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Sandbox vs manual analysis v2.1

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Malware Archaeology
LOG-MD

Are Malware Sandboxes as good as manual malware analysis?
A look at some samples sent through automated malware sandboxes vs. manaul analysis

Published in: Technology
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Sandbox vs manual analysis v2.1

  1. 1. Are malware sandboxes as good as manual analysis? Michael Gough – Founder MalwareArchaeology.com Co-creator of MalwareArchaeology.com
  2. 2. Who am I • Blue Team Defender Ninja, Malware Archaeologist, Logoholic • I love “properly” configured logs – they tell us Who, What, Where, When and hopefully How Creator of • Malware Management Framework • Several Windows Logging Cheat Sheets • Co-Creator of “Log-MD” – Log Malicious Discovery Tool – With @Boettcherpwned – Brakeing Down Security PodCast • @BrakeSec • @HackerHurricane and also my Blog MalwareArchaeology.com
  3. 3. Malware evolves • So must we • Darwin says so • Evolve or die • Well… Evolve or get breached anyways • Getting breached means an RGE !!! – Resume Generating Event MalwareArchaeology.com
  4. 4. Define Sandbox • A VM you build to evaluate malware • An on premise virtual malware analysis like Cuckoo sandbox • A specific malware analysis eco-system like RemNUX • A cloud based malware analysis like Payload Security/ Reverse.IT, Lastline, Malwr.com, etc. • Email Gateways like FireEye, Cisco AMP, etc. • Web Proxies like FireEye, Lastline, etc. • Advanced features in Firewalls like Palo Alto WildFire • And of course anything you specifically build MalwareArchaeology.com
  5. 5. Ways to bypass Automated Sandbox Analysis MalwareArchaeology.com
  6. 6. How do the malwarians evade sandbox analysis? Look for indicators of a VM • VM Tools • Registry keys • Hardware (is virtual not real) Look for ‘Recent Files’ • Have you opened several misc. documents Processor related indicators • Some API calls take MUCH longer on a VM MalwareArchaeology.com
  7. 7. How do the malwarians evade sandbox analysis? Password protected files • Can’t scan what you can’t access MalwareArchaeology.com
  8. 8. How do the malwarians evade sandbox analysis? OLE~ • Embed OLE objects and the sandbox may not know where to click to execute the payload MalwareArchaeology.com
  9. 9. How do the malwarians evade sandbox analysis? URL’s in the document • Can be anywhere in the document MalwareArchaeology.com
  10. 10. How do the malwarians evade sandbox analysis? Time • They wait you out • Your automated queue will just backup • How long can you wait? Or the automated sandbox wait? MalwareArchaeology.com
  11. 11. How do the malwarians evade sandbox analysis? Time • They wait you out • Your automated queue will just backup • How long can you wait? Or the automated sandbox wait? MalwareArchaeology.com
  12. 12. How do the malwarians evade sandbox analysis? Time • The automated sandbox gave up • So did our email “Advanced Malware Protection” But WE did not • +LOG-MD caught it all MalwareArchaeology.com
  13. 13. Manual Analysis rules • We detonate everything in a lab that fits a pattern like ‘has a password’ and anything that comes back ‘unknown’ or ‘look incomplete MalwareArchaeology.com
  14. 14. Manual Analysis rules MalwareArchaeology.com
  15. 15. Manual Analysis rules • We even found persistence MalwareArchaeology.com
  16. 16. Time to disclose a Cloud provider that has had a serious flaw ;-) MalwareArchaeology.com
  17. 17. Hey, I got a FAX!!! • Typical Phish • A FAX.. SERIOUSLY? • So 90’s… • Word Doc attached • Date: 08/30/16 • Time: 11:15am MalwareArchaeology.com
  18. 18. Simple Manual Analysis • 7-Zip • Contains Macros MalwareArchaeology.com
  19. 19. Simple Manual Analysis • Strings or Type • Shows a Macro • “Document_Open” shows autorun when the document is opened MalwareArchaeology.com
  20. 20. Simple Manual Analysis • OfficeMalScanner – Seems malicious MalwareArchaeology.com
  21. 21. Email Gateway MalwareArchaeology.com • Date: 08/30/16 • Time: 12:02pm • 47 Mins later, another copy CLEAN ???
  22. 22. And a couple more… • Clean??? MalwareArchaeology.com VawTrak
  23. 23. Even AV actually caught it • Same Day ! • McAfee knew MalwareArchaeology.com VawTrak
  24. 24. Simple Manual Analysis • In 1 minute or less I was able to tell this Word DOC is malicious with very basic analysis – 7Zip, Strings & OfficeMalScanner • To be certain the file is bad, we could detonate it in a lab or an online solution • Let’s see what the fancy pants Cloud and Sandbox solutions say about it • By the way, auto processing your documents to the cloud may contain PII ;-( MalwareArchaeology.com
  25. 25. VirusTotal • VT Score 28/53 • Date: 9/8/16 • 8 Days later • AV has a Sig • Clearly BAD MalwareArchaeology.com
  26. 26. Unknown??? MalwareArchaeology.com • This is obviously bad Word Doc, same as the others • This one had the added benefit of an embedded OLE object • Still easily bad • This one was KOVTER
  27. 27. Let’s see what a Cloud analysis shows MalwareArchaeology.com
  28. 28. Reverse.IT MalwareArchaeology.com
  29. 29. Reverse.IT MalwareArchaeology.com
  30. 30. Reverse.IT MalwareArchaeology.com
  31. 31. Artifacts / Indicators • What do we want to get out of any analysis? – URL’s What websites were visited – IP’s Communications – Filenames What files were added – Directories used Where does it live – Autoruns used How does it launch – Config changes What changed – Metadata Details – Signed Digital Signatures – Behavior What actually happened – Network info Traffic behavior - Net Flow MalwareArchaeology.com
  32. 32. Artifacts / Indicators • Why do we want this data? • We need to know who else got infected – The IP’s and URL’s • What was added • What was changed • So we know whether to – Re-image – IF we can clean it up MalwareArchaeology.com
  33. 33. Let’s look at another Manual analysis MalwareArchaeology.com
  34. 34. Artifacts URL’s • A little script I run during analysis • And… • Google MalwareArchaeology.com
  35. 35. Process Artifacts • What launched • Linked processes – Bad EXE calls WinHost32.exe MalwareArchaeology.com Creator ID Process ID Process Name Sandbox Found
  36. 36. Artifacts IP’s • What talked to Whom • Wait… WinHost32 did not show up in the Cloud Analysis MalwareArchaeology.com
  37. 37. File & Dir Artifacts • Files involved • Directories involved MalwareArchaeology.com
  38. 38. Persistence • Run Key created MalwareArchaeology.com
  39. 39. Artifacts - Sysmon • What loaded the image • Signed or not • Hashes MalwareArchaeology.com
  40. 40. • Another little script I run MalwareArchaeology.com
  41. 41. Let’s compare Manual to Cloud MalwareArchaeology.com
  42. 42. Artifacts / Indicators – URL’s – IP’s – All Filenames – All Directories used – Autoruns used – Config changes – Metadata – Signed – Behavior MalwareArchaeology.com No/Yes Yes No Yes Some Yes Some Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Cloud Manual
  43. 43. Sandbox or Manual? • Paid solutions work better than Free ones • Many samples failed to execute due to VM aware • Not as much detail as you can get yourself (IMHO) • You CAN do as good a job, or better as sandbox solutions • Sandbox solutions are good for multiple samples after you have evaluated one using manual analysis so you can compare results • You may, or will have to super harden VM sandboxes to make them look and act like a normal system MalwareArchaeology.com
  44. 44. So what do we use for manual analysis? MalwareArchaeology.com
  45. 45. Free Edition MalwareArchaeology.com • Audit your settings – Do you comply? • Harvest security relevant log data • Whitelist log events by IP, Cmd Line, Process and File / Registry audit locations • Perform a full File Baseline of a system • Compare a suspect system to a Baseline or Dir • Perform a full Registry snapshot of a system • Compare a suspect system to a Reg Baseline • Look for Large Registry Keys for hidden payloads
  46. 46. MalwareArchaeology.com • Everything the Free Edition does and… • More reports, breakdown of things to look for • Specify the Output directory • Harvest Sysmon logs • Whitelist Hash compare results • Whitelist Registry compare results • Create a Master-Digest to exclude unique files • WhoIs lookups of IP Addresses called • SRUM netflow data (Win 8.1 & 10 64bit) • Free updates for 1 year, expect a new release every quarter • Manual – How to use LOG-MD Professional
  47. 47. MalwareArchaeology.com Future Versions – In the works! • PowerShell details • AutoRuns report • VirusTotal lookups of discovered files • Find parent-less processes • Assess all processes and create a Whitelist • Assess all services and create a Whitelist • VirusTotal lookups of unknown or new processes and services • Other API calls to security vendors
  48. 48. So what do we get? MalwareArchaeology.com • WHAT Processes executed • WHERE it executed from • IP’s to enter into Log Management to see WHO else opened the malware • Details needed to remediate infection • Details to improve your Active Defense! • I did this in… 15 Minutes!
  49. 49. Resources MalwareArchaeology.com • Websites – Log-MD.com The tool • The “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” – MalwareArchaeology.com • Malware Analysis Report links too – To start your Malware Management program • This presentation is on SlideShare and website – Search for MalwareArchaeology or LOG-MD
  50. 50. Questions? MalwareArchaeology.com You can find us at: • Log-MD.com • @HackerHurricane • @Boettcherpwned • MalwareArchaeology.com • HackerHurricane.com (blog) • MalwareManagementFramework.Org • http://www.slideshare.net – LinkedIn now

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