Don't Get Hacked! Cybersecurity Boot Camp


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At the 2011 NARUC Winter Committee Meetings, Patrick Miller teamed up with seasoned security experts Miles Keogh from NARUC and Bill Hunteman from the Department of Energy to deliver an engaging Cybersecurity Boot Camp.

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Don't Get Hacked! Cybersecurity Boot Camp

  1. 1. NARUC Don’t Get Hacked! Cybersecurity Boot Camp Patrick C Miller, EnergySec / NESCO Bill Hunteman, US DOE Miles Keogh, NARUC February 13 2011 NARUC Winter Committee Meetings Marriott Renaissance, Washington DC
  2. 2. Our Drill Instructors! l Miles Keogh §  Director of Grants and Research, NARUCNARUC l Patrick C Miller §  Founder, President and CEO, EnergySec §  Principal Investigator, National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization (NESCO) §  Former Director, NERC CIP Practice, ICF International §  Former Manager, WECC CIP Audits & Investigations §  Corporate Security staff for several Pacific Northwest utilities §  Deep roots in Telecom sector, IT and Industrial Control Systems §  CRISC, CISA, CISSP-ISSAP, SSCP, CEH, CVI, NSA-IAM
  3. 3. Our Drill Instructors! l Bill Hunteman §  Chief Advisor for Cybersecurity, US Department of EnergyNARUC §  DOE Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) and Associate CIO for Cyber Security §  Cybersecurity Program Manager for the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration §  Worked in the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories §  Managed cybersecurity research and development activities §  Participated in the development of national and international cyber security criteria §  Joint projects with Russia to improve cyber security in the Russian nuclear weapons complex §  Design and development of high performance computer networks and operating systems for many of the supercomputers used by DOE (and its predecessors) §  Bachelor or Science in Mathematics and Master of Science Electrical Engineering/Computer Science
  4. 4. What We’re Covering Today l What’s the “Cyber” in “Cyber security?”NARUC l What are we trying to protect? l What threats do we face? l What are the challenges of instituting cyber security? l Where do the vulnerabilities within the system exist? l What can Commissions do about it? l What are the policy structures you have to work with?
  5. 5. What Have You Seen? l How well do you understand the confluence of networked and traditionalNARUC devices? l Has cybersecurity come before your commission? l What has that looked like? l What questions do you have about cybersecurity? l Is cybersecurity a concern at your commission?
  6. 6. Rising Cybersecurity ThreatsThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   5  
  7. 7. CyberWar (InfoWar)The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   6  
  8. 8. AuroraThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   7  
  9. 9. Night Dragon•  Recently published by McAfee•  Activity designed to obtain sensitive data from targeted organizations in global oil and energy industries…The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   8  
  10. 10. Night Dragon•  Source appears to be China, but this is difficult to confirm exactly•  Began Nov 2009, possibly as early as 2007•  Techniques: –  Social engineering –  Spear-phishing attacks –  Exploitation of Microsoft Windows vulnerabilities –  Microsoft Active Directory compromises –  Remote administration tools (RATs)The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   9  
  11. 11. Night Dragon•  Harvesting sensitive competitive proprietary operations, and project-financing information for oil and gas field bids and operations•  Controlled systems, then cracked accounts to move to more sensitive information/systems•  Focus was on operational oil and gas field production systems and financial documents related to field exploration and bidding•  In certain cases, the attackers collected data from SCADA systemsThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   10  
  12. 12. Stuxnet•  First publicly disclosed control systems rootkit, but certainly wont be the last...•  USB vector; focused on air-gapped networks•  Highly sophisticated; infects everything, then rewrites PLC logic and hides•  Undermines integrity of control system•  Most regulations wouldn’t have stopped it•  No 100% security against determined adversaryThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   11  
  13. 13. SHODAN, ERIPP, ETCThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   12  
  14. 14. SHODAN, ERIPP, ETC Berkeley  Cyclotron  HMI  images  The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   13  
  15. 15. There’s An App For That•  “Get mobile access to your control system via an iPhone, iPad, Android and other smartphones and tablet devices. The Ignition Mobile Module gives you instant access to any HMI / SCADA project created with the Ignition Vision Module.”The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   14  
  16. 16. Public DomainThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   15  
  17. 17. Only The DisclosedThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   16  
  18. 18. TwitBookBlogosphereThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   17  
  19. 19. Research and Disclosure•  October 24, 2010, 12:39PM, Threat Post –  SCADA Vendors Still Need Security Wake Up Call • –  Please don t waste my time•  October 28, 2010: ICSJWG Seattle Meeting –  Invensys, IOActive, ICS-CERT presented on case study on Wonderware vulnerability•  Disclosure positions are hotly debatedThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   18  
  20. 20. From Obscurity To Novelty•  Smart Meter hacking•  Hacking cookbooks•  Metasploit•  Fuzzers•  Supply chain attacks•  Manuals available in all languages on InternetThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   19  
  21. 21. Shiny Object•  Shiny object for the mass media•  60 minutes•  Wall Street Journal, National Journal, CNN•  Too many IT trade publications to name•  Blockbuster films•  Prime time television shows•  Social Media (blogosphere, Twitter)The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   20  
  22. 22. Economic Drivers•  Recession economy brings unique challenges•  Decreased participation working groups and conferences•  Static or shrinking headcount; increased workload•  Insider threat increases•  Decreased spending on new equipment•  Older products extended beyond intended lifespan•  Security is expensive for customers and vendorsThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   21  
  23. 23. People Problem•  Humans are the weakest link in any security system –  Passwords for candy; Social engineering•  Humans are also the strongest link in any security system –  The Aware Person System (APS) –  ICS culture shift is very slow, but can be very powerful•  Danger: unskilled/untrained operators of power tools can cause significant damage –  Increasing complexity = training treadmillThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   22  
  24. 24. People Solution•  So you’ve bought all of the fancy cybersecurity gizmos… –  What about the skilled staff to use them?•  So you’ve put cameras in all critical sites… –  What about the staff to monitor and respond?•  An appropriate balance of skilled people and current technology must be usedThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   23  
  25. 25. Back In The Good Old Days•  Pneumatic, electromechanical, analog•  Telephone meant POTS or “bat phone”•  No Internet•  Less automation•  Less complexity•  Proprietary•  Long life spanThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   24  
  26. 26. ICS Gen-X•  Automation, more complexity•  Internet Protocol (TCP/UDP/etc)•  Data, more data and even more data•  Processing power, memory, bandwidth = SPEED!•  Interconnected business•  Flat networks•  COTS software and hardware•  Increasingly shorter lifespansThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   25  
  27. 27. Millennium Systems•  Highly digital, highly complex•  Highly interconnected, highly layered•  Bitflocking, dynamic emergent behavior•  New protocols•  New interdependencies•  Homogenization•  Innovation treadmill; constant lifespan fluxThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   26  
  28. 28. Bigger, Better, Faster•  ARRA and other green dollars are flowing•  SCADA devices now come with a flash-webserver- WiMax-mesh-ZigBee-kitchensink•  Mixing legacy and bleeding edge tech is difficult•  Logical distance between kinetic endpoint and HMI is exponentially increasing; “hyperembeddedness”•  Most (but not all) vendors put features first, security last; this will not change in the foreseeable futureThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   27  
  29. 29. Advantage: Attackers•  Security approaches favor new installations, legacy environments are still vulnerable•  Very difficult to replace/patch in-service devices•  Stuxnet: game changer, sets the new bar - even when sophisticated attacks aren’t necessary•  Organized crime will top Nation States and Non- Government Organizations (NGOs) as biggest threat•  Welcome to the cyberarms raceThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   28  
  30. 30. Cybersecurity Vocabulary•  Network •  Virus/Trojan/Malware•  Connectivity •  Firmware•  Packet •  Denial of Service•  Header •  NIST•  Traffic •  NERC CIP•  Bandwidth •  SCADA•  Latency •  Encryption•  Internet Protocol •  CredentialThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   29  
  31. 31. Information Technology 101•  Connectivity: how the systems talk to each other –  Hub “dumb”   –  Switch Device  Intelligence   –  Managed Switch –  Router –  Firewall –  Next Generation Firewall –  Workstation/Server “smart”  •  What are we building for?The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   30  
  32. 32. Three FlavorsBusiness  Systems   Control  Systems   “Smart  Grid”  The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   31  
  33. 33. Business IT Security•  Typical approach: password, firewall, anti-virus, etc•  Protecting four key domains 1. Confidentiality – preventing unauthorized access to information 2. Integrity – preventing the unauthorized modification or theft of information 3. Availability – preventing the denial of service and ensuring authorized access to information 4. Non-Repudiation – preventing the denial of an action that took place or the claim of an action that did not take placeThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   32  
  34. 34. What Is A Control System? Human Machine Interface L1 START L2 STOP M M O.L. M S Control Programmable M R Valve Logic Basic Motor Control Controllers Ladder Logic I/O Remote Comms MasterMeters PLC Protocols SCADASensors IED Wired ServerField RTU Wireless HMIDevices Controller EMS DCS The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon   (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   33  
  35. 35. IT vs ICS Security TOPIC   Informa5on  Technology   Industrial  Control  Systems   AnA-­‐Virus/Mobile  Code   Common,  widely  used   Uncommon,  impossible   Typical  Lifespan   3-­‐5  years   15-­‐20  years   Outsourcing   Common,  widely  used   Rare,  uncommon   Patch  Management   Regular,  scheduled   Slow,  vendor-­‐specific   Change  Management   Regular,  scheduled   Uncommon   Time  CriAcal  Content   Generally  delays  accepted   CriAcal  due  to  safety   Availability   Generally  delays  accepted     24  x  7  x  365  x  forever   Security  Awareness   Good   Poor,  except  physical   Security  TesAng/Audit   Scheduled,  mandated   Occasional,  uncommon   Physical  Security   Secure   Remote  and  unmanned  The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   34  
  36. 36. Typical Architecture Firewall   SCADA  and   Internet   other  field   devices     Corporate  Network   Process   Control   Network  The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   35  
  37. 37. Smart Grid ComplicationsThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   36  
  38. 38. Smart Grid ComplicationsThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   37  
  39. 39. What Have You Seen?•  Did cyber security appear in your filings and hearings?•  How did this fit in your list of priorities?•  What elements were most important? –  Privacy? –  Reliability? –  Cost? –  Security Effectiveness? –  Upgradeability as a solution or vulnerability?The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   38  
  40. 40. Threat Sources•  Inadvertent errors•  Power system equipment malfunctions•  Communication equipment failure•  Deliberate malicious actsThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   39  
  41. 41. Threat Types •  Replay attacks •  Indiscretions (leaks) by personnel •  Brute force •  Bypass controls •  Man-in-the-Middle •  Denial of Service •  Resource ExhaustionThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   40  
  42. 42. Nothing New Under The Sun•  Mature security practices; highly refined –  Defense in Depth –  Principle of Least Privilege –  Segregation of Duties –  Need to Know –  Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability•  No Silver Bullet, 100%, Total Security•  Strong protection has never been easy, inexpensive or quick to implement•  Tradeoff between functionality and securityThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   41  
  43. 43. Strategies for Defense In Depth•  Governance, policy•  Authentication•  Authorization•  Admission control•  Encryption•  Integrity checking•  Auditing, detectionThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   42  
  44. 44. Defense In Depth: Example•  NERC CIP Standards –  CIP-002 – Critical Cyber Asset Identification –  CIP-003 – Security Management Controls –  CIP-004 – Personnel & Training –  CIP-005 – Electronic Security Perimeter(s) –  CIP-006 – Physical Security –  CIP-007 – Systems Security Management –  CIP-008 – Incident Reporting & Response Planning –  CIP-009 – Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber AssetsThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   43  
  45. 45. Proven Security Solutions•  Physical Protection•  Network Controls: Admission, Segmentation•  Strong ID, Authentication and Authorization•  Aware Person System (Training and Awareness)•  Intrusion Detection/Prevention•  Integrity Assurance•  Application Whitelisting•  Response and RecoveryThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   44  
  46. 46. You Don’t Need a Perfect Defense•  If defensive measures can be beaten, does the system ensure the results of the attack are : –  Unprofitable –  Limited in its ramifications –  Hard enough to make the “juice” not worth the “squeeze” –  Difficult to replicate –  Quickly and easily recoverable –  Traceable and easy to detect; and –  Otherwise unappealingThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   45  
  47. 47. NARUC Why Your Role Is Increasing l  Increased attacks to business processes l  NERC CIP compliance l  The deployment of smart grid l  These are increasingly drivers for cost recovery consideration and other contexts in cases that are coming your way very soon l  Is that reflected in what you’re seeing / hearing?
  48. 48. Proposal: Roles for Public Utility Commissions 1.  Ask the right questions when considering cost recovery of prudent utility expenditures for cyberNARUC security. 2.  Assuring that cyber security requirements that utilities are subject to are being met. §  PUC Staff need to be up-to-date on cyber security requirements and potential threats. 3.  Assuring that the PUC’s computer systems and operations are subject to on-going cyber security reviews and remediation, and that disaster recovery plans are in place and tested. §  This also included cyber security awareness for agency employees. 4.  Understand and participate in regional and national efforts for protecting critical infrastructure
  49. 49. Cybersecurity Investments: What To Ask l  Worth saying twice: someone at the PUC staff needs to be up-to- date on cyber security requirements and potential threats.NARUC l  Ask how security is addressed (conceptually) for each component l  Don’t accept assurances that all products used were built to be secure, or that IT solutions will work for SCADA systems. Insist that vendors document & independently verify their security controls l  Use compliance as a floor, not a ceiling: Ask to see risk assessment documentation l  Ensure security is budgeted for and individuals are assigned responsibility l  Ensure service providers (for example, telcos, meter data processors) are included in risk assessment and provide sufficient information l  Ensure integrated security between business systems and control systems for existing grid and for smart grid48
  50. 50. NARUC Three examples of State action l Pennsylvania l Missouri l New York l PUCs don’t need to become cyber experts or enforces, but if you ask a utility a question they will return with an answer
  51. 51. Cybersecurity Requirements and Resources•  For the Bulk Power System: –  The North American Electric Reliability Corporation -- Standards CIP-002 through CIP-009 (the Critical Cyber Asset Identification portion of the Critical Infrastructure Protection standards) –|20•  For the Smart Grid: –  The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) smart grid interoperability standards and specifications for inclusion in the Smart Grid Interoperability Standards Framework, Release 1.0. These include three volumes on cyber security –•  What’s Missing? –  Distribution systems, serial control systems, and other gapsThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   50  
  52. 52. Smart Grid Investment Grant Program•  Requires a description of how cyber security concerns will be addressed with respect to the use of best available equipment and the application of procedures and practices involving system design, testing, deployment, operations and decommissioning, including at a minimum: i.  A description of the cyber security risks at each stage of the system deployment lifecycle, ii.  Cyber security criteria used for vendor and device selection, iii.  Cyber security control strategies, iv.  Descriptions of residual cyber security risks, v.  Relevant cyber security standards and best practices, and vi.  Descriptions of how the project will support/adopt/implement emerging smart grid security standardsSource: Notice of Intent to Issue a Funding Opportunity Announcement For the Smart Grid Investment Grant Program, April 16, 2009The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   51  
  53. 53. Is Smart Grid More Vulnerable? Source: “San Diego Smart Grid Study”, October 2006 Power outages cost between $80 billion and $150 billion every yearThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   52  
  54. 54. Energy Independence and Security Acto  In the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, Congress established the development of a Smart Grid as a national policy goal.o  Under EISA, NIST is directed to “coordinate the development of a framework that includes protocols and model standards for information management to achieve interoperability of smart grid devices and systems” as well as maintain the reliability and security of the electricity infrastructure. 53
  55. 55. Conceptual Reference Diagram for Smart Grid Information Networks 54
  56. 56. Interoperability Framework Testing and Certification Standards Security Architecture and Requirements Conceptual Reference Model Business and Public Policy Requirements 55
  57. 57. NIST Three Phase Plan PHASE 1 PHASE 2Identify an initial set of Establish public/private existing consensus Standards Panel to providestandards and develop ongoing recommendations for a roadmap to fill gaps new/revised standards PHASE 3 Testing and Certification Framework 2009 2010 56 56
  58. 58. Smart Grid – an Opportunityo  Modernization provides an opportunity to improve security of the Grido  Integration of new IT and networking technologies n  Brings new risks as well as an array of security standards, processes, and toolso  Architecture is key n  Security must be designed in – it cannot be added on later 57
  59. 59. CSWGo  To address the cross-cutting issue of cyber security, NIST established the Cyber Security Coordination Task Group (CSCTG) in March 2009o  Moved under the NIST Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP) as a standing working group and was renamed the Cyber Security Working Group (SGIP–CSWG)o  The CSWG now has more than 475 participants from the private sector (including vendors and service providers), academia, regulatory organizations, national research laboratories, and federal agencies 58
  60. 60. Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Securityo  NIST Interagency Report 7628 - Augut 2010 n  Development of the document lead by NIST n  Represents significant coordination among o Federal agencies o Private sector o Regulators o Academics n  Document includes material that will be used in selecting and modifying security requirements 59
  61. 61. NISTIR 7628 – What it IS and IS NOTWhat it ISo  A tool for organizations that are researching, designing, developing, and implementing Smart Grid technologieso  May be used as a guideline to evaluate the overall cyber risks to a Smart Grid system during the design phase and during system implementation and maintenanceo  Guidance for organizations n  Each organization must develop its own cyber security strategy (including a risk assessment methodology) for the Smart Grid.What it IS NOTo  It does not prescribe particular solutionso  It is not mandatory 60
  62. 62. Smart Grid Cyber Security Strategy - Tasks 64(7$2(.*$2( 8&*9:$#$ B<?C+<D&(*&*9:$#$ -#&%2,C3<=?<&2&%E( +<=*#&5 P4(N#$Q(8$$2$$=2&% ! /+2&%#J:(*$$2%$ ! R>9&2,*A#9#%#2$ ! BH,2*%$ ! /=?*3%$ ;<%%<=(>?(*&*9:$#$ -@>9&2,*A#9#%:( 0,#@*3:( 39*$$2$5 8$$2$$=2&% K4(L#H(M2@29( )23>,#%:( N2O>#,2=2&%$ !"#$%#&( FA4()=*,%(G,#+( F*4()23>,#%:( )%*&+*,+$ )%*&+*,+$( 8,3H#%23%>,2 -./01(/!!!1( 8$$2$$=2&% /!.1(2%345 I4(.<&J<,=#%: 8$$2$$=2&% 61
  63. 63. NISTIR 7628 ContentThe NISTIR includes the followingo  Executive Summaryo  Chapter 1 - Overall cyber security strategy for the Smart Grido  Chapter 2 – High level and logical security architectureo  Chapter 3 – High level security requirementso  Chapter 4 – Cryptography and key management 62
  64. 64. NISTIR 7628 Content (2)o  Chapter 5 - Privacy and the Smart Grido  Chapter 6 – Vulnerability Classeso  Chapter 7 – Bottom-up security analysis of the Smart Grido  Chapter 8 - R&D themes for cyber security in the Smart Grido  Chapter 9 – Overview of the standards review 63
  65. 65. NISTIR 7628 Content (3)o  Chapter 10 – Key power system use cases for security requirementso  Appendices A - J 64
  66. 66. How to Participate in CSWGo  NIST Smart Grid portal smartgrido  Cyber Security Working Group n  Lead: Marianne Swanson ( n  NIST Support: Tanya Brewer (  Cyber Security Twiki siteo SmartGrid/CyberSecurityCTG 65
  67. 67. Security of PUC’s computer systems This may be the responsibility of another state agency orNARUC office, but the implication of a failure will impact the business operation of the Commission l Assuring that the computer systems that the PUC relies have on-going cyber security reviews and remediation of identified vulnerabilities. l Disaster recovery plans are in place and tested and Continuity of Operation Plans have been developed. l Cyber security awareness for agency employees including social engineering and insider threats.
  68. 68. Continuity of Operation Plans (COOP) l  Internal contingency plans of government and business to assure the rapid resumption of essentialNARUC functions as soon as possible if they are disrupted for any reason: e.g., fire, tornado, hurricanes, wildfires, earthquakes, terrorism, pandemics, etc. – Build Self- reliance and Resiliency l  Helps assure that critical/essential functions can quickly resume operations l  Addresses key or essential employees, required facilities, computer system records and back-up data systems, etc. l  Minimize damage & losses l  Management succession & emergency powers
  69. 69. On what cyber systems do you rely? l  What IT systems support critical PUCNARUC functions? l  What are the backed up systems? l  What systems are needed to support restoration? l  What systems are needed operationally? l  In what sequence should systems be restored? l  What are the telecommunication needs and requirements? Hourly Loss from Downtime in the Information Technology Sector: $1.3 million/hr
  70. 70. NARUC What if this happened?
  71. 71. NARUC Employee Education
  72. 72. Resilience Factors•  Robustness –  The ability to operate or stay standing in the face of disaster•  Resourcefulness –  skillfully managing a disaster once it unfolds•  Rapid Recovery –  The capacity to get things back to normal as quickly as possible after a disaster•  Learning lessons –  Having the means to absorb the new lessons that can be drawn from a catastropheThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   71  
  73. 73. Resilience Considerations•  Resilience depends on humans –  Human networks are key –  Ability to work together and individually –  Potential for panic or confusion –  Build necessary connections (relationships) in advance•  In the event of an electric power sector cyberattack, do you know: –  Your role? If not, whose role it is to act? –  Who to call? What they can /should do?The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   72  
  74. 74. Protecting The Right Stuff•  Very little security actuarial data vs. engineering actuarial data•  Most organizations don t communicate details of security breaches•  Most estimates are based on FUD (Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt)•  Need better/current data on: –  What is being attacked? (most preferred targets) –  Which attacks were successful?The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   73  
  75. 75. Product/Service Problem(s)•  Utilities are married to their products [and vendors] for many years•  Most products are very expensive to replace or upgrade and challenging to coordinate•  Product vendors are trying to balance security and profit; guess which one wins…•  Some vendors are responsive, most are not•  SCADA Procurement Language can help, but only for new purchasesThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   74  
  76. 76. What Can State Regulators Do?•  Get educated (even more than today)•  Strategic communication, in all directions•  Build new relationships and reshape old•  Support measures to get actuarial data•  Support secure procurement measures•  Support security training/education•  Support appropriate staffing levels•  Rethink the rate case approachThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   75  
  77. 77. What Can State Regulators Do?•  Ask questions… –  Are you using the SCADA Procurement Language? –  Are you participating in local, state, regional, national security/disaster exercises? –  What security training/education/awareness are you providing to your staff and how often? –  Where do you get your situational awareness data? –  What cybersecurity technologies do you use? –  Have you performed a full [exhaustive] inventory of all control systems and all associated communication links?The  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   76  
  78. 78. Education and Training•  What is happening in Operations, Federal, States?•  OpSec, Red-Blue, Security Body of Knowledge, security concepts•  Security practices change rapidly –  Need for training on new tactics and new technology is perpetual•  Lack of education leads to a false sense of security –  Otherwise known as knowing just enough to be dangerousThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   77  
  79. 79. Communication•  Ratepayers want a secure grid, until they see the bill –  Expect rate shock –  Rates could triple or more, for some infrastructures•  Common Practice vs. Best Practice•  Early and regular, fact-based communication can minimize negative public reaction•  Remind ratepayers that smart, informed decisions are being madeThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   78  
  80. 80. Communication•  Keep the story fresh; lather, rinse, repeat•  Leverage existing Safety communication vehicles/ mechanisms –  Newsletters –  Mailers, billing notices –  Public service announcments –  Sponsored events•  Partner with utilities, Federal agencies and even Media to convey a unified messageThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   79  
  81. 81. Relationships•  Get out and talk to your operators•  Get to know the industry thought leaders•  What are your peers doing?•  Situational Awareness –  NESCO, VirtualUSA, Einstein, Fusion centers, Infragard…•  Take a partnership approach to the rate case (vs. adversarial) as much as possibleThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   80  
  82. 82. Closing Thoughts•  Cybersecurity is worth taking seriously, but will have to fit into a long list of concerns and priorities•  There are few response networks for utility sector cybersecurity among State Governments•  Few of those evaluating cybersecurity investments understand cybersecurity•  An unskilled operator of any power tool will hurt themselves and those around them –  Training and staffing are imperative•  A culture shift is the first ingredient for success•  Soft-skills may matter more than technical skillsThe  Naonal  Electric  Sector  Cybersecurity  Organizaon  (NESCO)  is  a  DOE-­‐funded  EnergySec  Program   81  
  83. 83. Questions? Patrick C Miller,NARUC President and CEO, EnergySec Principal Investigator, NESCO 503-446-1212 Miles Keogh, NARUC Director of Grants & Research 202-898-2217 Bill Hunteman, Chief Cyber Security Advisor US Department of Energy Office of Electricity Deliver & Energy Reliability