Lessons learned from recent very large-scale disasters in the world


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Norio, Okada, Kyoto University, Professor

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Lessons learned from recent very large-scale disasters in the world

  2. 2. Our models are based onthe assumption that eachsegment movesseparately.
  3. 3. 農林水産省・国土交通省Development of sea walls and their damages Sea wall height determined by Tsunami Sea wall height determined by Storm surge Iwate Miyagi Fukushima
  4. 4. Otsuchi TownNot only wooden but also stealbuildings suffered damage. Town office was also damaged.
  5. 5. Impacts• Dead and Missing: 16,019 and 3,805• Housing: 118,821 (collapsed) , 181,801(half- collapsed)• Tsunami Inundated Area: 507 km2• Direct Damage: USD about 200 billion (16.9 trillion JPYen)(without Nuclear Power plant failure)• Total Economic Loss may exceeds USD 500~600 billion
  6. 6. Economic Impact of Tsunami• Direct losses – Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry: USD 17 Billon ( USD 9 billion, USD 7 billion, USD 1 billion) – Industries: USD 60-110 Billion by Tsunami [production capital USD 900 billion (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima)]• Cascading Effect through supply chain, e.g., Automobile, IT industries, even for Construction Industries• Electric Power Shortage: TEPCO: 6000->3400MW (5500to be increased by summer)Insurance Payout: 1.163 trillion JPN (Households Earthquake Insurance, as of Oct. 12 ) 529 billion JPN (JA Kyosai (Zenkyoren) as of July 19) →Muteki bond (sponsored by Munich Re) can reduce $300 million losses. (insurance insider April 4 2011)
  7. 7. Features of the event• Large Spatial Scale – Preparation is not enough – Huge causality, economic losses – Difficulty in coordinating response, relief and recovery• Complex – Earthquake, Tsunami, Nuclear, NaTech, etc.• Cascading Impacts – Production Capacity Decrease, Supply Chain Disruption, Shortage of Goods and Services
  8. 8. Shortage of Material SupplyCompound Wood Board Ofunato has large share. Shinetsu Chemical and KanekaPlastic Vinyl Chloride is stopping their production. Polyethylen / Mitsubishi Chemical group at Kashima Polypropylene and Chiba stops their production. heat insulator synthetic rubber A part of JSR Kashima starts production. 4/12 Nikkei 日経新聞朝刊
  9. 9. What happened in Kashima Port Area? Petro refinery naphtha Chemical industry A Mitsubishi Chemical Co. D JSR Co. A Co. B Co. C Co. C Co. E Shinetsu Kaneka chemicalLiquefaction, ground motion and Tsunami affects production facility heavily atKashima Port area. Cascading impact of stoppage of naphtha was critical andaffected to many companies located at the port area.
  10. 10. Gasoline shortage occurred and turned to be one of the major obstacles of rescue and recovery activities • Fuel storage stations, oil refinery facilities were affected by the EQ. • Although the highways recovered relatively quickly, gasoline shortages for two weeks. • Capacity of transportation was limited by the shortage of gasoline.
  11. 11. Hazard Map
  12. 12. Distribution of the killed people
  13. 13. Capacity building: Disaster Education “Kamaishi Miracle” •Prof. Katada, Gumma University and his group have spend eight years for disaster education for elementary and junior high school. •All the pupils under the control of schools are saved in entire Kamaishi City.What he taught:(1) Not believe hazard scenario (map)(2) Spend best effort for survive(3) Behave as a “leading evacuator”
  14. 14. Immediate response• Evacuation: Very few children were killed under the control of nursery. – Nursery should make practice of evacuation drill once in a month. No new things can be done during disaster. Pupils of Kamaishi said, “We can save our lives because of the drill and practice of evacuation before the event. We think it was a result of the practice, not a miracle.”
  15. 15. Major Lessons : Planning and Management Aspect• Reduce “expected surprise,” by taking account of all the possible consequences for designing DRM Plans and contingency plans.• Integrated Disaster Risk Management is needed: – Structural + Nonstructural Measures taking account of “Excess Design Forces.” • Eg. Tsunami protection walls reduced impact when they are not destroyed even Tsunami exceeds • Capacity building through disaster education is very important• Implementation of IDRM is a big challenge: – Governance Issues: multiple authorities, governments, NGOs, Citizens • Eg. Raising elevation of highways: who covers the cost, who decide the elevation of the road.
  16. 16. Why we have “expected surprise”?• Design external force is used for facility design.• If the actual external force exceeds the design force, it is not a responsibility of the authority.No authority don’t want to take risk by considering force exceeding the design force.→ This leads to “cliff-edge fragility” problem (Kameda 2011) .
  17. 17. Four Nuclear power plants are affected
  18. 18. Nuclear Power Plant Fukushima No.1TEPCO assumed to have amaximum Tsunami height at5.7m. TEPCO made a internalresearch draft which reportedMaximum Tsunami height canreach at 15.7m in 2008 butthey reported Nuclear PowerAuthority on March 7th 2011. Unfortunately, TEPCO loose the chance for installing additional Tsunami Countermeasures and the Tsunami on March 11th run-up height reached to 15m and Tsunami washed away functionality of the emergency diesel power generator.
  19. 19. Tokai Dai Ni Nuclear Power plantIn 2009.9, they modifiedthe design tsunamiheight (4.86m→5.7m)based on revisedTsunami hazardassessment by theIbaragi Pref. (2008.9)and had startconstructing of Tsunamiprotection wall for At march 11th, two of theemergency diesel emergency diesel powerbuilding (6.1m). generator was saved and kept functionality.
  20. 20. From Cliff-edge to Smooth Fragility (Kameda, 2011) Cliff- Prob. malfunctioning edge Hazard levelAllowing uncertainty of functionality of countermeasures for excessexternal forces, we should increase the coping capacity of the facilityagainst natural hazards.
  21. 21. Exceeding external forces• Safety is a fundamental needs of citizen.• Design and evaluation standard gradually were getting considering “exceeding external forces.” – Robust sea wall and break water design – Robust river dykes – Seismic design: economic efficiency investigation
  22. 22. 農林水産省・国土交通省Development of sea walls and their damages Sea wall height determined by Tsunami Sea wall height determined by Storm surge Iwate Miyagi Fukushima
  23. 23. How sea wall collapsed?
  24. 24. Improvement of sea walls’ resiliency
  25. 25. To establish the design method for Integrated Disaster Risk Management• Change scope of design: not only a facility but also non-structural measures, i.e., integrated countermeasures• Evaluate the functionality of the integrated countermeasures at all the possible consequences.• Recognize and prepare for the worst consequences
  26. 26. Renovation Plan of Sendai City(仙台市) Protection against maximum Tsunami Protection against Park(mold) Tsunami once in one hundred and several Highway Highway ten years Multiple protection lines: Sea walls, river dykes, raising elevation of highways Land use Land use regulation: regulation: Areas where expected Tsunami depth Restriction of exceeds 2m are designated as “Sakigai construction of Kiken Kuiki” (Disaster Prone Zones). In houses. the area, construction of buildings for the purpose for living is prohibited. Evacuation Shelters and Routes: Mounded parks closer to sea shore, high-rise building as a shelter
  27. 27. Challenges• Establish the methodology to evaluate integrated countermeasures: – Decision making under ambiguity New method? – Maximizing Net Benefit subject to social safety requirement (Live-safety) Conditional optimization? – Benefit should cover reduction of business interruption losses (economic impacts) need for an integrated framework of economic impact assessment!• Establishing Better Risk Governance – Who takes responsibility for the safety against natural hazards? – Can we achieve it by enhancing public private partnership?
  28. 28. Thank you for your attention!• E-mail: tatano@imdr.dpri.kyoto-u.ac.jp