model farmer extension techniques, consumer education initiatives, safe food handling training Range of needed policy interventions
  3. 3. Political and Governance Considerations to Achieve Needed Policy Interventions Alignment - degree to which relevant stakeholders share the same interests ▪ Short versus long-term ▪ Low versus high visibility ▪ Trade-offs in harmed constituencies ▪ Ideational Examples: input subsidy reform in Zambia, devolution of agriculture in Ghana Capacity - presence of funding, human resources, training, and infrastructure Example: Informal food trade in Nigeria Commitment - sustainability of policy beyond mandates of leader or time period Example: Nigerian land governance reform Coordination - modalities to minimize duplication, maximize information flows, and avoid contradictions ▪ Horizontal ▪ Vertical ▪ Business-state Example: Informal food trade in Nigeria
  4. 4. Four Examples
  5. 5. Alignment of Incentives: Input subsidy reform in Zambia Why did the adoption of an e-voucher for subsidized inputs in Zambia fail in 2013 but succeed in 2015? Background • On the policy agenda since 2008 • Subsidizes a more diverse range of inputs besides maize seed and fertilizer • Farmers go directly to agro-dealers so reduces admin costs and improves timeliness of input distribution • More companies can participate and less opaque tendering Data and methods • Semi-structured interviews with multiple stakeholders • Review of donor documents, Ministry of Agriculture reports, peer-reviewed literature, media reports, and Parliamentary Hansards • Analysis using the Kaleidoscope Model of Food Security Policy Change FISP E-voucher Visa cards Source: PMRC
  6. 6. Input Subsidy Reform in Zambia Key findings: Zambia’s implementation of e-voucher in 2015 depended on winning over key veto players who stymied the reform in 2013 Positions in 2013 Positions in 2015 Source: Resnick et al. (2018a)
  7. 7. Alignment of Incentives: Devolution of Agriculture in Ghana What has been the impact of devolving agricultural functions to district governments in Ghana? Background • Local Instrument 1961 adopted in 2009 to initiate devolution • Agriculture formally devolved in 2012 • Staff became members of Local Government Services and composite budgeting system established Data and methods • Survey with 80 District Directors of Agriculture across all 10 regions • Survey with 960 households • District-level budget data Survey Sites
  8. 8. Devolution of Agriculture in Ghana Composite budgets District devt plans & composite budgets MoFEP - Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning MoFA - Ministry of Food & Agriculture NDPC - National Development Planning Commission MLGRD - Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development RADUs - Regional Agriculture Departments RCCs - Regional Coordinating Councils MMDAs - Metropolitan, Municipal, District Assemblies LGS - Local Government Services MoFA NDPC MoFEP MMDAS LGS District devt plans Ag planning & monitoring Intergovernmental transfers Transfers & internally generated funds Ag donor funding & national programs Rural Households Service Delivery MLGRD Hiring, firing, promotions Department of Agriculture
  9. 9. Devolution of Agriculture in Ghana Increase in Actual Public Works Expenditures, by District Notes: The budgets are all in constant 2012 GHS Source: Resnick (2018) Decline in Actual Agricultural Expenditures, by District
  10. 10. Devolution of Agriculture in Ghana Key findings Locally elected government politicians prefer using budget for schools and clinics than for low visibility agricultural extension • Local governments receive better information about citizen priorities and pursue “preference matching” • Households appreciate increased accountability that local politicians have to citizens through devolution • BUT, if politicians preference match, then increased accountability can result in decreased provision of goods and services that citizens do not prioritize, especially low “visibility” goods and services Ag extension motorbikes donated by Canada sitting idle due to no fuel or licenses, Shai Osudoku, 2019 Photo: Danielle Resnick, IFPRI
  11. 11. Commitment: Land Governance Reform in Nigeria Why have some states in Nigeria proceeded further with systematic land tenure regularization (SLTR) than others? Background • Land governance reform a priority with the AU Declaration on Land, FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines, and World Bank’s Land Governance Assessment Framework • In 2009, late president set up President’s Technical Committee on Land Reform • SLTR adopted as option in Nigeria after similar success in Rwanda, South Africa, and Thailand Data and methods • Semi-structured interviews with more than 90 stakeholders in 6 states • Focused on seven components of implementation
  12. 12. Land Governance Reform in Nigeria Key findings • SLTR never driven by citizen demand • Implementation was higher where • There was continuity in political administration across elections • Donors did not bypass Ministries of Land or cede key functions to external consultants • Diversity in donor support ensured more funding for rolling out the reform Indicators of implementation Cross River Jigawa Kaduna Kano Katsina Ondo GIS set up Yes Partially Yes Yes No No Land records digitized Yes Partially Yes Yes No Yes Certificates of Occupancy titled Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Certificates of Occupancy issued Yes Yes No Yes No Nob Budget line for SLTR Yes Yes No Yes No No Continued cash release for SLTR No Yes No Yes No No SLTR still ongoing? a Partially Yes No Yes No No Source: Resnick and Okumo (2017) Notes: a As of December 2016. b Only three CfOs were issued in Ondo.
  13. 13. Coordination & Capacity: Informal Food Safety in Nigeria How do local governments ensure access to safe food from informal traders in Nigerian cities? Background • Informal markets and traders are major source of food for urban poor • Food safety hazards are common in informal and wet markets • Local governments in Nigeria often have a mandate over informal trade Data and methods • Survey with 1,097 informal food traders in Calabar and Minna • Semi-structured interviews with state and LGA level officials for institutional mapping Source: Karl Pauw, IFPRI Butcher, Tamale Central Market, Ghana Street Vendor, Lusaka, Zambia Source: Bhavna Sivasubramanian , IFPRI
  14. 14. Informal Food Safety in Nigeria’s Secondary Cities Calabar, Nigeria Minna, Nigeria Source: Resnick et al. (2018) Confusing Array of Actors Regulating Informal Food Trade
  15. 15. Informal Food Safety in Nigeria’s Secondary Cities Official Calabar Minna Local government market managers 18.7 21.2 LGA health officers 6.4 4.4 LGA revenue officers 33.8 22.8 State-level authorities 2.1 0.4 Task Force 23.2 0.9 Police 1.9 1.0 None 13.0 49.4 Other 0.9 0.0 Total observations 530 567 Service Calabar Minna Trash collection 43.1 44.5 Toilets 62.1 36.2 Electricity 40.2 66.1 Clean, running water 16.7 8.9 Safe storage facilities for merchandise 28.3 37.6 Shelter during bad weather 28.3 55.2 Fire extinguishers 2.2 1.1 Security 74.3 82.5 Health facilities 1.9 2.9 Proper drainage 15.2 53.7 Total observations 269 348 Notes: Since access to services was limited to those who worked inside a market, the number of observations is smaller than for the entire sample of informal traders. Source: Resnick et al. (2018) Government Official that Traders Engage with Most Often in the Course of a Month (%) Share of Respondents Reporting Access to Key Services in the Market (%) Source: Resnick et al. (2018)
  16. 16. Informal Food Safety in Nigeria’s Secondary Cities Key findings and policy options • Food traders in Nigeria’s secondary cities operate in environment of benign neglect rather than harsh repression, as in Lagos • Multiplicity of mandates across government entities, confusion over accountability among food vendors, low capacity to enforce • Support “market leaders” to help monitor sanitation guidelines • Develop scorecards to identify worst-affected markets to target enforcement
  17. 17. Politics and Governance for Policy Change Agrifood system transformation key for delivering on the many agendas of governments and donors, requiring policy interventions in many domains • Alignment, capacity, coordination, and commitment key for effective implementation Identify ways to align technically optimal solutions with interests of veto players • If alignment involves trade-offs across policy goals, need to look at sequencing and triage Assess degree of needed commitment to have impact and whether there is a realistic alignment of interests to sustain it • Interventions that involve wholesale bureaucratic and cultural reforms are not achievable in a 5-year donor cycle (e.g. land reform) Consolidate responsibilities over informal food trade to recognize capacity constraints and disincentives to cooperative • Avoid regulatory frameworks that cannot be realistically enforced Pres. Lungu launches e- voucher, Oct.2015 Source: Lusaka Times
  18. 18. What’s Next? Governance of informal food trade in African cities • Expand Nigerian research to Ghana • Analyzing survey of 1,200 traders in Accra, Kumasi, and Tamale to understand when and why… • Food safety regulations and trading laws are enforced • Traders receive services (garbage collection, drainage, etc) in exchange for their tax payments Binding constraints to local government capacity • Completed interviews with over 200 bureaucrats and elected politicians in 4 Zambian provinces to understand… • Extent of financing for local development • Degree to which a mayor’s party affects the autonomy a council receives from national government • How political interference by elected councilors affects bureaucrats’ motivation and career aspirations • Input into the Decentralization Secretariat’s revised Decentralization Implementation Plan for 2019
  19. 19. References Resnick, D. and A. Okumo. 2017. “Subnational variation in policy implementation: The case of Nigerian land governance reform.” Nigeria Strategy Support Program Paper 46. Washington, DC: IFPRI. Resnick, D. 2018. “The Devolution Revolution: Implications for agricultural service delivery in Ghana.” IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 1714. Washington, DC: IFPRI. Resnick, D., S. Haggblade, S. Babu, S. Hendriks, and D. Mather. 2018a. “The Kaleidoscope Model of Policy Change: Applications for food security policy in Zambia.” World Development. Vol.109(September): 101-120. Resnick, D., B. Sivasubramanian, C.Idiong, M. Ojo, and L. Tanko. 2018b. “The Enabling Environment for Informal Food Traders in Nigeria’s Secondary Cities.” Nigeria Strategy Support Program Paper 59. Washington, DC: IFPRI.
  20. 20. Thank you! For more information: d.resnick@cgiar.org http://www.ifpri.org/profile/danielle-resnick www.danielleresnick.com
  21. 21. Q&A session Recordingofthiswebinarwillbeavailableonthewebinarpagesoonafterthelifeevent:http://bit.ly/2UI3Hjb PIMWebinarsarchive:https://pim.cgiar.org/resource/webinars/ Visitwww.pim.cgiar.orgformoreinformationaboutourwork.

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