Shared Assumptions of Realisms and Liberal Institutionalism <ul><li>Shared assumptions with Realism </li></ul><ul><ul><li>...
International Institutions and International Actors Facilitate Cooperation and Constrain Conflict   <ul><li>1) States seek...
Examples of Important IGOs: 2000+  <ul><li>United Nations </li></ul><ul><li>World Trade Organization (WTO) </li></ul><ul><...
European Union <ul><li>25 states delegate key state powers to the European Union </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Common Trade Policy...
Institutions of the European Union to Ensure State Compliance <ul><li>Commission: The Executive of the EU </li></ul><ul><l...
Why Are Institutions Important to Explain State Behavior? <ul><li>Remember states do not trust (have confidence in) other ...
Institutions (like the EU) perform these functions <ul><li>1) They establish rules and norms of behavior that provide some...
Implications of Liberal Institutional Theory <ul><li>In contrast to realists, institutional theorists, like Joseph Nye, ex...
Key Assets of NGOs for States <ul><li>The economic welfare of the state’s populations </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Global markets...
NGOs are also Instruments for Civil Liberties and Human Rights <ul><li>NGO organizations provide information about state a...
Can Liberal Institutionalists Explain the Beginning, Evolution, and End of the Cold War? <ul><li>Like realists, liberal in...
Liberal Institutionalist and the Evolution of Cold War/Superpower Cooperation <ul><li>Institutionalists expect cooperation...
Liberal Institutionalist and the Evolution of Cold War/Superpower Cooperation <ul><li>Liberal Institutionalists also expec...
Weaknesses of Liberal Institutionalist Theory <ul><li>Failure to anticipate fundamental change in the Soviet Union within ...
Weaknesses of Liberal Institutionalist Theory <ul><li>Institutionalists fail to exploit the power of global markets as a p...
Weaknesses of Liberal Institutionalist Theory <ul><li>Principal weakness of realism/neorealism and liberal institutionalis...
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Share Assumptions of Realisms and Liberal Institutionalism

  1. 1. Shared Assumptions of Realisms and Liberal Institutionalism <ul><li>Shared assumptions with Realism </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The state is key actor in international relations </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>States pursue their selfish interests </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>They have no confidence that other states can be expected to support their interests </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>They lack reliable information to predict the real intentions and behavior of other states </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Military power is the final arbiter of state conflicts under conditions of an anarchical state system </li></ul></ul>
  2. 2. International Institutions and International Actors Facilitate Cooperation and Constrain Conflict <ul><li>1) States seek multiple aims, not just security: economic growth, environmental protection, human rights, etc. </li></ul><ul><li>2) The ceaseless competition of aims and interests checks focused pursuit of state power, security and survival </li></ul><ul><li>3) States are obliged to rely on multiple intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to achieve their multiple aims and interests </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Hard power (military and economic) and soft power (shared values and aims) are both indispensable for state achievement of its objectives </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Voluntary agreements on security (arms control/disarmament) are possible to regulate conflict (Axelrod and English School) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The effective and efficient workings of global markets depend on voluntary agreements </li></ul></ul>
  3. 3. Examples of Important IGOs: 2000+ <ul><li>United Nations </li></ul><ul><li>World Trade Organization (WTO) </li></ul><ul><li>World Bank </li></ul><ul><li>International Monetary Fund </li></ul>
  4. 4. European Union <ul><li>25 states delegate key state powers to the European Union </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Common Trade Policy </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Common Agricultural Policy </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>12 of 25 members use a common currency and banking system: Euro </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Regulation of integrated market transactions and policies: EU law supercedes state law when inflict </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Banking </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Corporate market practices </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Environmental policy </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Movement of EU populations across state boundaries </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Protection of human rights and civil liberties </li></ul></ul></ul>
  5. 5. Institutions of the European Union to Ensure State Compliance <ul><li>Commission: The Executive of the EU </li></ul><ul><li>Council of Minister: The Principle Decision-Making Body </li></ul><ul><li>European Court of Justice; The court decides whether states are complying with EU directives </li></ul><ul><li>European Parliament: Elected directly by the European peoples (425 million), it has limited but important powers, but is subordinate to the Council of Ministers </li></ul><ul><li>European Council: This is composed of the Heads of State or Government and provides over-all direction to the other bodies </li></ul>
  6. 6. Why Are Institutions Important to Explain State Behavior? <ul><li>Remember states do not trust (have confidence in) other state </li></ul><ul><li>They also lack information about what these states intend to do that might harm another state or the material capabilities (military forces) that might harm them </li></ul>
  7. 7. Institutions (like the EU) perform these functions <ul><li>1) They establish rules and norms of behavior that provide some confidence in predicting the behavior of states who are members of the institution (e.g. WTO, UN, etc.) </li></ul><ul><li>2) Knowledge about the likely behavior of states provides important information that is not available to state leaders if the institutions did not exist </li></ul><ul><li>3) The rules and norms of an institution provide two outcomes that makes state behavior less likely to lead to conflict and war </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The institution enlarges the power and capability of the members (e.g. The EU increases trade and economic growth of EU members) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The institution also puts limits on the unilateral use of a state’s power </li></ul></ul>
  8. 8. Implications of Liberal Institutional Theory <ul><li>In contrast to realists, institutional theorists, like Joseph Nye, expect cooperation between states, not conflict </li></ul><ul><li>Other actors, IGOs and NGOs, not only influence and limit unilateral use of state power, but they are indispensable in realizing state objectives: security, the material welfare of their populations, ecological protection, the advancement of civil liberties and human rights </li></ul>
  9. 9. Key Assets of NGOs for States <ul><li>The economic welfare of the state’s populations </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Global markets are an instrument of state policy </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Multilateral corporations (Toyota, Honda, General Motors) ensures the workings of global markets </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Both are necessary conditions for states to respond to the material needs and demands of their populations </li></ul></ul>
  10. 10. NGOs are also Instruments for Civil Liberties and Human Rights <ul><li>NGO organizations provide information about state abuses </li></ul><ul><li>NGOs also provide significant humanitarian aid to failed states and peoples under stress of civil war or starvation </li></ul><ul><ul><li>For example, Doctors without Borders, Red Cross, Religious groups providing humanitarian assistance -- food, health services, shelter, etc. </li></ul></ul>
  11. 11. Can Liberal Institutionalists Explain the Beginning, Evolution, and End of the Cold War? <ul><li>Like realists, liberal institutionalists expect conflict between states, as the principal actor in international relations </li></ul><ul><li>They also agree that military power is the final arbiter of conflicts between states </li></ul><ul><li>The Cold War and the US-Soviet struggle for global hegemony is consistent with realist/ liberal institutionalist theory and expectations </li></ul>
  12. 12. Liberal Institutionalist and the Evolution of Cold War/Superpower Cooperation <ul><li>Institutionalists expect cooperation in security </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Based on rational actor assumptions of behavior, rival states are predicted to cooperate in constructing an international security regime that limits the choice of war or use of force </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Arms control and disarmament accords: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks: SALT and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) </li></ul></ul></ul>
  13. 13. Liberal Institutionalist and the Evolution of Cold War/Superpower Cooperation <ul><li>Liberal Institutionalists also expect cooperation in non-security areas: economic growth and development </li></ul><ul><ul><li>United States supports European Union at economic expense to end state conflict </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>United States and Europeans support global markets and open trading system (with Japan) to facilitate economic growth and technological development </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Mutual confidence and transparency between liberal democratic states facilitates cooperation and overcomes traditional conflicts: France and Germany resolved security and economic interests within NATO and EU </li></ul></ul>
  14. 14. Weaknesses of Liberal Institutionalist Theory <ul><li>Failure to anticipate fundamental change in the Soviet Union within the scope of Institutionalist Theory </li></ul><ul><li>Soviet Prime Minister Gorbachev acts contrary to realist/liberal institutionalist expectations: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The Soviet Union unilaterally cuts nuclear and conventional forces in Europe in pursuit of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (economic reform on a market model) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Gorbachev announces that the Soviet Union will not intervene to protect Communist party rule in the Warsaw Pact nations </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>These moves undermine Soviet control of Eastern Europe and leads to the unification of Germany under Western control </li></ul></ul>
  15. 15. Weaknesses of Liberal Institutionalist Theory <ul><li>Institutionalists fail to exploit the power of global markets as a positive force on the Soviet Union for economic reform </li></ul><ul><li>The demand by Russians for greater economic growth pressures the Communist Party to implement economic reform </li></ul><ul><li>These same pressures also apply to Communist China, which implemented economic reform but unlike the Soviet Union resisted political reform and liberalization. </li></ul>
  16. 16. Weaknesses of Liberal Institutionalist Theory <ul><li>Principal weakness of realism/neorealism and liberal institutionalism and security </li></ul><ul><ul><li>No understanding of the force of nationalism as the basis for the legitimacy of government and the state </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The Soviet Union implodes for three reasons related to nationalism </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>The Russian people rebel against the costs of maintaining an empire -- Control over Eastern Europe, the Soviet Republics, and client states around the world, many of which are among the most underdeveloped in the world (e.g. Vietnam, Ethiopia, etc.) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>The demands for national self-determination of the East European satellite states in the Warsaw Pact </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>The demands for national self-determination of the peoples of the Soviet Republics </li></ul></ul></ul>

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