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The Moro Homeland

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From the Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Roundtable Discussion Series of the Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG), presentation by Atty. Randolph Parcasio | 6 July 2015, Committee Room 1 Senate of the Philippines

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The Moro Homeland

  1. 1. MORO HOMELAND
  2. 2. 16TH CENTURY MORO STATES By the 16th Century, four Moro states already existed: 1. Sultanate of Sulu; 2. Sultanate of Maguindanao; 3. Buayan Sultanate; and 4. Apat na Pangampong in Lanao
  3. 3. During the Spanish-American War of 1898, all three competing powers - Aquinaldo's revolutionary government, the Kingdom of Spain, and the U.S. government acknowledged that the Moros were not part of the Philippines.
  4. 4. During the peace negotiations conducted between Madrid and Washington to formally terminate the war and resolve colonial issues, Spain - contrary to earlier pronouncements - officially declared that Moroland, Basilan, Mindanao, Palawan, and the Sulu archipelago, was not part of her colony of the Philippines.
  5. 5. The Moros were independent of the Philippines so bilateral treaties were to be negotiated especially with the Sultanate of Sulu. A commercial treaty had already existed between the U.S. and Sulu since 1842.
  6. 6. The result was the Bates Treaty. Negotiated between two, equal, sovereign states - the United States and the Sultanate of Sulu - the treaty was signed on August 20, 1899. This was eight months after the Treaty of Paris had been signed ending the Spanish- American War. .
  7. 7. BATES TREATY Washington officially acknowledged that the Moros were not part of the Philippines and specifically guaranteed to respect the identity and the integrity of the Sulu Sultanate. In return, the sultan recognized U.S. sovereignty
  8. 8. MORO-US WAR AFTER BATES TREATY ABROGATION March 21, 1904, the U.S. government unilaterally, and illegally, abrogated the Bates Treaty and provoked a MORO-US war which lasted until 1913.
  9. 9. Notable Pockets of War were: the Panglimas Hasan and Maharadja Andung in Sulu, the Datus of Maciu, Binidayan, and Taraca in Lanao, Mindanao, the Datu Ali in Cotabato, Mindanao, and the leaders of the Footmen Uprising in Palawan.
  10. 10. MORO PROVINCE June 1, 1903 Moro Province consisting of all of the territory of the Philippines lying south of the eight parallel of latitude, excepting the island of Palawan and the eastern portion of the northwest peninsula of Mindanao, which includes current provinces/regions of Zamboanga, Lanao, Cotabato, Davao, and Sulu.
  11. 11. MORO PROVINCE MISAMIS SURIGAO AGUSAN MINDANAO-SULU 1903-1913 SPECIAL: Moro; Agusan REGULAR: Misamis; Surigao
  12. 12. SEAL OF GOVERNMENT OF MORO PROVINCE
  13. 13. COAT OF ARMS OF MINDANAO AND SULU 1914-1920 EAL OF GOVERNMENT OF THE MORO PROVINCE
  14. 14. FILIPINO COLONIZATION In 1935, the Commonwealth of the Philippines was formally established. Under the Quezon administration an escalation of Filipino colonization of Bangsa Moro homeland commenced.
  15. 15. President Quezon's address to the First National Assembly on June 16, 1936 states that. . . “the time has come when we should systematically proceed with and bring about the colonization and economic development of Mindanao..”
  16. 16. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF MINDANAO AND SULU May 1, 1968, the provincial governor of Cotabato, Datu Udtog Matalam, made a dramatic move. He issued the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) manifesto calling for the independence of Mindanao and Sulu to be known and referred to as the Republic of Mindanao and Sulu.
  17. 17. DECOLONIZATION STRUGGLE THE FOUNDING OF THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT IN 1969 BY YOUNG MILITANT MUSLIM STUDENTS, POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE MORO GRASSROOTS SIGNALLED THE POLITICAL AND ARMED STRUGGLE TO DECOLONIZE THE MORO HOMELAND FROM THE PHILIPPINE “NEO-COLONIAL RULE”
  18. 18. 1976 TRIPOLI AGREEMENT AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH THE AUTONOMOUS REGION FOR SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES.
  19. 19. 1976 TRIPOLI AGREEMENT THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES 1. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; 2. THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT; 3. WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE MINISTERIAL COMMISSION MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE
  20. 20. TERRITORY Provinces: Tawi Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Palawan, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Sibugay, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Sarangani Province, Davao del Sur Cities: Puerto Princesa, Zamboanga, Dipolog, Pagadian, Iligan, Marawi, Cotabato, Koronadal, Kidapawan, General Santos
  21. 21. 13 Provinces Territory of Autonomy Tripoli Agreement 1976
  22. 22. TRANSITIONAL MECHANISM ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE TRIPOLI AGREEEMENT TO BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
  23. 23. MANDATE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1. To prepare for the elections of the Legislative Assembly in the territories of the autonomy; 2. Administer the areas in accordance with the Tripoli Agreement until a Government is formed by the elected Legislative Assembly. (Par. 15, TA)
  24. 24. PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES SHALL TAKE ALL NECESSARY CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT (Par. 16)
  25. 25. FRAMEWORK OF AUTONOMY SECURITY • JOINING OF THE FORCES OF MNLF AND THE AFP (par. 2) • SETTING UP OF SPECIAL REGIONAL SECURITY FORCES (par. 8)
  26. 26. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE • Right to set up Courts to implement Islamic Shari’ah laws • Right to be represented in all courts including the Supreme Courts (par. 3)
  27. 27. EDUCATION Right to set up schools, colleges and universities (par. 4)
  28. 28. SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AN ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF AUTONOMY, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (par. 5 and 9)
  29. 29. NATURAL RESOURCES REASONABLE PERCENTAGE DERIVED FROM THE REVENUES OF MINES AND MINERALS (par. 10)
  30. 30. REPRESENTATION RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND ALL OTHER ORGANS OF THE STATE.
  31. 31. PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT SHALL BE ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY UPON THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT ON DECEMBER 23, 1976. (par. 15)
  32. 32. AUTONOMOUS REGIONS DURING MARTIAL LAW On the basis of the "referendum -plebiscite" of April 17, 1977, the Philippine government by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1618 issued on July 25, 1975 established two autonomous regions, namely, Region IX (Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur) and Region XII (Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, and Sultan Kudarat).
  33. 33. MNLF REJECTION THE MNLF REJECTED THE PD 1816 BECAUSE IT VIOLATED THE 1976 TRIPOLI AGREEMENT.
  34. 34. ARMM ON AUGUST I, 1989, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES PASSED REPUBLIC ACT 6734 CREATING THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO WHEREBY A PLEBISCITE WAS HELD IN THE TWO AUTONOMOUS REGIONS OF REGION IX AND REGION IX PLUS THE PROVINCES OF DAVAO DEL SUR, SOUTH COTABATO AND PALAWAN.
  35. 35. MNLF REJECTION AGAIN, THE MNLF REJECTED RA 6734 BECAUSE IT VIOLATED THE 1976 TRIPOLI AGREEMENT AND BOYCOTTED THE PLEBISCITE FOR THE RATIFICATION OF THE NEW AUTONOMY LAW. THE LATE PRESIDENT CORAZON AQUINO ADMITTED THAT RA 6734 WAS A UNILATERAL INITIATIVE OF THE GRP TO IMPLEMENT THE 1976 TRIPOLI AGREEMENT.
  36. 36. RA 6734 PLEBISCITE THE PLEBISCITE RATIFYING RA 6734 SHRUNK THE BANGSAMORO HOME LAND TO FOUR PROVINCES NAMELY: TAWI TAWI, SULU, LANAO DEL SUR AND MAGUINDANAO
  37. 37. ARMM 1989
  38. 38. 1996 FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT THE IMPLEMENTING MECHANISM TO FULLY IMPLEMENT THE 1976 TRIPOLI AGREEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS IS THE 1996 FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT
  39. 39. 1996 PEACE AGREEMENT THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES 1.GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (GRP); 2. MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF); 3. WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (OIC) MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE OF THE SIX AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE OIC
  40. 40. THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (PHASE I) • Establishment of Special Zone of Peace and Development SZOPAD • Establishment of Southern Philippinnes Council for Peace and Developemnt (SPCPD) • Joining of MNLF elements with the PNP (1,500) and AFP (5,750) • Right of Representation • Establish Development Task Forces
  41. 41. • Creation of the Darul Iftah • Establishment of the Consultative Assembly having powers, among others, to make rules and regulations to the extent necessary for the effective and efficient administration of the affairs of the area. • Channeling of public and private investment into the area to spur economic development
  42. 42. POWERS OF THE SPCPD • Exercise control and supervision over appropriate agencies engaged in peace and development activities in the area; • Monitor, promote, and coordinate development efforts; • Attract foreign investment ; • Cause the implementation of peace and development projects; • To be deputized by the Commission on Elections to assist in the preparation of the holding of elections, referenda or plebiscite and people’s initiative
  43. 43. ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW AUTONOMOUS REGION (PHASE II) THE SECOND PHASE SHALL BE IMPLEMENTED THROUGH A CONGRESSIONAL ACT TO LEGISLATE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT BY AMENDING RA 6734.
  44. 44. THE AUTONOMOUS REGION The New Autonomous Government exercises broad and plenary powers Exceptions: Foreign Affairs, National and Security Defense, Postal Service, Coinage, Fiscal and Monetary Policies, Administration of Justice except Shari’a,. Quarantine, Customs and Tariff, Citizenship, Naturalization, Immigration, Deportation, General Auditing, Civil Service and Foreign Trade, Patents, Trademarks, Trade-names and Copyrights. (par. 27)
  45. 45. The Establishment of the Special Regional Security Forces for the Autonomous Region -Phase-2 of the Implementation of the Tripoli Agreement (paragraphs 73-93)
  46. 46. Educational System to develop total spiritual, intellectual, social, cultural, scientific and physical aspects of Bangsamoro people to make them God-fearing, productive, patriotic citizens conscious of their Filipino and Islamic values and Islamic cultural heritage (paragraphs 94-124 PA);
  47. 47. • The Economic and Financial System, Control over Mines and Minerals (paragraphs 126- 151, PA); • Establishment of Shari’ah Courts (152 PA)
  48. 48. GAPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION IN PHASE I Executive Order No. 371 signed in October 1996 omitted the stipulated control, and/or regulatory powers of the SPCPD over government agencies operating within SZOPAD
  49. 49. Immediately after the signing of the 1996 Peace Agreement, the GRP held peace talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front without any participation and knowledge of the SPCPD/MNLF ignoring the vital role of the latter to orchestrate the peace and development projects within SZOPAD
  50. 50. In the 1998 general elections, and local elections and even in the plebiscite in 2000 the SPCPD was not deputized to participate in the conduct of these electoral exercises violating the agreement that the SPCPD would be deputized by the COMELEC in the conduct of any electoral activity within the SZOPAD.
  51. 51. The deteriorating peace and order condition in the area, the all out war policy of the GRP particularly in the Estrada regime, the unabated criminal activities of lawless elements aggravated by the deliberate ignoring of the SPCD’S role by the GRP in the resolutions of these conflicts, have all conspired to marginalized and render the SPCPD irrelevant in violation of the 1996 Peace Agreement.
  52. 52. The “business as usual” attitude of the government in the preparations and enactment of the General Appropriation Acts from 1997 to 2001 up to the present resulted in the lack of/insufficient funding for projects intended for rehabilitation, reconstruction, reconciliation, social, economic and infrastructure projects.
  53. 53. The projects implemented and the funds released in the SZOPAD during the 3 year transitory period were regular funds for regular projects and programs (to be implemented even if there was no Peace Agreement). The alleged projects were implemented by national agencies but not the SPCPD.
  54. 54. RA 9054 EXPANDED ARMM RA 9054 LAPSED INTO LAW ON MARCH 31, 2001 WITHOUT THE PRESIDENT’S SIGNATURE, PURSUANT TO SEC 27(1), ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION.
  55. 55. LEGITIMACY OF REPUBLIC ACT 9054 IS QUESTIONED RA 9054 IS QUESTIONED BY THE MNLF BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE 1976 TRIPOLI AGREEMENT AND 1996 FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT
  56. 56. UNRESOLVED HOMELAND SHRINKAGE THE PLEBISCITE PROCESS TO RATIFY RA 9054 IN 2001 ADDED BASILAN PROVINCE ONLY TO THE SHRUNK BANGSAMORO HOMELAND REGIONAL GOVERNMENT
  57. 57. ARMM 2001
  58. 58. 13 Provinces Territory of Autonomy Tripoli Agreement 1976
  59. 59. MORO PROVINCE MISAMIS SURIGAO AGUSAN MINDANAO-SULU 1903-1913 SPECIAL: Moro; Agusan REGULAR: Misamis; Surigao
  60. 60. OIC INITIATIVES TO FULLY IMPLEMENT THE 1996 FPA NOVEMBER 2007 JEDDAH, KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA FORMATION OF THE OIC-GRP-MNLF TRIPARTITE REVIEW FOR THE PURPOSE OF FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1996 FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT REGARDING THE FOLLOWING: SHARI’AH, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT;POLITICAL SYSTEM; SPECIAL REGIONAL SECURITY FORCE and EDUCATION.
  61. 61. STATUS OF THE TRIPARTITE REVIEW 1. Agreement to amend 46 defective provisions of RA 9054 to conform to the 1996 Final Peace Agreement; 2. Proposed Amendments to 9054 shall be certified by the President to Philippine Congress as Administration Urgent Bill; 3. Affirmed the Primacy of the 1996 FPA; 4. On March 1, 2012, MNLF walked out during Tripartite Meeting in Bandung, Indonesia because GRP insist the latter had fully implemented Phase 2 of the 1996 FPA
  62. 62. GPH-MNLF AGREEMENT UNDERSTANDING DURING MNLF-OIC-GPH WITH OIC MEETING IN KUWAIT LAST MAY 2015 THERE WAS UNDERSTANDING TO RESUME THE TRIPARTITE REVIEW
  63. 63. PROPOSED MEETINGS • TRIPARTITE TECHNICAL MEETING ON AUGUST 2015; • MINISTERIAL LEVEL TRIPARTITE REVIEW MEETING ON OCTOBER 2015
  64. 64. UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE TRIPARTITE REVIEW 1. TERRITORY OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION AND AREAS TO BE COVERED BY A NEW PLEBISCITE; 2. DEFINITION AND SHARING OF REVENEUS OF STRATEGIC MINERALS; AND 3. TRANSITIONAL MECHANISM.
  65. 65. Question: What is the MNLF position on plebiscite? Answer: 1. The emendment/revision/repeal of RA 9054 shall be ratified in a plebiscite to be conducted in the five provinces and one city in the ARMM; 2. All other provinces and cities identified in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and 1996 Final Peace Agreement which are outside the ARMM will be asked whether they will join the autonomous government. (Par. 2(a-b), Section 1, Art. II, 9054)
  66. 66. Question: What is the GPH position on territory and plebiscite? Answer: 1. The territory of the ARMM is the final territory of the autonomous region; 2. The result of the plebiscite in 2001 is final so there cannot be another plebiscite
  67. 67. Question: Does the Constitution prohibit the conduct of another plebiscite to the determine the new territory of the autonomous region? • Answer: No. In fact there are two plebiscites already conducted to determined the territory of the ARMM namely: 1. 1990 Plebiscite to create ARMM; 2. 2001 Plebiscite to expand the ARMM
  68. 68. Question: What does the constitution say on autonomous regions? Answer: Section 5, Article X provides that the autonomous regions shall “consist of the provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structure and other relevant characteristics.
  69. 69. Based on the constitution the autonomous region can comprise the provinces and cities mentioned in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and all other areas in Mindanao sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structure and other relevant characteristics
  70. 70. Question: What is the GPH position on Strategic Minerals? Answer: 1. Definition: Uranium, petroleum, other fossil fuels, mineral oils, and all sources of potential energy, aquatic parts, forest and watershed reservation; 2. Sharing: 50=50
  71. 71. Question: What is the MNLF position on Strategic Minerals? Answer: 1. Definition: Uranium and imported minerals. 2. Sharing: 70% for the autonomous government; 30% for the central government.
  72. 72. INTERIM AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC MINERALS 1. THE ARMM AND DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SHALL CO-MANAGE STRATEGIC MINERAL; 2. SHARING OF REVENUES SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 9054– 50-50.
  73. 73. CO-MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC MINERALS ARG ARMM DENR-DOA Acceptance, processing, evaluation, and assessment of application for permit to explore, utilization contracts, to impose administrative charges and fees. Approval of application for permit to explore and/or utilization contact duly recommended by the ARG. No application shall be approved without the favorable recommendation of the ARG If, after the lapse of 30 working days upon receipt of the recommended application, no action is taken by the national government, the application is deemed approved.
  74. 74. ARG-ARMM DENR-DOA CENTRAL GOVT. Recommends approval of permits, contract upon endorsement of all the respective Sangguniangs (Local Government Councils) and after securing the free and prior informed consent in accordance with the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Approval of the permits, contracts recommended by ARG Co signatory together with the GPH of any permit, contract Co signatory together with the ARG of any permit, contract Tasked to be primarily responsible for the monitoring of compliance to the duly approved exploration permits and utilization contracts May at its option, monitor compliance to the duly approved exploration permits and utilization.

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