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Logging for Hackers
How you can catch them with what
you already have and a walk through
of an actual attack and how we
ca...
Who am I
• Blue Team Defender Ninja, Malware Archaeologist, Logoholic
• I love “properly” configured logs – they tell us W...
Malware Archaeology
Log-MD.com
• We discovered this
May 2012
• Met with the Feds ;-)
Why you should listen to me?
MalwareArchaeology.com
2014 - We gave a...
Malware evolves
• So must we
• Darwin says so
• Evolve or die
• Well… Evolve or get breached anyways
• Getting breached me...
A quick look at
STATS
MalwareArchaeology.com
DBIR 2016
• Why we are here…
MalwareArchaeology.com 7
• Hackers
compromises us
• in minutes
• And steal our data
• in days
DBIR 2016
MalwareArchaeology.com 8
• Hackers time to
Compromise is
getting faster
• Than our ability to
Discover them
DBIR 2016
MalwareArchaeology.com 9
• Fraud and Internal
detection going
down
• The dreaded 3rd
party call and Law
Enforcem...
Chasing Hashes
MalwareArchaeology.com
• Malware hashes are no longer
similar
• Malware is morphing or
created unique by de...
Symantec says…
MalwareArchaeology.com
SANS says…
MalwareArchaeology.com
Sophos Says…
• 70% of malware is unique to 1 company (APT)
• 80% of malware is unique to 10 or less (APT)
• That means…
• ...
A quick look at
Advanced Malware
Artifacts
MalwareArchaeology.com
Winnti - Malware Infection
15
Malware
Launch
Hiding malware
in the Registry
Modify Service
Escalate permissions
obvious NOT your admin
16
Check the Service used
Modify
Permissions
Push out malware using CMD Shell ...
Using the Registry for storage
17
Update Registry
Change Registry
Permissions
Change permissions on
files
Bad behavior becomes obvious
18
Doing Recon
Going after Terminal
Services
Query Users
You can even capture their Credentials
19
Caught THEIR
Credentials!
Persistence
• Avoided leaving key files behind like they did
before, well one anyways… the persistence
piece
MalwareArchae...
HKLMSoftwareClients
• putfile
• file
• read
MalwareArchaeology.com
4D5A = MZ in HEX
Key Size = 256k
Persistence
• Infector… One for the DLL (infect.exe) and
one for the Driver (InfectSys.exe)
• Altered system management bi...
Persistence
• BAM! Got ya – PROCMon on bootup
MalwareArchaeology.com
A quick look at
Commodity Malware
Artifacts
MalwareArchaeology.com
Angler delivered Kovtar
• Unique way to hide the persistence
• Inserted a null byte in the name of the Run
key so that Reg...
Dridex Artifacts
MalwareArchaeology.com
Dridex Persistence
• New method towards the end of 2015, nothing in
the Registry showing persistence while system
was runn...
Dridex is Baaack
• 2016 variant
MalwareArchaeology.com
How to Detect
Malicious Behavior
MalwareArchaeology.com
Take Away
#1
MalwareArchaeology.com
Where to start
• What am I suppose to set?
• Where do I get more information?
“Windows Logging Cheat Sheet”
“Windows File ...
PowerShell
• It’s coming… in a BIG way, it’s here
• Ben Ten uses it (Not PowerShell)
• Carlos uses it (MetaSploit)
• Dave ...
Take Away
#2
MalwareArchaeology.com
So what do we do???
• It is the “SHOW ME” state
• So here it is
• The “Windows PowerShell Logging Cheat Sheet”
• Designed ...
Take Away
#3
MalwareArchaeology.com
How to catch this stuff
Command Line Logging !!!!
• At the time of Winnti 2014 ONLY Win 8.1 and Win
2012 R2 had command li...
And this query
index=windows LogName=Security EventCode=4688 NOT
(Account_Name=*$) (arp.exe OR at.exe OR bcdedit.exe OR bc...
So how do you do this?
• Malware Management allowed us to setup
alerts on artifacts from other malware analysis
• Of cours...
What we need to look for
• Logs of course, properly configured - Events
– Command Line details
– Admin tools misused – exe...
So what did we
take away
from all of this?
MalwareArchaeology.com
You have 3 options
• Do nothing – Eventually an RGE
• Log Management / SIEM
– Cost $$$ and storage
– But IS the best optio...
It didn’t exist
So we created it!
So you can do it too!
MalwareArchaeology.com
Take Away
#4
MalwareArchaeology.com
MalwareArchaeology.com
• Log and Malicious Discovery tool
• When you run the tool, it tells you what
auditing and settings...
Functions
MalwareArchaeology.com
• Audit Report of log settings compared to:
– The “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet”
– Center ...
Purpose
MalwareArchaeology.com
• Malware Analysis Lab – Why we initially developed it
• Investigate a suspect system
• Aud...
Free Edition
MalwareArchaeology.com
• Audit your settings – Do you comply?
• Harvest security relevant log data
• Whitelis...
MalwareArchaeology.com
• Everything the Free Edition does and…
• More reports, breakdown of things to look for
• Specify t...
MalwareArchaeology.com
Future Versions – In the works!
• PowerShell details
• WhoIs lookups of IP Addresses called
• Virus...
MalwareArchaeology.com
Let’s look
at some
LOG-MD
RESULTS
Crypto Event
MalwareArchaeology.com
• C:UsersBobAppDataRoamingvcwixk.exe
• C:UsersBobAppDataRoamingvcwpir.exe
• C:WINDOWSs...
Malicious Word Doc
MalwareArchaeology.com
DRIDEX
Malicious Word Doc con’t
MalwareArchaeology.com
More DRIDEX
Use the power of Excel
MalwareArchaeology.com
• The reports are in .CSV format
• Excel has sorting and Filters
• Filters a...
So what do we get?
MalwareArchaeology.com
• WHAT Processes executed
• WHERE it executed from
• IP’s to enter into Log Mana...
Resources
MalwareArchaeology.com
• Websites
– Log-MD.com The tool
• The “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet”
– MalwareArchaeology...
Questions?
MalwareArchaeology.com
You can find us at:
• Log-MD.com
• @HackerHurricane
• @Boettcherpwned
• MalwareArchaeolo...
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Logging for Hackers - What you need to know to catch them

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ShowMeCon 2016
MalwareArchaeology.com
Malware Archaeology
LOG-MD

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Logging for Hackers - What you need to know to catch them

  1. 1. Logging for Hackers How you can catch them with what you already have and a walk through of an actual attack and how we caught it Michael Gough – Founder MalwareArchaeology.com MalwareArchaeology.com
  2. 2. Who am I • Blue Team Defender Ninja, Malware Archaeologist, Logoholic • I love “properly” configured logs – they tell us Who, What, Where, When and hopefully How Creator of • Malware Management Framework • Several Windows Logging Cheat Sheets • Co-Creator of “Log-MD” – Log Malicious Discovery Tool – With @Boettcherpwned – Brakeing Down Security PodCast • @HackerHurricane and also my Blog MalwareArchaeology.com
  3. 3. Malware Archaeology Log-MD.com
  4. 4. • We discovered this May 2012 • Met with the Feds ;-) Why you should listen to me? MalwareArchaeology.com 2014 - We gave an infected VM to one of the Big IR Firms… They came back “Yup.. It’s clean” #Fail
  5. 5. Malware evolves • So must we • Darwin says so • Evolve or die • Well… Evolve or get breached anyways • Getting breached means an RGE !!! – Resume Generating Event MalwareArchaeology.com
  6. 6. A quick look at STATS MalwareArchaeology.com
  7. 7. DBIR 2016 • Why we are here… MalwareArchaeology.com 7 • Hackers compromises us • in minutes • And steal our data • in days
  8. 8. DBIR 2016 MalwareArchaeology.com 8 • Hackers time to Compromise is getting faster • Than our ability to Discover them
  9. 9. DBIR 2016 MalwareArchaeology.com 9 • Fraud and Internal detection going down • The dreaded 3rd party call and Law Enforcement notifications going up
  10. 10. Chasing Hashes MalwareArchaeology.com • Malware hashes are no longer similar • Malware is morphing or created unique by design for each system OR on reboot
  11. 11. Symantec says… MalwareArchaeology.com
  12. 12. SANS says… MalwareArchaeology.com
  13. 13. Sophos Says… • 70% of malware is unique to 1 company (APT) • 80% of malware is unique to 10 or less (APT) • That means… • 20% of malware is what the AV industry focuses on, but it is what most of you and everyone in this room sees and gets by: – Attachments in email – URL in email – Surfing the web • Ads • WordPress, Drupal, Joomla… MalwareArchaeology.com
  14. 14. A quick look at Advanced Malware Artifacts MalwareArchaeology.com
  15. 15. Winnti - Malware Infection 15 Malware Launch Hiding malware in the Registry Modify Service
  16. 16. Escalate permissions obvious NOT your admin 16 Check the Service used Modify Permissions Push out malware using CMD Shell & CScript
  17. 17. Using the Registry for storage 17 Update Registry Change Registry Permissions Change permissions on files
  18. 18. Bad behavior becomes obvious 18 Doing Recon Going after Terminal Services Query Users
  19. 19. You can even capture their Credentials 19 Caught THEIR Credentials!
  20. 20. Persistence • Avoided leaving key files behind like they did before, well one anyways… the persistence piece MalwareArchaeology.com
  21. 21. HKLMSoftwareClients • putfile • file • read MalwareArchaeology.com 4D5A = MZ in HEX Key Size = 256k
  22. 22. Persistence • Infector… One for the DLL (infect.exe) and one for the Driver (InfectSys.exe) • Altered system management binaries – McAfeeFrameworkService – BESClientHelper – Attempted a few others, some failed MalwareArchaeology.com • We tried the infector on several other system files and it worked
  23. 23. Persistence • BAM! Got ya – PROCMon on bootup MalwareArchaeology.com
  24. 24. A quick look at Commodity Malware Artifacts MalwareArchaeology.com
  25. 25. Angler delivered Kovtar • Unique way to hide the persistence • Inserted a null byte in the name of the Run key so that RegEdit and Reg Query fail to read and display the value • And a LARGE Reg Key (anything over 20k is large) MalwareArchaeology.com
  26. 26. Dridex Artifacts MalwareArchaeology.com
  27. 27. Dridex Persistence • New method towards the end of 2015, nothing in the Registry showing persistence while system was running • In memory only until system shutdown – On shutdown the Run key was created • On startup the malware loads and Run key deleted MalwareArchaeology.com
  28. 28. Dridex is Baaack • 2016 variant MalwareArchaeology.com
  29. 29. How to Detect Malicious Behavior MalwareArchaeology.com
  30. 30. Take Away #1 MalwareArchaeology.com
  31. 31. Where to start • What am I suppose to set? • Where do I get more information? “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” “Windows File Auditing Cheat Sheet” “Windows Registry Auditing Cheat Sheet” “Windows Splunk Logging Cheat Sheet” “Malware Management Framework” • Find them all here: – MalwareArchaeology.com MalwareArchaeology.com
  32. 32. PowerShell • It’s coming… in a BIG way, it’s here • Ben Ten uses it (Not PowerShell) • Carlos uses it (MetaSploit) • Dave uses it (SET) • Kevin too (Pen Tester) • Dridex uses it • RansomWare uses it • And logging SUCKS for it MalwareArchaeology.com
  33. 33. Take Away #2 MalwareArchaeology.com
  34. 34. So what do we do??? • It is the “SHOW ME” state • So here it is • The “Windows PowerShell Logging Cheat Sheet” • Designed to catch the folks I just mentioned, and others ;-) • Get it at: – MalwareArchaeology.com MalwareArchaeology.com
  35. 35. Take Away #3 MalwareArchaeology.com
  36. 36. How to catch this stuff Command Line Logging !!!! • At the time of Winnti 2014 ONLY Win 8.1 and Win 2012 R2 had command line logging • Which we had, then we saw this in our alerts of suspicious commands (Cscript & cmd.exe & cacls & net & takeown & pushd & attrib) • Scripts too MalwareArchaeology.com
  37. 37. And this query index=windows LogName=Security EventCode=4688 NOT (Account_Name=*$) (arp.exe OR at.exe OR bcdedit.exe OR bcp.exe OR chcp.exe OR cmd.exe OR cscript.exe OR csvde OR dsquery.exe OR ipconfig.exe OR mimikatz.exe OR nbtstat.exe OR nc.exe OR netcat.exe OR netstat.exe OR nmap OR nslookup.exe OR netsh OR OSQL.exe OR ping.exe OR powershell.exe OR powercat.ps1 OR psexec.exe OR psexecsvc.exe OR psLoggedOn.exe OR procdump.exe OR qprocess.exe OR query.exe OR rar.exe OR reg.exe OR route.exe OR runas.exe OR rundll32 OR schtasks.exe OR sethc.exe OR sqlcmd.exe OR sc.exe OR ssh.exe OR sysprep.exe OR systeminfo.exe OR system32net.exe OR reg.exe OR tasklist.exe OR tracert.exe OR vssadmin.exe OR whoami.exe OR winrar.exe OR wscript.exe OR "winrm.*" OR "winrs.*" OR wmic.exe OR wsmprovhost.exe OR wusa.exe) | eval Message=split(Message,".") | eval Short_Message=mvindex(Message,0) | table _time, host, Account_Name, Process_Name, Process_ID, Process_Command_Line, New_Process_Name, New_Process_ID, Creator_Process_ID, Short_Message | stats count > 2 MalwareArchaeology.com
  38. 38. So how do you do this? • Malware Management allowed us to setup alerts on artifacts from other malware analysis • Of course our own experience too • Malware Discovery allowed us to find odd file hashes, command line details, registry locations • Malware Analysis gave us the details MalwareArchaeology.com
  39. 39. What we need to look for • Logs of course, properly configured - Events – Command Line details – Admin tools misused – executions – New Services (retail PoS should know this) – Drivers used (.sys) • New Files dropped anywhere on disk – Hashes • Infected management binary (hash changed) • Delete on startup, write on shutdown - Auditing • Scripts hidden in the registry – Registry Compare • Payload hidden in the registry – Large Reg Keys • Malware Communication – IP and WhoIS info • Expand PowerShell detection • VirusTotal Lookups MalwareArchaeology.com
  40. 40. So what did we take away from all of this? MalwareArchaeology.com
  41. 41. You have 3 options • Do nothing – Eventually an RGE • Log Management / SIEM – Cost $$$ and storage – But IS the best option, better than most security solutions if you want my opinion • What if I don’t have Log Management or SIEM? MalwareArchaeology.com
  42. 42. It didn’t exist So we created it! So you can do it too! MalwareArchaeology.com
  43. 43. Take Away #4 MalwareArchaeology.com
  44. 44. MalwareArchaeology.com • Log and Malicious Discovery tool • When you run the tool, it tells you what auditing and settings to configure that it requires. LOG-MD won’t harvest anything until you configure the system! • So answers How to check for the What to set I already told you about
  45. 45. Functions MalwareArchaeology.com • Audit Report of log settings compared to: – The “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” – Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmarks – Also USGCB and AU ACSC • White lists to filter out the known good – By IP Address – By Process Command Line and/or Process Name – By File and Registry locations (requires File and Registry auditing to be set) • Report.csv - data from logs specific to security
  46. 46. Purpose MalwareArchaeology.com • Malware Analysis Lab – Why we initially developed it • Investigate a suspect system • Audit the Windows - Advanced Audit Policy settings • Help MOVE or PUSH security forward • Give the IR folks what they need and the Feds too • Take a full system (File and Reg) snapshot to compare to another system and report the differences • Discover tricky malware artifacts (Large Keys, Null Byte, AutoRuns) • SPEED ! • Deploy with anything you want, SCCM, LanDesk, PSExec, PS, etc… • Replace several tools we use today with one easy to use utility that does much more • Replace several older tools and GUI tools • To answer the question: Is this system infected or clean? • And do it quickly !
  47. 47. Free Edition MalwareArchaeology.com • Audit your settings – Do you comply? • Harvest security relevant log data • Whitelist log events by IP, Cmd Line, Process and File / Registry audit locations • Perform a full File Baseline of a system • Compare a suspect system to a Baseline or Dir • Perform a full Registry snapshot of a system • Compare a suspect system to a Reg Baseline • Look for Large Registry Keys for hidden payloads
  48. 48. MalwareArchaeology.com • Everything the Free Edition does and… • More reports, breakdown of things to look for • Specify the Output directory • Harvest Sysmon logs • Harvest WLS Logs • Whitelist Hash compare results • Whitelist Registry compare results • Create a Master-Digest to exclude unique files • Free updates for 1 year, expect a new release every quarter • Manual – How to use LOG-MD Professional
  49. 49. MalwareArchaeology.com Future Versions – In the works! • PowerShell details • WhoIs lookups of IP Addresses called • VirusTotal lookups of discovered files • Find parent-less processes • Assess all processes and create a Whitelist • Assess all services and create a Whitelist • VirusTotal lookups of unknown or new processes and services • Other API calls to security vendors
  50. 50. MalwareArchaeology.com Let’s look at some LOG-MD RESULTS
  51. 51. Crypto Event MalwareArchaeology.com • C:UsersBobAppDataRoamingvcwixk.exe • C:UsersBobAppDataRoamingvcwpir.exe • C:WINDOWSsystem32cmd.exe /c del C:UsersBobAppDataRoamingvcwixk.exe >> NUL • C:WindowsSystem32vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /Quiet
  52. 52. Malicious Word Doc MalwareArchaeology.com DRIDEX
  53. 53. Malicious Word Doc con’t MalwareArchaeology.com More DRIDEX
  54. 54. Use the power of Excel MalwareArchaeology.com • The reports are in .CSV format • Excel has sorting and Filters • Filters are AWESOME to thin out your results • You might take filtered results and add them to your whitelist once vetted • Save to .XLS and format, color code and produce your report • For .TXT files use NotePad++
  55. 55. So what do we get? MalwareArchaeology.com • WHAT Processes executed • WHERE it executed from • IP’s to enter into Log Management to see WHO else opened the malware • Details needed to remediate infection • Details to improve your Active Defense! • I did this in… 15 Minutes!
  56. 56. Resources MalwareArchaeology.com • Websites – Log-MD.com The tool • The “Windows Logging Cheat Sheet” – MalwareArchaeology.com • Malware Analysis Report links too – To start your Malware Management program • This presentation is on SlideShare and website – Search for MalwareArchaeology or LOG-MD
  57. 57. Questions? MalwareArchaeology.com You can find us at: • Log-MD.com • @HackerHurricane • @Boettcherpwned • MalwareArchaeology.com • HackerHurricane.com (blog) • http://www.slideshare.net – LinkedIn now

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