Relevant Issues In Public Administration

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Graduate School of Asia and Pacific Studies University of Waseda, Tokyo-JAPAN 2010

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Relevant Issues In Public Administration

  1. 1. DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION III. RELEVANT ISSUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION Graduate School of Asia and Pacific Studies University of Waseda, Tokyo-JAPAN 2010
  2. 2. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION LAW BUSINESS POLITICS ECONOMICS <ul><li>ADMINISTRATIVE LAW </li></ul><ul><li>DISCRETIONARY POWERS </li></ul>PUBLIC CHOICE PUBLIC POLICY MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  3. 3. <ul><li>THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY AND POLICY ANALYSIS IS NOW A WELL ESTABLISHED PART OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. </li></ul><ul><li>PUBLIC POLICY IS A COURSE OF ACTION ADOPTED AND PURSUED BY GOVERNMENT (HENRY, 2004). </li></ul><ul><li>PUBLIC POLICY REFERS TO THE DECISIONS MADE BY GOVERNMENT, TO A PURPOSIVE COURSE OF ACTION TAKEN BY GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS IN PURSUING SOLUTIONS TO PERCEIVED PROBLEMS (LEMAY, 2002). </li></ul><ul><li>PUBLIC POLICY CAN BEST BE VIEWED AS A PROCESS, A SET OR SERIES OF STAGES THROUGH WHICH POLICY IS ESTABLISHED AND IMPLEMENTED. THE POLICY PROCESS CONSISTS OF A SUCCESSION OF ANALYTICAL STAGES ( LEMAY, 2002) </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  4. 4. <ul><li>FOR MANY YEARS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS WERE SEEN AS NEUTRAL IMPLEMENTORS OF PUBLIC POLICIES SHAPED AND DESIGNED ELSEWHERE IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. SINCE THE 1960s, WITH THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS, BOTH THE POLICY PROCESS IT SELF AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN IT HAVE BEEN REEVALUATED. </li></ul><ul><li>PROCEEDING FROM THE PREMISE THAT POLITICS IS MESSY AND IMPRECISE, PROPONENTS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS ARGUE THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF RIGOROUS ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGIES AND DECISION TOOLS WILL DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE BOTH THE DEFINITION OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THEM. </li></ul>PUBLIC POLICY Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  5. 5. <ul><li>FURTHER, IT IS ARGUED THAT MORE RATIONAL DECISION PROCESSES WILL NOT ONLY BE MORE EFFICIENT, BUT ALSO MORE RESPONSIVE TO CITIZEN NEEDS AND PREFERENCES. THIS VERSION OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS VALUES OBJECTIVITY AND NEUTRALITY; IT IS BASED ON AN ABIDING BELIEF IN TECHNICAL ANALYSIS AND ABILITIES. </li></ul>PUBLIC POLICY Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  6. 6. <ul><li>IT MAKES USE OF TECHNIQUES DEVELOPED IN THE FIELDS OF ECONOMICS, MATHEMATICS, STATISTICS, OPERATIONS RESEARCH, AND SYSTEMS DYNAMICS, AMONG OTHERS, TO PROVIDE DECISION MAKERS WITH ADVICE IN THE FORMULATION OF PUBLIC POLICY. </li></ul><ul><li>IN APPLYING THOSE TECHNIQUES, THE ANALYST MAY ALSO DRAW ON KNOWLEDGE FROM FIELDS SUCH AS SOCIOLOGY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS, LAW, ORGANIZATION - THEORY, THE PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, AND ELSEWHERE. POLICY ANALYSIS MUST TAKE THE ANALYST WHEREVER THE POLICY ISSUE LEADS, MAKING ANALYSIS THE MULTI DISIPLINARY ACTIVITY PAR EXCELLENCE. </li></ul>PUBLIC POLICY Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  7. 7. <ul><li>POLICY ANALYSIS INCLUDES: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>IDENTIFYING THE “PROBLEM” TO BE RESOLVED, </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>SPECIFYING THE GOAL(S) TO BE SOUGHT THROUGH PUBLIC POLICY, </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>IDENTIFYING OR INVENTING THE AVAILABLE POLICY ALTERNATIVES, </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF EACH OF THE ALTERNATIVES, BOTH FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE, </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>IMPUTING VALUES IN A SINGLE, COMMENSURABLE MATRIX TO THOSE EFFECTS, AND </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>CHOOSING THE “BEST” POLICY ALTERNATIVE ACCORDING TO AN EXPLICIT DECISION RULE. </li></ul></ul>PUBLIC POLICY Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  8. 8. <ul><li>PUBLIC CHOICE REPRESENTS ANOTHER FACET OF WORK IN POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. MOST POLITICAL ECONOMISTS IN THE PUBLIC CHOICE TRADITION BEGIN WITH THE INDIVIDUAL AS THE BASIC UNIT OF ANALYSIS. THE TRADITIONAL &quot;ECONOMIC MAN&quot; IS THEN REPLACED BY &quot;MAN: THE DECISION MAKER.&quot; </li></ul>PUBLIC CHOICE Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  9. 9. <ul><li>THE SECOND CONCERN IN THE PUBLIC CHOICE TRADITION IS WITH THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PUBLIC GOODS AS THE TYPE OF EVENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE OUTPUT OF PUBLIC AGENCIES. </li></ul><ul><li>PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY IS ALSO CONCERNED WITH THE EFFECT THAT DIFFERENT DECISION RULES OR DECISION-MAKING ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE UPON THE PRODUCTION OF THOSE EVENTS CONCEPTUALIZED AS PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES. </li></ul>PUBLIC CHOICE Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  10. 10. <ul><li>FOUR BASIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR ARE NORMALLY MADE: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>FIRST , INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSUMED TO BE SELF-INTERESTED (NOT EQUIVALENT TO “SELFISH”). THE ASSUMPTION OF SELF-INTEREST IMPLIES PRIMARILY THAT INDIVIDUALS EACH HAVE THEIR OWN PREFERENCES WHICH AFFECT THE DECISIONS THEY MAKE, AND THAT THOSE PREFERENCES MAY DIFFER FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INDIVIDUAL. </li></ul></ul>PUBLIC CHOICE Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  11. 11. <ul><ul><li>SECONDLY, INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSUMED TO BE RATIONAL. RATIONALITY IS DEFINED AS THE ABILITY TO RANK ALL KNOWN ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO THE INDIVIDUAL IN A TRANSITIVE MANNER. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>THIRD, INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSUMED TO ADOPT MAXIMIZING STRATEGIES. MAXIMIZATION AS A STRATEGY IMPLIES THE CONSISTENT CHOICE OF THOSE ALTERNATIVES WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL THINKS WILL PROVIDE THE HIGHEST NET BENEFIT AS WEIGHED BY HIS OWN PREFERENCES. AT TIMES THE ASSUMPTION OF MAXIMIZATION IS RELATED TO THAT OF SATISFY ING, DEPENDING UPON ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO AN INDIVIDUAL IN A DECISION-MAKING SITUATION. </li></ul></ul>PUBLIC CHOICE Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  12. 12. <ul><ul><li>FOURTH, AN EXPLICIT ASSUMPTION NEEDS TO BE STATED CONCERNING THE LEVEL OF INFORMATION POSSESSED BY A REPRESENTATIVE INDIVIDUAL. THREE LEVELS HAVE BEEN ANALYTICALLY DEFINED AS INVOLVING CERTAINTY, RISK, AND UNCERTAINTY. </li></ul></ul>PUBLIC CHOICE Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  13. 13. <ul><ul><ul><li>THE CONDITION OF CERTAINTY IS DEFINED TO EXIST WHEN: </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>AN INDIVIDUAL KNOWS ALL AVAIL ABLE STRATEGIES; </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>EACH STRATEGY IS KNOWN TO LEAD INVARIABLY TO ONLY ONE SPECIFIC OUTCOME, AND; </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>THE INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HIS OWN PREFERENCES FOR EACH OUTCOME. GIVEN THIS LEVEL OF INFORMATION, THE DECISION OF A MAXIMIZING INDIVIDUAL IS COMPLETELY DETERMINED. </li></ul></ul></ul></ul>PUBLIC CHOICE Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  14. 14. <ul><ul><li>UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK , THE INDIVIDUAL IS STILL ASSUMED TO KNOW ALL AVAILABLE STRATEGIES. ANY PARTICULAR STRATEGY MAY LEAD TO A NUMBER OF POTENTIAL OUTCOMES, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IS ASSUMED TO KNOW THE PROBABILITY OF EACH OUTCOME. THUS, DECISION MAKING BECOMES WEIGHTING PROCESS WHEREBY HIS PREFERENCES FOR DIFFERENT OUTCOMES ARE COM BINED WITH THE PROBABILITY OF THEIR OCURRENCE PRIOR TO A SELECTION OF A STRATEGY. </li></ul></ul>PUBLIC CHOICE Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  15. 15. <ul><ul><li>DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY IS ASSUMED TO OCCUR EITHER WHERE (1) AN INDIVIDUAL HAS A KNOWLEDGE OF ALL STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES, BUT LACKS KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE PROBABILITIES WITH WHICH A STRATEGY MAY LEAD TO AN OUTCOME, OR (2) AN INDIVIDUAL MAY NOT KNOW ALL STRATEGIES OR ALL OUTCOMES WHICH ACTUALLY EXIST. </li></ul></ul>PUBLIC CHOICE Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  16. 16. <ul><ul><li>UNDER CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY, THE DETERMINATENESS OF SOLUTIONS IS REPLACED BY CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE &quot;SOLUTIONS.&quot; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>ESTIMATIONS ARE MADE ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF STRATEGIES. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>(VINCENT OSBORNE & ELEANOR OSBORN, 1971) </li></ul>PUBLIC CHOICE Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  17. 17. <ul><li>PUBLIC CHOICE IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING IN ADMINISTRATION . </li></ul><ul><li>OTHER MODELS INCLUDE: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>RATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE MODEL; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>BARGAINING MODEL; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>INCREMENTAL MODEL; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>PARTICIPATIVE MODEL. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>(LEMAY, 2002) </li></ul></ul>PUBLIC CHOICE Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  18. 18. <ul><li>ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFERS TO THOSE LAWS AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE CREATED BY THE ACTIVITIES OF GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES THAT MAKE RULES AND ADJUDICATE CASES CONCERNING PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AND THE LIMITS NEEDED TO CONTROL SUCH AGENCIES. </li></ul><ul><li>INCLUDED IN THE BODY OF LAWS (OR RULES AND REGULATIONS) OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES THAT COLLECTIVELY MAKE UP ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ARE INTERPRETATIVE RULES—THOSE RULES THAT SPECIFY AN AGENCY'S VIEWS OF THE MEANING OF ITS REGULATIONS OR OF THE STATUTES IT ADMINISTERS. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  19. 19. <ul><li>ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IS RESTRICTED TO AGENCY ACTIONS THAT COVER THE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE PARTIES. IT EXCLUDES THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND DEPARTMENTS OR THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT (MATTERS COVERED IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW). ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CONCERNS THE QUASI-LEGISLATIVE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. THE ADMINISTRATORS OF SUCH AGENCIES ARE POLICY MAKERS—BUT WITH A LIMITED RANGE OF AUTHORITY WHEN MAKING RULES. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  20. 20. <ul><li>ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES' FORMAL POWERS INCLUDE: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>INVESTIGATING COMPLAINTS; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>ORDERING THE ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN PRACTICES; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>SETTING STANDARDS; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>PROSECUTING FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF LAWS AND STANDARDS, INCLUDING ISSUING CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDERS AND IMPOSING FINES; </li></ul></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  21. 21. <ul><ul><li>SETTING FORTH RULES AND REGULATIONS; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>HOLDING HEARINGS BEFORE ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>HOLDING ADJUDICATION HEARINGS; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>ISSUING, WITHHOLDING, AND REVOKING LICENSES; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>PROVIDING FOR APPEAL PROCEDURES; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>ORDERING TEMPORARY CESSATIONS OF ACTIVITIES; AND </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>SEIZING PROPERTY AND IMPOSING FINES AND PENALTIES. </li></ul></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  22. 22. <ul><li>LIMITATIONS OVER REGULATORY AGENCY DISCRETION ARE BUILT INTO THE RIGHTS AND PROCEDURAL RULE SAFEGUARDS DESIGNED INTO AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY'S ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURES, OR PRACTICES AS WELL AS THROUGH JUDICIAL REVIEW. </li></ul><ul><li>OTHER CONTROL DEVICES ALSO LIMIT AGENCY DISCRETION. ONE SUCH DEVICE IS MEDIA SCRUTINY. INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING AND THE ABILITY OF MEDIA MEMBERS TO HOLD AGENCIES UP TO PUBLIC RIDICULE DOES SERVE AS SOMETHING OF A CHECK ON AGENCY ABUSE OF POWER. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  23. 23. <ul><li>ANOTHER DEVICE IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OMBUDSMAN, OR AN OFFICIAL WHO IS CHARGED WITH PROCESSING AND EXAMINING COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE BUREAUCRACY. OMBUDSMEN TYPICALLY REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURES OR OTHER OFFICE THAT HOLDS AUTORITY. </li></ul><ul><li>CITIZEN ACTION GROUPS SUCH AS COMMON CAUSE ALSO CAN SERVE AS INFORMAL WATCHDOGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  24. 24. <ul><li>ALTHOUGH ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES ENJOY WIDE DISCRETION IN DEVELOPING THE MASSIVE BODY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, RULES OR REGULATIONS, THEIR DISCRETION HAS ITS LIMITS. THESE LIMITS MAY BE IMPOSED BY THE LEGISLATURE WHEN IT ESTABLISHES AN AGENCY OR WHEN IT ENACTS AMENDING LAWS REGARDING AN AGENCY'S JURISDICTION, AS WELL AS BY THE COURTS THROUGH THEIR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTIONS AND RULINGS. </li></ul><ul><li>(LEMAY, 2004) </li></ul>www.ginandjar.com
  25. 25. <ul><li>AS SOCIETY BECAME MORE COMPLEX AND ORGANIZATIONS GREW LARGER, ORGANIZATIONS (BOTH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC) INCREASED THEIR DIVISION OF LABOR INTO MORE AND SMALLER SPECIALIZED UNITS. </li></ul><ul><li>LARGER INSTITUTIONS BEGAN TO DEFER TO THE JUDGMENTS OF THESE UNITS, WHICH SHOWS THAT A MAJOR FOUNDATION OF BUREAUCRATIC POWER IS EXPERTISE , OR SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE . </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  26. 26. <ul><li>AS SOCIETY BECAME MORE COMPLEX AND SPECIALIZED, DECISION MAKERS RELIED ON EXPERT ADVICE. SOME BUREAUCRATIC AGENCIES, THEN, DEVELOPED A NEAR MONOPOLY ON THE TECHNICAL DATA OR CRITERIA USED TO DECIDE POLICY. </li></ul><ul><li>DEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF POLICY THEY IMPLEMENT, BUREAUCRACY HAVE DISCRETIONARY POWER, EITHER MORE OR LESS. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  27. 27. <ul><li>IN THE MINDS OF MOST OBSERVERS, THE ISSUE IS NOT WHETHER BUREAUCRACIES HAVE POWER BUT THE MAGNITUDE AND OMINOUS NATURE OF THAT POWER. BUREAUCRACIES ARE SEEN AS TOO INFLUENTIAL, TOO UNCHALLENGED, AND SUBSEQUENTLY DANGEROUS. BUREAUCRATS ARE THOUGHT OF AS ASSUMING A PREMINENT, EVEN UNCHECKED ROLE IN THE FORMATION AND EXECUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  28. 28. <ul><li>CORRUPTION </li></ul><ul><li>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS BOTH PROFESION AND SCIENTIFIC STUDY FROM THE BEGINNING HAS BEEN VERY MUCH CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEMS OF CORRUPTION OR ABUSE OF POWER. </li></ul><ul><li>A CORRUPTED BUREAUCRACY, BY DEFITION, IS ONE THAT, DOES NOT DO WHAT IT IS SUPPPOSED TO, SINCE ILLEGAL PAYMENTS TO OFFICIALS ARE PRESSUMABLY NOT MADE UNLESS THOSE WHO RECEIVE PAYMENT CAN AND DO CONTRAVENE THE INTENT OF THE LAWS THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO APPLY. ALTHOUGH FORMALLY SALARIED, BUREAUCRATS IN SUCH QUASI-SALARY SYSTEMS INDULGE IN SELF-ENRICHMENT ON A LARGE SCALE (RIGGS,1995). </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  29. 29. <ul><li>FOR THESE REASONS, LEGALLY SANCTIONED DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES CONSTITUTE A &quot;BOTTLENECK&quot; BETWEEN WHAT PEOPLE WANT AND WHAT THEY GET. </li></ul><ul><li>THE TEMPTATION TO GET AROUND THE BOTTLENECK—TO SPEED THINGS UP AND MAKE FAVORABLE DECISIONS MORE PROBABLE—IS BUILT INTO THIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY. </li></ul><ul><li>TO GET AROUND THE BOTTLENECK, ONE MUST USE POLITICAL INFLUENCE—AND CORRUPTION, WHICH BY DEFINITION CUTS ACROSS ESTABLISHED AND LEGITIMATE PROCESSES, IS A MOST EFFECTIVE FORM OF INFLUENCE. </li></ul><ul><li>(MICHAEL JOHNSTON, 1982) </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  30. 30. <ul><li>CORRUPTION, IS A FORM OF PRIVELEDGE IDULGED IN BY THOSE IN POWER. IT CONCENTRATES POWER IN THE HANDS OF A FEW WHO CAN MAKE DECISIONS BASED NOT ON THE GOOD OF THE WHOLE BUT ON THE INTERESTS OF THE FEW. </li></ul><ul><li>POWER TENDS TO CORRUPT, AND ABSOLUTE POWER CORRUPTS ABSOLUTELY. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  31. 31. <ul><li>ACCOUNTABILITY </li></ul><ul><li>ACCOUNTABILITY IS THE DEGREE TO WHICH A PERSON MUST ANSWER TO SOME HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR ACTIONS IN THE LARGER SOCIETY OR IN THE AGENCY. </li></ul><ul><li>ELECTED PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO VOTERS. PUBLIC AGENCY MANAGERS ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO ELECTED EXECUTIVES AND LEGISLATURES. </li></ul><ul><li>AGENCY LEADERS ARE HELD ACCOUNTABLE TO THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF SOCIETY, WHICH HOLDS GENERAL VALUES AND IDEAS OF DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC MORALITY. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  32. 32. <ul><li>ACCOUNTABILITY IS DETERMINED BOTH EXTERNALLY (BY CODES OF ETHICS, LEGAL MANDATES CONTAINED IN A CONSTITUTION AND AUTHORIZATION LAWS, AND PROFESSIONAL CODES OR STANDARDS) AND INTERNALLY (BY AGENCY RULES AND REGULATIONS OR PERSONALLY INTERNALIZED NORMS OF BEHAVIOR AND MORAL ETHICS). </li></ul><ul><li>DEMOCRACY REQUIRES A SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY: CHECKS AND BALANCES ON GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES, THE SECURITY OF REGULAR AUDITS, AND THE INQUISITIVE EYE OF COMMUNITY AND MEDIA WATCHDOGS. </li></ul><ul><li>(ROOSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK, 2005) </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  33. 33. <ul><li>ETHICS </li></ul><ul><li>ETHICS CONCERN WITH WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS WRONG. </li></ul><ul><li>(FREDERICKSON, 1994) </li></ul><ul><li>ETHICS CAN BE CONSIDERED A FORM OF SELF-ACCOUNTABILITY, OR AN “INNER CHECK” ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS CONDUCT. </li></ul><ul><li>(ROOSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK, 2005) </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  34. 34. <ul><li>STANDARDS AND NORMS </li></ul><ul><li>STANDARDS AND NORMS ARE DEFINED AS PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT ACTION BINDING UPON THE MEMBERS OF A GROUP AND SERVING TO GUIDE, CONTROL, OR REGULATE PROPER AND ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR. </li></ul><ul><li>STANDARDS AND NORMS ARE THE CODIFICATION OF GROUP, ORGANIZATIONAL, COMMUNITY, OR GOVERNMENTAL VALUES. LAWS, REGULATIONS, CODES OF ETHICS. </li></ul><ul><li>RULES ARE TYPICAL OF STANDARDS AND NORMS. </li></ul><ul><li>(FREDERICKSON, 1994) </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  35. 35. <ul><li>THE BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES OF THE STATE CONSTITUTE THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH AND THROUGH WHICH PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT MANAGERS FUNCTION. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  36. 36. <ul><ul><li>STATE BUREAUCRACY, HOWEVER, CONSTITUTES A PROFOUNDLY PLURAL PHENOMENON . THERE IS NO SINGLE STATE BUREAUCRACY, NOR CAN THERE BE. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>CONVENTIONAL REFERENCES TO THE STATE BUREAUCRACY AS AN AGGREGATE OR COLLECTIVITY ARE USELESS AND MISLEADING. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>( JOHN D. MONTGOMERY, 1988) </li></ul></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  37. 37. <ul><li>THE CULTURE OF AN ENTERPRISE THAT GENERATES AND DISTRIBUTES ELECTRIC POWER DIFFERS MARKEDLY FROM THAT OF A FAMILY-PLANNING AGENCY, AND BOTH OF THEM DIFFER FROM A CENTRAL BANK OR A DEPARTMENT OF PRISONS AND CORRECTIONS. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  38. 38. <ul><li>THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF THESE VERTICAL, FUNCTIONALLY SPECIALIZED STRUCTURES , INCLUDING THEIR INCLINATION TO MAINTAIN TIGHT BOUNDARIES IN RELATION TO PARALLEL BUREAUCRACIES PERFORMING COMPLEMENTARY ACTIVITIES, PRODUCES, ONE OF THE CLASSICAL DILEMMAS IN MODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. </li></ul><ul><li>THIS IS THE DIFFICULTY OF PROGRAMMATIC COORDINATION AMONG BUREAUCRACIES CHARGED WITH COMPLEMENTARY, EVEN INTERDEPENDENT, FUNCTIONS THAT AFFECT THE SAME PUBLIC. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  39. 39. <ul><li>DIFFERENTIATED PUBLIC </li></ul><ul><li>THE NORMAL TENDENCY IN BUREAUCRACY IS TO REGARD ITS CLIENTELE AS AN UNDIFFERENTIATED PUBLIC TO WHOM REGULATIONS ARE TO BE APPLIED AND SERVICES DELIVERED UNIFORMLY, THEREFORE OBJECTIVELY AND EQUITABLY. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  40. 40. <ul><li>DIFFERENTIATED PUBLICS , ON THE OTHER HAND, EXPECT TO BE TREATED ACCORDING TO THEIR DISTINCTIVE NEEDS AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. </li></ul><ul><li>THEY MAY, FOR EXAMPLE, DEMAND THAT THE SERVICE BE PROVIDED IN THEIR MINORITY LANGUAGE OR THAT CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS BE ACCEPTED AS INTERMEDIARIES BETWEEN THEM AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. </li></ul><ul><li>THE INTENTION AND THE EFFECT ARE NORMALLY TO MITIGATE THE IMPACT OF REGULATIONS, INCREASE THEIR SHARE OF BENEFITS, OR RESPOND TO THEIR PARTICULAR NEEDS AND PREFERENCE. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  41. 41. <ul><li>BUREAUCRATS ARE RARELY SYMPATHETIC FIGURES EVEN WHEN THEY ARE HELPING PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN BENEFITS TO WHICH THEIR CITIZENSHIP ENTITLES THEM. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>( JOHN D. MONTGOMERY, 1988) </li></ul></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  42. 42. <ul><li>BUREAUCRATS BECOME MOST NEWSWORTHY WHEN THEY FAIL. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  43. 43. <ul><li>UNDER THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES, BUREAUCRATS ARE PSYCHOLOGICALLY VULNERABLE. MUCH OF THEIR WORK IS USEFUL BUT DULL; MANY OF THEIR FUNCTIONS TEND TO BECOME ROUTINE AND IMPERSONAL. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  44. 44. <ul><li>PARADOXICALLY THE DEMAND FOR THE BUREAUCRAT’S SERVICES KEEPS EXPANDING WITHOUT IMPROVING THEIR PUBLIC IMAGE. </li></ul><ul><li>MORE AND MORE PEOPLE ARE BECOMING INTERESTED IN MONITORING PUBLIC INTERVENTIONS IN THEIR COMMUNITY. </li></ul><ul><li>PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF PROGRAMS IS SEEN AS AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT OF A HEALTHY SOCIETY. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  45. 45. <ul><li>THIS PARADOXICAL FEATURES MEANS THAT BUREAUCRAT’S ARE CALLED UPON TO HELP (EMPOWER) PEOPLE HELP THEMSELVES BY PARTICIPATING IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL PROGRAMS </li></ul><ul><li>MONTGOMERY (1988) CALLS THE PROCESS BY WHICH BUREAUCRATS TRY TO HELP PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN MANAGING PUBLIC POLICIES: “BUREAUCRATIC POPULISM” . </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  46. 46. <ul><li>AT ONE EXTREME, ADMINISTRATORS CAN MOBILIZE OR EXPEDITE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND THUS INTRODUCE BASIC CHANGES IN THE POLITY. </li></ul><ul><li>AT THE OPPOSITE EXTREME IS THE EXPLOITIVE USE OF PARTICIPATION AS THE SUPPLYING OF FREE LABOR THAT BENEFIT LITTLE FROM WHAT THEY PRODUCE. </li></ul><ul><li>AT SOME MIDPOINT BETWEEN EMPOWERMENT AND EXPLOITATION LIES THE RANGE OF BUREAUCRATIC ACTIVITIES THAT CAN AND HAVE IMPROVED THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF THE AVERAGE CITIZEN IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  47. 47. <ul><li>EMPOWERMENT </li></ul>BUREAUCRATIC POPULISM EXPLOITATION Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  48. 48. <ul><li>WHEN PUBLIC POLICY DETERMINES, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT DISCRIMINATION IS EVIL, OR THAT UNPRODUCTIVE USE OF RESOURCES IS TOO COSTLY, OR THAT PUBLIC GOODS MUST CONSERVED OR REALLOCATED, THE PUBLIC’S BEHAVIOR BECOMES A SUBJECT OF OFFICIALS NOTICE, IT IS THE ROLE OF THE BUREAUCRAT TO REDUCE DISCRIMINATION, TO INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY, OR TO IMPROVE CONSERVATION. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  49. 49. <ul><li>THE THEORY OF BUREAUCRATIC POPULISM DEPENDS UPON THE ASSUMPTION THAT GOVERNMENTS CAN MOTIVATE THE PEOPLE TO PRODUCE A PUBLIC GOOD THAT PROVIDES OPPORTUNITIES FOR THEM TO GENERATE PRIVATE GOODS </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  50. 50. <ul><li>THE THEME OF “REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY” DESCRIBES BUREAUCRATS AS A KIND OF RANDOM SAMPLE OF THE POLITY, DESERVING OF THE SAME TREATMENT ACCORDED OTHER CITIZENS. </li></ul><ul><li>PUCLIC ADMINISTRATION ARE EXPECTED TO HELP RESTRAIN ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION WITHIN THEIR OWN RANKS IN ORDER TO REDUCE COMMUNAL TENSION. </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com
  51. 51. <ul><li>IT POSES A DILEMMA: IT MAY REQUIRE THE USE OF EITHER POSITIVE OPPORTUNITIES TO HELP THE DISADVANTAGED GAIN ACCESS TO PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT OR A NEGATIVE QUOTA SYSTEM TO RESTRICT THE NUMBERS FROM FAVORED GROUPS WHO ALREADY HAVE IT. </li></ul><ul><li>BOTH REMEDIES MAKE REPRESENTATIVENESS A CONCESSION TO EQUITY AT THE COST OF EFFECIENCY . </li></ul>Day 1_GSAPS 2010 www.ginandjar.com

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