Tj workshop session 4-kazakhstan

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  • A water license can grant the use of a fixed amount (cubic meters per day) or a proportional (time) share of a water flow.
  • establishment of new WRM institutionsYet little understanding of corruption risks in water licencing processes – 2 ways:1) by public officials responsible for licencing 2) by those applying for a licence
  • Given definition of corruption as ‘use of public office for private gain’, this approach palces the public office at the core of the interaction framework and notes that the public officers/agencies interact with 3 types of actors: other public actors/agencies, private actors & companies; and consumers, civil society & its represnetative org.
  • Poor control measurement: technical ability to measure abstraction (if licence if for fixed amount per day)? Or are tehre water dividers (if licence is in proportional time shares)
  • Red flag: Answer the question: “What would make the risk come true? How would you measure that?”1. Number of documents required per applicaton / average time for application process (from time of submission to time of delivery of licence)
  • 1. Oveview of aggregate terms & conditions of all licences granted vs. actual water use over given period of time
  • 1. Distribution of licences per km2 / per population concentration 2. Cases of damaged / stolen control gates -- %crops damaged due to disruptions in water flows3. Existence of a water licence registry which is publicly available
  • E.g. No meters to measure water deliveries to individual farmers: farmers get allocated an individual quota, but different crops, different water requirements (vs. at time of the kholkoz, only one production unit and one crop) Controller supposed to measure water use at least once a day & get signature of WUA or farmer that a certain amount was delivered. This may not provide reliable info on daily water consumption. But controller may not be able to go! Underfunded  not enough cars to cover area, so had to go by bike or on horseback or walk. Water pollution licencing: attributing pollution to its source impossible when measuring water quality at end of a canal that is polluted by 10 or 1 companies! Impossibel to work out who polluted how much. Red flag: Budget for enforcement oflicences (control/monitoring mechanism); % of licences covered by a monitoring device; availabilioty of means of transportation for controllers; % of pollution licences covered by pollution control devicesIf not paying enough for water itself (the service) Survey of Licencees re: access/effectiveness of complaint mechanismSalary figures – relative comparison with average regional wages
  • These will likely fail when licencensing administered by under-funded, under-equipped and under-coordinated regulating agencies
  • Important since in the near future, situation may be aggravated because every farmer – insteda of every WUA – will have to obtain a permit for certain amounts of water: exponential increase of corruption risks!
  • QUALITATIVE - Expert input: mapping study of ‘corruption risks’ based on desk research / interviews (institutions, laws & regulations)Identify red flagsQUANTITATIVE - Get feedback from water stakeholders: Nationwide ‘baseline survey’ on how water consumers and water providers experience & perceive corruption in the provision of water, in both rural and urban areas (COMPARE RESULTS!); or through buget/expenditure tracking to detect where unexplained leakages occurTo assess impact: what is the amount of resources involved? What is the effect on org reputation/credibility? What is the impact on the general public / the poor? Important to note that petty corruption (one 1 to 1 basis) may seem to have a small practice, but if they occur very frequently (high likelihood), their combined impact may be high! (may also need to revise / add some ‘red flags’!) 3) Do survey results confirm the expert mapping?
  • AC mechanisms are systems enhancing transparency- indicator looks at existence and functioning of the mechanismAssessing risk – involves mapping out, by talking to people and comparing TORs and procedures, the vulerable points in a system, then assessing the effectiveness of mechanisms, procedures, changes to mandates ect that are put in place after based on this info.
  • See Reference sheet 23
  • See Reference Sheet 23
  • See Reference Sheet 23
  • How do you assess simple yes/no questions?some indicators require a scale: a set of numerical values assigned to certain criteria for the purpose of quantifying qualitative indicators.Scaling introduces quality benchmarksCreating scales with quality/performance standards is an example of the types of important decisions that have to be made when designing indicators, and which are the basis for benchmarking.
  • Tj workshop session 4-kazakhstan

    1. 1. Session 4<br />Mapping risks areas for potential corruption in water licensing in Kazakhstan<br />Marie Laberge, UNDP Oslo Governance Centre<br />
    2. 2. Why is water licensing at the heart of WRM?<br />Licences are required for use of water for agriculture, industry, electricty production, fish breeding, etc.<br />Licences determine who has access to water & how much they pay to use or pollute it <br />Licences provide a means to manage water fairly, efficiently and sustainably<br />Water resource licenses or permits may cover a range of purposes:<br />Regulation of abstraction of surface or groundwater<br />Utilising or changing the course of water through damming or draining<br />Discharging pollutants into receiving waters <br />
    3. 3. Why mapping corruption risks in water licencing?<br />Countries are pursuing multiple reforms to improve WRM<br />New national WRM frameworks, establishment of new WRM institutions<br />Yet little understanding of corruption risks in water licencing processes <br />Mapping corruption risks in water licencing<br />Can help form alliances between key WRM institutions (govt & civil society)<br />Can serve as a credible input (based on evidence) for a broader discussion and follow-up action<br />
    4. 4. Mapping corruption risks in water licencing: The case of Kazakhstan<br />State-dominated water sector in the midst of reforms, including turning former farm cooperatives (kolkhoz) into individual farm enterprises<br />Like Tajikistan, most water is used in agriculture (82% water share) <br />Important WRM problems: <br />Inequitable water distribution: system skwed towards the powerful <br />Inefficient water use in agriculture<br />Inadequate wastewater treatement<br />Negative effects of massive water diversion from rivers for cotton production resulting in shrinking of lake Aral<br />
    5. 5. Mapping corruption risks in water licencing: The case of Kazakhstan<br />State-managed water licencensing system<br />Licences for irrigation given by Ministry of Agriculture (Commission of Water Resources)  irrigation departments  Water User Associations  farmers (time allocations)<br />
    6. 6. Mapping corruption risks in water licencing: Methodology used in Kazakhstan<br />Semi-structured & open interviews held with licensors issuing water licences, water licencees & other stakeholders (NGOs, private sector managers, meda)<br />First interviewees provided other names <br />Field observations<br />Literature review<br /><ul><li>Variety of sources allowed for triangulation of information</li></li></ul><li>What are the main ‘corruption risks’ in the Kazakh water licensing system? <br />License application process: Potential to influence the awarding process<br />Content of the licence: Possibility to influence amount of water, timing, kind and amount of pollutant, etc.<br />Bidding and trading procedures: Opportunities to influence the bidding mechanism <br />Enforcement of licence: Possibilities to avoid consequences of infringements (poor control measurement, paying bribes, etc.)<br />
    7. 7. Risk area no.1: Licence application process<br />
    8. 8. Risk area no.2: Content of the licence <br />
    9. 9. Risk area no.3: Bidding and trading procedures <br />
    10. 10. Risk area no.4: Enforcement of licence<br />
    11. 11. What does this experience show us? <br />Corruption-mapping studies are useful to help understand local realities when designing new water policies & regulation<br />Often such policies are developed with the help of international organizations, based on experience of countries with better control mechanisms<br />These will likely fail in countries with weak controls or lack of data!<br />Instead, creative solutions need to be found for water allocation & control mechanisms, without increasing bureaucracy & potential corruption! <br />Extending informal systems may be more effective in some cases than building parallel formal systems <br />
    12. 12. Planning ahead: How to apply this to the Tajik context?<br />Which actors should be interviewed?<br />Are the ‘risk areas’ identified in the Kazakh context applicable to the Tajik context? <br />Which other areas should be investigated? <br />What are possible administrative/objective sources of information we could draw from (beyond interviews)? <br />
    13. 13. But what to do next, after having identified the main corruption risks areas?<br />How to monitor those on a regular basis? <br />
    14. 14. Remember the four steps of our assessment approach? <br />Mapping the ‘potential’ corruption risks for each ‘step’ in the provision of water <br />Identify danger signs (‘red flags’) to watch out for: they alert decision-makers, investigators or the public to the possibility of corrupt practices<br />Find empirical evidence (through surveys & analysis of objective data sources) of corruption risks and ‘rank’ them based on incidence & impact<br />Establish a monitoring system to track the most critical ‘red flags’ on a regular basis <br />
    15. 15. Monitoring integrity indicators: The Macedonian experience<br />1. Trace the steps in the delivery of a service<br />2. Identify corruption “hot spots”<br />3. Identify corresponding anti-corruption mechanisms<br />4. Design indicatorsto match<br />5. Quantify indicators <br />
    16. 16. Example – Procurement (Macedonia Integrity Index) <br />Hot spot:<br />Publication of and invitation for bids done in a way that does not inform as many bidders as possible<br />AC mechanism:<br />Public procurements, particularly those of a larger value, should be published in the daily newspaper with the largest circulation, instead of in newspapers with limited circulation<br />Indicator (quantitative):<br />Number (as % of total number of procurements) and value (as % of total value of procurements) of procurements advertised in papers of large circulation<br />
    17. 17. Exercise: Developing integrity indicators<br />Over to you…<br />A selection of corruption hot spots for the procurement sector is provided on the worksheet.<br />Can you create matching anti-corruption mechanisms and indicators?<br />Small groups<br />15 mins<br />
    18. 18. How to quantify?<br />Example :How responsive was Agency X in disclosing the requested information? <br />Highly responsive (within 1 week)……………………..3 points<br />Somewhat responsive (within 2 months)……………...2 points<br />Somewhat unresponsive (more than 6 months)……....1 point<br />Very unresponsive (1 year or no response)……………0 point<br />
    19. 19. How to quantify?<br />Example indicator 2:<br />Existence of a system for informing parties through written notices posted up or obtainable at the window from a clerk.<br />Information for the parties is visibly posted or easily obtainable………........................................2 points<br />Information upon request of the party……….....….1 point<br />No system of informing the parties………...…...….0 point<br />
    20. 20. How to quantify?<br />Slightly trickier…<br />How do you assess simple yes/no questions?<br />Example: In practice, are major public procurements effectively advertised? <br /> These can also be scaled!<br />
    21. 21. Developing a scale to quantify qualitative indicators <br />In practice, are major public procurements effectively advertised?<br />Score 100: There is a formal process of advertising public procurements. This may include a government website, newspaper advertising, or other official announcements. All major procurements are advertised in this way. Sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to advertisements.<br />Score 50: There is a formal process of advertising but it is flawed. Some major procurements may not be advertised, or the advertising process may not be effective. The time between advertisements and bidding may be too short to allow full participation.<br />Score 0: There is no formal process of advertising major public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective. <br />
    22. 22. Developing indicator scales<br />Over to you…<br />Using the worksheet provided, work with a partner or two to develop your own indicator scales.<br />15 minutes<br />

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