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African Dialogue Rough Draft Slides--Child Protection and eCommerce

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  1. 1. Mobile Mayhem:<br />Designing an E-Commerce Regime to Regulate Dangerous Behavior in Mobile Environments <br />Professor Joshua Fairfield<br /><ul><li>Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law
  2. 2. Director, Frances Lewis Law Center © 2010
  3. 3.  </li></ul>Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson<br />Washington and Lee University School of Law<br />© 2010<br />
  4. 4. RoadMap<br />Mobile Mayhem: What Can the ‘Net Teach Us About the Future of Mobile Environments?<br />Failures of Real-World Enforcement Regimes in Novel Contexts<br />3. Incentives: Workable Alternatives to Enforcement<br />
  5. 5. Mobile Mayhem: Mutating Issues<br />“Measured in terms of depravity, insularity and traffic-driven turnover, the culture of /b/ has little precedent. /b/ reads like the inside of a high-school bathroom stall, or an obscene telephone party line, or a blog with no posts and all comments filled with slang that you are too old to understand.”<br />–Matthias Schwartz, “The Trolls Among Us,” inThe New York Times, 2008<br />Marginal Conduct Appeared on the Internet Immediately<br />
  6. 6. Mobile Mayhem: Mutating Issues<br /><ul><li> Virtual Worlds made this Marginal Conduct
  7. 7. more graphic
  8. 8. more real, and
  9. 9. more accessible </li></ul>to Children<br /><ul><li>Virtual Worlds Accept/Target Children via Gaming Model
  10. 10. and provide parent-free venue for kids to bully/speak explicitly to each other
  11. 11. Mobile Environments offer LESS supervision and GREATER variety</li></li></ul><li>Mobile Mayhem: Sex<br /><ul><li>Sexting: Early Indicator of Marginal Conduct Moving from Desktop to Mobile
  12. 12. Augmented Reality Objectification
  13. 13. “Jiggletits”: user takes pics of women & manipulates their bodies
  14. 14. “Bikini Camera”: user takes pics of clothed women and overlays bikini-clad women over them
  15. 15. Pornographic MMS, Websites, Ads, & Apps</li></li></ul><li>Mobile Mayhem: Violence<br /><ul><li>Augmented Reality
  16. 16. Brings Violence Closer to Real Life
  17. 17. Will get more gruesome (realistic) as devices progress</li></li></ul><li>Mobile Mayhem: Privacy & Anonymity<br />Geolocation Services<br /><ul><li>Passive (unlike Desktop “cookies,” which operate on click)
  18. 18. Constant (unlike cookies, which stop logging you when you log off)
  19. 19. Necessary for the Commerce Services</li></li></ul><li>Mobile Mayhem: Privacy & Anonymity<br />Social Network Integration<br /><ul><li>Real Life ID Connection
  20. 20. Broadcasting Private Information
  21. 21. Makes Users Easier to Contact in Real Life</li></li></ul><li>Imagine that instead of “Capt. Tim’s Galley,” this showed your presence at the local jail, or the free clinic, or your child’s daycare facility.<br />
  22. 22. Mobile Commerce is now much more threatening to personal privacy than any world government.<br />
  23. 23. Mobile Mayhem: Holistic Approach<br />Invasions of Privacy<br />Hate Speech, Cyber-Bullying, Kid-to-Kid Explicit Chat<br />Adult Content Accessible to Children<br />Users Must Be Protected from Social AND Economic Misconduct in Online Environments<br />Deceptive Advertising<br />Fraud/Scamming<br />Technical Attack<br />
  24. 24. Mobile Mayhem: Scams & Fraud<br />USER-Focused<br /><ul><li>SMShing
  25. 25. VOIP phishing
  26. 26. Fraudulent Apps or Websites</li></ul>Mobile Devices offer more varied means of contact, increasing risk that user will be unaware of threat and trust communication too easily.<br />
  27. 27. Mobile Mayhem: Technical Attack<br />DEVICE-Focused<br /><ul><li>Signal-borne
  28. 28. Wifi
  29. 29. Bluetooth
  30. 30. Email
  31. 31. Download
  32. 32. SMS/MMS
  33. 33. Containment Problems
  34. 34. Mobility = Infection Opportunity
  35. 35. Hardware Theft
  36. 36. More Common than Stationary Desktop Devices</li></li></ul><li>Mobile Microtransactions<br />
  37. 37. The U.S. system of<br />COLLECTION<br />SALE, and <br />RESALE<br />of personal information <br />cannot be allowed to migrate to mobile markets.<br />
  38. 38. Traditional Enforcement Regimes have been <br />Forced into Novel <br />Environments <br />(the internet, virtual worlds, and now the mobile marketplace)<br />
  39. 39. Enforcement is Ineffective<br />Low Equipment Cost<br />$1000s Profit Through Comm. Fraud<br />Strong Incentive to Defraud<br />+<br />=<br />Many Wrongdoers Engaging in Fraud<br />Strong Incentive to Defraud<br />Ineffectiveness of Even Harsh Penalties<br />+<br />=<br />
  40. 40. Email<br /><ul><li>costs nothing to send
  41. 41. incentives strongly in favor of abuse
  42. 42. CAN-SPAM act limits recovery to ISPs, and has been nonexistent</li></ul>Fax<br /><ul><li>costs more to receive than to send
  43. 43. TCPA enforcement destroyed legitimate business models </li></ul>Text Messaging<br /><ul><li>can cost to send or receive
  44. 44. abuse low where sending costly
  45. 45. enforcement has led mostly to prosecuting children: punishing children for things they do offline anyway</li></ul>Telephone<br /><ul><li>do-not-call list: arguably best abuse prevention of all
  46. 46. businesses know who they may/may not contact
  47. 47. enforcement serves as backstop</li></ul>Failures of Enforcement Regimes<br />
  48. 48. The Myth of the Tech-Savvy Third Grader:<br />She may know which buttons do what, but she does NOT know how to keep herself [or her (parents’) money] safe.<br />
  49. 49. Make Abuses Less Profitable!<br />Lower Profit Margins, and Lower Incentive for Abuse<br />Lower Profit Margins, and Lower Incentive for Invasion<br />Fewer Users Falling For Scams<br />Fewer Devices Vulnerable to Attack<br />Fewer Users Allowing Privacy Invasions<br />Competitive Marketplace for Non-Invasive Products<br />+<br />=<br />+<br />=<br />
  50. 50. "Double Opt-In" Procedures<br />Cross-Account & Cross-Device Authentication<br />Cross-Device Password Protection<br /><ul><li>DO NOT store multiple passwords on mobile phones
  51. 51. Use DIFFERENT passwords for each device and account</li></ul>Technological Authentication<br /><ul><li>Apple’s new iPhone heart </li></ul> monitor patent<br /><ul><li>Pantech’s ten-digit speed dial fingerprint reader</li></ul>Multi-Part User Authentication<br />
  52. 52. Regulation of Private Money<br /><ul><li>Real-world-backed currencies are problematic
  53. 53. Online fiat currencies do well</li></li></ul><li>Educating Users about Dangers to Children<br />
  54. 54. Carrier and Industry Provided Programs<br />
  55. 55. Public (Gov’t) Provided Programs<br />
  56. 56. Other Accessible Info<br />
  57. 57. Mobile Mayhem:<br />Designing an E-Commerce Regime to Regulate Dangerous Behavior in Mobile Environments <br />Joshua Fairfield<br /><ul><li>Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law
  58. 58. Director, Frances Lewis Law Center
  59. 59.  </li></ul>Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson<br />Washington and Lee University School of Law<br />© 2010<br />

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