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Agent Architecture for
Simulating Norm Dynamics. Part II


  Rosaria Conte



  LABSS (Laboratory of Agent Based Social
  Simulation), Roma, ISTC-CNR
Why to comply?
How to make norms happy?
Levels and dynamics of
                                  immergence
   Norms may “sink” into
    the mind
   Various levels
       Full norm processing
                                              Violation/
       Internalization                       compliance

         • Internalized N-goal           Full norm processing
            • Independent of norm
              enforcement belief         N-internalization
         • Internalized goal
            • Independent of N--belief    N-incorporation
       Incorporation
         • Automated behaviour
   Bidirectional dynamics
A non-rigid modular
                                           architecture
           NORM
           RECOGNITION
INPUT      N-B1               NORM        DECISION:   CONFORM
           B-B2               ADOPTION:               BEHAVIOR
                                          N-
           N-B3               N-GOAL
                                          INTENTION




                  Socrates
                  acceptance of
                  sentence




        Internalization
A non-rigid modular
                                          architecture
           NORM
           RECOGNITION
INPUT      N-B1              NORM        DECISION:    CONFORM
           B-B2              ADOPTION:                BEHAVIOR
                                         N-
           N-B3              N-GOAL
                                         INTENTION




                                               Stop at red light
                  Mind
                  commands                    Answer requests if
                                              eye contact is
                                              established

        Internalization                         Incorporation
Norm internalization
Classic and current views
   Classic conditioning: external sanctioning system never
    completely abandoned (Scott 1971).
   Internal sanctions (Parsons, 1952; Scott, 1971; Axelrod,
    1986, Elster, 1989; Coleman, 1990; Dequech, 2009; etc):
      Related to emotions of discomfort, shame and guilt

      Sense of duty

   Thoughtless conformity:
      The more agents have conformed to a norm in the past,
       the more they will redo it in the future (Epstein, 2007).

   Why, when, how???
   What about retrieving deliberation in norm-compliance?
In EMIL follow-ups
                             (Conte et al., 2011; Villatoro et al., 2010)


   Formulate hypotheses about
       effects, factors, and evolution of internalization
       reversible dynamics
   Implement essential mechanisms in EMIL-A.
    No emotions at this stage
   Check hypotheses by simulation
   Internalized N-goal:
    goal no more
    relativized to N-
                                       EMIL-Internalizer
    enforcement belief.
       N-enforcement belief
                                              (EMIL-IA)
        still persists but agent
        does not calculate it      I   N-bel1:general
        when decide to             n
        execute N-goal                                       Internalized
                                   p   N-bel2:pertinence        N-goal
   Internalized goal:             u
                                   t
    goal no more                       N-bel3: enforcement
    internalized to
    normative belief in
    the general form.              I   N-bel1:general
       Internalizer has lost      n
        normative origin of        p                         Internalized
                                       N-bel2:pertinence         goal
        her goal.                  u
                                   t
       N-belief still persist         N-bel3: enforcement
        but agent pursues
        goal irrespective of it.
   Internalized N-goal:
    goal no more
    relativized to N-
                                       EMIL-Internalizer
    enforcement belief.
       N-enforcement belief
                                              (EMIL-IA)
        still persists but agent
        does not calculate it      I   N-bel1:general
        when decide to             n
        execute N-goal                                       Internalized
                                   p   N-bel2:pertinence        N-goal
   Internalized goal:             u
                                   t
    goal no more                       N-bel3: enforcement
    internalized to
    normative belief in
    the general form.                  N-bel1:general
       Internalizer has lost      I
        normative origin of        n                         Internalized
                                       N-bel2:pertinence         goal
        her goal.                  p
                                   u
       N-belief still persist     t   N-bel3: enforcement
        but agent pursues
        goal irrespective of it.       Bel4
Factors of internalization

   Why form a normative goal irrespective of external
    sanctions?
   Several factors, among which
       Consistency with previously internalized norms
        (McAdams, 2008) and temporal discount (see below)
       “Internal sanctions” (Scott, 1971; Axelrod, 1986, etc).
Consistency with previous
         norms
   Why observe norms irrespective of
    external sanctions?
   Consistency (McAdams, 2008),
        Successful educational strategies (King,
         2008) link new inputs to previously
         internalized norms
        Policymaking: Controversial efficacy of
         frightening announcements (Goodall,
         2005): Inability to act under
         representation of delayed reward due to
         hyperbolic discounting (Bickel and
         Johnson, 2003; Rachlin, 2000), i.e. effort
         hyperbolically decreasing with time-
         distance from goal-attainment,
          • leads to procrastination
          • Better refer to consistent norms and
            values
Internal sanctions
                “ The internal sanction of duty is a feeling in our mind; a pain, more or less
                   intense, attendant on violation of duty; it is the essence of conscience.”
                                                                            (John Stuart Mill)


When. ground the mechanism on salience.
How:
   Anticipatory representations of consequences (supported by
      emotions)
   tend to replace exter:al sanctions.
Why: the higher the salience,
       The more the sanctioners
       The more frequent and severe the sanction is observed/received
       The more justified the sanction is perceived.
       The more often it is expected
       The more often it is anticipated, simulated in imagination
   But the confine between
       what is experienced in anticipating future sanctions
       current sanction becomes fuzzier over time…
Internal sanctions
        “ The internal sanction of duty is a feeling in our mind; a pain, more or less
      intense, attendant on violation of duty; it is the essence of conscience.” (John
                                                                           Stuart Mill)

When. ground the mechanism on salience.
How:
   Anticipatory representations of consequences (supported by
      emotions)
   tend to replace external sanctions.
Why: the higher the salience,
       The more the sanctioners
       The more frequent and severe the sanction is observed/received
       The more justified the sanction is perceived.
       The more often it is expected
       The more often it is anticipated, simulated in imagination
   But the confine between
       what is experienced in anticipating future sanctions
       current sanction becomes fuzzier over time…
Internal sanctions
        “ The internal sanction of duty is a feeling in our mind; a pain, more or less
      intense, attendant on violation of duty; it is the essence of conscience.” (John
                                                                           Stuart Mill)

When. ground the mechanism on salience.
How:
   Anticipatory representations of consequences (supported by
      emotions)
   tend to replace exter:al sanctions.
Why: the higher the salience,
       The more the sanctioners
       The more frequent and severe the sanction is observed/received
       The more “justified” the sanction is perceived.
       The more often it is expected
       The more often it is anticipated, simulated in imagination
   But the confine between
       what is experienced in anticipating future sanctions
       current sanction becomes fuzzier over time…
Internal sanctions
         “ The internal sanction of duty is a feeling in our mind; a pain, more or less
       intense, attendant on violation of duty; it is the essence of conscience.” (John
                                                                            Stuart Mill)

When. ground the mechanism on salience.
How:
   Anticipatory representations of consequences (supported by emotions)
   tend to replace exter:al sanctions.
Why: the higher the salience,
        The more the sanctioners
        The more frequent and severe the sanction is observed/received
        The more justified the sanction is perceived.
        The more often it is expected
        The more often it is simulated in imagination
    But the confine between
        what is experienced in anticipating future sanctions
        What is experienced during the effective sanction
    becomes fuzzier over time…
Dynamics of
                     N-internalization


             N-                       Delibe
             inter                    rative
N-salience               N-salience   N-
             naliz                    compli
             ation                    ance
Dynamics of
                     N-internalization


             N-                       Delibe
             inter                    rative
N-salience               N-salience   N-
             naliz                    compli
             ation                    ance
Natural experimental
                              hypotheses
Natural experiments
Internalized goals lead to a more vigorous goal-attainment (Bargh
   et al., 2001) than originally inner goals because of effect of
   prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Abdellaoui et
   al., 2007)
Internalizer shows higher intolerance for norm violation based on
   confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998; Sternberg, 2007)
Internalizers are much better at defending the norms than
   externally-enforced observers based on cognitive dissonance
   (Festinger 1957).
However, internalizers are sensitive to salience
Artificial experimental
                       hypotheses

Artificial experiments
Compliance is more robust if norms are
  internalized because independent of
  external sanctioning entities.
Less costly, allowed evolution
Sensitivity to salience makes internalization
  flexible and allows for norm innovation
Effects of internalization in artificial societies
                         (Villatoro et al., 2010)
•   Three interacting subpopulations :
    •   Strategic




    •   Normative (EMIL-A)

    •   Internalizers (EMIL-IA)

•   NA may internalize the N.
Hypotheses
•   Strategic and Normative agents lead to a
    collapse of cooperation with low punishment
    rates
•   Internalizers maintain social order imposed by
    social norms even if these are not defended
    •   Temporarily, allowing the system to recover from
        possible failures;
    •   Permanently: when salience decreases internalizers
        start dismissing the norm and do cost-to-benefit-
        calculation
Experimental scenario
•   Agents play a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
•   Norm specifies “Cooperation”.
•   Agents can punish those that do not follow the norm,
    with a given probability.
•   Depending on salience value:
    •   Strategic punishment: Fine.
    •   Normative punishment: Fine + Deontic Message.
Simulation sequence



    3rd Phase: Update values
    • Norm salience
    • Cooperation rate
    • Internalization rate
Details
•   Strategic Agents:
    •   Do not know about punishment. They only have a
        benefit cost global perception of the interaction

•   Normative Agents:
    •   They are initialized with a risk-taking value. They will
        defect when they detect that probability of being
        punished is below 30%.
Experimental design
•   100 Agents.
•   Fully Connected Network.
•   Results averaged on 25 runs.
•   Different punishment distributions:
     •   Constant: agents are assigned a constant probability to punish.
     •   Linearly Increasing: probability continuously increases as the simulation
         runs.

     •   Linearly Decreasing: the probability continuously decreases as the
         simulation runs.

     •   Step Down: at a certain moment of the simulation, the probability of being
         punished drops from 1 to 0, i.e. from total punishments to no punishment.

     •   Step Up: at a certain moment of the simulation, the probability of being
         punished raises from 0 to 1, i.e. from no punishment to total punishments.
Results: Linearly Decreasing
Cooperation Rates              Internalization Rates




                    Salience
Results: Step down
Cooperation Rates                 Internalization Rates




                       Salience
Experimental lessons
•   Allowing different types of normative agents to interact
    provides system policymakers with a tool that can help
    predict the dynamics of prosocial behavior.

•   Internalizers are endowed with a rich cognitive
    architecture allowing high cooperation rates even when
    punishment is low (and costly).

•   Internalizers need a certain amount of strategic or
    normative agents to dismiss the normative action when
    necessary.
Conclusions
   Summary
       Building blocks of a rich cognitive
        model of internalization
       Types and degrees of internalization
       factors favoring different types of
        internalization
       First implementation (EMIL-IA)
       First experimental results on effect of
        internalizaiton on cooperation rates
   But “Only the barest outline of
    internalization is known" (Vygotzsky,
    1978, p. 57).
Conclusions (2)
   Norme emerge from agents endowed with mental representations
    and the capacity to act on them
   A simpler agent architecture does not allow for norms to emerge
    in certain domains
   But to make norms happy, cognitive but non-fully deliberative
    agent architecture is needed
   Further artificial experiments,
       more than one norm
       more interesting scenarios
   Necessity of cross-methodological experiments
   Implement incorporation
   Implement emotions
To practice (and discuss)
   Internalization with > one norm

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ESSA10 Summer school 2

  • 1. Agent Architecture for Simulating Norm Dynamics. Part II Rosaria Conte LABSS (Laboratory of Agent Based Social Simulation), Roma, ISTC-CNR
  • 2. Why to comply? How to make norms happy?
  • 3. Levels and dynamics of immergence  Norms may “sink” into the mind  Various levels  Full norm processing Violation/  Internalization compliance • Internalized N-goal Full norm processing • Independent of norm enforcement belief N-internalization • Internalized goal • Independent of N--belief N-incorporation  Incorporation • Automated behaviour  Bidirectional dynamics
  • 4. A non-rigid modular architecture NORM RECOGNITION INPUT N-B1 NORM DECISION: CONFORM B-B2 ADOPTION: BEHAVIOR N- N-B3 N-GOAL INTENTION Socrates acceptance of sentence Internalization
  • 5. A non-rigid modular architecture NORM RECOGNITION INPUT N-B1 NORM DECISION: CONFORM B-B2 ADOPTION: BEHAVIOR N- N-B3 N-GOAL INTENTION Stop at red light Mind commands Answer requests if eye contact is established Internalization Incorporation
  • 7. Classic and current views  Classic conditioning: external sanctioning system never completely abandoned (Scott 1971).  Internal sanctions (Parsons, 1952; Scott, 1971; Axelrod, 1986, Elster, 1989; Coleman, 1990; Dequech, 2009; etc):  Related to emotions of discomfort, shame and guilt  Sense of duty  Thoughtless conformity:  The more agents have conformed to a norm in the past, the more they will redo it in the future (Epstein, 2007).  Why, when, how???  What about retrieving deliberation in norm-compliance?
  • 8. In EMIL follow-ups (Conte et al., 2011; Villatoro et al., 2010)  Formulate hypotheses about  effects, factors, and evolution of internalization  reversible dynamics  Implement essential mechanisms in EMIL-A. No emotions at this stage  Check hypotheses by simulation
  • 9. Internalized N-goal: goal no more relativized to N- EMIL-Internalizer enforcement belief.  N-enforcement belief (EMIL-IA) still persists but agent does not calculate it I N-bel1:general when decide to n execute N-goal Internalized p N-bel2:pertinence N-goal  Internalized goal: u t goal no more N-bel3: enforcement internalized to normative belief in the general form. I N-bel1:general  Internalizer has lost n normative origin of p Internalized N-bel2:pertinence goal her goal. u t  N-belief still persist N-bel3: enforcement but agent pursues goal irrespective of it.
  • 10. Internalized N-goal: goal no more relativized to N- EMIL-Internalizer enforcement belief.  N-enforcement belief (EMIL-IA) still persists but agent does not calculate it I N-bel1:general when decide to n execute N-goal Internalized p N-bel2:pertinence N-goal  Internalized goal: u t goal no more N-bel3: enforcement internalized to normative belief in the general form. N-bel1:general  Internalizer has lost I normative origin of n Internalized N-bel2:pertinence goal her goal. p u  N-belief still persist t N-bel3: enforcement but agent pursues goal irrespective of it. Bel4
  • 11. Factors of internalization  Why form a normative goal irrespective of external sanctions?  Several factors, among which  Consistency with previously internalized norms (McAdams, 2008) and temporal discount (see below)  “Internal sanctions” (Scott, 1971; Axelrod, 1986, etc).
  • 12. Consistency with previous norms  Why observe norms irrespective of external sanctions?  Consistency (McAdams, 2008),  Successful educational strategies (King, 2008) link new inputs to previously internalized norms  Policymaking: Controversial efficacy of frightening announcements (Goodall, 2005): Inability to act under representation of delayed reward due to hyperbolic discounting (Bickel and Johnson, 2003; Rachlin, 2000), i.e. effort hyperbolically decreasing with time- distance from goal-attainment, • leads to procrastination • Better refer to consistent norms and values
  • 13. Internal sanctions “ The internal sanction of duty is a feeling in our mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty; it is the essence of conscience.” (John Stuart Mill) When. ground the mechanism on salience. How: Anticipatory representations of consequences (supported by emotions) tend to replace exter:al sanctions. Why: the higher the salience, The more the sanctioners The more frequent and severe the sanction is observed/received The more justified the sanction is perceived. The more often it is expected The more often it is anticipated, simulated in imagination But the confine between what is experienced in anticipating future sanctions current sanction becomes fuzzier over time…
  • 14. Internal sanctions “ The internal sanction of duty is a feeling in our mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty; it is the essence of conscience.” (John Stuart Mill) When. ground the mechanism on salience. How: Anticipatory representations of consequences (supported by emotions) tend to replace external sanctions. Why: the higher the salience, The more the sanctioners The more frequent and severe the sanction is observed/received The more justified the sanction is perceived. The more often it is expected The more often it is anticipated, simulated in imagination But the confine between what is experienced in anticipating future sanctions current sanction becomes fuzzier over time…
  • 15. Internal sanctions “ The internal sanction of duty is a feeling in our mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty; it is the essence of conscience.” (John Stuart Mill) When. ground the mechanism on salience. How: Anticipatory representations of consequences (supported by emotions) tend to replace exter:al sanctions. Why: the higher the salience, The more the sanctioners The more frequent and severe the sanction is observed/received The more “justified” the sanction is perceived. The more often it is expected The more often it is anticipated, simulated in imagination But the confine between what is experienced in anticipating future sanctions current sanction becomes fuzzier over time…
  • 16. Internal sanctions “ The internal sanction of duty is a feeling in our mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty; it is the essence of conscience.” (John Stuart Mill) When. ground the mechanism on salience. How: Anticipatory representations of consequences (supported by emotions) tend to replace exter:al sanctions. Why: the higher the salience, The more the sanctioners The more frequent and severe the sanction is observed/received The more justified the sanction is perceived. The more often it is expected The more often it is simulated in imagination But the confine between what is experienced in anticipating future sanctions What is experienced during the effective sanction becomes fuzzier over time…
  • 17. Dynamics of N-internalization N- Delibe inter rative N-salience N-salience N- naliz compli ation ance
  • 18. Dynamics of N-internalization N- Delibe inter rative N-salience N-salience N- naliz compli ation ance
  • 19. Natural experimental hypotheses Natural experiments Internalized goals lead to a more vigorous goal-attainment (Bargh et al., 2001) than originally inner goals because of effect of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Abdellaoui et al., 2007) Internalizer shows higher intolerance for norm violation based on confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998; Sternberg, 2007) Internalizers are much better at defending the norms than externally-enforced observers based on cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957). However, internalizers are sensitive to salience
  • 20. Artificial experimental hypotheses Artificial experiments Compliance is more robust if norms are internalized because independent of external sanctioning entities. Less costly, allowed evolution Sensitivity to salience makes internalization flexible and allows for norm innovation
  • 21. Effects of internalization in artificial societies (Villatoro et al., 2010) • Three interacting subpopulations : • Strategic • Normative (EMIL-A) • Internalizers (EMIL-IA) • NA may internalize the N.
  • 22. Hypotheses • Strategic and Normative agents lead to a collapse of cooperation with low punishment rates • Internalizers maintain social order imposed by social norms even if these are not defended • Temporarily, allowing the system to recover from possible failures; • Permanently: when salience decreases internalizers start dismissing the norm and do cost-to-benefit- calculation
  • 23. Experimental scenario • Agents play a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. • Norm specifies “Cooperation”. • Agents can punish those that do not follow the norm, with a given probability. • Depending on salience value: • Strategic punishment: Fine. • Normative punishment: Fine + Deontic Message.
  • 24. Simulation sequence 3rd Phase: Update values • Norm salience • Cooperation rate • Internalization rate
  • 25. Details • Strategic Agents: • Do not know about punishment. They only have a benefit cost global perception of the interaction • Normative Agents: • They are initialized with a risk-taking value. They will defect when they detect that probability of being punished is below 30%.
  • 26. Experimental design • 100 Agents. • Fully Connected Network. • Results averaged on 25 runs. • Different punishment distributions: • Constant: agents are assigned a constant probability to punish. • Linearly Increasing: probability continuously increases as the simulation runs. • Linearly Decreasing: the probability continuously decreases as the simulation runs. • Step Down: at a certain moment of the simulation, the probability of being punished drops from 1 to 0, i.e. from total punishments to no punishment. • Step Up: at a certain moment of the simulation, the probability of being punished raises from 0 to 1, i.e. from no punishment to total punishments.
  • 27. Results: Linearly Decreasing Cooperation Rates Internalization Rates Salience
  • 28. Results: Step down Cooperation Rates Internalization Rates Salience
  • 29. Experimental lessons • Allowing different types of normative agents to interact provides system policymakers with a tool that can help predict the dynamics of prosocial behavior. • Internalizers are endowed with a rich cognitive architecture allowing high cooperation rates even when punishment is low (and costly). • Internalizers need a certain amount of strategic or normative agents to dismiss the normative action when necessary.
  • 30. Conclusions  Summary  Building blocks of a rich cognitive model of internalization  Types and degrees of internalization  factors favoring different types of internalization  First implementation (EMIL-IA)  First experimental results on effect of internalizaiton on cooperation rates  But “Only the barest outline of internalization is known" (Vygotzsky, 1978, p. 57).
  • 31. Conclusions (2)  Norme emerge from agents endowed with mental representations and the capacity to act on them  A simpler agent architecture does not allow for norms to emerge in certain domains  But to make norms happy, cognitive but non-fully deliberative agent architecture is needed  Further artificial experiments,  more than one norm  more interesting scenarios  Necessity of cross-methodological experiments  Implement incorporation  Implement emotions
  • 32. To practice (and discuss)  Internalization with > one norm