Blended Threat Concept in Web Applications - DefCamp 2012

DefCamp
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“Blended Threat” Concept in web applications

Bogdan Sergiu Dragos
a.k.a Domnul.Do


Student at Drăgan European University in Lugoj
Legal Disclame

This is only a proof of concept ,
    for demostrating only .
“Blended Threat Concept”

• It has no clear definition because it’s more
      a concept that an attack .

• But we have the following definition from
  different sites:
Blended Threat Concept
• Definition from Wikipedia:

“A blended threat is a software vulnerability which in turn involves
   a combination of attacks against different vulnerabilities. For
   example, many worm, a trojan horse and a computer virus
   exploit multiple techniques to attack and propagate. It is a kind
   of computer threat.”




                                         Link:
                      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blended_threat
Blended Threat Concept
• Definition from TrendMicro:

“ (…) A blended threat refers to a single threat that attacks via
   multiple vectors (e.g., a worm gains entry via email and then
   leverages back-door vulnerabilities for further infection and
   destruction). “




                                                 Link:
          http://apac.trendmicro.com/apac/threats/enterprise/threats-summary/blended-threats/
Blended Threat Concept
• My own definition:

 “A Blended Threat: is a non-limited vector that
 need two or more different attack,that are mutually
 dependent, for manipulation of the usual
 application logic.“
History of Blended Threat’s

• The person who introduce this kind of method
  was: Billy (BK) Rios

• In his presentation: “Will it Blend”

• With this P.o.C :
  Blended Threat from Combined Attack Using Apple’s
The P.o.C
My Proof Concept is:

• In a Yahoo! Service , called YQL
• Based on CSRF and one user interaction

In this presentation I will show a method to
   validate YQL commands, without the console ,
   more exactly :
! To change the status in the Yahoo! Profile
             YQL = Yahoo Query Language
What is YQL
YQL is:
• A SQL-like language
• A clowd service
• W can create API’s or using other API’s and
  manipulating the rezults in the “cloud”
• We can make authentificated YQL
  commands in Yahoo!Inbox or Yahoo!Profile
YQL- Open Data Tables

• It’s a way to connect to the remote web
  API (EndPoint) and understanding what to
  do with the data that will get



• How it look like:
YQL-Open Data Table Example
YQL –Use verb
• We can use simple server side javascripts in the
  <execute> tab of the xml ,here some exemple:

• To make an object request we can use request:
               Request.accept(‘application/json’)
                      .header(‘Authorization’, ‘…’)
                     .query(‘searchterm’, ‘foo’).get()


• The response.object can transmit the user the
  final result :
                    Response.object = data
YQL – JS API
• Some key feature , what can do:
 - use external JS files
 - convert between XML JSON
 - can make other YQL in the same YQL
How it look like in console




Link: http://developer.yahoo.com/yql/console/#h=update%20social.profile.status%20set%20status%3D%22EasterEgg
                                       %22%20where%20guid%3Dme
How it look like in request
• First the console read the crumb (Yahoo!
  Token )
• Second the console send the YQL
  command with the crumb to the “cloud”
First Step: Read the crumb




    Note: The crumb is generated no matter if the user is logged in
Second step: Sending the data
The P.o.C
• I have the “location” of the crumb
• I know where to send the data,but how to
  convise the user to give us the crumb?!
The P.o.C
• I have the “location” of the crumb
• I know where to send the data,but how to
  convise the user to give us the crumb?!

• Is simple …
Meanwhile …
• Why do dogs (and other animals) eat
  poop?

 “Herbivores such as rabbits eat their own poop because their
 diet of plants is hard to digest efficiently, and they have to make
 two passes at it to get everything out of the meal. “
The P.o.C




This is another version of the attack named “Fake Captcha” by
                            Kotowicz
The sourse of the P.o.C
How to gather the status
 We can confirm by using the YQL command:




                                                   Link :
http://developer.yahoo.com/yql/console/#h=select%20message%20from%20social.profile.status%20where%20guid%3Dme
My recommendation is:

Is enough to add the response header:
        ”X-FRAME-OPTIONS”
Credits
• Billy (BK) Rios
• Kotowicz

• Dragan European University , Lugoj , Timis

• Dan Kaminsky , in 2008 he “own-ed” the
  internet. His work must not be forgoten!
Want to ask something?
1 of 26

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Blended Threat Concept in Web Applications - DefCamp 2012

  • 1. “Blended Threat” Concept in web applications Bogdan Sergiu Dragos a.k.a Domnul.Do Student at Drăgan European University in Lugoj
  • 2. Legal Disclame This is only a proof of concept , for demostrating only .
  • 3. “Blended Threat Concept” • It has no clear definition because it’s more a concept that an attack . • But we have the following definition from different sites:
  • 4. Blended Threat Concept • Definition from Wikipedia: “A blended threat is a software vulnerability which in turn involves a combination of attacks against different vulnerabilities. For example, many worm, a trojan horse and a computer virus exploit multiple techniques to attack and propagate. It is a kind of computer threat.” Link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blended_threat
  • 5. Blended Threat Concept • Definition from TrendMicro: “ (…) A blended threat refers to a single threat that attacks via multiple vectors (e.g., a worm gains entry via email and then leverages back-door vulnerabilities for further infection and destruction). “ Link: http://apac.trendmicro.com/apac/threats/enterprise/threats-summary/blended-threats/
  • 6. Blended Threat Concept • My own definition: “A Blended Threat: is a non-limited vector that need two or more different attack,that are mutually dependent, for manipulation of the usual application logic.“
  • 7. History of Blended Threat’s • The person who introduce this kind of method was: Billy (BK) Rios • In his presentation: “Will it Blend” • With this P.o.C : Blended Threat from Combined Attack Using Apple’s
  • 8. The P.o.C My Proof Concept is: • In a Yahoo! Service , called YQL • Based on CSRF and one user interaction In this presentation I will show a method to validate YQL commands, without the console , more exactly : ! To change the status in the Yahoo! Profile YQL = Yahoo Query Language
  • 9. What is YQL YQL is: • A SQL-like language • A clowd service • W can create API’s or using other API’s and manipulating the rezults in the “cloud” • We can make authentificated YQL commands in Yahoo!Inbox or Yahoo!Profile
  • 10. YQL- Open Data Tables • It’s a way to connect to the remote web API (EndPoint) and understanding what to do with the data that will get • How it look like:
  • 12. YQL –Use verb • We can use simple server side javascripts in the <execute> tab of the xml ,here some exemple: • To make an object request we can use request: Request.accept(‘application/json’) .header(‘Authorization’, ‘…’) .query(‘searchterm’, ‘foo’).get() • The response.object can transmit the user the final result : Response.object = data
  • 13. YQL – JS API • Some key feature , what can do: - use external JS files - convert between XML JSON - can make other YQL in the same YQL
  • 14. How it look like in console Link: http://developer.yahoo.com/yql/console/#h=update%20social.profile.status%20set%20status%3D%22EasterEgg %22%20where%20guid%3Dme
  • 15. How it look like in request • First the console read the crumb (Yahoo! Token ) • Second the console send the YQL command with the crumb to the “cloud”
  • 16. First Step: Read the crumb Note: The crumb is generated no matter if the user is logged in
  • 18. The P.o.C • I have the “location” of the crumb • I know where to send the data,but how to convise the user to give us the crumb?!
  • 19. The P.o.C • I have the “location” of the crumb • I know where to send the data,but how to convise the user to give us the crumb?! • Is simple …
  • 20. Meanwhile … • Why do dogs (and other animals) eat poop? “Herbivores such as rabbits eat their own poop because their diet of plants is hard to digest efficiently, and they have to make two passes at it to get everything out of the meal. “
  • 21. The P.o.C This is another version of the attack named “Fake Captcha” by Kotowicz
  • 22. The sourse of the P.o.C
  • 23. How to gather the status We can confirm by using the YQL command: Link : http://developer.yahoo.com/yql/console/#h=select%20message%20from%20social.profile.status%20where%20guid%3Dme
  • 24. My recommendation is: Is enough to add the response header: ”X-FRAME-OPTIONS”
  • 25. Credits • Billy (BK) Rios • Kotowicz • Dragan European University , Lugoj , Timis • Dan Kaminsky , in 2008 he “own-ed” the internet. His work must not be forgoten!
  • 26. Want to ask something?