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iOS MITM Attack
Technology and effects




          sieg.in        1
sieg.in   2
Boot validation




• CA – Apple Certificate Authority
• SIGN – Signature
                    sieg.in          3
Files Protection




       sieg.in     4
Classic provisioning




         sieg.in       5
Actual provisioning




        sieg.in       6
Why we can’t create fake signature?




Because “Apple Root CA” fingerprint hardcoded into iOS and have to
   be 61:1E:5B:66:2C:59:3A:08:FF:58:D1:4A:E2:24:52:D1:98:DF:6C:60

                               sieg.in                         7
SSL




sieg.in   8
Certificate Authority Storage



Few from 186 are quite interesting :

    – C=US, O=U.S. Government, OU=DoD, OU=PKI, CN=DoD CLASS 3 Root CA
    – C=JP, O=Japanese Government, OU=ApplicationCA
    – C=CN, O=China Internet Network Information Center, CN=China Internet
      Network Information Center EV Certificates Root
…

                                    sieg.in                                  9
Certificate authentication




            sieg.in          10
I want my CA in your iOS




           sieg.in         11
Ways to install CA in iOS

o Safari
o Email attachment
o MDM
With configuration profile
  Can be installed with Safari




                      sieg.in     12
Attack




  sieg.in   13
Mobileconfig contains
WiFi settings (pass, SSID) for “Gate”

CA

Proxy Settings, if we want victim’s traffic even
 it has left attack range. (Only for iOS6)

iCloud backup (enable it, if not)

                       sieg.in                      14
Mobileconfig installation




           sieg.in          15
Looks bad =(




    sieg.in    16
Let’s take a look on default CA list...




                  sieg.in             17
COMODO trial certificate
• You only need valid admin@yourdomain.com
  mail for confirmation
• Can be used for signing




                    sieg.in              18
How to sign




    sieg.in   19
Looks much better




       sieg.in      20
SSL Defeated
But we want more




      sieg.in      21
How to get files from device




             sieg.in           22
Elcomsoft Phone Password Breaker




               sieg.in         23
Once again




    sieg.in   24
What’s in backup?

•   SMS
•   Private photo
•   Emails
•   Application data
•   And more …


                       sieg.in   25
Files done
But we want more



      sieg.in      26
Apple Push Notification Service




              sieg.in             27
Fake! Fake! Fake!




       sieg.in      28
Wipe Tragedy (act 1/1)




          sieg.in        29
Summary
User only have to tap ‘Install’ two times to make
us able to :
  – Sniff all his SSL traffic (cookies,passwords, etc)
  – Steal his backup (call log, sms log, photos and
    application data)
  – Send him funny push messages or just wipe device




                         sieg.in                     30
sieg.in
al@sieg.in
 @siegin



    sieg.in   31

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Troshichev i os mitm attack