Seminar 2A


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  • Broacband means 100 megabits or more. UMB is multiple services -- Vs. WiMax, WiFi or UWB.
  • AKA Evolved UMTS E-UTRA - Evolved UTRA
  • AKA Evolved UMTS E-UTRA - Evolved UTRA
  • Seminar 2A

    1. 1. Seminar 2A 8:30AM-Noon April 10, 2007 EDUCAUSE Security Professionals Conference H. Morrow Long, CISSP, CISM, CEH Director - Information Security Yale University Wireless Security for Mobile Devices
    2. 2. Copyright Notice <ul><li>Copyright H. Morrow Long 2007. This work is the intellectual property of the author. Permission is granted for this material to be shared for non-commercial, educational purposes, provided that this copyright statement appears on the reproduced materials and notice is given that the copying is by permission of the author. To disseminate otherwise or to republish requires written permission from the author. </li></ul>
    3. 3. Description <ul><li>A discussion of the security issues involved in a multitude of wireless data technologies including PPP over cellular, IEEE Cellular and Mobile Data (one way and two way pagers), IEEE 802.11a/b/g/i, WEP, WPA as well as IEEE 802.1X, WEP, WAP’s WTLS, Bluetooth, ZigBee, CPDP, 1RTT, EVDO and SMS. </li></ul><ul><li>A useful guide to the relative information security risks to an individual or organization involved in wireless data technologies including those used by pagers, cellphones, PDAs, assorted networked ‘appliances’ and wireless WANS, LANS and PANs </li></ul>
    4. 4. Outside workshop scope: <ul><li>Private Mobile Radio </li></ul><ul><li>Private Microwave </li></ul><ul><li>Shortwave Radio IP </li></ul><ul><li>DirectPC </li></ul><ul><li>SkyDSL / Aloha Networks High Speed ISP </li></ul><ul><li>Mobile Satellite data services </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Iridium (Motorola, et. al) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>GlobalStar (Qualcomm, Loral) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Teledesic (Gates/McCaw) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Digital cordless </li></ul><ul><li>IrDA </li></ul>
    5. 5. Topics <ul><li>Introduction, History and Evolution of Wireless Data </li></ul><ul><li>Terminology Definitions: Wireless Data Security </li></ul><ul><li>Wireless Data Risks and Threats </li></ul><ul><li>Pager Security </li></ul><ul><li>Cellular Phone Security </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Analog </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Digital </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Wireless Data Security </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Non-IP Mobile Data Access Networks </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Wireless PANs / Pico-Nets </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Wireless LANs and VLANs </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>802.11 / WiFi </li></ul></ul>
    6. 6. Introduction Prediction for the Late 1990s “ Most people now carry a portable radio transceiver with a Touchtone keyboard. They have a wallet full of credit-card size overlays. When an individual is dialed, he can be reached in most parts of the country. The zones of radio in-accessibility are diminishing. It has been suggested that the public should be issued with transceivers that transmit their national identification number, even when switched off. These devices would help in controlling crime, which is still growing at an appalling rate. They would also be used in most financial transactions.” - James Martin, 1971, “Future Developments in Telecommunications”, p. 355, Prentice Hall.
    7. 7. Introduction <ul><li>Workers connect wireless home LANs to the Internet at high speed. </li></ul><ul><li>Workers set up office PCs to push data to PDAs over Internet. </li></ul><ul><li>Senior US Government official told staff he wanted wireless access. They set up a demo of all kinds of reports and data availability. Turns out he just wanted an alphanumeric pager. </li></ul><ul><li>INS considers a ban on the use of personal devices to hold data. </li></ul><ul><li>Doctors are buying PDAs and putting notes & data on patients in them. </li></ul><ul><li>Army Material Command giving senior managers Blackberry 2-way pagers. </li></ul><ul><li>Pentagon issues a warning reminder that wireless LANs are not allowed in the Pentagon, nor may mobile wireless devices enter most DOD areas. </li></ul>
    8. 8. Mobile Wireless Voice – History <ul><li>Radio-telephones develop 1901-1920 </li></ul><ul><li>First wireless voice AM Radio – 1906 </li></ul><ul><li>Commercial AM Radio Pitt PA – 1920 </li></ul><ul><li>First FM broadcast – 1935 (FM is a big mobile radio help) </li></ul><ul><li>Military walkie-talkies - 1940 </li></ul><ul><li>Two-way police radios –1930-1950s </li></ul><ul><li>Commercial RadioTelephone: MTS & IMTS 1946..1965..1976..1980s </li></ul><ul><li>Private mobile radio services </li></ul><ul><li>DC-NYC Metroliner phones – late 1960s </li></ul><ul><li>CB Radios – 1970s </li></ul><ul><li>1G Cellular (Tokyo 1979, Sweden 1981, Chicago 1983) </li></ul>
    9. 9. Wireless Data – History and Evolution McClure's Magazine , February, 1902, pages 291-299 : Marconi‘s  Achievement. Telegraphing  Across  The  Ocean  Without  Wires.
    10. 10. Wireless Data – History and Evolution <ul><li>1901 – First Transatlantic telegraph – Marconi Company 1920s commercial service – Marconi Company </li></ul><ul><li>Mobile – 1908 Shipboard telegraph – Marconi Company </li></ul><ul><li>Encrypted radiotelegraph messages </li></ul><ul><li>Alohanet / Hawaii Radio WAN – 1970s </li></ul><ul><li>TCP/IP over shortwave (Ham) radio – 1980s </li></ul><ul><li>Cellular V.90 modems – 1990s </li></ul><ul><li>PDAs and cellphones with digital wireless services </li></ul><ul><li>$150 Wireless 802.11b Ethernet cards and base stations </li></ul><ul><li>(Mobile Data + Mobile Internet + Internet) -> Supranet </li></ul>
    11. 11. Secure Wireless Data – History and Evolution <ul><li>Secure telephony over Radio </li></ul><ul><ul><li>A-3 – analog “scrambling” </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>US/UK analog voice privacy system in use at WWII start </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Broken by Germans early in WWII, real time decryption </li></ul></ul></ul>
    12. 12. Secure Wireless Data – History and Evolution <ul><li>Secure telephony over Radio </li></ul><ul><ul><li>SIGSALY Secure Digital Voice Communications </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>First useful use of : </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Companded PCM encoding of voice (vocoder – BTL 1936-9) </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Enciphered telephony, quantized speech transmission </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Speech bandwidth compression </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Spread Spectrum technology </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>multilevel Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) and FDM (Frequency Division Multiplex) as a viable transmission method over a fading medium </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Weighted 90 tons, ocupied a large room. </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Special phongraph records contained a secret key masking voices with white noise </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Germans monitored but never broke the system </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Declassified in 1976. </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>US (BTL, DOD), UK (Turing) </li></ul></ul></ul>
    13. 13. Secure Wireless Data – History and Evolution Alan Turing
    14. 14. Secure Wireless Data – History and Evolution <ul><li>Spread spectrum radio transmission </li></ul><ul><li>Actress Hedy Lamarr and composer George Antheil. </li></ul><ul><li>Patent 2,292,387 given to DOD, Declassified in mid-1980s. </li></ul>Designed to defeat interception and jamming of sub signals to torpedo by sending multiple coded signals on different frequencies in random pattern.
    15. 15. Secure Wireless Data – History and Evolution <ul><li>Secure telephony over Radio – Other WWII methods </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Navaho code-talkers </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1st Marine Division </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Ballarat </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>7 July 1943 Photog: Ashman </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Private First Class Preston Toledo (left) and </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Private First Class Frank Toledo, cousins and </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Navajos, attached to a Marine Artillery Regiment </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>in the South Pacific will relay orders over a </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>field radio in their native tongue. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>OFFICIAL U.S. MARINE CORPS PHOTO </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>USMC #57875 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>(Paraphrased caption) </li></ul></ul>
    16. 16. Wireless – Terminology Definition <ul><li>AMPS </li></ul><ul><li>DAMPS </li></ul><ul><li>TDMA </li></ul><ul><li>CDMA </li></ul><ul><li>GSM </li></ul><ul><li>PCS </li></ul><ul><li>ISP </li></ul><ul><li>1G </li></ul><ul><li>2G </li></ul><ul><li>2.5G </li></ul><ul><li>3G </li></ul><ul><li>Dual-mode </li></ul><ul><li>Tri-mode </li></ul><ul><li>SIM </li></ul><ul><li>GPS </li></ul><ul><li>Spread-spectrum </li></ul><ul><li>Frequency Hopping </li></ul>
    17. 17. Wireless Data – Terminology Definition <ul><li>CDPD </li></ul><ul><li>PPP </li></ul><ul><li>EVDO </li></ul><ul><li>GPRS </li></ul><ul><li>Portal </li></ul><ul><li>WLAN </li></ul><ul><li>W-VLAN </li></ul><ul><li>WAP </li></ul><ul><li>“ Web-clipping” </li></ul><ul><li>PQA – Palm Query App </li></ul><ul><li>IEEE 802.11a </li></ul><ul><li>IEEE 802.11b </li></ul><ul><li>IEEE 802.1x </li></ul><ul><li>IEEE 802.11e </li></ul><ul><li>IEEE 802.11g </li></ul><ul><li>Bluetooth </li></ul><ul><li>HomeRF </li></ul><ul><li>Jini </li></ul>
    18. 18. Wireless Data Security– Terminology Definition <ul><li>VPN </li></ul><ul><li>Supranet </li></ul><ul><li>Internet </li></ul><ul><li>internet </li></ul><ul><li>intranet </li></ul><ul><li>extranet </li></ul><ul><li>ISP </li></ul><ul><li>PPP CHAP mode </li></ul><ul><li>Firewall </li></ul><ul><li>WEP </li></ul><ul><li>SSL / TLS </li></ul><ul><li>WTLS </li></ul><ul><li>Encryption </li></ul><ul><li>Authentication </li></ul><ul><li>PKI </li></ul><ul><li>LDAP </li></ul><ul><li>“ Certificate” </li></ul>
    19. 19. Wireless Data Risks and Threats Business Needs for Wireless Data Security <ul><li>Financial / m-commerce </li></ul><ul><li>Enable Telecommuting for employees </li></ul><ul><li>Secure current insecure applications (alerts, remote administration) </li></ul><ul><li>Provide remote access to important internal information resources (e.g. E-mail) </li></ul><ul><li>Monitoring/Controlling sensitive and/or important real-world devices (sensors) </li></ul>
    20. 20. Wireless Data Risks and Threats – CIA / AAA / etc <ul><li>C onfidentiality - Data Exposure </li></ul><ul><li>I ntegrity - Data Modification/Tampering </li></ul><ul><li>A vailability - Denial of Service to Data/Resources </li></ul><ul><li>A uthentication - Identification vs Spoofing </li></ul><ul><li>A uthorization - Appropriate Access Control </li></ul><ul><li>A ccounting - Theft of Service (cloning, wireless ISP) </li></ul><ul><li>M-commerce - Fraudulent transactions, CC # theft </li></ul><ul><li>Malicious Software – Trojan Horses, Viruses, Worms, etc. </li></ul><ul><li>Personal Privacy - Location exposure (new 911 law, GPS) </li></ul><ul><li>Physical theft of device </li></ul>
    21. 21. Wireless Data Risks and Threats <ul><li>Confidentiality </li></ul><ul><li>Sniffing / Eavesdropping / Interception from the air </li></ul><ul><li>Sniffing / Eavesdropping / Interception at endpoint </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Via Compromise of mobile/wireless device </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Via Compromise of base station (cell tower / GSM POP) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Stolen devices – stored data </li></ul><ul><li>Stolen devices – use of keys & secrets for access </li></ul><ul><li>Brute Force Decryption / Cryptanalysis </li></ul><ul><li>Replay Attack </li></ul>
    22. 22. Alternatives to wireless data service provider encryption <ul><li>Secure corporate or partner portals </li></ul><ul><li>SSL Web servers / Secure ASPs </li></ul><ul><ul><li>WTLS WAP servers </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Secured Applications (SSLized IMAP/POP) </li></ul><ul><li>Secure Remote Access (Term/File xfer) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>SSH, Secure Telnet/FTP, FTP over SSL </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Multiuser NT/W2K (w/WinCE MS Term Srvr Client) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Remote Console: CC, PCA, Timbukto, VNC </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>PGP Encrypted Files for transfer over insecure links/email </li></ul></ul>
    23. 23. Wireless Data Risks and Threats – <ul><li>Integrity – Data/etc Modification </li></ul><ul><li>Tampering with intercepted data in transit </li></ul><ul><li>Tampering with stored data </li></ul><ul><li>Tampering with keys & secrets for access </li></ul><ul><li>Tampering with device identification credentials </li></ul><ul><li>Tampering with device applications (programs) </li></ul><ul><li>Replay Attack </li></ul>
    24. 24. Wireless Data Risks and Threats <ul><li>Availability </li></ul><ul><li>Denial of Service via Signal Jamming (e.g. Israeli device) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Netline C-Guard Cellular Firewall </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li> </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Non-malicious man-made problems </li></ul><ul><li>Natural Disasters in cell areas </li></ul>
    25. 25. Wireless Data Risks and Threats <ul><li>Authentication - Identification </li></ul><ul><li>Spoofing data in transit – Man in the middle </li></ul><ul><li>Spoofing the endpoints </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Cloning analog phones </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Impersonating servers (e.g. m-commerce web servers or WAP servers) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Cellphone credentials </li></ul><ul><ul><li>ID #s </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Phone #s </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>GSM SIM cards </li></ul></ul><ul><li>User credentials </li></ul><ul><ul><li>PINs, Passwords, X.509 “Certificates”, Smartcards </li></ul></ul>
    26. 26. Wireless Data Risks and Threats <ul><li>Authorization – Access Control </li></ul><ul><li>Allowing a user or device access to a: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Application </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Network </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Resource (file, printer, fax) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>E.g., Cellular phone companies authorize devices/users for access to their networks: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Roaming </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Long distance calls </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Local calls </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>911 calls </li></ul></ul>
    27. 27. Wireless Data Risks and Threats <ul><li>Accounting </li></ul><ul><li>Theft of Service: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Via cloning </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Via theft of wireless ISP access credentials </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Via theft of physical device </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Via compromise of base station / networked servers / etc. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Via fraudulent registration with carrier or ISP </li></ul></ul>
    28. 28. Wireless Data Risks and Threats <ul><li>M-Commerce </li></ul><ul><li>Fraudulent transactions </li></ul><ul><li>Credit Card number theft </li></ul><ul><ul><li>At WAP WTLS gateway </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>At Web server endpoint </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>At mobile device endpoint </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Other account (customer/employee/vendor) theft. </li></ul>
    29. 29. Wireless Data Risks and Threats <ul><li>Cellphone Malicious Software </li></ul><ul><li>E-Mail & WAP browsers too “dumb” to infect? </li></ul><ul><li>Other push and pull content methods </li></ul><ul><ul><li>PIM synch </li></ul></ul><ul><li>First Cellphone Virus Hoax – </li></ul><ul><ul><li>“ Mobile Phone Virus Hoax” – May 18, 1999 </li></ul></ul><ul><li>No Known Cellphone Malicious Software </li></ul><ul><li>First Cellphone Messaging Attack – Spanish SMS </li></ul>
    30. 30. “Mobile Phone Virus Hoax” <ul><li>Dear all mobile phone's owners, </li></ul><ul><li>ATTENTION!!! </li></ul><ul><li>NOW THERE IS A VIRUS ON MOBILE PHONE SYSTEM.. </li></ul><ul><li>All mobile phone in DIGITAL system can be infected by this virus..If you receive a phone call and your phone display </li></ul><ul><li>&quot;UNAVAILABLE&quot; on the screen (for most of digital mobile phones with a function to display in-coming call telephone number), </li></ul><ul><li>DON'T ANSWER THE CALL. END THE CALL IMMEDIATELY!!!BECAUSE IF YOU ANSWER THE CALL, YOUR </li></ul><ul><li>PHONE WIL L BE INFECTED BY THIS VIRUS.. This virus will erase all IMIE and IMSI information from both your phone </li></ul><ul><li>& your SIM card which will make your phone unable to connect with the telephone network. You will have to buy a new phone. </li></ul><ul><li>This information has been confirmed by both Motorola and Nokia.. </li></ul><ul><li>For more information, please visit Motorola or Nokia web sites: </li></ul><ul><li> </li></ul><ul><li> or </li></ul><ul><li>There are over 3 million mobile phone being infected by this virus in USA now. You can also check this news in CNN web site: </li></ul><ul><li> </li></ul><ul><li>Please forward this information to all your friends who have digital mobile phones.. </li></ul>
    31. 31. “ Mobilevirus” Hoax – 3/19/2001 <ul><li>VIRUSINFORMATION VARNING !!!! </li></ul><ul><li>---------------------------------------------------------------- </li></ul><ul><li>Följande har hänt: </li></ul><ul><li>Om din mobiltelefon ringer och det blinker: !?UNAVAILABLE!? på </li></ul><ul><li>displayen. SÅ SVARA INTE. Din telefonen blir angripen av ett </li></ul><ul><li>virus, som raderar alla IMIE och IMSI informationer, </li></ul><ul><li>både från telefonen och SIM-kortet. </li></ul><ul><li>Och då finns det bara en sak att göra, just det - köpa en ny </li></ul><ul><li>telefon. </li></ul><ul><li>Både Motorola och Nokia har bekräftat denne information. I USA </li></ul><ul><li>har detta virus förstört 3 miljoner mobiltelefoner. </li></ul><ul><li>VB DENNA E-MAIL TILL ALLA DU KÄNNER SOM HAR </li></ul><ul><li>MOBILTELEFON. </li></ul>
    32. 32. PDA/Cellphone Malicious Software <ul><li>E-Mail Clients and Web browsers </li></ul><ul><li>Other push and pull content methods </li></ul><ul><ul><li>PDA PIM synch </li></ul></ul><ul><li>First PDA Virus Hoax – “Hairy Palms” 10/12/97 </li></ul><ul><li>First PDA Malicious Software: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Palm.Liberty.A 8/28/00 Trojan Horse </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Palm.Vapor 9/22/00 Trojan Horse </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Palm.Phage.Dropper 9/22/00 Computer Virus </li></ul></ul><ul><li>PDA Anti-Virus Software </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Palm: Symantec, McAfee, CA, Trend, F-Secure </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>EPOC: McAfee, F-Secure PocketPC: McAfee </li></ul></ul>
    33. 33. Wireless Data Risks and Threats <ul><li>Personal Privacy </li></ul><ul><li>Location exposure: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Passive roaming transmit cellphone #ID continously in cell area. This method is used to track down fugitives today. Reg 911. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>New E911 law requirement and methods require greater accuracy: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Triangulation within cell area – TDOA (Time Difference of Arrival) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>AOA – Angle of Arrival (CDMA near-far problem as with TDOA) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Location Pattern Matching </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>GPS – Global Positioning System -- is one method likely to be used as well as included inside mobile wireless devices. Under user privacy control. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Caller-ID / ANI / *69 </li></ul><ul><li>Physical theft of device – stored data / credentials / etc. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Phone card / Credit card numbers / PINs, Passwords, etc. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Traffic Analysis – called #s recorded on mobile device </li></ul></ul>
    34. 34. Wireless Data Risks and Threats <ul><li>Physical theft of device </li></ul><ul><li>Loss / Destruction of mobile device </li></ul><ul><li>Loss / Destruction of data: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Sensitive business records </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>secret access credentials </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Compromise/Abuse of secret access credentials </li></ul><ul><li>Fraudulent use of mobile device </li></ul><ul><li>True replacement cost of mobile device, new device + : </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Damage assessment – exposure of business data </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Replacing data </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Securing secret access credentials </li></ul></ul>
    35. 35. Wireless Data Risks and Threats <ul><li>Reverse Tunneling </li></ul><ul><li>Utilizing a VPN tunnel or other “trusted” connection to connect back to or burrow through to the user’s enterprise network and computer resources (if you can steal the device or hijack the connection) This is a particular Blackberry worry. </li></ul><ul><li>Carpal Tunneling </li></ul><ul><li>Also a particular Blackberry worry…. </li></ul>
    36. 36. Pager Technologies and Security <ul><li>Typically low data rate, insecure, one-way short messages. Powerful ground transmitter networks. </li></ul><ul><li>In CT and NY individuals are actively listening on pager traffic (PIs, news organizations, etc.). Don’t use for anything private as there is no encryption. </li></ul><ul><li>One Way </li></ul><ul><ul><li>POCSAG - Post Office Code Standardization Advisory Group – 1981. 512bps – 2400bps. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>ERMES – 1995 – International Standard </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>FLEX (Motorola) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Two Way </li></ul><ul><ul><li>reFLEX (Motorola) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Mobitex (2 way paging and mobile data) </li></ul></ul>
    37. 37. “Zero G” <ul><li>0G </li></ul><ul><li>PTT </li></ul><ul><li>MTS </li></ul><ul><li>IMTS </li></ul><ul><li>AMTS </li></ul><ul><li>OLT </li></ul><ul><li>MTD </li></ul><ul><li>Autotel/PALM </li></ul><ul><li>ARP </li></ul>
    38. 38. “One G” <ul><li>1G </li></ul><ul><li>NMT </li></ul><ul><li>AMPS/TACS/ETACS </li></ul><ul><li>Hicap </li></ul><ul><li>CDPD </li></ul><ul><li>Mobitex </li></ul><ul><li>DataTac </li></ul>
    39. 39. Cellular Techology and Standards <ul><li>1G – 1 st Generation - Analog </li></ul><ul><li>AMPS (US) 800Mhz (UHF) FM used </li></ul><ul><li>NAMPS </li></ul><ul><li>UK: TACS (1982), ETACS (1985) </li></ul><ul><li>Japan: NMT (Nordic Mobile Telephone) – 1979 </li></ul><ul><li>Data transmission is unreliable and 9.6kbps or less. </li></ul>
    40. 40. “Two G” <ul><li>2G </li></ul><ul><li>GSM </li></ul><ul><li>iDEN </li></ul><ul><li>D-AMPS </li></ul><ul><li>IS-95/cdmaOne </li></ul><ul><li>PDC </li></ul><ul><li>CSD </li></ul><ul><li>PHS </li></ul><ul><li>GPRS </li></ul><ul><li>HSCSD </li></ul><ul><li>WiDEN </li></ul><ul><li>CDMA2000 1xRTT/IS-2000 </li></ul><ul><li>EDGE (EGPRS) </li></ul>
    41. 41. Cellular Techology and Standards <ul><li>2G - 2 nd Generation – Digital </li></ul><ul><li>PDC (Japan) Pacific Digital Cellular </li></ul><ul><li>TDMA/FDMA </li></ul><ul><ul><li>GSM (World-wide) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>USDC (North American TDMA Cellular, aka US Digital Cellular) Dual-mode 800Mhz </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>DAMPS: IS-54 (1992), IS-136 (1996) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>CDMA/FDMA </li></ul><ul><ul><li>IS-95 (CDMAone 1993) Dual-mode 800Mhz </li></ul></ul>
    42. 42. Cellular Techology and Standards <ul><li>2G - 2 nd Generation – Digital Cellular </li></ul><ul><li>PCS – (Personal Communiations Services) 1.9 Ghz PCS is a misnomer, but was supposed to be for a different type of coverage range and/or service than cellular phone service. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>TDMA/FDMA </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>DCS-1900 – Upbanded GSM </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>J-STD-011 – Upbanded USDC </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>CDMA/FDMA </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>J-STD-008 – Upbanded CDMA </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Data rates from 9.6kbps to 14.4kbps. Slow. </li></ul>
    43. 43. Cellular Techology and Standards <ul><li>2.5G - 2 1/2 Generation – Digital Cellular Enhanced </li></ul><ul><li>HSCSD (High Speed Circuit-Switched Data) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>38.4kbps </li></ul></ul><ul><li>GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>144kbps </li></ul></ul><ul><li>EDGE (Enhanced Data Rates for Global Evolution) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>384kbps </li></ul></ul>
    44. 44. “Three G” <ul><li>3G </li></ul><ul><li>W-CDMA </li></ul><ul><ul><li>UMTS (3GSM) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>FOMA </li></ul></ul><ul><li>TD-CDMA/UMTS-TDD </li></ul><ul><li>1xEV-DO/IS-856 </li></ul><ul><li>TD-SCDMA </li></ul><ul><li>GAN (UMA) </li></ul><ul><li>HSPA </li></ul><ul><ul><li>HSDPA </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>HSUPA </li></ul></ul><ul><li>HSPA+ </li></ul><ul><li>HSOPA) </li></ul>
    45. 45. Cellular Techology and Standards <ul><li>3G - 3 rd Generation – Digital Next Generation </li></ul><ul><li>3GPP – UMTS/UTRA, WCDMA, ARIB </li></ul><ul><ul><li>UMTS – Universal Mobile Telecom System </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>European implementation of IMT2000 standard </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>WCDMA – Wide band CDMA (NTT Japan) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>CDMA </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>CDMA2000 (US) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Data rates from 144kbps to 2000kbps. </li></ul>
    46. 46. “Four G” <ul><li>4G </li></ul><ul><li>UMB </li></ul><ul><ul><li>3GPP2 Project based on IS-95/CMDA (e.g CDMA2000) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>UMTS Revision 8 (LTE) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>3GPP Project based on evolved GSM (UTMS) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>WiMAX </li></ul>
    47. 47. Cellular Techology and Standards - 4th Generation <ul><li>UMB (Ultra Mobile Broadband) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>OFDMA technology </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>3GPP2 CDMA200 upgrade’s brand name </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>280 Mbits/sec downstream, 75 Mbits up </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Std in 2007, commercialization in 2009. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>IP based -- but supports voice cell calls </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Interoperable with 1x and 1XEV-DO </li></ul></ul>
    48. 48. Cellular Techology and Standards - 4th Generation <ul><li>UMTS Revision 8 (LTE) - 3GPP Long Term Evolution </li></ul><ul><ul><li>E-UTRA OFDMA down, SC-FDMA uplink </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>3GPP GMS/UTMS upgrade’s name - AKA SC-FDMA) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>100 Mbits/sec downstream, 50 Mbits up </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Std in 2007, commercialization in 2009. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>IP based -- voice cell to WiMAX & UMB? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Interoperable with GMS/GPRS or W-CDMA-based UMTS - WRT mobility hand-offs </li></ul></ul>
    49. 49. Cellular Techology and Standards - 4th Generation <ul><li>WiMAX - Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access </li></ul><ul><ul><li>IEEE 802.16 standard AKA WirelessMAN 100 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Theoretical 70 Mbits (distance related) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>20 - 30 Kilometres radius </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>IEEE 802.16e-2005 is called “Mobile WiMax” </li></ul></ul>
    50. 50. Cellular Techology Security <ul><li>GSM has been criticized for cryptographic insecurity. It is a non-open, licensed system. In 1999 Adi Shamir and Alex Biryukov deciphered GSM A5/1. </li></ul><ul><li> htm </li></ul><ul><li> </li></ul><ul><li>The SDA (SmartCard Developers Assn.), Ian Goldberg and David Wagner of UC Berkeley ‘cloned’ a SIM card in 1998 (broke Comp128): </li></ul><ul><li> </li></ul><ul><li>Data rates from 10Mbps to 150Mbps! </li></ul>
    51. 51. GPRS Security <ul><li>GPRS - Global General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) </li></ul><ul><li>2.5G Packet-switched Mobile Data Service </li></ul><ul><li>Built on GSM and IS-136 </li></ul><ul><li>Uses GSM security. </li></ul><ul><li>Superceded oler GSM CSD (Circuit Switched Data) </li></ul><ul><li>Superceded by EGPRS (Edge GPRS) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>200+ Kbps vs. 60 - 80 Kbps </li></ul></ul>
    52. 52. 1XRTT and EVDO <ul><li>EV-DO - Evolution Data Optimized </li></ul><ul><li>Built on CDMA - 1x data available w/CDMA </li></ul><ul><li>1xRTT 50 Kbps-100 Kbps - burst to 144Kbps </li></ul><ul><li># EVDO Rev 0 400kbps-700kbps Download, bursts up to 2.0Mbps, 50kbps-100kbps Upload Speed, bursts to 144Kbps. </li></ul><ul><li># EVDO Rev A 450Kbps-800Kbps Download, bursts to 3.0Mbps, 300Kbps-400Kbps Upload Speed, bursts to 1.8Mbps. </li></ul><ul><li>Uses CDMA built-in encryption / security. </li></ul>
    53. 53. Cellular Techology / Mobile Data <ul><li>SMS – Short Message Service </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Similar to paging </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Small text messages </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Encryption is supported </li></ul></ul><ul><li>NTT DoCoMo iMode </li></ul>
    54. 54. Cellular Techology / Mobile Data <ul><li>WAP – Wireless Application Protocol </li></ul><ul><ul><li>4 or 5 line text menus in ‘microbrowser’ </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Designed for use of numeric keypad on cellphones called ‘Internet-enabled’ phones. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Mobile Web: HTML/HDML/XML/WML files converted at WAP gateway. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>WTLS (Wireless Transport Level Security) provides single leg vs. end-to-end security using ECC (less cpu intensive), not RSA encryption. Uses X.509v3 certificates from root Trust CAs </li></ul></ul>
    55. 55. Mobile Data Techology and Standards <ul><li>Public Packet Data Networks (WAN Tech) </li></ul><ul><li>19.2kbps – Ardis, RAM, CDPD </li></ul><ul><li>128kbps – Metricom (circuit-switched) </li></ul><ul><li>Used by paging and wireless data services: </li></ul><ul><li>RIM (Research in Motion) Blackberry </li></ul><ul><li>AT&T Wireless </li></ul><ul><li>Verizon </li></ul><ul><li> </li></ul><ul><li>OmniSky </li></ul>
    56. 56. Mobile Data Techology <ul><li>Public Packet Data Networks (WAN Tech) </li></ul><ul><li>Motorola DataTAC and ASTROs </li></ul><ul><li>EDACS (Ericsson Enhanced Digital Access Communications System) </li></ul><ul><li>TETRA (Terrestrial Trunked Radio) – Europe. </li></ul><ul><li>Used by : </li></ul><ul><li>Fedex </li></ul><ul><li>US Govt </li></ul><ul><li>Private companies who build their own mobile data networks. </li></ul>
    57. 57. Mobile Data Device Security Palm Security @Stake NotSync utility demonstrated an attack on the Palm via the use of the IR port to attempt to sync with the Palm. The Sync could be hijacked and important information (e.g. password) obtained. Any time you are beaming from a Palm you must be careful about any devices in IR range.
    58. 58. Blackberry Security <ul><li>Has message level security between BB & BES </li></ul><ul><li>(Blackberry Enterprise Server) but not on Internet. </li></ul><ul><li>Only allows ‘signed’ applications to run - but these could infect & compromise.. </li></ul><ul><li>Such an application could be used as a backdoor/proxy into enterprise networks. </li></ul><ul><li>It could also read and send e-mail, SMS and Internet traffic. </li></ul><ul><li>DISABLE the CAPABILITY TO INSTALL & RUN 3-rd Party Applications. </li></ul>
    59. 59. Wireless Data Tech and Standards <ul><li>Wide/Metro Area </li></ul><ul><li>PPP over Cellular </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Analog (AMPS) – 9.6kbps </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Digital (US CDMA) – 14.kbps </li></ul></ul><ul><li>CDPD – 19.2kbps </li></ul><ul><li>Metricom Richochet modem– provides encryption! </li></ul><ul><li>Wireless ISPs for high speed access </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Several hundred kbps to several megabits per second </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Proprietary MAN technologies </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Native American Reservation high speed Internet access </li></ul></ul><ul><li>WiMax - 20 to 30 KM at 70 Megabits/sec. </li></ul>
    60. 60. PAN (Personal Area Network) Standards <ul><li>PAN/piconet networks PCs, printers, peripherals, applicances in a very small (10’ – 20’) personal area network. Meant as wire/cable replacements. </li></ul><ul><li>Wireless LAN Technology </li></ul><ul><li>Bluetooth (IEEE 802.15) </li></ul><ul><li>HomeRF </li></ul><ul><li>Middleware: </li></ul><ul><li>Jini – Sun Microsystems Java – provides authentication and security </li></ul>
    61. 61. <ul><li>1, 10 and 100 metre versions. </li></ul><ul><li>Uses 2.4Ghz freq range. </li></ul><ul><li>Bluetooth uses custom algorithms based on the SAFER+ block cipher for authentication and key derivation. </li></ul><ul><li>The E22 used for initialization and master key generation. </li></ul><ul><li>Encryption is via the E0 stream cipher. </li></ul><ul><li>“ PINs” have been cracked/hacked. </li></ul><ul><li>Encryption to be upgraded. </li></ul><ul><li>Bluetooth 3 to use UMB. </li></ul>
    62. 62. Bluetooth Security Threats <ul><li>Bluejacking - sending messages to Bluetooth-enabled devices. </li></ul><ul><li>Bluesnarfing - stealing info from a Bluetooth device (contacts/addressbook) </li></ul><ul><li>Bluestumbling - discovering and cataloging Bluetooth devices </li></ul><ul><li>Buebugging controlling another’s device </li></ul><ul><li>Bluetooth “rifle” can be used up to 1 mile to receive signal.. </li></ul>
    63. 63. ZigBee (AKA HomeRF lite) <ul><li>250 Kbps at up to 30 meters. </li></ul><ul><li>Uses the 2.4GHz radio band - ala 802.11b/g and 868/915 MHz. </li></ul><ul><li>HomeRF Lite plus the 802.15.4 specification. </li></ul><ul><li>AKA PURLnet, RF-Lite, Firefly & HomeRF Lite. </li></ul><ul><li>CSMA/CA in varied topologies up to 50 metres </li></ul><ul><li>Low Power </li></ul>
    64. 65. Summary and Unresolved Issues <ul><li>Wireless data over digitally encrypted channels (e.g. US CDMA) is better security in general than “over” analog un-encrypted. </li></ul><ul><li>No encryption nor security mechanism is 100% secure. You need to assess risk threats and evaluate tradeoffs. </li></ul><ul><li>For sensitive/critical data you should use end-to-end protection: either encrypted applications (e.g. SSL) or VPNs (or both) over wireless networks even those with digital encryption. </li></ul>
    65. 66. Questions?
    66. 67. Additional Resources <ul><li>3G Wireless FAQ </li></ul><ul><li>Official Bluetooth SIG Website: </li></ul><ul><li>HomeRF Working Group, Inc. http://www. homerf .org/ </li></ul><ul><li>IEEE 802 LAN/MAN Standards Committee: </li></ul><ul><li>Wireless Application Protocol Forum Ltd.: </li></ul>
    67. 68. Questions