1
Sri Lankan Armed Forces
Campaign Against
Tamil Insurgents

2
expressed their grievances through political channels,
and later in the 1970s encouraged by many external and
THEME
region...
Sri Lankan Armed Forces
Campaign Against
Tamil Insurgents

4
IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE COMPASSIONATE,
THE MOST MERCIFUL
5
Introduction
• The pearl of Indian ocean.
• Target of a ruthless insurgent

movement
• Sri Lanka fielded a series of
respo...
Introduction
• The worst face of terrorism
• LTTE

had

evolved

into

a

globally prominent organization

7
Introduction
• Managed suicide killing of two
head of states
• LTTE stood strong enough to
hold its own naval fleet

8
Introduction
• May

2009,

witnessed

a

decisive victory by Sri Lankan
Armed Forces
• LTTE laying down their arms
and acc...
Aim
To present the analysis of
Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka with
a view to draw pertinent lessons
for dealing with terror...
SEQUENCE

Part – I

Tamil Insurgency – Its Rise and Support
LT HASAN

Part – II

Past Measures for Conflict Resolution
LT ...
PART – I

TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE &
SUPPORT
Contents
Genesis of LTTE
Role of Tamil Diaspora and India
Conclusions

Gen...
History Of Sri Lanka Is
Marked By Inveterate Mutual
Fear

Sinhalese
Part - I

Tamil
13
In The Pre Colonial Era
• Small Sinhalese Kingdoms
in the centre and South
• Tamil kingdom in the North
of the island

Par...
INDIA
Jaffna

SRI LANKA
Part - I

15
Four Centuries Of
Colonial Rule
British
1815-1948
Dutch
1658-1796

Portuguese
1505-1638
Part - I

16
Three Main Steps

Emergence of LTTE

1956

Sinhala Only Act

1972

1972

Late
70s

Revival of
Isolation of Tamils
Sinhales...
Emergence Of LTTE
• LTTE came into existence
in 1974

• Prabhakaran

was

the

founding member

Part - I

18
THREE MAIN REASONS
FOR SURVIVAL
• Other groups were MarxistLeninist
• They

entered

mainstream

following Indo – Lanka ac...
Organization

Part - I

20
Central Governing
Committee
Central
Governing
Committee

Political
Wing

Part - I

Military
Wing

Interna
tional
Wing
21
Military Wing

Army
Intelligence

Navy

Special Forces

Air Force

Black Tigers
Political Wing
 Political Wing formed the second tier of LTTE’s
organization

Part - I

23
International Secretariat

Propaganda Wing

Part - I

Fund Raising
Ariyana Group

Arms Procurement
(KP Department)

24
Tactics

Part - I

25
Pause And Pounce
“Action and inaction” was the leitmotif of LTTE’s
modus operandi against SLF

Part - I

26
Outsourcing
LTTE made use of “Outsourcing” to gain maximum
benefit

Part - I

27
Suicide Bombing
• An asymmetric strategy
• Not a religious phenomenon for LTTE
• Types of suicide missions

Part - I

28
Gender Manipulation
• LTTE used gender manipulation to improve combat
efficiency
• The women were grouped with small male ...
Political Assassinations
• LTTE

carried

numerous

out

high

profile

assassinations
• Prime

Minister

Rajiv

Gandhi of...
Tamil Diaspora
• As of 2001, Tamil
Diaspora around the
globe was 600,000 to
800,000 strong
• 23 to 30% of global
Tamil pop...
Tamil Diaspora
• 250,000 Tamils in North
America alone
• 200,000 Tamils resided in
Europe
• Almost 30,000 in Australia
• T...
Indian Role
Indian involvement in the conflict was
underpinned by its interest in the region

33
Reasons For Involvement
• Sri Lankan overtures towards West, caused worry
• To placate the Indian Tamil population
• India...
Support Provided
• 32 training camps operating all over India

INDIA

Part - I

35
Change In Indian Approach
• Indian policy makers soon realised that their policy
could backfire
• India withdrew its offic...
CONCLUSIONS
TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS
RISE AND SUPPORT

Part - I

37
Sinhalese-Tamil Rivalry
• Sinhalese-Tamil rivalry has its roots in the history
beyond the colonial rule
• Rivalry kept sim...
Sinhalese Nationalism
• Tamils
initially
democratic path
• Revival
of
Nationalism

pursued

Sinhalese

Part – I TAMIL INSU...
LTTE Emergence
• Astute
leadership,
steadfastness
to
Tamil
nationalism and strong link
with Diaspora; enabled LTTE
to emer...
LTTE
Organizational Structure
• LTTE
developed
an
elaborate
organizational
structure
• That held them in good
stead during...
LTTE - Novel Tactics
• Militarily, LTTE never failed to
innovate
and
obfuscate
security forces with its novel
tactics
• It...
Tamil Diaspora
• Tamil Diaspora supported the
insurgency
possible

through
legitimate

all
and

illegitimate means

• The ...
Indian Involvement
• Indian involvement in the
conflict was based on self
interest
• Tamils misinterpreted Indian
involvem...
Indian Involvement
• Indians, were never interested in the Tamil Eelam

• Would have encouraged Tamil population in India
...
PART – II

Political And Military
Response

Contents
1. Political Response
2. Military Response
3. Conclusions
Thimpu Talks
SRI LANKAN
GOVERNMENT

Peace
Talks
TAMIL
MILITANTS

Part - II

TAMIL
POLITICIANS

JULY 1985

47
Fighting continued between two
sides and Sri Lankan forces
managed to corner LTTE in Jaffna

Part - II

48
Indian Sponsored Peace
Talks
• Indo-Lankan agreement at Colombo in Jul 1987

• Indian forces were never welcomed by either...
Indian Sponsored Peace
Talks
• Extremist JVP loathed presence of Indian forces
• LTTE started ambushing Indian Forces and
...
Indian Sponsored Peace
Talks
• Forms the basis of “Op Pawan” by IPKF
• President

Premadasa

demanded

immediate

withdraw...
Indian Sponsored
Peace Talks
• Rajiv Gandhi refused to withdraw IPKF
• V P Singh in December 1989, declared the policy
as ...
Eelam War II
• Newly elected government of
Chandrika Kumaratunga offer
peace talks
• Policy of military engagement
with th...
1994 Peace Talks
• President Kumaratunga initiated peace talks in
1994
• Short lived cease fire took place but failed

Par...
Reasons
• Lack of sincerity
• Lack of professionalism
• Lack of flexibility

Part - II

55
Eelam War III
• Failure of 1994 talks led to

Eelam War III
• LTTE resorted to shoulder
fired anti aircraft, “Stinger
Miss...
Operation Jayasikurui

Operation terminated in 1999 without meeting all its
objectives

Part - II

57
Norwegian Sponsored
Peace Talks
SRI LANKAN
GOVERNMENT

CEASE FIRE
AGGREEMENT

Part - II

LTTE

58
Critical Issues
• LTTE’s exclusion from reconstruction talks
• Tamil people were not receiving the full economic
benefits ...
Parliamentary Elections –
2005
• Mahindra Rajapakse offered to
hold unconditional peace talks
in 2005
• LTTE
instead
annou...
Peace Dialogue

Peace talks started from 28-29 Oct 2006 but the
peace talks broke down

Part - II

62
Eelam War IV
• Resolved not to hold talks
• Pursue the military option
• Leadership is not interested in
a peaceful coexis...
Eelam War IV
• Continued fighting led to territorial gains
• Operation is termed as Eelam War IV
• Changed Sri Lankan stra...
CONCLUSIONS
POLITICAL AND
MILITARY RESPONSE

65
Failure Of Peace
Negotiations
Attributed to LTTE’s belief that they could achieve
political goals through violence and int...
Lacked Sincerity Of
Purpose
Both came to the negotiations table only because of
either external pressure or to achieve som...
Display Flexibility
• To reach a compromise solution
• Agenda should widen as the negotiations proceed
to maintain confide...
Role Of IPKF
• IPKF failed to bring peace in Sri Lanka
• LTTE considered the agreement

has deflected

their goal to estab...
Role Civil Society
•
•
•
•

Crucial for any settlement to ethnic conflicts
People’s voice was weak in Sri Lanka
Be informe...
Change In Strategy
• Paid the dividends in the form of complete
eradication of LTTE leadership
• Army this time focused on...
PART – III

CHANGE IN STRATEGY
Part

Part

Part

1

2

3

Change in
Political
Thinking

Change in
Military
Strategy

Concl...
Past Political Strategy
• Mounting pressure by the International community
• Straight forward military strategy could not ...
Past Political Strategy
• Weak
agencies
to
develop
frontline
intelligence
• Lack
of
political
commitment

Part – III

75
THE NEW STRATEGY

76
Nuanced Political
Approach
• LTTE invited to negotiation table
• LTTE’s unwillingness to implement peace
accords
• Interna...
Model Of Fighting
Terrorism

“Given the political will, the military can crush
terrorism”

Part – III

78
Model Of Fighting
Terrorism
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Unwavering political will
Disregard for biased international opinion
No negot...
Proactive Foreign Policy
•
•
•
•

To gain support of international community
To create awareness in support of official st...
Change In Military
Strategy

Part – III

81
Change In Military
Strategy
• Unconventional war, in a conventional mode

Part – III

82
Change In Military
Strategy
• Transform the national security doctrine,
training and weaponry

Part – III

83
Change In Military
Strategy

CONVENTIONAL

GUERI
LLA

TRANSFORMATION

Part – III

84
NAVAL Strategy

Part – III

85
Air Strategy
• Continuous raids on identified LTTE fortifications
and nerve centers
• Sri Lankan Air force did well to cou...
Land Forces Strategy
• Focused on destroying terrorists instead of capturing
the territory

Part – III

87
Operational Level
• Focused on supporting huge logistic
demands for tactical level operations

Part – III

88
Tactical Level
• Shifted from large scale operations to small
scale platoon and section level operations

Part – III

89
Tactical Level
• Multi pronged attacks to paralyze Tamil
resistance

Part – III

90
Morale Of Troops
• Good training
• Effective casualty evacuation plans

Part – III

91
Brief Account Of
Operations
• Military offensive commenced in February 2007
which continued up to March 2009 and finally
c...
Brief Account Of
Operations

Part – III

93
xx
53

February
2007

55

TF

xx
57
58

Part – III

TF
TF

xx
TF

59
94
xx
53

February
2007

55

August
2008

TF
TF

xx
57
58

Part – III

TF

TF

xx
59
95
xx
53
February
2007

55

August
2008

November
2008

xx
58

TF
TF
TF

Part – III

TF

xx
59
96
xx
53

February
2007
August
2008

November
2008

55

xx
58

January
2009

TF
TF
TF

Part – III

TF

xx
59
97
February
2007
August
2008

November
2008
January
2009
March
2009

Part – III

98
CONCLUSIONS
CHANGE IN STRATEGY

Part – III

99
Unwavering Political Will

Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY

100
Foreign Policy
• Undeterred by international pressure
• Continued with its policy
• Limiting the diplomatic damage through...
Warfare Transformation
• Embarked upon a transformation process from
conventional to irregular warfare
• Under the dynamic...
Warfare Transformation
• Multipronged, unconventional in nature
• Based on sub unit level actions instead of large
scale c...
Personal Supervision
• Personally supervised operations
• Maintained touch with field commanders
• Appointed young command...
Role Of Navy
• By choking LTTE’s lifeline through sea

Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY

105
Role Of Air Force
• Precision strikes against insurgents and by
destroying elements of LTTE

Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY...
PART
IV
ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT
AND LESSONS LEARNT

Contents
• Political Aspects

Military Aspects
Causes Of Sri Lankan
Success
• Two decades in the conflict
• Neither side was strong enough to overcome the
other

Part – ...
Causes Of Sri Lankan
Success
Change in strategy came three years
ago
MOB TACTICS

INTELLIGENCE

YOUNG COMMANDERS

Part – I...
Political Aspects
• To defeat terrorism, all political forces must develop
consensus

Part – IV

110
Strong And Proactive
Foreign Policy

FOREIGN
POLICY

Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS

111
Consistency In Handling The
Conflict
1974
1983
1987
CONSISTENCY
1993
1994
1997
2009

Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS

112
No Ceasefire/ Peace
Agreements
Refit
Regroup
Re-Arm
Re-Supply

Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS

113
Curtail External
Support

Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS

114
Economic Aspects

Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS

115
Military Aspects

Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS

116
Clear Objectives

Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS

117
Adaptable Tactical Plans

Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS

118
Secrecy In Operational
Planning

Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS

119
Choose Men To Bring
Effects

Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS

120
Intelligence Gathering

Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS

121
Coordinated Joint
Operations

Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS

122
SUSTAINED MILITARY
BUILDUP

Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS

123
LESSONS
Political Lessons

Part – IV

125
National And Political
Will

Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS

126
Proactive/ Clear Foreign
Policy

FOREIGN
POLICY

Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS

127
Concessions Will Not
Defeat Terrorism

Resupply
Rearm
Re-group

Re-fit
Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS

128
Curtail Foreign Support

Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS

129
Regional Cooperation On
Security/ Intelligence

Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS

130
Media Handling

Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS

131
Border Control

Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS

132
ENHANCEMENT OF LEAS
ANTI TERRORISM CAPACITY

Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS

133
Modernization Of
Intelligence Agencies

Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS

134
Strategy For Stability
After War

Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS

135
MILITARY LESSONS

Part – IV

136
Clear Aim And Objectives

Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS

137
Doctrine For LIC

Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS

138
Establishing Special
Warfare Center

Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS

139
Procurement Of Weapons
And Equipment

Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS

140
Employment Of Special
Operations Force

Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS

141
Logistic Buildup

Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS

142
Destroying Safe Havens
Of Terrorists

Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS

143
Isolating The Insurgents

Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS

144
Identifying And Targeting
Insurgent Leadership

Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS

145
CONCLUSION
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  • Tamil Insurgency & Sri Lankan Army Action Against it

    1. 1. 1
    2. 2. Sri Lankan Armed Forces Campaign Against Tamil Insurgents 2
    3. 3. expressed their grievances through political channels, and later in the 1970s encouraged by many external and THEME regional players, resorted to violence and terrorism. Peace overtures by Sri Lankan Government did not bear any result and armed conflict sparked on. Suicide attacks and protracted insurgency also resulted into hundreds of civilian and military casualties. Sri Lankan Armed Forces finally accomplished decisive victory in this counter insurgency campaign by end of May 2009, bringing about total subjugation of the rebels along with elimination of the terrorist leadership. It had truly been a tale of unflinching national spirit, military professionalism and resolve for sacrifices by the Sri Lankan armed forces and public alike. Above in view, carry out analysis of the Tamil 3 insurgency in Sri Lanka examining its back ground,
    4. 4. Sri Lankan Armed Forces Campaign Against Tamil Insurgents 4
    5. 5. IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MOST MERCIFUL 5
    6. 6. Introduction • The pearl of Indian ocean. • Target of a ruthless insurgent movement • Sri Lanka fielded a series of responses • Episode of violence, grief and death 6
    7. 7. Introduction • The worst face of terrorism • LTTE had evolved into a globally prominent organization 7
    8. 8. Introduction • Managed suicide killing of two head of states • LTTE stood strong enough to hold its own naval fleet 8
    9. 9. Introduction • May 2009, witnessed a decisive victory by Sri Lankan Armed Forces • LTTE laying down their arms and accepting defeat • Elimination of insurgent leadership leaving disorder 9
    10. 10. Aim To present the analysis of Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka with a view to draw pertinent lessons for dealing with terrorism 10
    11. 11. SEQUENCE Part – I Tamil Insurgency – Its Rise and Support LT HASAN Part – II Past Measures for Conflict Resolution LT TAFSEER Part – III Change in Strategy LT HABIB Part – IV Analysis & Lessons Learnt LT ANEES 11
    12. 12. PART – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE & SUPPORT Contents Genesis of LTTE Role of Tamil Diaspora and India Conclusions Genesis of LTTE Conclusions Role of Tamil Diaspora and India Preview 12
    13. 13. History Of Sri Lanka Is Marked By Inveterate Mutual Fear Sinhalese Part - I Tamil 13
    14. 14. In The Pre Colonial Era • Small Sinhalese Kingdoms in the centre and South • Tamil kingdom in the North of the island Part - I 14
    15. 15. INDIA Jaffna SRI LANKA Part - I 15
    16. 16. Four Centuries Of Colonial Rule British 1815-1948 Dutch 1658-1796 Portuguese 1505-1638 Part - I 16
    17. 17. Three Main Steps Emergence of LTTE 1956 Sinhala Only Act 1972 1972 Late 70s Revival of Isolation of Tamils Sinhalese Nationalism THE TIPPING POINT IN THE CONFLICT
    18. 18. Emergence Of LTTE • LTTE came into existence in 1974 • Prabhakaran was the founding member Part - I 18
    19. 19. THREE MAIN REASONS FOR SURVIVAL • Other groups were MarxistLeninist • They entered mainstream following Indo – Lanka accord of 1987 • LTTE systematically lobbied for assistance from the Tamil Diaspora Part - I 19
    20. 20. Organization Part - I 20
    21. 21. Central Governing Committee Central Governing Committee Political Wing Part - I Military Wing Interna tional Wing 21
    22. 22. Military Wing Army Intelligence Navy Special Forces Air Force Black Tigers
    23. 23. Political Wing  Political Wing formed the second tier of LTTE’s organization Part - I 23
    24. 24. International Secretariat Propaganda Wing Part - I Fund Raising Ariyana Group Arms Procurement (KP Department) 24
    25. 25. Tactics Part - I 25
    26. 26. Pause And Pounce “Action and inaction” was the leitmotif of LTTE’s modus operandi against SLF Part - I 26
    27. 27. Outsourcing LTTE made use of “Outsourcing” to gain maximum benefit Part - I 27
    28. 28. Suicide Bombing • An asymmetric strategy • Not a religious phenomenon for LTTE • Types of suicide missions Part - I 28
    29. 29. Gender Manipulation • LTTE used gender manipulation to improve combat efficiency • The women were grouped with small male teams • To ensure that the men fought for winning the admiration Part - I 29
    30. 30. Political Assassinations • LTTE carried numerous out high profile assassinations • Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India • President Premadasa of Sri Lanka Part - I 30
    31. 31. Tamil Diaspora • As of 2001, Tamil Diaspora around the globe was 600,000 to 800,000 strong • 23 to 30% of global Tamil population Part - I 31
    32. 32. Tamil Diaspora • 250,000 Tamils in North America alone • 200,000 Tamils resided in Europe • Almost 30,000 in Australia • The Tamil Diaspora is highly educated and occupies professional jobs Part - I 32
    33. 33. Indian Role Indian involvement in the conflict was underpinned by its interest in the region 33
    34. 34. Reasons For Involvement • Sri Lankan overtures towards West, caused worry • To placate the Indian Tamil population • India was not interested in Tamil independence Part - I 34
    35. 35. Support Provided • 32 training camps operating all over India INDIA Part - I 35
    36. 36. Change In Indian Approach • Indian policy makers soon realised that their policy could backfire • India withdrew its official support after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi INDIA Part - I 36
    37. 37. CONCLUSIONS TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT Part - I 37
    38. 38. Sinhalese-Tamil Rivalry • Sinhalese-Tamil rivalry has its roots in the history beyond the colonial rule • Rivalry kept simmering during the colonial period and gained momentum in post independence era Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 38
    39. 39. Sinhalese Nationalism • Tamils initially democratic path • Revival of Nationalism pursued Sinhalese Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 39
    40. 40. LTTE Emergence • Astute leadership, steadfastness to Tamil nationalism and strong link with Diaspora; enabled LTTE to emerge as the leading resistance group Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 40
    41. 41. LTTE Organizational Structure • LTTE developed an elaborate organizational structure • That held them in good stead during the three decade long civil war Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 41
    42. 42. LTTE - Novel Tactics • Militarily, LTTE never failed to innovate and obfuscate security forces with its novel tactics • It gave new dimensions to suicide bombing Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 42
    43. 43. Tamil Diaspora • Tamil Diaspora supported the insurgency possible through legitimate all and illegitimate means • The war can rightly be termed as the “Diaspora funded war” Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 43
    44. 44. Indian Involvement • Indian involvement in the conflict was based on self interest • Tamils misinterpreted Indian involvement and tried to invoke the 1971 war Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 44
    45. 45. Indian Involvement • Indians, were never interested in the Tamil Eelam • Would have encouraged Tamil population in India to raise demand for independence Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT 45
    46. 46. PART – II Political And Military Response Contents 1. Political Response 2. Military Response 3. Conclusions
    47. 47. Thimpu Talks SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT Peace Talks TAMIL MILITANTS Part - II TAMIL POLITICIANS JULY 1985 47
    48. 48. Fighting continued between two sides and Sri Lankan forces managed to corner LTTE in Jaffna Part - II 48
    49. 49. Indian Sponsored Peace Talks • Indo-Lankan agreement at Colombo in Jul 1987 • Indian forces were never welcomed by either side Part - II 49
    50. 50. Indian Sponsored Peace Talks • Extremist JVP loathed presence of Indian forces • LTTE started ambushing Indian Forces and abandoned the truce Part - II 50
    51. 51. Indian Sponsored Peace Talks • Forms the basis of “Op Pawan” by IPKF • President Premadasa demanded immediate withdrawal of IPKF on 2nd January 1989 Part - II 51
    52. 52. Indian Sponsored Peace Talks • Rajiv Gandhi refused to withdraw IPKF • V P Singh in December 1989, declared the policy as utter failure Part - II 52
    53. 53. Eelam War II • Newly elected government of Chandrika Kumaratunga offer peace talks • Policy of military engagement with the Tigers • Retaking the control of Jaffna from insurgents Part - II 53
    54. 54. 1994 Peace Talks • President Kumaratunga initiated peace talks in 1994 • Short lived cease fire took place but failed Part - II 54
    55. 55. Reasons • Lack of sincerity • Lack of professionalism • Lack of flexibility Part - II 55
    56. 56. Eelam War III • Failure of 1994 talks led to Eelam War III • LTTE resorted to shoulder fired anti aircraft, “Stinger Missiles” • Hit two Sri Lankan planes flying over Jaffna Part - II 56
    57. 57. Operation Jayasikurui Operation terminated in 1999 without meeting all its objectives Part - II 57
    58. 58. Norwegian Sponsored Peace Talks SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT CEASE FIRE AGGREEMENT Part - II LTTE 58
    59. 59. Critical Issues • LTTE’s exclusion from reconstruction talks • Tamil people were not receiving the full economic benefits of peace • Tamil held areas are not as peaceful Part - II 59
    60. 60. Parliamentary Elections – 2005 • Mahindra Rajapakse offered to hold unconditional peace talks in 2005 • LTTE instead announced refresh war effort Part - II 60
    61. 61. Peace Dialogue Peace talks started from 28-29 Oct 2006 but the peace talks broke down Part - II 62
    62. 62. Eelam War IV • Resolved not to hold talks • Pursue the military option • Leadership is not interested in a peaceful coexistence • In 2006 fighting officially resumed after a cease fire Part - II 63
    63. 63. Eelam War IV • Continued fighting led to territorial gains • Operation is termed as Eelam War IV • Changed Sri Lankan strategy started to pay dividends Part - II 64
    64. 64. CONCLUSIONS POLITICAL AND MILITARY RESPONSE 65
    65. 65. Failure Of Peace Negotiations Attributed to LTTE’s belief that they could achieve political goals through violence and intimidation Part – II Political and Military Response 66
    66. 66. Lacked Sincerity Of Purpose Both came to the negotiations table only because of either external pressure or to achieve some shortterm gains Part – II Political and Military Response 67
    67. 67. Display Flexibility • To reach a compromise solution • Agenda should widen as the negotiations proceed to maintain confidence in the process Part – II Political and Military Response 68
    68. 68. Role Of IPKF • IPKF failed to bring peace in Sri Lanka • LTTE considered the agreement has deflected their goal to establish independent Tamil State Part – II Political and Military Response 69
    69. 69. Role Civil Society • • • • Crucial for any settlement to ethnic conflicts People’s voice was weak in Sri Lanka Be informed of the broad contours of the talks Broad-basing of negotiations will weaken manipulation Part – II Political and Military Response 70
    70. 70. Change In Strategy • Paid the dividends in the form of complete eradication of LTTE leadership • Army this time focused on elimination of LTTE leadership instead Part – II Political and Military Response 71
    71. 71. PART – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY Part Part Part 1 2 3 Change in Political Thinking Change in Military Strategy Conclusions
    72. 72. Past Political Strategy • Mounting pressure by the International community • Straight forward military strategy could not be formulated • Insufficient provision of equipment and logistics • Lack of international and regional interagency and security cooperation Part – III 74
    73. 73. Past Political Strategy • Weak agencies to develop frontline intelligence • Lack of political commitment Part – III 75
    74. 74. THE NEW STRATEGY 76
    75. 75. Nuanced Political Approach • LTTE invited to negotiation table • LTTE’s unwillingness to implement peace accords • International community tried to force the government • Resisted all such external pressures Part – III 77
    76. 76. Model Of Fighting Terrorism “Given the political will, the military can crush terrorism” Part – III 78
    77. 77. Model Of Fighting Terrorism • • • • • • • • Unwavering political will Disregard for biased international opinion No negotiations with forces of terror Improved flow of conflict information Absence of political intervention Complete operational freedom Accent on young commanders Kept the regional countries in the loop Part – III 79
    78. 78. Proactive Foreign Policy • • • • To gain support of international community To create awareness in support of official stance Complete support from China, Russia and Pakistan Keeping United States, India and Europe neutral Part – III 80
    79. 79. Change In Military Strategy Part – III 81
    80. 80. Change In Military Strategy • Unconventional war, in a conventional mode Part – III 82
    81. 81. Change In Military Strategy • Transform the national security doctrine, training and weaponry Part – III 83
    82. 82. Change In Military Strategy CONVENTIONAL GUERI LLA TRANSFORMATION Part – III 84
    83. 83. NAVAL Strategy Part – III 85
    84. 84. Air Strategy • Continuous raids on identified LTTE fortifications and nerve centers • Sri Lankan Air force did well to counter LTTE air threat Part – III 86
    85. 85. Land Forces Strategy • Focused on destroying terrorists instead of capturing the territory Part – III 87
    86. 86. Operational Level • Focused on supporting huge logistic demands for tactical level operations Part – III 88
    87. 87. Tactical Level • Shifted from large scale operations to small scale platoon and section level operations Part – III 89
    88. 88. Tactical Level • Multi pronged attacks to paralyze Tamil resistance Part – III 90
    89. 89. Morale Of Troops • Good training • Effective casualty evacuation plans Part – III 91
    90. 90. Brief Account Of Operations • Military offensive commenced in February 2007 which continued up to March 2009 and finally concluded in May 2009 • LTTE command structure completely destroyed Part – III 92
    91. 91. Brief Account Of Operations Part – III 93
    92. 92. xx 53 February 2007 55 TF xx 57 58 Part – III TF TF xx TF 59 94
    93. 93. xx 53 February 2007 55 August 2008 TF TF xx 57 58 Part – III TF TF xx 59 95
    94. 94. xx 53 February 2007 55 August 2008 November 2008 xx 58 TF TF TF Part – III TF xx 59 96
    95. 95. xx 53 February 2007 August 2008 November 2008 55 xx 58 January 2009 TF TF TF Part – III TF xx 59 97
    96. 96. February 2007 August 2008 November 2008 January 2009 March 2009 Part – III 98
    97. 97. CONCLUSIONS CHANGE IN STRATEGY Part – III 99
    98. 98. Unwavering Political Will Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY 100
    99. 99. Foreign Policy • Undeterred by international pressure • Continued with its policy • Limiting the diplomatic damage through astute diplomacy Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY 101
    100. 100. Warfare Transformation • Embarked upon a transformation process from conventional to irregular warfare • Under the dynamic leadership of the Army Chief General Fonseka Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY 102
    101. 101. Warfare Transformation • Multipronged, unconventional in nature • Based on sub unit level actions instead of large scale conventional assaults Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY 103
    102. 102. Personal Supervision • Personally supervised operations • Maintained touch with field commanders • Appointed young commander to infuse enthusiasm Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY 104
    103. 103. Role Of Navy • By choking LTTE’s lifeline through sea Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY 105
    104. 104. Role Of Air Force • Precision strikes against insurgents and by destroying elements of LTTE Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY 106
    105. 105. PART IV ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT AND LESSONS LEARNT Contents • Political Aspects Military Aspects
    106. 106. Causes Of Sri Lankan Success • Two decades in the conflict • Neither side was strong enough to overcome the other Part – IV 108
    107. 107. Causes Of Sri Lankan Success Change in strategy came three years ago MOB TACTICS INTELLIGENCE YOUNG COMMANDERS Part – IV 109
    108. 108. Political Aspects • To defeat terrorism, all political forces must develop consensus Part – IV 110
    109. 109. Strong And Proactive Foreign Policy FOREIGN POLICY Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS 111
    110. 110. Consistency In Handling The Conflict 1974 1983 1987 CONSISTENCY 1993 1994 1997 2009 Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS 112
    111. 111. No Ceasefire/ Peace Agreements Refit Regroup Re-Arm Re-Supply Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS 113
    112. 112. Curtail External Support Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS 114
    113. 113. Economic Aspects Part – IV POLITICAL ASPECTS 115
    114. 114. Military Aspects Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 116
    115. 115. Clear Objectives Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 117
    116. 116. Adaptable Tactical Plans Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 118
    117. 117. Secrecy In Operational Planning Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 119
    118. 118. Choose Men To Bring Effects Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 120
    119. 119. Intelligence Gathering Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 121
    120. 120. Coordinated Joint Operations Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 122
    121. 121. SUSTAINED MILITARY BUILDUP Part – IV MILITARY ASPECTS 123
    122. 122. LESSONS
    123. 123. Political Lessons Part – IV 125
    124. 124. National And Political Will Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 126
    125. 125. Proactive/ Clear Foreign Policy FOREIGN POLICY Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 127
    126. 126. Concessions Will Not Defeat Terrorism Resupply Rearm Re-group Re-fit Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 128
    127. 127. Curtail Foreign Support Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 129
    128. 128. Regional Cooperation On Security/ Intelligence Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 130
    129. 129. Media Handling Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 131
    130. 130. Border Control Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 132
    131. 131. ENHANCEMENT OF LEAS ANTI TERRORISM CAPACITY Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 133
    132. 132. Modernization Of Intelligence Agencies Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 134
    133. 133. Strategy For Stability After War Part – IV POLITICAL LESSONS 135
    134. 134. MILITARY LESSONS Part – IV 136
    135. 135. Clear Aim And Objectives Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 137
    136. 136. Doctrine For LIC Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 138
    137. 137. Establishing Special Warfare Center Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 139
    138. 138. Procurement Of Weapons And Equipment Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 140
    139. 139. Employment Of Special Operations Force Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 141
    140. 140. Logistic Buildup Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 142
    141. 141. Destroying Safe Havens Of Terrorists Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 143
    142. 142. Isolating The Insurgents Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 144
    143. 143. Identifying And Targeting Insurgent Leadership Part – IV MILITARY LESSONS 145
    144. 144. CONCLUSION

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