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Sedik - The Architecture of Food Safety Control in the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union

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Sedik - The Architecture of Food Safety Control in the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union

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http://www.fao.org/europe/events/detail-events/en/c/434413/

Conference ""Regional and International Cooperation in Central Asia and South Caucasus: Recent Developments in Agricultural Trade"", November 2016
Presentations of participants.

© FAO: http://www.fao.org

http://www.fao.org/europe/events/detail-events/en/c/434413/

Conference ""Regional and International Cooperation in Central Asia and South Caucasus: Recent Developments in Agricultural Trade"", November 2016
Presentations of participants.

© FAO: http://www.fao.org

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Sedik - The Architecture of Food Safety Control in the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union

  1. 1. Economic contraction and food insecurity in the post- Soviet region David Sedik Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN
  2. 2. Outline • Food insecurity • Main macroeconomic shock • Exchange rates • Expected spillover effects • Trade • Financial system • Remittances • Conclusion 12/2/2016 2
  3. 3. Food insecurity • Definition • Food security—when all people at all times have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (FAO, 2006). • Food security concern of the presentation: • Spillover effects on the most food insecure countries • 5 countries: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Armenia, Uzbekistan 12/2/2016 3
  4. 4. Main Shock: Fall in USD value of Russian GDP in 2014-16, other countries follow… Percent change in annual GDP in current USD, Russia and other post-Soviet countries Source: IMF WEO database (July 2016). Note: Others=Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 3 -9 -35 -14 12 18 64 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Yearonyear%change Russia Others Zero 12/2/2016 4
  5. 5. Almost all is exchange rate movements… 2013-2015 changes USD value of GDP Real GDP LCU/USD exchange rate (2013=100) Azerbaijan -27 4 131 Belarus -25 -2 179 Kazakhstan -25 6 146 Kyrgyzstan -9 7 133 Russia -41 -3 191 Tajikistan -8 10 129 Ukraine -50 -16 273 Currency depreciationSources: IMF, WEO (July 2016), WB, WDI.12/2/2016 5
  6. 6. Individual financial and travel sanctions Mar 2014 April 2014 Entity sanctions May 2014 Jun 2014 Jul 2014 July 2014 Financial sanctions extended to Rosneft, Novatek, Gazpromb ank, Vneshekon ombank. Jul 2014. Ruble begins rapid loss of value Aug 2014 Aug 2014. Russian food embargo Sep 2014 Technolog y transfer sanctions 12/2/2016 6 Effect of Sanctions?
  7. 7. Russian exchange rate change is triggered by change in price of oil… 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 900 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Jan 2010 Apr 2010 Jul 2010 Oct 2010 Jan 2011 Apr 2011 Jul 2011 Oct 2011 Jan 2012 Apr 2012 Jul 2012 Oct 2012 Jan 2013 Apr 2013 Jul 2013 Oct 2013 Jan 2014 Apr 2014 Jul 2014 Oct 2014 Jan 2015 Apr 2015 Jul 2015 Oct 2015 Jan 2016 Apr 2016 Jul 2016 Ruble-dollarexchangerate(rublesperdollar) Brentcrudeoilprice(USDperbarrel) Oil price Ruble dollar exchange rate June 2014 97% correlation June 2014-Sep 2016 Ruble-dollar X rate and Oil price World Bank, WDI. July 2014—Financial sanctions extended to Rosneft, Novatek, Gazprombank, Vneshekonombank 12/2/2016 7
  8. 8. Decline in Russian GDP and exchange rate depreciation: Expected spillover effects on other countries • Trade effects • Fall in Russian demand for other countries’ goods/services • Financial system effects • Outward investment flows • Remittances effects • Drop in production should mean fall in derived demand for labor and perhaps wage decline (in some sectors). Perhaps fall in ruble value of remittances. • In addition, ruble value remittances are worth less due to depreciation. 12/2/2016 8
  9. 9. Trade spillover effects 12/2/2016 9
  10. 10. Unclear whether fall in Russian demand had an effect on partner country exports and GDP 12/2/2016 10 Country 2013 Belarus 23 Lithuania 14 Estonia 13 Ukraine 8 Moldova 6 Latvia 5 Uzbekistan 4 Slovakia 3 EU-28 0.9 Total exports to Russia as portion of GDP (%) Country 2013 2014 2015 Belarus 1.0 1.6 -3.9 Lithuania 3.5 3.5 1.8 Estonia 1.4 2.8 1.4 Ukraine 0.0 -6.6 -9.9 Moldova 9.4 4.8 -1.1 Latvia 2.9 2.1 2.7 Uzbekistan 8.0 8.1 8.0 Slovakia 1.5 2.6 3.8 EU-28 0.2 1.5 2.2 Change in GDP % (LCU) Sources: EUROSTAT, Unctad, IMF. Country 2013 2014 Belarus 83 104 Lithuania 108 102 Estonia 99 99 Ukraine 93 89 Moldova 115 103 Latvia 99 102 Uzbekistan 116 109 Slovakia 105 101 EU-28 103 98 Total exports to world (prev year=100) %
  11. 11. Effects of Russian downturn on EU agrifood exports EU 28 Agrifood Exports, Total (2014-2015, mln EUR) EU 28 Agrifood Exports by Product (2014-2015, % change) August to July To all countries To Russia Bovine sector +23 -57 Hog sector 0 -95 Poultry sector +5 -67 Butter +3 -99 Cheese -14 -97 Skimmed milk powder -10 -100 Whole milk powder -24 -100 Fruit and Vegetables -12 -89 August to July Change (%) To all countries 6% To Russia -43% Ukraine -28% US 16% China 33% Turkey 26% Korea 29% Egypt 26% http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/russian-import-ban/pdf/2015-09-22-russian-import-ban_en.pdf.12/2/2016 11
  12. 12. Investment spillover effects 12/2/2016 12
  13. 13. Outward net foreign direct investment flows, Russian Federation, 2007-2015 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 FDIoutflowfromRussia (millionUSdollars) CIS countries Non_CIS countries 12/2/2016 13 Source: Central Bank of Russia, Direct investments, 2016.
  14. 14. Remittance effects 12/2/2016 14
  15. 15. Personal remittances as % of GDP of the recipient country, 2006-2014 Country Name 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Ukraine 5 5 5 5 6 Latvia 5 5 5 5 6 Albania 10 9 8 9 9 Montenegro 7 8 8 9 9 Bosnia and Herzegovina 11 11 11 11 11 Georgia 10 11 11 12 12 Armenia 18 18 18 20 18 Moldova 23 26 27 27 26 Kyrgyz Republic 26 28 31 31 30 Tajikistan 41 47 47 50 43 Source: World Bank, WDI. 12/2/2016 15
  16. 16. Recorded money transfers from Russia, 2010- 2015 (current rubles and US dollars) 0 5 10 15 20 25 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 BillionsofUSdollars BillionsofRubles Ruble value of transfers Dollar value of transfers 26% fall in ruble value 50% fall in USD Value 12/2/2016 16 Source: Central Bank of Russia, Cross border transfers, 2016; World Bank, WDI, 2016.
  17. 17. Local currency value of recorded money transfers from Russia, 2010-2015 2013 2014 2015 Armenia drams 654,172 588,942 325,940 Kyrgyz soms 100,751 108,703 69,812 Tajikistan somoni 19,795 18,916 7,876 Moldovan lei 15,872 17,053 8,882 Previous year=100 Armenia drams 112 90 55 Kyrgyz soms 117 108 64 Tajikistan somoni 115 96 42 Moldovan lei 111 107 52 12/2/2016 17 Source: World Bank, WDI.
  18. 18. Effects of fall in transfers on GDP and food insecurity • Remittances are not counted as part of GDP in recipient country • Affect GDP only through change in aggr. demand, but that depends on what they are spent on • Only if spent on domestic goods, they increase aggregate demand and GDP • Remittances spent mostly on personal consumption • Effect of remittances in 2009 Tajikistan (ILO, 2010) • Remittances: 100% of income for 30% of HH, >50% of income for 60% of HH • 60% of remittances spent on immediate consumption needs • So, it is likely that a 58% fall in the domestic value of remittances in Tajikistan had a moderate to severe effect on household food security there. 12/2/2016 18
  19. 19. Conclusions: spillover effects of fall in Russian GDP and ruble value • Trade effects: • Uncertain, no convincing evidence that fall in Russian demand influenced GDP, except possibly for Belarus. • Outward investment: • For countries outside of post-Soviet region. Dollar value falls quite substantially. • For post-Soviet countries, no evidence of a significant decline, except for 2014. • Remittances: • In poor countries fall in remittances probably created moderate to severe household food security stress 12/2/2016 19

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