The top 10 windows logs event id's used v1.0

The top 10 windows logs event id's used v1.0
1 The Top 10 Windows Event ID's Used To Catch Hackers In The Act Michael Gough Lead Incident Response
2 What will be covered during this talk • Windows logs are solid gold if you know what to Enable, Configure, Gather and Harvest. When hacked they can tell you what you need to know to find and harvest the malware and what occurred. This talk walks through simple commodity malware seen in SPAM and drive-bys to a Chinese advanced attack and what Top Windows Event Codes and information in the logs allowed us to harvest their malware and understand what, where and when they were doing it. • Details of the attack from the logs and the queries used will be covered and shared to allow you to catch a similar type of attack. This talk will show an advanced attack at its finest, but is designed to be Blue Team Defense in nature so you can learn from those that deal with malware and advanced attacks almost daily. • What works and why will also be discussed
3 Disclaimer The information in this presentation and opinions are mine alone and do not reflect those of my current or past employers. MalwareArchaeology.com
4 INTRODUCTION MalwareArchaeology.com
5 Who Am I 5 • Michael Gough, Malware Archaeologist • Blue Team Ninja, Active Defense, Splunk Fu • Blog - HackerHurricane.com • Twitter - @HackerHurricane • Creator of the “Malware Management Framework” • Creator of several Logging Cheat Sheets • “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” • “Windows Splunk Logging Cheat Sheet” • “Windows File Auditing Cheat Sheet” • “Windows Registry Auditing Cheat Sheet” • Co-Creator of Log-MD • LOG and Malicious Discovery tool for Malware Discovery & Incident Response MalwareArchaeology.com
6 Hackers, Malware and Logs • I am a Logoholic • I love malware, malware discovery and malware management • But once I find an infected system, what happened before I found it? • Was there more than one system involved? • Did the Malwarian do more? • What behavior did the system or systems have after the initial infection? • Who was Patient 0? • Logs are the perfect partner to malware! MalwareArchaeology.com
7 So why listen to me? • I have been there • In the worst way • Found malware quickly • Discovered 10 months before the Kaspersky report – June 2012 • We needed more… Who, What, Where, When and How • We found the logs were not fully enabled or configured and couldn’t get the data we needed • Once the logs from endpoints were enabled and configured, we saw all kinds of cool stuff, it showed the How that we ALL NEED MalwareArchaeology.com
8 8 So what is the problem we are trying to solve? MalwareArchaeology.com
9 You’re Next 97,000 76 Mil + 8 Mil 1000+ Businesses395 Stores 4.5 Million 25,000 4.9 Million 4.03 Million 105k trans 40 Million 40+70 Million ~ $758 Mil 33 locations 650k - 2010 76,000 670,000 1900 locations 145 Million 20,000 3 Million 35,000 60,000 alerts 990,000 56 Mil 550,000 TBD Citigroup, E*Trade Financial Corp., Regions Financial Crop, HSBC Holdings and ADP ????? ? MalwareArchaeology.com
10 What is Coming • Statistics showing prevalence of weaponized document attacks as top threat in 4th quarter of 2015. MalwareArchaeology.com
11 Why we should care Mandiant M-Trends 2016 Report • Numbers always tell a story, but it’s the interpretation of those numbers that holds the real value. The median number of days an organization was compromised in 2015 before the organization discovered the breach (or was notified about the breach) was 146. This continues a positive improvement since we first measured 416 days in 2012. Additionally, the median number was 205 days in 2014, which means we witnessed a drop of more than 50 days in 2015! Obviously, as an industry, we are getting better at detecting breaches. On a positive note, companies that detected the breach on their own had a median number of 56 days compromised. The takeaway is that we are getting better as an industry, but there is still work left to do! • 2012 – 416 days MTTD • 2014 – 205 days MTTD • 2015 – 146 days MTTD • 2015 – 56 days MTTD for companies that detected it themselves MalwareArchaeology.com
12 Who is catching it? MalwareArchaeology.com Mandiant M-Trends 2016 Report
13 Compromise to Discovery MalwareArchaeology.com Mandiant M-Trends 2016 Report
14 Why should we care? Let’s take a look at real hacks caught in action In order to understand why we need to log things MalwareArchaeology.com
15 An attack in the raw logs MalwareArchaeology.com
16 Commodity malware in the raw logs 16 MalwareArchaeology.com
17 Catch PowerShell Logging bypass 17 • These were 2015 Dridex payloads MalwareArchaeology.com
18 You could catch a Crypto event MalwareArchaeology.com
19 A walk through of Winnti Winter 2014 campaign MalwareArchaeology.com
20 Winnti – A campaign against the Gaming industry • Kaspersky was the first to report on Winnti • Then came the publically released report in 2013 MalwareArchaeology.com • Followed up in 2014 with another wave of attacks • Now the group is expanding • Kaspersky Report – http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game- 130410.pdf • Novetta did a Winnti Analysis – https://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf
21 Like all malware.. It and they evolve • First gaming • Then Telecoms and BIG Pharma • Now So. Korea, UK & Russia businesses • We must learn and evolve with them MalwareArchaeology.com
22 The Malware Infection 22 Malware Launch Hiding malware in the Registry Modify Service MalwareArchaeology.com
23 Escalate permission – obvious NOT your admin 23 Check the Service used Modify Permissions Push out malware using CMD Shell & CScript MalwareArchaeology.com
24 Command Line logging is Priority #1 24 Update Registry Change Registry Permissions Change permissions on files MalwareArchaeology.com
25 Bad behavior becomes obvious 25 Doing Recon Going after Terminal Services Query Users MalwareArchaeology.com
26 You can even capture their Credentials 26 Caught THEIR Credentials! MalwareArchaeology.com
27 With what we have just seen What can we do with logs? MalwareArchaeology.com
28 More than you would have ever guessed! •Not only detect retail PoS malware (BackOff) that hit Target, Neiman Marcus and Michael’s •Government sponsored malware like Regin, Cleaver, Stuxnet, Duqu, Flamer, etc. •Yes, even the really bad stuff like Winnti, well good stuff to me ;-) •You can lower your MTTD to days if not hours •IF... you know what to look for MalwareArchaeology.com
29 Malware Management • Read reports from analysts, IR firms and presentations like this • Use the data in these reports, pull out the artifacts • Tweak your defenses • Lather – Rinse – Repeat • Long list of reports at MalwareArchaeology.com • Details found at MalwareManagementFramework.org • Send me links to reports and your thoughts MalwareArchaeology.com
30 Improve Security with Endpoint Data •Great coverage with 10 events per system, not 60,000 alerts like we heard the retailers had •If you get 10, then 20, then 30 alerts… you should be kicking into Incident Response mode •Of course there are more, but this is where to start MalwareArchaeology.com
31 The Windows Logging Cheat Sheet • 6 pages on Windows Logging • Details on how configure Windows logging and auditing • Found at: • MalwareArchaeology.com Also… • Windows Splunk Logging Cheat Sheet • Windows File Auditing Cheat Sheet • Windows Registry Auditing Cheat Sheet MalwareArchaeology.com
32 The 10 Windows Event ID’s everyone must monitor and alert on MalwareArchaeology.com
33 The Ten Command-lets 1. 4688 - New Process – Look for the obvious malicious executables like cscript.exe, sysprep.exe, nmap.exe, nbtstat.exe, netstat.exe, ssh.exe, psexec.exe, psexecsvc.exe, ipconfig.exe, ping.exe OR powershell.exe (SET, MetaSploit) Of course, new odd .exe’s 2. 4624 - Some account logged in. What is normal? 3. 5140 - A share was accessed. They most likely connected to the C$ share. 4. 5156 – Windows Firewall Network connection by process. Can see the process connecting to an IP that you can use GEOIP to resolve Country, Region and City. 5. 7040 - A new service has changed. Static systems don't change details of services 6. 7045 - A new service is installed. Static systems don't get new services except at patch time and new installs. 7. 4663 - File auditing must be enabled on directories you want to monitor. 8. 4657 – Registry auditing will give more Registry details than 4663 for Reg items 9. 501 – PowerShell execution 10. 4104 – PowerShell Scriptblock module loading MalwareArchaeology.com
34 Steps you will need to take 34 • Enable Advanced Audit Policy in Windows • The “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” • Audit Process Creation = Success 4688 • Audit Logon = Success & Failure 4624 & 4625 • Audit File Share = Success 5140 • Audit File System = Success 4663 • Audit Registry = Success 4657 • Audit Filtering Platform Connection = Success 5156 (Any/Any min) • Services already captured by System Log 7045 & 7040 • Enable and Configure to capture • Process Command Line • The #1 thing that will catch the nefarious ne’er-do-wellers MalwareArchaeology.com
35 Enable Command Line Logging MalwareArchaeology.com
36 Windows 7 thru 2012 (Win 10 too) "Include command line in process creation events“ • http://technet.microsoft.com/en- us/library/dn535776.aspx 1. You must have the patch for MS15-015 (KB3031432) for Win 7 and Win 2008, From Feb 2015 2. Registry Key tweak for all versions • SoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionPoliciesSystemAudit • ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled • to DWORD - 1 MalwareArchaeology.com
37 And you will see this added to your logs 37 • Only a fraction more data • Most valuable thing to log Additional context is important to identify abnormal behavior MalwareArchaeology.com
38 PowerShell – Command Line Windows PowerShell Log: Event ID 501 Details on setting PowerShell Preference variables • http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh847796.aspx 1. You MUST have a default Profile for all users: • C:WindowsSystem32WindowsPowerShellv1.0Profile.ps1 2. Add these to your default profile.ps1 file • $LogCommandHealthEvent = $true • $LogCommandLifecycleEvent = $true 3. Upgrade PowerShell to version 4 • Investigating PowerShell Attacks (DefCon & Blackhat 2014) • Ryan Kazanciyan TECHNICAL DIRECTOR, MANDIANT • Matt Hastings CONSULTANT, MANDIANT MalwareArchaeology.com
39 PowerShell – Script Block Module loading Microsoft-Windows - PowerShell/Operational Log: • Event ID 4104 Details on setting PowerShell Script Block and Module logging • http://technet.microsoft.com/en- us/library/hh847796.aspx 1. Add these Registry keys Windows 8.1 Server 2012 and later, Sorry no Windows 7 or Win 2008 yet: • HKLMSOFTWAREWow6432NodePoliciesMicrosoftWindowsPowerShellModuleLogging EnableModuleLogging= 1 HKLMSOFTWAREWow6432NodePoliciesMicrosoftWindowsPowerShellModuleLogging ModuleNames = * • HKLMSOFTWAREWow6432NodePoliciesMicrosoftWindowsPowerShellScriptBlockLogging EnableScriptBlockLogging= 1 2. Windows Management Framework version 5 will add more • FireEye article on the new capabilities • https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat- research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html MalwareArchaeology.com
40 PowerShell Logging via GPO MalwareArchaeology.com
41 PowerShell Transcripts • You can also specify a transcript of all PowerShell commands executed which can be located locally or on a network share • You can add these to your Log Management solution • Add these Registry Keys: • HKLMSOFTWAREWow6432NodePoliciesMicrosoftWindowsPowerShellTranscription EnableTranscription = 1 • HKLMSOFTWAREWow6432NodePoliciesMicrosoftWindowsPowerShellTranscription EnableInvocationHeader = 1 • HKLMSOFTWAREWow6432NodePoliciesMicrosoftWindowsPowerShellTranscription OutputDirectory = “” (Enter path. Empty = default) MalwareArchaeology.com
42 Some tips to save on data that you collect with your Log Management solution MalwareArchaeology.com
43 Do’s and Don’ts Reducing or excluding events (save on license) • Event ID’s 4688 & 4689 (New Process Start/Stop) and 5156 & 5158 (Windows Firewall) will be the Top 4 Events in quantity! • Storage and License required to gather all these events • 4689 and 5158 CAN be excluded as least valuable that is 50% savings • Do NOT exclude by EventID’s that you want, exclude them by the Message within the EventID • I want 4688, but not splunk*.exe or googleupdate.exe, so exclude by New_Process_Name to reduce normal noise • I want 5156, but not things that are normal to execute, so exclude by Application_Name 43 MalwareArchaeology.com
44 A sample query using Splunk for the #1 alert that ALL Log Management solutions should MUST have MalwareArchaeology.com
45 4688 (New Process Started) You can add any or all Windows Admin Utilities in System32 or SysWOW64 • index=windows source="WinEventLog:Security" (EventCode=4688) NOT (Account_Name=*$) =*$) (arp.exe OR at.exe OR bcdedit.exe OR bcp.exe OR chcp.exe OR cmd.exe OR cscript.exe OR csvde OR dsquery.exe OR ipconfig.exe OR mimikatz.exe OR nbtstat.exe OR nc.exe OR netcat.exe OR netstat.exe OR nmap OR nslookup.exe OR netsh OR OSQL.exe OR ping.exe OR powershell.exe OR powercat.ps1 OR psexec.exe OR psexecsvc.exe OR psLoggedOn.exe OR procdump.exe OR qprocess.exe OR query.exe OR rar.exe OR reg.exe OR route.exe OR runas.exe OR rundll32 OR schtasks.exe OR sethc.exe OR sqlcmd.exe OR sc.exe OR ssh.exe OR sysprep.exe OR systeminfo.exe OR system32net.exe OR reg.exe OR tasklist.exe OR tracert.exe OR vssadmin.exe OR whoami.exe OR winrar.exe OR wscript.exe OR "winrm.*" OR "winrs.*" OR wmic.exe OR wsmprovhost.exe OR wusa.exe) | eval Message=split(Message,".") | eval Short_Message=mvindex(Message,0) | table _time, host, Account_Name, Process_Name, Process_ID, Process_Command_Line, New_Process_Name, New_Process_ID, Creator_Process_ID, Short_Message 45 MalwareArchaeology.com
46 New Process Information in Splunk - Normal 46 MalwareArchaeology.com
47 New Process to Catch the PowerShell bypass • index=windows source="WinEventLog:Security" (EventCode=4688) (powershell* AND -ExecutionPolicy) OR (powershell* AND bypass) OR (powershell* AND -noprofile) | eval Message=split(Message,".") | eval Short_Message=mvindex(Message,0) | table _time, host, Account_Name, Process_Name, Process_ID, Process_Command_Line, New_Process_Name, New_Process_ID, Creator_Process_ID, Short_Message • CRITICAL ALERT !!! Catch malware using PowerShell and executing a policy bypass 47 MalwareArchaeology.com
48 4688 (PowerShell bypass) results in Splunk 48 MalwareArchaeology.com
49 5156 (Win FW Connection) Shows what process connecting to an IP • index=windows LogName=Security EventCode=5156 NOT (Source_Address="239.255.255.250" OR Source_Address="224.0.0.*" OR Source_Address="::1" OR Source_Address="ff02::*" OR Source_Address="fe80::*" OR Source_Address="255.255.255.255" OR Source_Address=192.168.1.255) NOT (Destination_Address="127.0.0.1" OR Destination_Address="239.255.255.250" OR Destination_Address="*.*.*.255" OR Destination_Address="224.0.0.25*") NOT (Destination_Port="0") NOT (Application_Name=“icamsource" OR Application_Name="*binsplunkd.exe") | dedup Destination_Address Destination_Port | table _time, host, Application_Name, Direction, Source_Address, Source_Port, Destination_Address, Destination_Port | sort Direction Destination_Port 49 MalwareArchaeology.com
50 5156 - CSV output for additional processing 50 Used to track BAD IP’s MalwareArchaeology.com
51 Windows Firewall Logging • Set to ANY/ANY mode if Windows Firewall not used. Filter out 5158 events as these are not needed • Do NOT disable in Root OU, put lower so you can add and remove systems to the OU to apply this rule • Of course enable the Win F/W everywhere and collect locally, there is no good reason not to • Export to CSV for manual processing or (or use LOG-MD) • Do WhoIS lookup to resolve the Company, Country, etc. • Create a large Whitelist of good IP’s (lookup list) • Exclude Browsers from one search. The list of IP’s will be much smaller for non browser executables talking to external IP’s 51 MalwareArchaeology.com
52 7045 (New Service added) New Service has been added • index=windows LogName=System EventCode=7045 NOT (Service_Name=tenable_mw_scan) | eval Message=split(Message,".") | eval Short_Message=mvindex(Message,0) | table _time host Service_Name, Service_Type, Service_Start_Type, Service_Account, Short_Message • This one alert would have caught EVERY retail PoS breach! 52 MalwareArchaeology.com
53 7045 (New Service added) – In Splunk 53 MalwareArchaeology.com
54 4663 (File Auditing) 4657 (Registry) Filter out/exclude known good noise • index=windows sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4663 NOT (Process_Name="*WindowsservicingTrustedInstaller.exe" OR "*WindowsSystem32poqexec.exe") NOT (Object_Name="*Userssvc_acctpnp“ OR Object_Name="C:UsersSurfAppDataLocalGoogleChromeUser Data*" NOT Object_Name="C:UsersSurfAppDataRoamingMicrosoftWindowsRecentCustomD estinations") NOT (Object_Name="C:WindowsSystem32LogFiles*" OR Object_Name="*ProgramDataMicrosoftRAC*" OR Object_Name="*MicrosoftWindowsExplorerthumbcache*" OR Object_Name="*.MAP" OR Object_Name="*counters.dat" OR Object_Name="*WindowsGatherlogsSystemIndex*") | rename Process_Name as Created_By | table _time, host, Security_ID, Handle_ID, Object_Type, Object_Name, Process_ID, Created_By, Accesses 54 MalwareArchaeology.com
55 4663 (File/Reg Auditing) – In Splunk 55 Using LOG-MD we were able to enable and expand File and Registry auditing and use the results to tweak the audit locations to reduce noise or events that are not needed, saving on license and storage If it were not for LOG-MD testing, we would have never caught Dridex creating a key on shutdown and deleting that key on startup for persistence.! File and Registry auditing for shutdown and startup is VERY powerful MalwareArchaeology.com
56 File and Registry Auditing tips Add this slowly and keep it simple or you will create a lot of noise • Set via the GUI (Booo) • Or use a PowerShell script, GPO, etc. • Or by Security Policy file • Make one for each File and Registry, apply via GPO or locally with “secedit” • Audit only for: • Files - WriteData (or AddFile), Create folders / append data, Change permissions, Take ownership • Registry – Set Value, Delete, Write DAC, Write Owner are optional • NEW is what we want... Malware needs to be added • Start with simple items like Run Keys, Firewall policy, keys that are HIGH value • Remember there are 2 Cheat Sheets to help you with this • “Windows File Auditing Cheat Sheet” • “Windows Registry Auditing Cheat Sheet” 56 MalwareArchaeology.com
57 Other valuable queries Add these to the list • EventID 106 – New Scheduled job • EventID 2004, 2005, 2006 – Windows Firewall rule added, modified or deleted • Exchange by Subject • Use to find who received a reported Phishing email • Network logs by known Bad IP • Who visited a known Bad IP (you populate) that you discover in malware analysis or triggered logs mentioned in previous slides 57 MalwareArchaeology.com
58 Other logging improvements • Of course LOG-MD to help you refine your logging and expand it. • Also great for IR tasks, lots of other features • Sysinternals – SYSMON • Module loading (.EXE, DLL, SYS) • Provides Hashes of files • Networks connections like Win FW 5156 • Windows Logging Service (WLS) • Agent to replace your logging agent • Provides Hashes of files • Provides some WMI and PowerShell execution • Replaces the need for SYSMON MalwareArchaeology.com
59 The Windows Splunk Cheat Sheet Just for you • All the queries in this preso and a few more • Some tips about filtering • Found at: • MalwareArchaeology.com 59 MalwareArchaeology.com
60 Resources Websites • MalwareArchaeology.com • Cheat Sheets • Malware Reports • Log-MD.com • Log and Malicious Discovery tool • Malware Analysis Report links too • To start your Malware Management program MalwareArchaeology.com
61 Questions? You can find me at: • MalwareArchaeology.com • MalwareManagementFramework.org • HackerHurricane.com (blog) • @HackerHurricane • Log-MD.com • http://www.slideshare.net • Search for MalwareArchaeology MalwareArchaeology.com
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