2. BACKGROUND
THE ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS 1997-1998,
WAS THE MOST DRAMATIC EVENT,
SET THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
CONDITIONS BACK FOR YEARS,
INDONESIAN CRISIS IS THE MOST SEVERE
IN EAST ASIA,
TRIGERED POLITICAL REFORM ACTION,
ADHERENCE ACTION OF ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL REFORM
3. THE IMF ROLE
IMF CAME INTO ACTION IN INDONESIA TO
OVERCOME THE PROBLEM WITH MANY
“RECIPES” TO BE IMPLEMENTED.
THE OFFICIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA GOVERNMENT AND
THE IMF WAS SIGNED ON OCTOBER 31 1997
THE AGREEMENT SO CALLED LETTER OF
INTENSE (LoI) BECAME THE WORKING
DOCUMENT OF INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT
DURING THE CRISIS.
AS THE RESULT MANY PUBLIC POLICIES BASED
UPON THE LoI
4. THE THREE PILLARS OF POLICY
FIRSTLY, THE FRAMEWORK OF MACROECONOMICS
TO ACHIEVE THE ADJUSTMENT IN EXTERNAL
CURRENT ACCOUNT AS WELL AS UNITED THE
ADJUSTMENT FISCAL WITH THE MONETARY POLICY
AND THE EXCHANGE RATE.
SECONDLY, THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
RESTRUCTURIZATION COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIES.
THIRDLY, THE REFORM ACTION STRUCTURAL THAT
INCLUDES THE AREA TO INCREASE THE GOVER-
NANCE, INCLUDING THE POLICY OF INVESTMENT, THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, DEREGULATION AND THE
PRIVATIZATION, THE ENVIRONMENT SUSTAINABILITY,
AND THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROGRAM
5. INDONESIA:
ARRANGEMENT WITH THE IMF 1997–2003
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ACCESS AMOUNT DRAWN
------------------------------- -----------------------------
APP DATE EXP DATE SDR BNS US$ BNS SDR BNS US$ BNS
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
STAND-BY
ARRANGEMENT
(SBA) NOV 5, 1997 AUG 25, 1998 8.3 11.4 3.7 4.9
EXTENDED
FUND FACILITY
(EFF) AUG 25, 1998 FEB 4, 2000 5.4 7.2 3.8 5.2
EXTENDED
FUND FACILITY FEB 4, 2000 DEC 31, 2003 3.6 5.0 2.9 4.0
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
SOURCE: IMF
6. THE IMF RECOMMENDATION
1. THE TIGHT MONETARY POLICY,
2. FISCAL DISCIPLINE,
3. THE PRIVATIZATION,
4. DEREGULATION OF THE TRADE,
5. DEREGULATION OF INVESTMENT,
6. THE RESTRUCTURING AND
RECAPITALIZATION OF THE BANKS.
7. REGIME CHANGE IN INDONESIAREGIME CHANGE IN INDONESIA
May 1998-October 1999
Accountability Speech
Rejected
Declined to run for
President
May 1998-October 1999
Accountability Speech
Rejected
Declined to run for
President
August 1945 - March
1968
Elected by the PPKI
Impeached by MPRS
August 1945 - March
1968
Elected by the PPKI
Impeached by MPRS
October 1999 – July 2001
Elected by MPR
Impeached by MPR
October 1999 – July 2001
Elected by MPR
Impeached by MPR
SukarnoSukarnoSukarnoSukarno
B.J. HabibieB.J. HabibieB.J. HabibieB.J. Habibie
Abdurrahman WahidAbdurrahman WahidAbdurrahman WahidAbdurrahman Wahid
October 2004 – 2009
Directly elected
October 2004 – 2009
Directly elected
Susilo BambangSusilo Bambang
YudhoyonoYudhoyono
Susilo BambangSusilo Bambang
YudhoyonoYudhoyonoJuly 2001 – October
2004
Elected by MPR
Lost election to SBY
July 2001 – October
2004
Elected by MPR
Lost election to SBY
MegawatiMegawatiMegawatiMegawati
March 1968 - May 1998
Elected by MPRS
Resigned under
pressure
March 1968 - May 1998
Elected by MPRS
Resigned under
pressure
SuhartoSuhartoSuhartoSuharto
8. THE END OF IMF ASSISTANCE
THE IMF PROGRAM WAS TERMINATED
IN YEAR 2004.
9. WHAT WE HAVE DONE
CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT
DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
CONTINUNING REFORMATION ON
BUREAUCRACY, AND PUBLIC
INSTITUTIONS
RESTRUCTURING THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
RESHAPING CENTRAL-LOCAL
RELATIONSHIP
10. WHAT WE HAVE TO DO TO PUBLIC
ADMINSTRATION
GOVERNMENT FUNCTION REDESIGN
PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY PHILOSOPHY
THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATION
REVISION OF THE REGULATIONS AND LAWS
THE POLICY OF PUBLIC SERVANTS
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE BUREAUCRATIC
REFORMS
PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY WELFARE
11. POSITIVE GROWTH TRAJECTORY
Source: CBS .
ECONOMY IS ON A STEADY
UPWARD TREND. INDONESIA’S
PERFORMANCE IS VERY MUCH
COMPARABLE IN THE REGION
OVER THE MEDIUM TERM, THIS
ACCELERATION PROCESS
SHOULD CONTINUE ASSUMING
THAT ALL REFORM PROGRAMS
ARE IMPLEMENTED.
2001-2003
4 %
5.25 %
5 - 6 %
> 7%
2004-2005 2006 2007 - 2009 2010 - beyond
6 - 7 %
12. THE PROSPECTS
MANAGEABLE DEMOCRACY DYNAMISM
BECOME THE 4th
LARGEST
DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY
BANISHING CORRUPTION
EFFECTIVE, EFFICIENT, AND PRODUCTIVE
BUREACRACY
BETTER ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
INFRASTRUCTURES
14. THE FINAL REMARKS
1. ALTHOUGH THE IMF PRESENCE IN INDONESIA
WAS PRECEDED WITH CONTROVERSIAL, BUT THE
FACT IS THE PROGRAMS BROUGHT INDONESIA
LEFT THE CRISIS
2. NO GENERIC PRESCRIPTION FOR ALL COUNTRIES
EXPERIENCING THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. IT
SHOULD BE HANDLED RATHER CASE BY CASE
AND IN SPECIFIC MANNER FOR EACH COUNTRY.
3. SUPPORT FOR THE REFORM PROGRAM BY THE
COUNTRY'S POLITICAL SYSTEM ALSO ANOTHER
KEY FACTOR
Indonesian economy grew 5.2% in second quarter 2006 and during Q3 2006, economic growth reached an estimated 5.40% up from the Q1 and Q2 performance.
Growth driven essentially by higher domestic demand, with key momentum from government consumption and exports . Private consumption remains weak due to lower real incomes and higher production costs following domestic fuel price hike in October 2005. No significant improvement, however, has been observed in investment outside the construction sector. On the supply side, the construction sector and transport and communications sector again charted high growth, followed by manufacturing and the trade, hotels and restaurants sector
There is a renewed optimism for improvement in economic conditions for the rest of 2006 which is reflected in the improvement of Production Index and Business Tendency Index release by BPS. Looking ahead, the outlook is for steady improvement in economic growth. GDP growth in 2006 is forecasted to be slightly ahead of the initial 5.5% projection. Supporting this outlook are stronger exports, the onset of recovery in purchasing power and better investment performance in the second half of 2006. The overall macroeconomic outlook augurs for continued stability. Supported by improved public purchasing power with expected improvements in fiscal stimulus & investment climate