Securitatea mobila - Atacuri prin SMS

DefCamp
DefCampDefCamp
Securitate mobila –
 Atacuri prin SMS
       Prezentator:
     Bogdan ALECU
     http://m-sec.net
    Twitter: @msecnet
Informatii generale despre SMS
Amenintari
WAP
Interceptare trafic de date
Demo
Informatii generale
SMS - Short Message Service reprezinta un
mod de comunicare prin mesaje text intre
telefoanele mobile / fixe, utilizand un protocol
standardizat. Este un mod de comunicare
eficace; utilizatorul scrie un text, apasa SEND si
mesajul e livrat aproape instant catre destinatar.
Folosit pentru mai multe scopuri: MMS –
Multimedia Messaging Service, OTA – Over The
Air – configurarea telefonului, notificari pentru
mesageria vocala, email, fax, microplati – plata
unor sume mici pentru diferite servicii =>
SECURITATE!
Informatii generale
“Un dispozitiv mobil activ trebuie sa fie
capabil de a primi un mesaj scurt de
tipul TPDU - Transfer protocol data unit
- (SMS-DELIVER) in orice moment,
indiferent daca exista un apel sau trafic
de date in derulare. Un raport va fi
trimis intotdeauna catre SC (Serviciul
de mesaje); confirmand fie ca tel a
primit mesajul sau ca mesajul nu a fost
livrat, incluzind si motivul refuzului.”
ETSI TS 100 901 V7.5.0 (2001-12), pag
13
Amenintari - SMS
SMS SPAM
SMS spoofing
Notificari SMS
Alte tipuri
Amenintari - SMS
  SMS SPAM
Companiile ofera servicii de publicitate
  prin SMS
Mesaje cu castiguri false
Inginerie sociala – “Suna-ma urgent pe nr
  asta: 0900323421! Mama”
Amenintari - SMS
  SMS Spoofing
Servicii online ce permit modificarea
  expeditorului (numeric / alfanumeric)
Greu de oprit, mai ales daca tinem cont de
  roaming
Eficienta mai mare in atacurile de tip
  inginerie sociala
Amenintari - SMS
  Notificari SMS
Voicemail
Fax
E-mail
Video
Utilizatorul nu poate scoate icon-ul de
  notificare asupra primirii unui astfel de
  mesaj
Amenintari - SMS
Notificari SMS
(voicemail)
Amenintari - SMS
Notificari SMS
(email)
Amenintari - SMS
  Alte tipuri
Flash SMS (Class 0) – utilizatorul vede
  mesajul direct, fara a intra in Inbox
Silent SMS – DCS 0xC0 = Message Waiting
  Indication Group: Discard Message
Amenintari - SMS
  Alte tipuri
Flash SMS
Amenintari - SMS
  Alte tipuri
Silent SMS
WAP
Wireless Application Protocol
Arhitectura de retea specifica
Set de reguli
Limbaj specific: Wireless Markup Language
(WML)
Pagini HTML ajustate pentru dimensiunea
ecranului telefonului
WAP
WAP Push
Permite trimiterea de continut WAP cu o
interventie minima din partea utilizatorului
2 tipuri: Service Indication / Service Load
WAP Push
Service Indication (SI) permite trimiterea
de notificari utilizatorului intr-un mod
asincron
WAP Push
Service Indication (SI)
WAP Push
Service Load (SL) determina “aplicatia” de
pe telefon sa incarce si execute un
serviciu
WAP Push
Service Load (SL)
WAP Push - securitate
   Teoria: Doar un anumit numar este autorizat pentru
   trimitere; Practica: daca nu e configurat bine, un telefon
   accepta de la orice numar astfel de mesaje
   Pe Windows Mobile trebuiesc verificate setarile din
   HKLMSecurityPoliciesPolicies
; SL Message Policy ; (default: SECROLE_PPG_TRUSTED)
   [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESecurityPoliciesPolicies]
   "0000100c"=dword:800 ; SI Message Policy ; (default:
   SECROLE_PPG_AUTH | SECROLE_PPG_TRUSTED)
   [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESecurityPoliciesPolicies]
   "0000100d"=dword:c00
WAP Push - securitate
SECROLE_PPG_TRUSTED: Trusted Push Proxy
Gateway. Messages assigned this role indicate
that the content sent by the Push Initiator is
trusted by the Push Proxy Gateway. This role
implies that the device trusts the Push Proxy
Gateway (SECROLE_TRUSTED_PPG).
SECROLE_PPG_AUTH: Push Initiator
Authenticated. Messages assigned this role
indicate that the Push Initiator is authenticated by
the Push Proxy Gateway. This role implies that
the device trusts the Push Proxy Gateway
(SECROLE_TRUSTED_PPG).
WAP Push - securitate
WAP
Configurarea telefonului pentru acces la Internet
/ date poate fi facuta manual
Pentru o configurare mai usoara, rapida si
pentru eventualele schimbari, a fost creat un
standard ce permite configurarea de la distanta
Programarea Over The Air (OTA) foloseste
standardul OMA – Open Mobile Alliance
Programarea se face prin SMS-uri special
concepute
WAP - provisioning
Foloseste protocolul WAP
WBXML (WAP Binary XML) prin Wireless
Application Environment
Wireless Session Protocol
Wireless Datagram Protocol
SMS
WAP - provisioning
Configurarea se scrie in XML (conform
specificatiilor de la
http://www.openmobilealliance.org)

XML-ul se va codifica in WAP Binary XML
WBXML se va encapsula intr-o data de tip
Wireless Session Protocol
Datele se vor codifica intr-un mesaj Push, definit
in Wireless Session Protocol
WAP - provisioning
Mesajul Push contine diferiti parametri,
unul fiind parametrul “SEC” pentru
autentificare pe baza de “cheie” comuna
USERPIN: string ASCII codificat in
zecimale
NETWPIN: cheia este specifica retelei si
cunoscuta (teoretic) doar de catre operator
USERNETWPIN: combinatie a celor 2
WAP - provisioning
NETWPIN: IMSI = MCC+MNC+MSIN
(Mobile Subscription Identification
Number)
Pret: 2-5 euro-centi
In general limitat pentru companii, se cere
un volum mare de interogari
WAP - provisioning
<wap-provisioningdoc>
<characteristic type="NAPDEF">
<parm name="NAME" value="NewAPN"/>
<parm name="NAPID" value="NewAPN_NAPID_ME"/>
<parm name="BEARER" value="GSM-GPRS"/>
<parm name="NAP-ADDRESS" value="apn.operator.ro"/>
<parm name="NAP-ADDRTYPE" value="APN"/>
</characteristic>
<characteristic type=“APPLICATION">
<parm name="NAME" value="NewAPN"/>
<parm name="APPID" value="w2"/>
<parm name="TO-NAPID" value="NewAPN_NAPID_ME"/>
</characteristic>
<wap-provisioningdoc>
WAP - provisioning
<wap-provisioningdoc> - contine toata informatia
  transmisa
<characteristic …> - grupeaza informatia in unitati
  logice
<… value="NAPDEF"/> - configuram un nou
  network access point
<parm name="APPID" value="w2"/> -
 mapeaza configuratia la activitatile de
 browsing

Informatii la http://www.openmobilealliance.org
WAP - provisioning
<wap-provisioningdoc>
<characteristic type="BOOTSTRAP">
<parm name="NAME" value=“Operator NET"/>
<parm name="PROXY-ID"
  value="OpNET_Proxy"/>
</characteristic>
<characteristic type="NAPDEF">
<parm name="NAME" value="OpNET"/>
<parm name="NAPID" value="OpNET_NAPID"/>
<parm name="BEARER" value="GSM-GPRS"/>
<parm name="NAP-ADDRESS" value="net"/>
<parm name="NAP-ADDRTYPE" value="APN"/>
</characteristic>
WAP - provisioning
<characteristic type="PXLOGICAL">
<parm name="NAME" value="OpNET"/>
<parm name="PROXY-ID" value="OpNET_Proxy"/>
<characteristic type="PXPHYSICAL">
<parm name="PHYSICAL-PROXY-ID"
   value="OpNET_PhProxy"/>
<parm name="PXADDR" value=“192.168.1.1"/>
<parm name="PXADDRTYPE" value="IPV4"/>
<parm name="TO-NAPID" value="OpNET_NAPID"/>
<characteristic type="PORT">
<parm name="PORTNBR" value="8080"/>
</characteristic>
</characteristic>
</characteristic>
WAP - provisioning
<characteristic type="APPLICATION">
<parm name="APPID" value="w2"/>
<parm name="NAME" value="OpNET"/>
<parm name="TO-PROXY"
  value="OpNET_Proxy"/>
<characteristic type="RESOURCE">
<parm name="NAME" value="OpNET"/>
<parm name="URI"
  value="http://www.google.com"/>
<parm name="STARTPAGE"/>
</characteristic>
</characteristic>
</wap-provisioningdoc>
WAP - provisioning
Teoretic aceasta configurare poate fi facuta
doar de catre operator, de la un numar
predefinit
Putem analiza SMS-ul prin WireShark
Putem adauga un alt numar
WAP - provisioning
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE wap-provisioningdoc PUBLIC "-//WAPFORUM//DTD PROV 1.0//EN"
              wap-                         "-
     "http://www.wapforum.org/DTD/prov.dtd">
     "http://www.wapforum.org/DTD/prov.dtd">
<wap-provisioningdoc version="1.1">
 wap-
<characteristic type="BOOTSTRAP">
<parm name="NAME" value=“Nume"/>
                       value=“ Nume"/>
</characteristic>
<characteristic type="PXLOGICAL">
<parm name="NAME" value=“Nume"/>
                       value=“ Nume"/>
<parm name="PROXY-ID" value="Trusted_Proxy"/>
       name="PROXY-        value="Trusted_Proxy"/>
<parm name="NAME" value="Trusted Proxy"/>
<characteristic type="PXPHYSICAL">
<parm name="PHYSICAL-PROXY-ID" value="Trusted_PhProxy"/>
       name="PHYSICAL- PROXY-          value="Trusted_PhProxy"/>
<parm name="PXADDR" value="40711111111"/>
<parm name="PXADDRTYPE" value="E164"/>
<parm name="TO-NAPID" value="Trusted_NAPID"/>
       name="TO-           value="Trusted_NAPID"/>
<parm name="PUSHENABLED" value="1"/>
<parm name="PULLENABLED" value="1"/>
</characteristic>
</characteristic>
<characteristic type="NAPDEF">
<parm name="NAME" value="Op"/>
<parm name="NAPID" value="Trusted_NAPID"/>
                       value="Trusted_NAPID"/>
<parm name="BEARER" value="GSM-SMS"/>
                          value="GSM-
<parm name="NAME" value="Trusted Proxy"/>
<parm name="NAP-ADDRESS" value=" 40711111111 "/>
       name="NAP-
<parm name="NAP-ADDRTYPE" value="E164"/>
       name="NAP-
</characteristic>
WAP - provisioning
<wap-provisioningdoc>
 <characteristic type="NetworkPolicy">
  <characteristic type="WiFi">
   <characteristic type="Settings">
     <parm name="Disabled" value="1"/>
   </characteristic>
  </characteristic>
 </characteristic>
</wap-provisioningdoc>
Interceptare trafic
Traficul trece prin proxy-ul nostru
Varianta 1 – Burp Proxy
Interceptare trafic
Traficul trece prin proxy-ul nostru
Varianta 2 – sslstrip
http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/sslstrip/
Interceptare trafic
DEMO
Protectie
Operatorul poate filtra aceste tipuri de
mesaje
Producatorii de telefoane trebuie sa se
concentreze mai mult pe securitate
Verificati constant (la fel cum faceti cu
factura / creditul disponibil) setarile de
Internet
Intrebari?
1 of 41

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Securitatea mobila - Atacuri prin SMS

  • 1. Securitate mobila – Atacuri prin SMS Prezentator: Bogdan ALECU http://m-sec.net Twitter: @msecnet
  • 2. Informatii generale despre SMS Amenintari WAP Interceptare trafic de date Demo
  • 3. Informatii generale SMS - Short Message Service reprezinta un mod de comunicare prin mesaje text intre telefoanele mobile / fixe, utilizand un protocol standardizat. Este un mod de comunicare eficace; utilizatorul scrie un text, apasa SEND si mesajul e livrat aproape instant catre destinatar. Folosit pentru mai multe scopuri: MMS – Multimedia Messaging Service, OTA – Over The Air – configurarea telefonului, notificari pentru mesageria vocala, email, fax, microplati – plata unor sume mici pentru diferite servicii => SECURITATE!
  • 4. Informatii generale “Un dispozitiv mobil activ trebuie sa fie capabil de a primi un mesaj scurt de tipul TPDU - Transfer protocol data unit - (SMS-DELIVER) in orice moment, indiferent daca exista un apel sau trafic de date in derulare. Un raport va fi trimis intotdeauna catre SC (Serviciul de mesaje); confirmand fie ca tel a primit mesajul sau ca mesajul nu a fost livrat, incluzind si motivul refuzului.” ETSI TS 100 901 V7.5.0 (2001-12), pag 13
  • 5. Amenintari - SMS SMS SPAM SMS spoofing Notificari SMS Alte tipuri
  • 6. Amenintari - SMS SMS SPAM Companiile ofera servicii de publicitate prin SMS Mesaje cu castiguri false Inginerie sociala – “Suna-ma urgent pe nr asta: 0900323421! Mama”
  • 7. Amenintari - SMS SMS Spoofing Servicii online ce permit modificarea expeditorului (numeric / alfanumeric) Greu de oprit, mai ales daca tinem cont de roaming Eficienta mai mare in atacurile de tip inginerie sociala
  • 8. Amenintari - SMS Notificari SMS Voicemail Fax E-mail Video Utilizatorul nu poate scoate icon-ul de notificare asupra primirii unui astfel de mesaj
  • 9. Amenintari - SMS Notificari SMS (voicemail)
  • 11. Amenintari - SMS Alte tipuri Flash SMS (Class 0) – utilizatorul vede mesajul direct, fara a intra in Inbox Silent SMS – DCS 0xC0 = Message Waiting Indication Group: Discard Message
  • 12. Amenintari - SMS Alte tipuri Flash SMS
  • 13. Amenintari - SMS Alte tipuri Silent SMS
  • 14. WAP Wireless Application Protocol Arhitectura de retea specifica Set de reguli Limbaj specific: Wireless Markup Language (WML) Pagini HTML ajustate pentru dimensiunea ecranului telefonului
  • 15. WAP
  • 16. WAP Push Permite trimiterea de continut WAP cu o interventie minima din partea utilizatorului 2 tipuri: Service Indication / Service Load
  • 17. WAP Push Service Indication (SI) permite trimiterea de notificari utilizatorului intr-un mod asincron
  • 19. WAP Push Service Load (SL) determina “aplicatia” de pe telefon sa incarce si execute un serviciu
  • 21. WAP Push - securitate Teoria: Doar un anumit numar este autorizat pentru trimitere; Practica: daca nu e configurat bine, un telefon accepta de la orice numar astfel de mesaje Pe Windows Mobile trebuiesc verificate setarile din HKLMSecurityPoliciesPolicies ; SL Message Policy ; (default: SECROLE_PPG_TRUSTED) [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESecurityPoliciesPolicies] "0000100c"=dword:800 ; SI Message Policy ; (default: SECROLE_PPG_AUTH | SECROLE_PPG_TRUSTED) [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESecurityPoliciesPolicies] "0000100d"=dword:c00
  • 22. WAP Push - securitate SECROLE_PPG_TRUSTED: Trusted Push Proxy Gateway. Messages assigned this role indicate that the content sent by the Push Initiator is trusted by the Push Proxy Gateway. This role implies that the device trusts the Push Proxy Gateway (SECROLE_TRUSTED_PPG). SECROLE_PPG_AUTH: Push Initiator Authenticated. Messages assigned this role indicate that the Push Initiator is authenticated by the Push Proxy Gateway. This role implies that the device trusts the Push Proxy Gateway (SECROLE_TRUSTED_PPG).
  • 23. WAP Push - securitate
  • 24. WAP Configurarea telefonului pentru acces la Internet / date poate fi facuta manual Pentru o configurare mai usoara, rapida si pentru eventualele schimbari, a fost creat un standard ce permite configurarea de la distanta Programarea Over The Air (OTA) foloseste standardul OMA – Open Mobile Alliance Programarea se face prin SMS-uri special concepute
  • 25. WAP - provisioning Foloseste protocolul WAP WBXML (WAP Binary XML) prin Wireless Application Environment Wireless Session Protocol Wireless Datagram Protocol SMS
  • 26. WAP - provisioning Configurarea se scrie in XML (conform specificatiilor de la http://www.openmobilealliance.org) XML-ul se va codifica in WAP Binary XML WBXML se va encapsula intr-o data de tip Wireless Session Protocol Datele se vor codifica intr-un mesaj Push, definit in Wireless Session Protocol
  • 27. WAP - provisioning Mesajul Push contine diferiti parametri, unul fiind parametrul “SEC” pentru autentificare pe baza de “cheie” comuna USERPIN: string ASCII codificat in zecimale NETWPIN: cheia este specifica retelei si cunoscuta (teoretic) doar de catre operator USERNETWPIN: combinatie a celor 2
  • 28. WAP - provisioning NETWPIN: IMSI = MCC+MNC+MSIN (Mobile Subscription Identification Number) Pret: 2-5 euro-centi In general limitat pentru companii, se cere un volum mare de interogari
  • 29. WAP - provisioning <wap-provisioningdoc> <characteristic type="NAPDEF"> <parm name="NAME" value="NewAPN"/> <parm name="NAPID" value="NewAPN_NAPID_ME"/> <parm name="BEARER" value="GSM-GPRS"/> <parm name="NAP-ADDRESS" value="apn.operator.ro"/> <parm name="NAP-ADDRTYPE" value="APN"/> </characteristic> <characteristic type=“APPLICATION"> <parm name="NAME" value="NewAPN"/> <parm name="APPID" value="w2"/> <parm name="TO-NAPID" value="NewAPN_NAPID_ME"/> </characteristic> <wap-provisioningdoc>
  • 30. WAP - provisioning <wap-provisioningdoc> - contine toata informatia transmisa <characteristic …> - grupeaza informatia in unitati logice <… value="NAPDEF"/> - configuram un nou network access point <parm name="APPID" value="w2"/> - mapeaza configuratia la activitatile de browsing Informatii la http://www.openmobilealliance.org
  • 31. WAP - provisioning <wap-provisioningdoc> <characteristic type="BOOTSTRAP"> <parm name="NAME" value=“Operator NET"/> <parm name="PROXY-ID" value="OpNET_Proxy"/> </characteristic> <characteristic type="NAPDEF"> <parm name="NAME" value="OpNET"/> <parm name="NAPID" value="OpNET_NAPID"/> <parm name="BEARER" value="GSM-GPRS"/> <parm name="NAP-ADDRESS" value="net"/> <parm name="NAP-ADDRTYPE" value="APN"/> </characteristic>
  • 32. WAP - provisioning <characteristic type="PXLOGICAL"> <parm name="NAME" value="OpNET"/> <parm name="PROXY-ID" value="OpNET_Proxy"/> <characteristic type="PXPHYSICAL"> <parm name="PHYSICAL-PROXY-ID" value="OpNET_PhProxy"/> <parm name="PXADDR" value=“192.168.1.1"/> <parm name="PXADDRTYPE" value="IPV4"/> <parm name="TO-NAPID" value="OpNET_NAPID"/> <characteristic type="PORT"> <parm name="PORTNBR" value="8080"/> </characteristic> </characteristic> </characteristic>
  • 33. WAP - provisioning <characteristic type="APPLICATION"> <parm name="APPID" value="w2"/> <parm name="NAME" value="OpNET"/> <parm name="TO-PROXY" value="OpNET_Proxy"/> <characteristic type="RESOURCE"> <parm name="NAME" value="OpNET"/> <parm name="URI" value="http://www.google.com"/> <parm name="STARTPAGE"/> </characteristic> </characteristic> </wap-provisioningdoc>
  • 34. WAP - provisioning Teoretic aceasta configurare poate fi facuta doar de catre operator, de la un numar predefinit Putem analiza SMS-ul prin WireShark Putem adauga un alt numar
  • 35. WAP - provisioning <?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE wap-provisioningdoc PUBLIC "-//WAPFORUM//DTD PROV 1.0//EN" wap- "- "http://www.wapforum.org/DTD/prov.dtd"> "http://www.wapforum.org/DTD/prov.dtd"> <wap-provisioningdoc version="1.1"> wap- <characteristic type="BOOTSTRAP"> <parm name="NAME" value=“Nume"/> value=“ Nume"/> </characteristic> <characteristic type="PXLOGICAL"> <parm name="NAME" value=“Nume"/> value=“ Nume"/> <parm name="PROXY-ID" value="Trusted_Proxy"/> name="PROXY- value="Trusted_Proxy"/> <parm name="NAME" value="Trusted Proxy"/> <characteristic type="PXPHYSICAL"> <parm name="PHYSICAL-PROXY-ID" value="Trusted_PhProxy"/> name="PHYSICAL- PROXY- value="Trusted_PhProxy"/> <parm name="PXADDR" value="40711111111"/> <parm name="PXADDRTYPE" value="E164"/> <parm name="TO-NAPID" value="Trusted_NAPID"/> name="TO- value="Trusted_NAPID"/> <parm name="PUSHENABLED" value="1"/> <parm name="PULLENABLED" value="1"/> </characteristic> </characteristic> <characteristic type="NAPDEF"> <parm name="NAME" value="Op"/> <parm name="NAPID" value="Trusted_NAPID"/> value="Trusted_NAPID"/> <parm name="BEARER" value="GSM-SMS"/> value="GSM- <parm name="NAME" value="Trusted Proxy"/> <parm name="NAP-ADDRESS" value=" 40711111111 "/> name="NAP- <parm name="NAP-ADDRTYPE" value="E164"/> name="NAP- </characteristic>
  • 36. WAP - provisioning <wap-provisioningdoc> <characteristic type="NetworkPolicy"> <characteristic type="WiFi"> <characteristic type="Settings"> <parm name="Disabled" value="1"/> </characteristic> </characteristic> </characteristic> </wap-provisioningdoc>
  • 37. Interceptare trafic Traficul trece prin proxy-ul nostru Varianta 1 – Burp Proxy
  • 38. Interceptare trafic Traficul trece prin proxy-ul nostru Varianta 2 – sslstrip http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/sslstrip/
  • 40. Protectie Operatorul poate filtra aceste tipuri de mesaje Producatorii de telefoane trebuie sa se concentreze mai mult pe securitate Verificati constant (la fel cum faceti cu factura / creditul disponibil) setarile de Internet