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The Impact of Clientelism on Sudan and the Implications for a Sustainable Peace - Geoffrey Campbell


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The Impact of Clientelism on Sudan and the Implications for a Sustainable Peace - Geoffrey Campbell

  1. 1. 22The Impact of Clientelism onSudan and the Implications fora Sustainable Peace Geoffrey CampbellS udan’s history, riddled with internal and external conflicts, has provided the basis for hundreds of books to be written regardingthe issues of war and peace in Sudan. Over thelast fifty years, the world has witnessed numerousattempts by Sudanese leaders to be outspokenabout peace while at the same time waging war.In order to understand the complex nature ofconflict in Sudan, it is imperative to have anunderstanding of the role that identity has playedin Sudan’s history. The account provided heredoes not portend to be comprehensive in either thebreadth or depth of Sudan’s long and complicatedhistory, but will examine the crucial elementsin many recent conflicts in Sudan’s tumultuoushistory. Specifically, this paper will argue thatclientelism has made a crucial impact on Sudan’stumultuous history by promoting conflict andtherefore, resolving clientelist policies is crucialto building a sustainable peace in Sudan.Sudan’s political situation is complex whichreflects its long history tormented by the legacyof colonialism. In order to provide context,this paper will now briefly outline Sudan’shistory from colonial times to the signing of theComprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.In 1881, Muhammad Ahmad, a religious leaderdeclared that he was the mahdi, the divinelyinspired deliverer of the Islamic faith.2 He tookadvantage of the widespread resentment thatthe “exploitation and maladministration” undercolonial rule by leading declaring jihad, or holywar against the British, which unified western andcentral Sudan, further culminated in a nationalist Iyob, Ruth and Gilbert M Khadiagala, Sudan: TheElusive Quest for Peace, (Boulder, CO: Lynne RiennerPublishers, Inc., 2006), 13.2 John H. Clarke, “Mohammed Ahmed, (The Mahdi) Mes-siah of the Sudan,” The Journal of Negro Education 30.2(1961): 157.
  2. 2. 23revolt which overthrew the capital of Khartoum3 and socialist military officers to seize power. Heand freed the country from sixty years of colonial replaced Abboud’s policy of Islamicization withoppression. socialism and outlined a policy of autonomy for the South. After a failed coup attempt bySudan was not long thereafter retaken by an communists in his government he ordered aAnglo-Egyptian force and was ruled in theoryjointly by Egypt and Britain. However, in reality, “massive purge” of communists, which alienatedBritain exercised effective control of the country the Soviet Union and led it to withdraw itsduring this period. support. Despite official policies ceding authority to the South, most southerners had believed sinceIn 1953, the United Kingdom and Egypt agreed Independence that the more powerful Northto Sudanese self-governance, which led to its would subsume the South. This led to minorindependence in 1956 under a provisional mutinies and disorganised rebellions eventuallyconstitution. The constitution did not mention united to fight for succession of the South. Thetwo crucial issues that still impact the country two sides eventually came to negotiations underto this day: “the secular or Islamic character of Nimeri with perhaps the most important actionthe state and its federal or unitary structure.”5 during his rule: the Addis Ababa peace agreementIn 1958, there was a coup d’état led by General between the central government and southernIbrahim Abboud who pursued a policy of rebels in 1972, which gave the South limitedArabization and Islamicization for the North and autonomy.South of Sudan. This increased opposition to hisrule by the primarily non-Muslim South and he The agreement was not supported by secularist orwas eventually overthrown in 1964. The Southern Islamic Northern parties (which he saw as moreleaders divided into two factions, one in favour important than Southern support) so Nimeriof a federation between North and South and changed course and announced a policy of nationalanother in favour of ‘self-determination’, which reconciliation. In 1979, when Chevron discoveredin fact means succession as “it was assumed the oil in the South, Northern parties pressuredsouth would vote for independence if given the Nimeir to appropriate the wealth derived from oilchoice.”6 and thereby contravene the peace accord which gave financial independence to the South. OnlyFor sixteen years, from independence until a four years later, in 1983, Nimeri cancelled thecoup d’état in 1969, governments in Sudan failed peace treaty by abolishing the Southern region,to agree on a permanent constitution or to cope replacing English with Arabic as the officialwith the problems of “factionalism, economic language of the South, and ordered the transferstagnation, and ethnic dissidence.”7 This period of southern soldiers to northern command. Asof Sudanese history has had a strong impact on Nimeri reverted to Islamicazation, he announcedSudan’s current conditions. The main feature of that punishments drawn from Shari’a (Islamic)Sudanese politics in this period has often been law would be carried out. This was a verygeneralized as a time of ‘Arab’ Muslim assertion controversial step, even among Muslims in theof Islam in society and a domination of the South country.9by refusing it self-determination. Also in 1983, John Garang, then an army officerHowever, in May 1969, Colonel Gaarfar was sent to put down the rebellion of troops thatMuhammad Nimeri led a group of communist refused to relocate to the North but instead also defected and helped found the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A).3 Department of State, “Background Note: Sudan,” De- This set off a civil war that would last twenty-partment of State: Bureau of Public Affairs, Nov. 9, 2010, two years.10 Shortly thereafter, in 1985 a popular Clarke, “Mohammed Ahmed, (The Mahdi) Messiah of Department of State, “Background Note: Sudan.”the Sudan,” 157. Ibid.5 Department of State, “Background Note: Sudan.” 10 Gray Phombeah, “Obituary: John Garang,” BBC6 Ibid. News, 3 August 2005, Ibid. rica/2134220.stm.
  3. 3. 2uprising caused by repressive tactics of the all people can be heard by their government,regime, economic collapse and the war in the which mobilised people in support of the SPLM.South overthrew the Nimeri government. The Iyob and Khadiagala stress the importance ofgovernment held new elections and there were this new relationship between political leaderssteps towards a new peace with the South, but and rebels. They argue that these “long-termradical Muslims refused to allow the South to be strategic [alliances]... can bring about Sudan’sexempt from Shari’a law. transformation from a morn caliphate to aIn 1989, General Umar al-Bashir along multinational state capable of governing thewith Islamic army officers overthrew the inhabitants of the west, south, north, and center asgovernment and instituted a policy of even full fledged citizens of the nations”. In responsefurther Islamicization. He supported Islamic to popular support for the SPLM/A, Khartoumterrorist groups in Algeria while Khartoum was was to both wage war against the rebels and at theestablished as a base for radical Islamist terrorist same time attempt to breed resentment betweengroups within the country, providing safe haven the rebels by “highlighting tribal divisions”.15 Thisand logistical support to Osama Bin Laden. The led to rebel factions uniting behind Colonel John1990s were a period of increasing alienation by Gurang SPLM which was able to operate with thethose on the periphery of Sudan because the help of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, partiallyBashir government was seen as unresponsive due to Bashier’s support of radical Islamistto the concerns of Muslims and non-Muslimsalike. This alienation from the power centre in groups.16Khartoum led to growing sympathy towards and The 1990s brought regional efforts to end thesupport of the rebel cause led by the SPLM.2 John fighting. From an initial peace agreement throughGarang, then leader of the SPLM spoke in a radio the Intergovernmental Authority for Developmentaddress to the people of Sudan in May, 1985: (IGAD) which had “mixed” results but led to a “The SPLA/SPLM belongs to all those Declaration of Principles (DOP) with an aim to who work in the factories and earn so identify the essential elements necessary to a just those who wash those and comprehensive peace settlement, namely forgotten citizens who crowd under very the “relationship between religion and the state, difficult conditions...and in the slums of power sharing, wealth sharing, and the right of our those in the North who self-determination for the South”.17 The Sudanese have been callously displaced from your Government, after major military defeats to the ancestral you the Nuba and SPLA, signed the DOP in 1997. In that year the Baggaras of the Centre, to you the Fur, government signed agreements with other rebel Zeghawa and Masalit of the West, to factions which moved them to Khartoum in order you all, the SPLA is yours....It is often to work for the central government or for them forgotten that the Sudan is not just North to engage militarily against the SPLA. In 2002, and South, The Sudan is also West, East GOS and SPLM/A reached an agreement on the and Centre, no matter what definitions role of the state and religion and the south’s right you wish to attach to these labels....All to self-determination. This talk led to further patriots must appreciate the reality that declarations, which culminated in the signing of we are a new breed of Sudanese who the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in will not accept being fossilized into sub- January, 2005. John Garang was appointed first citizens in the “Regions.”13 vice-president of Sudan but died in a helicopterIt is this new vision for the country, one in which 14 Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M Khadiagala. Sudan: The11 Elusive Quest for Peace, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Department of State, “Background Note: Sudan.”12 Ibid. Publishers, Inc., 2006), 56. 1513 Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M Khadiagala. Sudan: The Department of State, “Background Note: Sudan.” 16Elusive Quest for Peace, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Ibid. 17Publishers, Inc., 2006), 56. Department of State, “Background Note: Sudan.”
  4. 4. 25crash after only three weeks in office. had little effect in ending the civil war.27 Instead, it was the military position of each side thatThe combined weight of international isolation determined the tone of the negotiations. Asand domestic economic pressures led to the Meghan L. O’Sullivan writes in her book aboutInternational Governmental Authority on the effect of sanctions, “Neither KhartoumDevelopment Initiative in 1993.19 Various roundsof talks proceeded but eventually collapsed in nor the SPLM had approached the talks with a1994. Bashir declared that he could resolve the deep commitment to resolving the conflict. Theconflict “through the barrel of a gun… without seriousness with which each side regarded thethe SPLA”.20 This led countries within the region negotiations largely depended on its position onnamely Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda to oppose the battlefield.”2 IGAD underwent fits of progressBashir. These countries then “became conduits of and stagnation until the September 11th, 2001.military political, and diplomatic support to the Terrorist attacks “altered Sudanese-US relationsSPLA.”2 in a more propitious direction” because Khartoum wanted to “break out of pariah status as a formerIn response to Sudan’s continued destabilising supporter of Al-Qaida.”29 Sudan had years earlier,effects in the region, the United States thenpursued the “Frontline Strategy” in 1995 of at US insistence, asked Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda to“expanding economic and diplomatic sanctions leave Sudan.30 It now “publicly supported theagainst Sudan and strengthening the military international coalition actions against the Al-capacity of regional states to meet the escalation Qaeda network and the Taliban in Afghanistan.”of the civil war.”22 The United States’ goals were Such opposition increased anti-terrorism actionsto “deter Sudanese support for terrorism and in other countries and Sudan remains on the stateextremism, end the north-south civil conflict… sponsors of terrorism list.31and end the humanitarian crisis.”23 This wasdone by providing economic and military At the same time there existed “convergence ofsupport to the rebels via Eritrea, Ethiopia, and interests” among members of IGAD. There wasUganda. This aid “became critical to the SPLA’s international pressure for renewed peace talks. Theexecution of the guerrilla war.”2 By 1996, the United States mediated a six-month moderatedmilitary effectiveness of the Frontline strategy cease-fire and joined with other nations in settingwas evident. “Posing the greatest challenge to the a new agenda in 2002 that led to the Machakosgovernment since 1994, the offensive led to the Protocol. The Protocol was historic because itcapture of a string of towns and garrisons.”25 A “represented a mutual renunciation of previouslyyear later, the SPLA’s “impressive military gains ‘non-negotiable’ items such as the Islamization oftilted the balance of power on the battlefield, Southern Sudan on the government side and theleading to [John] Garang’s claims about the end secularization of the entire country on the SPLAof the war.”26 However, when further negotiationsmade little progress, the United States announcednew sanctions against Khartoum which in turn 27 Meghan L, O’Sullivan,Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism, (R.R. Donnelley, 2003),1 265. Phombeah, “Obituary: John Garang.”1 2 Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and StatePeace, 103-104. Sponsors of Terrorism, 264-265.20 2 Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest forPeace, 107. Peace, 2.21 30 Ibid. Veronica Nmoma, “The Shift in United States-Sudan22 Ibid. Relations: A Troubled Relationship and the Need for23 Mutual Cooperation,” Journal of Conflict Studies (2006): Ibid. 53-54.24 Ibid. 31 Embassy of the United States Khartoum Sudan, “US-25 Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Sudan Relations,” Embassy of the United States KhartoumPeace, 109. Sudan, Ibid. html.
  5. 5. 26side.”32 Furthermore, renewed fighting in 2002 wealth and defend their country”.37led to increased urgency in creating cease firearrangements. Sudan’s complex political history reflects its long history of colonialism. Sudan was a collection ofIn an effort to sustain negotiations, the United independent kingdoms until 1820-1821, whenStates passed the Sudan Peace Act in 2002, which Egypt conquered and unified northern Sudan.would lead to further US sanctions on Sudan if However, the vast areas of the South were neverthe president could not confirm that both parties effectively controlled by the Egyptians andwere “negotiating in good faith.” It simultaneously remained an area inhabited by “fragmentedheld out the possibility of normalised relations. tribes.”38 Due to maladministration by theBoth parties agreed to a cessation of hostilities Egyptians, there was a nationalist revolt overtookand negotiations continued. In order to speed the the capital. However, not long after, the statenegotiations along the United States convened a was reinvaded by an Anglo-Egyptian force, andUN Security Council session in Kenya to “press the territory when then controlled primarily bythe parties to conclude a comprehensive peace the British. The British maintained control bothaccord”.33 This was achieved on January 9th, 2005 through the use of “brutal military repression”with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace and, perhaps more importantly for the future ofAgreement (CPA) in Nairobi. the country, through strategies of “divide, ‘re- identify’, co-opt and rule”.39 As Daniel N. PosnerThe CPA was an “internationally recognised summed up in his book, Institutions and Ethnicpermanent cease-fire and subsequent verification Politics in Africa, nearly all African countriesof redeployment of government and SPLA have multi-dimensional ethnic differences whichforces.”34 It included a protocol on power sharing are understood by voters to “convey informationmeasures between North and South which about how politicians distribute patronage.”40would mean the creation of “government of He continues by stating that “[a]lmost all havenational unity inspired by democracy, respect local cleavages defined by tribal affiliation or clanfor human rights, justice, devolution of power membership and national-scale divisions basedto the states the government of southern Sudan, on religion, language, or region.”and good governance.”35 The Agreement alsoincluded a wealth sharing protocol that detailed The large ethnic differences, coupled alongarrangements for the sharing of oil revenues with the legacy of clientelism from the time ofbetween North and South.36 Perhaps most decolonisation, contributes to how Africansimportantly for Sudan moving forward was the view the state. In short, “Africa is a region whosecreation of the Government of Southern Sudan’s poverty and weak government institutions leadinclusion of a timetable for a popular referendum citizens to view the state as a resource to beon sovereignty for Southern Sudan and whether consumed by the ethnic kin of those who control its offices.”2 This belief cannot be detachedthe oil rich region of Abyei would become part of from the history of colonialism and the way inthe North or South. The Agreement, may be one which Africans were forced to rapidly absorbthat, as Bashir claimed, “ends the war and makesa new contract for the Sudanese to share their 37 Iyoband Khadiagala. Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace. 125 332 Department of State, “Background Note: Sudan.” Iyob and M Khadiagala. Sudan: The Elusive Quest for 3Peace, 22 Alison J Ayers, “Sudan’s civil war: the global-historical33 constitution of political violence,” Review of African Ibid. Political Economy (2010): 157.34 Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for 40 Daniel N. Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics inPeace, 2 Africa, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005):35 Iyob and Khadiagala. Sudan: The Elusive Quest for 256.Peace, 123 41 Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 25636 Ibid. 42 Ibid.
  6. 6. 27power form colonial powers. Allen continues to guerrilla groups, African Scholar Nadir A. L.describe the introduction of clientelist politics as Mohammed, in the Review of African Political“a device for dealing effectively with the imposed Economy, wrote that Khaled’s explanation of thedecolonisation strategies of Britain, France and “roots of the problem” (the divide and rule policyBelgium, lead over the next decade and half to the of the British) was excellent. Those in powerphenomenon known at the time as ‘political decay’: stayed in power because they could reproducethe rapid growth of politicised communalism, their advantages, however, to lose power “waspolitical conflict and violence, abuse of political to risk never having the means to regain it. Thisand human rights, and corruption.”43 “” simple and readily appreciated fact was to haveOne of the prime examples of the deterioration a profound effect on political behaviour and thethat can be brought on by political systems that emerged inthe excesses of clientelism “Sudan’s conflicts have or from the 1950s.”49is evidenced by the decadesof civil war that Sudan has been oversimplified to In Sudan, this led theexperienced. By exploiting resemble a fight between underprivileged classes of peoplesome and privileging other to unite under the SPLA militantgroups, the British “exacerbated caricatures of ‘Arab/ group in hopes of overthrowingtensions between the different Non-Afican/nonblack’ the government and increasingregions” and widened the gap their own standards of living.between both modernity and and ‘African/non-Arab/ As Berman writes, “Patron-tradition among Sudan’s elites black’ protagonists “” client networks remain theand underclass. As formerSudanese Foreign Minister engaged in a zero-sum, fundamental state-societyMansour Khalid writes, this “set game of hegemonic linkage in circumstances of socialthe ground for post-colonial crisis and uncertainty and haveclass formation and the rise of competition.” extended to the very centre ofthe northern bourgeoisie that the state. This accounts for thehas since dominated Sudanese politics.” British personalistic, materialistic and opportunisticrule aggravated the already radicalised hierarchies character of African politics.”50 This cycle ofby “privileging and co-opting a narrow northern violence will continue until the governmentelite which self-consciously identified as ‘Arab.’”45 of Sudan ensures that all groups of people areThe Jellabas’, northern Arabised Muslims, considered in the transfer of goods to citizenssocial standing was thus confirmed and further and not just the privileged few.empowered as colonists sought to use them to‘influence the whole population.’46 These elites, With this understanding of some of the major“through British patronage and the manner in issues that have helped shape modern Sudan,which independence was negotiated” helped to one can analyse the main causes of conflicts thatensure, “for the greatest part of Sudan’s history, have ravaged the country. As demonstrated,a total monopoly on political power, garnering a major factor behind conflict in Sudan hasall the wealth derived from the exercise of such been the role of conflicting ethnic and religiouspower amongst themselves.” 47 identities. Although it is far beyond the reach of this essay to analyse the many varied ethnicAlthough Khalid’s explanations for further eventsmay be distorted because of his affiliation with 4 Nadir A. L. Mohammed, “Briefing: The Government They Deserve,” Review of African Political Economy43 (1993):130. Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, 30544 4 Ayers, “Sudan’s civil war: the global-historical constitu- Michael L. Ross, “The Political Economy of the Re-tion of political violence,” 157. source Curse,” World Politics 51.2 (1999): 304.45 50 Ibid. Bruce J. Berman, “Ethnicity, Patronage and the African46 Ibid. State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism,” African Af-47 Ibid, 157-158. fairs 97.388 (1998): 305.
  7. 7. 2and religious groups that make up Sudan, it is marginalized regions.”55 These factors are amongimportant to note that early conflicts have an the key influences in Sudanese politics.effect on present negotiations. As Sudan was acollection of indigenous communities, each with These demands for political inclusion, a shareits own power structure, it has been difficult to “fit over limited resources, and economic integrationin the institutional garb of modern statehood.”51 are major parts of the Comprehensive PeaceSudan’s conflicts have been oversimplified to Agreement (CPA). The ability to comment onresemble a fight between caricatures of “‘Arab/ what the future of Sudan holds as the post CPA-Non-Afican/nonblack’ and ‘African/non-Arab/ era in Sudan is something entirely new in its 54black’ protagonists engaged in a zero-sum, game year history since independence. The US hasof hegemonic competition.”52 This ignores the fact played a strong role in the peace negotiations andthat there are many different cultural and ethnic will continue to be an interested party in Sudan’sgroups in Sudan who have felt disenfranchised future. Unfortunately, the vast majority of theby the power centre. This together leads many academic literature on the possible future ofto argue that “that the raging conflicts are all Sudan was written before the CPA and is thereforemanifestations of the continuing quest of Sudan’s too outdated for a discussion about the specificsmultiethnic inhabitants for a more equitable of contemporary Sudanese politics. However,membership in a Sudanese polity that recognizes general recommendations regarding US policythe worth of each and all within it-in short, towards Sudan still hold true. In 2003, O’Sullivancitizenship”.53 wrote that “[t]he United States can best ensure ongoing Sudanese assistance if it makes clear toAs Iyob and Khadiagala write, it is important to have Sudan that continued cooperation will lead toan “awareness of the rise and ebb of violence from better U.S (sic) relations in general, and Sudan’sthe grassroots, where communities empowered eventual removal from the U.S. terrorism listand armed by the Khartoum government seek to more specifically.” 56 The US Secretary of Statesecure water, land, and pasturage to ensure the Clinton spoke about the crucial importance ofsurvival of their particular communities at the respecting the vote results of the referendum onexpense of others.” This inequality has led some Southern succession:to hope for a new Sudan based on the principle of “And regardless of the outcome, thecitizenship for those ‘disenfranchised Sudanese will of the people must be respectedalienated by Khartoum’s hegemonic elites”.54 by all parties in Sudan and around theWhile it would an act of oversimplification to world. Because we have already seenattempt to summarise the varied ethnic groups the alternative. The alternative, theand their economic disparities here, there are unacceptable alternative, is Sudan’skey characteristics in conflicts that have driven past, more than four decades of recurringSudanese politics in recent history. These conflict, two million people dead,include primarily relate to three overlapping millions more displaced, simmeringdimensions that unites many Sudanese in tensions that stall development andstruggle against Khartoum: “a traditional conflict perpetuate poverty, then erupt again toover scarce resources, the polarization of Sudanic darken the lives of another generationcommunities -inextricably linked through ties of of Sudanese children.”57history, kinship, and culture; and the demands ofpolitical inclusion and economic integration by 55 Ibid, 160. 5651 O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Sponsors of Terrorism, 276.Peace, 36. 5752 Hilary Clinton, “Clinton’s Remarks at U.N. Security Ibid, 27. Council Meeting on Sudan,” 16 November 2010, America.53 Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for gov. english/2010/Peace, 27. November/20101116140445su0.9675061.html?CP.54 Ibid, 55. rss=true.
  8. 8. 29This follows the argument by Iyob and Khadiagala these steps, ensuring that there is real powerabout long-term peace in Sudan. “Peace, if it is to sharing agreements and that Southern Sudanesebe sustained, must not only provide for the large “share politically and administratively in all theand well-known communities but also nurture the affairs of the country” is crucial.61 It also declaresaspirations for social justice and equity of those that devolution of power needs “to be done as aSudanese whose histories have been rendered political development priority. People at the grassillegible and illegitimate by elite groups seeking roots want to see themselves effectively takingto consolidate their hegemony over Africa’s decisions that affect their lives and conditions.giant nation. The numerous and sustained inter-communal encounters and exchanges of the past At that level, there is a need to set up a structureresulted in the fusion of cultures, ethnicities, and that will help in ensuring that power is indeedidentities which need to be considered in creating devolved to the grass roots to avoid any sort oftwenty-first century Sudan.”58 In practical terms marginalization.” 62this means a devolution of power from the centreto the periphery. To emphasise the cost of war and to pressure governments to pursue peace, Frontier EconomicsIn The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, partnered with civil society organisations toDouglas Johnson writes that this may finally be provide an economic impact of a return to war.a possibility. “Every internationally-sponsored They estimated that it would cost in excess ofpeace forum has ended at the same place: $100 billion dollars to Sudan and the worlddetermination as the principle on which the war community over ten years.63 They wrote thatis to be resolved. The dilution of this principle the only truly peaceful scenario would be onehas come through alternative initiatives outside in which “Both sides accept the referendumformal mediation.”59 This has been made possible result (succession) and outstanding issues ofdue to countries not pressuring Khartoum to contention are resolved quickly.”64 There is anallow for a real devolution of power from the evident concurrence in these three studies on thecentre. Writing before the CPA was agreed upon, necessity of a decentralization of power based onJohnson asserted that they were “denied a final the will of the Sudanese on their own future, and a decision on theform of government under which [they] were to Only in time will Sudan’s path become known,live as one people was deferred to a never-realized whether it is one in which clientelism is finallyfuture”.60 However, this yet to be realised future of (albeit gradually) eliminated from life in Sudan,self-determination may in fact finally be fulfilled or one where yet again there will be degradationunder the referendum on self determination of between the North and South. This latter optionthe South required by the CPA. threatens a return to conflict or a continuation of low-level violence in which there is noThe Berghof Foundation for Peace Support came reconciliation while the former may herald a newto the same conclusion on their “Sudanese Conflict era of peace and independence.Analysis and Systemic Conflict Transition”paper. It wrote that, in addition to the logistical 61steps that need to be taken, there also needs to “Sudan: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Transformation,” Berghoff Foundation for Peacebe a process of inclusiveness and a shift from Support, Jan. 2006, http://www.berghofpeacesupport.marginalization to a “genuine devolution of org/publications/SUD_Sudan_Options_for_Systemic_power” from Khartoum to the South. Among Conflict_Transformation.pdf . 62 “Sudan: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Con- flict Transformation,” 78.5 63 Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for “The Cost of Future Conflict in Sudan.” Frontier Eco-Peace, 26. nomics, Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil pdfs/frontier%20report%20%20the%20cost%20of%20futWars, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), ure%20conflict%20in%20sudan.pdf.180. 64 “The Cost of Future Conflict in Sudan.” Frontier Eco-60 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 180 nomics, 6.
  9. 9. Bibliography Frontier Economics. “The Cost of Future Conflict in Sudan.” 2010 FrontierAyers, Alison J. “Sudan’s civil war: the global- Economics. Accessed December 26, 2010. historical constitution of political violence.” Review of African Political _library/pdfs/frontier%20report%20 Economy (2010): 153-171. -%20the%20cost%20of%20future% 20conflict%20in%20sudan.pdf.Berghoff Foundation for Peace Support. “Sudan: Conflict Analysis and Options for Iyob, Ruth and Gilbert M Khadiagala. Sudan: Systemic Conflict Transformation.” The Elusive Quest for Peace. Boulder, Berghoff Foundation for Peace Support. CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Accessed December 26, 2010. http:// 2006. publications/SUD_Sudan_Options_for_ Johnson, Douglas H. The Root Causes of Systemic_Conflict_Transformation.pdf Sudan’s Civil Wars. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003.Berman, Bruce J. “Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Mohammed, Nadir A. L. “Briefing: The Nationalism.” African Affairs 97.388 Government They Deserve.” Review of (1998): 305-41. African Political Economy (1993): 129- 131.Clarke, John H. “Mohammed Ahmed, (The Mahdi) Messiah of the Sudan.” The Nmoma, Veronica. “The Shift in United Journal of Negro Education 30.2 (1961): States - Sudan Relations: A Troubled 156-62. Relationship and the Need for Mutual Cooperation.” Journal of Conflict StudiesClinton, Hilary. “Clinton’s Remarks at U.N. (2006): 44-70. Security Council Meeting on Sudan.” November 16, 2010. O’Sullivan, Meghan L. Shrewd Sanctions: Accessed November 17, 2010. http:// Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism. Washington D.C.: Brookings english /2010/November/ Institution Press, 2003. 20101116140445su0.9675061.html?CP. rss=true. Posner, Daniel N. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. Cambridge: CambridgeDepartment of State. “Background Note: University Press, 2005. Sudan.” November 9, 2010. Department of State: Bureau of Public Affairs. Phombeah, Gray. “Obituary: John Garang.” Accessed November 15, 2010. http:// August 3, 2005. BBC News, http://news. of the United States Khartoum Sudan. Ross, Michael L. “The Political Economy of the “US-Sudan Relations.” Embassy of the Resource Curse.” World Politics 51.2 United States Khartoum Sudan. Accessed (1999): 297-322. November 17, 2010. http://sudan.