Firm Points Out Need To Apply Keynesian Economic Multipliers For Proper Understanding of Negative Ramifications Following a Long Beach Line Closure; Again Cites National Security Risks as Boeing and Lawmakers Underestimate Threat to Manufacturing Base
Originally completed in November of 2005 as a specific counter to the conclusions reached within the largely discredited Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) echoing its "180 C-17s is enough", and "minimal negative economic impact" contentions, the DoC study paints a grim picture backed by voluminous data that is "evergreen".
"For all of the supportive --albeit very commendable-- talk by lawmakers and involved industrial entities, there is, with few exceptions, an observable recalcitrance in voicing the extremely serious state of affairs represented by C-17 line termination", says Myron D. Stokes, Managing Member.
"For example, despite that fact of the DoC study's existence and its data-based articulation of an immediate USD8.4 billion in negative industrio-economic base effect resulting from idling 30,000 highly skilled direct employees of (as of 2006) 702 suppliers in 42 states, there is focus on the more recent GAO analysis observing a USD1 billion cost if the line were closed and restarted. It is not only important to conjoin the expansive data contained within these vitally important studies, but to use them in driving home the point of a country's economic stability DNA as existing within its manufacturing base," he said.