Meeting Europe’s Security Challenges

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Meeting Europe’s Security Challenges

  1. 1. Meeting Europe’s Security Challenges Border security Maritime security ICT/Biometric security UAVs Transport security AeroSpace & Defence Industries Association of Europe FOCUS02SUMMER 2008 www.asd-europe.org
  2. 2. 01 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008CONTENTS Forewords 02 ° Ake Svensson / Saab ASD members respond positively to growing pan-European security agenda 03 François Gayet / ASD European security moves up EU agenda 04 Giancarlo Grasso / Finmeccanica The European industry supports an EU integrated security approach Border security 06 Robert Havas / EADS Coping with border security challenges 08 Ilkka Pertti Juhani Laitinen / Frontex Shaping European security Maritime security 09 Peter Mollema / Port of Rotterdam Rotterdam: Enhancing security with technologies 10 Paolo Neri / Large Architecture Systems, Selex Sistemi Integrati Shaping European security ICT / Biometric security 13 Joerg Sauerbrey / Siemens Developing a European security identity 14 Bernard Didier / Sagem Sécurité Biometrics; the citizen & the state 15 Paul Weissenberg / European Commission Reaping the benefits of European R&D UAVs 16 Serge Lebourg / Dassault UAV operations in future ATM 18 Mike Strong & Holger Matthiesen / EUROCONTROL Support UAS ATM integration 19 Gérard Mardiné / Sagem Sécurité Flying UAS in civil Airspace Transport security 20 Ulrich Schulte-Strathaus / Association of European Airlines A holistic approach to aviation security 22 Stefan Aust / Smiths Detection Alleviating the security bottleneck 24 Frank Greverie / Thales Innovation solutions for public transport security 26 Valère Moutarlier / GMES GMES contribution to security 28 Kathleen Barthe / Airbus Making it simple 30 Christian Ehler / European Parliament FP7: Building European defence & security 32 Luigi Rebuffi / EOS EOS develops a coherent European security market Publisher François Gayet ASD Secretary General Editor Martin Todd ASD PR & Communications Manager Design by www.landmarks.be AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe, ASD Avenue de Tervuren 270 B-1150 Brussels Belgium Tel. +32 2 775 8110 Fax. +32 2 775 8112 info@asd-europe.org www.asd-europe.org ©2008 All rights reserved. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the individual authors or advertisers and do not necessarily reflect those of the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe, ASD, or its members. The mention of specific companies or products in articles or advertisements contained herein does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by ASD, their members, and must neither be regarded as constituting advice on any matter whatsoever, nor be interpreted as such. FOCUS02SUMMER 2008 Cover Story 13 Joerg Sauerbrey / Siemens Developing a European security identity 14 Bernard Didier / Sagem Sécurité Biometrics; the citizen & the state 15 Paul Weissenberg / European Commission Reaping the benefits of European R&D
  3. 3. 02 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008FOREWORD The emergence of a pan-European security agenda has seen ASD members respond with positive and innovative approaches offering their capacity to develop advanced high technology solutions, to the rapidly changing security scenarios. There is clearly a growing need for improved measures to protect society and citizens in areas like maritime security, crisis management and emergency response as well as to protect critical infrastructure and secure transportation, in other words to protect flows in society. ASD has played an important role in supporting the creation of the EC Security R&D programme within FP7, seeking to develop technologies which enhance the security of the European citizen.WehavealsoseenASDmembers successfully forming consortia and winningcontractsintheinitialcallsofthe Security R&D programme within FP7. ASD was also a key catalyst for the foundation and development of the European Organisation for Security (EOS), which is going from strength to strength. EOS membership includes a number of ASD members as well as other companies. As a launch event, EOS is hosting a conference on Security in mid-May, where the development of a coherent European Security market in support of EU security policies and high security priorities will be discussed between regulators, users, operators and suppliers. Supporting the development of short- term capability in a European context; is increasingly important to the security community. Promoting and realizing the concept of a technologically advanced European security orientated industrial base and to initiate and foster ASD MEMBERS RESPOND TO GROWING EUROPEAN SECURITY AGENDA SMEsupportmeasuresareotherareas that requires further development. ASD member companies are increa- singly involved in supplying systems which manage information flows and co-ordinate information exchanges between various civil authorities res- ponsibleforpreventingterroristthreats, responding to natural disaster and tackling organised crime. Securitysolutions,whereourmembers can contribute, also cover systems development, systems integration and system security for government de- partments, defence agencies and the telecommunications industries, who work together to build and protect a variety of infrastructure. As the market for civil security systems continues to grow, new opportunities and challenges are created. ASD members have shown creativity and innovation in the development of pro- ducts and solutions in areas as diverse as reconnaissance, surveillance, com- munication and command control. I believe that through the continued active involvement of ASD members and through the partnership with EOS we can play a major role in the definition of a global, coherent and structuredsecuritypolicyacrossEurope and also help in shaping the market. I sincerely hope that our active enga- gement, will contribute to building a more secure Europe. ° AkeSvensson ASDPresidentandCEOofSaab ASD has played an important role in supporting the creation of the EC Security and R&D programme within FP7.
  4. 4. 03 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008FOREWORD FrançoisGayet SecretaryGeneralASD The perception and the understanding of security have evolved markedly in recentyears.Theconceptofthesecurity of a country has broadened to now focus much more clearly on the secu- rity and protection of citizens rather than primarily addressing political and economy stability. The globalisation of security threats andtheincreasedlikelihoodofnational securitycrisesmeanssecurityconcerns are now much closer to EU citizens’ everyday life than traditional interna- tional conflicts. External security missions (e.g. “Petersberg’s tasks”) with the use of military capabilities and internal security activities demanding the intervention of specific and well equiped forces, have contributed to the transformation of the perception in the needs for security and stabilisation of countries. The line between defence and security is increasingly blurred and dual technology is more and more used in both domains, arising from defence in the form of performance issueswhilecomingfromciviliansectors in areas for cost and rapid availability. ASD and our members are heavily involved in this transformation of the security sector and have had a consi- derable impact on the evolution and implementation of a range of security solutions taking place at both the national and international level. European defence has taken close to 60 years to reach the current level of cooperation across member states. Security cooperation is still in its infancy, but European-wide and urgent security needs exist and are more visible with each passing day. The European Commission has initi- ated a specific security research pro- gramme to help with the development and implementation of European se- curitytechnologies.Therecentcreation of ESRIF (European Security Research and Innovation Forum) will help facilitate the dialogue between the demand and supply elements of secu- rity technologies and solutions as well as the development of European-wide security policies. ASD and its members are strongly present in all the new developments and activities, affecting security. ASD was the initiator of EOS, the European Organisation for Security, formed to support the progress and implemen- tation of European security techno- gies as well as challenging the frag- mentation of the European security market. Increased cooperation on security issues goes well beyond the aerospace and defence sectors, de- manding a more holistic approach to communicating, with a broad range of stakeholders. It is my firm conviction that ASD and our members’ industries are committed to creating effective sustainable security solutions, based on innovative technologies that respect the rights of citizens, while satisfying the specific requirements coming from private and public users. EUROPEAN SECURITY MOVES UP EU AGENDA ASD and its members are strongly present in all the new developments and activities, affecting security.
  5. 5. 04 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008FOREWORD €22b (some 0,22% of US GDP) whilst the EU market for security is only around €10b (some 0,08% of EU GDP). In order to increase the protection of its citizens and develop innovative security technologies, systems and services, Europe must leverage on the high level competence and innovation capacity of its industry. Large compa- nies with a broad technological base should partner with innovative SMEs and research organisations. Security Research Research on security plays a growing role in providing solutions to evolving threats, satisfying demanding criteria of performance, reliability, and at the same time increasing European indus- tries’ competitiveness. The European Commission actively supports the growth of European com- petence in civilian security by allocating €1,4b in the FP7 (for the period 2007- 2013)totheEuropeanSecurityResearch Programme(ESRP).EuropeanIndustries participated extensively in the first ESRP call for tender (with 328 bids), demonstrating that they are willing to co-operate and invest, to promote sustainablesolutions.ASD strongly and successfully supported this action. In order to help the co-ordination of a pan-Europeaneffort,theCommisioners for Enterprise & Industry and Justice Security: a Concern for European Citizens Protectionofcitizens,governmentsand theeconomyisanissuethathasalways existed, but today it is considered as one of the greatest challenges of the century. According to Eurobarometer, Europe’s security (in particular relating toterrorism,organizedcrimeandillegal immigration) together with unemploy- ment, is among the most important issues for European citizens. Today’s threats are international and can be difficult to anticipate and this explains whysecurityisthemostimportantarea where citizens believe that an inte- grated European approach is needed. Europecountriesareincreasinglycons- cious of the need to coordinate their actions.Ahigherlevelofcoordinationis needed to face growing challenges and give EU Citizens adequate levels of se- curity, both in terms of Sustainable Security (e.g. engaging the constituen- ciesthatwillinfluencesecurityoverthe long-term)andsociallyacceptedsecurity (e.g. individual rights, privacy and the rule of law). The worldwide Homeland Security Civil market is developing at a rate estimated at over €40b p.a. Despite Europe’s increased awareness of the importance of protecting its citizens and assets, America still gives “Security” a much higher value: US investment in security is approximately THE EUROPEAN INDUSTRY SUPPORTS AN EU INTEGRATED SECURITY APPROACH GiancarloGrasso FINMECCANICASeniorAdvisortothePresident ChairASDSecurityCommittee;viceChairESRIF Freedom and Security have created the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF). ESRIF will define the roadmap of the European effort to achieve Sustainable Security, linking research needs both at national and European level with security policies as well as promoting aEurope-widesinglemarketforadvan- ced security systems and services. Security Sustainability How European security stakeholders can support Security Sustainability ? The following activities are proposed: / Exploiting relevant information avail- able in different areas, through a Network Centric Operations (NEC) approach; Defining a Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda for technological development; / Defining a European Industrial Secu- rity Policy aiming to reinforce its technological strengths. This will support the development and imple- mentation of cost-effective solutions to improve international competiti- veness while overcoming European weaknesses like fragmentation; / Specifying Security as one of the crucial requirements to be embedded into new systems; / Ensuring an optimal use of resources throughout the product life-cycle by partnering with users; / Integrating Security functions in sys- tems intended for other applications: e.g.Safety(Crisismanagement);Earth Monitoring (GMES and management of Earth resources); Defence (C3 for Maritime Safety and Security); / Developing new Security Services for the protection of Citizens, the Economy and Country stability. Research on security plays a growing role in providing solutions to evolving threats. G1 Limited level of integration products and services that were available on the security market before 9/11 G2 Moderate level of integration products whose core technologies were available on 9/11 in other fields (especially in the military field) G3 High level of integration technologies that are in the R&D phase, specifically designed to cope with the new security requirements G1 G2 G3 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Homeland Security Technologies Evolution
  6. 6. COPING WITH BORDER SECURITY CHALLENGES RobertHavas Security,EADS,Defence&Security All sides involved in the provision of se- curity systems, suppliers as well as end-users and operators, essentially think in terms of threat assessment and related mission definition, respec- tivetotheirdistinctduties.Thetaskofthe industrialsidehereistodevelop,deploy - and perhaps also support operations - solutions that enable end-users and operators to effectively and satisfacto- rily deal with these threats and vulner- abilities and thus fulfil their missions. This is also one of the main reasons why, in security research in Europe and elsewhere, the linkage between demand and supply, already at an early stage, is rightly stressed as an important factor in achieving success in security projects. Illegal crossing of borders by people and goods is a threat to European security as well as potentially destruc- tive for social consensus. Borders and their checkpoints also constitute natu- ral strategic lines and chokepoints for security authorities. Bordercheckpoints are especially tasked with the problem of facilitation of movement across the border while not compromising secu- rity (terrorism and social). These are the challenges driving R&D related to border security capabilities. Preparing the Future It is therefore worthwhile to take stock of existing and future technologies enabling this balance between a maxi- mum of freedom of movement and an optimum in border security. / Intrusionprevention:Implementingand hardeningofphysicalobstacles:barriers, fences, (fire-) walls, etc. integration of physical/hardwaresecuritytoolswith software-based logical components, andinparticular,encryption; / Intrusion detection: Optical and electro-optical sensors, acoustic sensors, pressure sensors, IT intru- sion detection systems; again we see an integration of physical / hardware security tools with software-based logical components; / People, material, and systemsauthen- tication and tracking: identity mana- gement, including biometrical and patternsensorsandsystems,RFID,etc. 06 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008BORDERSECURITY
  7. 7. / Material analytics: x-ray, CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological/ Nuclear, and Explosive) sensors, in particular Laser Ion Mobility Spec- trometry (LIMS), etc; / SensorPlatforms:fixedandrotorwing manned and unmanned aircrafts, vehicles and satellites; / Integrated, inter-operable, secure, real-time IT with multiple functions (See Box). These systems are based onopenstandardsandprotocols,which allow interoperability and, where appropriate, harmonization. / Secure fixed and mobile digital voice and data (including media data) communication systems. Industries as Security Capability Enabler Associetiesgrowincreasinglycomplex, so do their vulnerabilities and thus also the security solutions required. Security responsibles will therefore rather require comprehensive security systems instead of individual, isolated technologies geared towards one specific challenge. Future security solutions will need to be embedded into a network of legacy security systems, interact with them and provide the benefits of their synergies. More and more security solutions will therefore become part of complex systems,or"SystemsofSystems".Ifwe wantend-userstofullytakeadvantages of the increased capabilities thus pos- sible, solution designers and suppliers not only are required to possess high technological skills, but also system- level thinking and a profound knowl- edge of the end-users' operational processes. This is a requirement from beginning to end, from architectural design, technological implementation and project management, sourcing and vendor management, training, financial controlling, and, last but not least, quality control and assurance. It is crucial that these "Systems of Systems" be easy to operate, cost- effective for the operational expenses and scalable. This in turn requires the system de- signers to be aware of and to under- stand future challenges the end-user might face. Lastly, these systems will also need to be resilient against dis- ruptions, allow the control of service limitation resulting thereof and rapidly re-establish service provision. Only then can the "Security Capability Enabler" truly stimulate science, tech- nology research, and innovation for the benefit of the end-users and ultimately become his long-term partner. With the growth of the European Union by gaining new member states, border security is a huge area for R&D devel- opments and a promising market. 07 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008BORDERSECURITY Main Functions of IT Systems / Danger Prevention & Preparedness Management / Crisis & Emergency Response Management / Intelligence (HUMINT, SIGINT, intelligent surveillance means); Situational Awareness; Common Relevant Operational Picture, Data Fusion / Operational Concepts Modelling and Simulation, Training / Command, Control, Computers, Communication (fixed and mobile), Sensors, Biometrics, Identity Management / Criminal investigation systems, Prosecution support systems, Fines collection systems / National and international interagency cooperation & interoperability, civil-military collaboration / Operational and organizational resource management and logistics.
  8. 8. 08 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008BORDERSECURITY Effective border management does not exist without sophisticated systems of data collection and analysis. Border authorities in Europe are being challenged today as never before. Globalisation, a term used by econo- mists and sociologists to characterise today’s world, also touches the area of border security. We observe three phenomena in Europe which make border management a real challenge: growths in migration, international travel and trade globalisation, these have also created increased demands for more security. Hundreds of millions of people are travelling around the globe. Accord- inglytoIATA,thetenbiggestaircarriers transported more than 640 millions passengers in 2006. Their estimations show that this number will be increa- singbyalmost5%everyyearuntil2010. Frontex, is one of major the players in this field in Europe, promoting a pan- European model of Integrated Border Management,whichconsistsofseveral measures which are not only limited to border checks. An exhaustive model of border management actually com- prises five dimensions: / border control, including relevant risk analysis and crime intelligence, / detection and investigation of cross- border crime in coordination with all competentlawenforcementauthorities, / the four-tier access control model (measures in third countries, coope- ration with neighbouring countries, border control, control measures within the area of free movement, including return), / inter-agency cooperation in border management(borderguards,customs, police, national security and other relevantauthorities)andinternational cooperation, / coordination and coherence of the activities of Member States and institutions and other bodies of the Community and the Union. The implementation of this model is a major challenge for Frontex and law enforcement authorities of the EU Member States. In the 21st century border management must be intelligence-driven. Thisisaprerequisiteofallactionstaken regarding borders. Effective border management does not exist without sophisticated systems of data collec- tion and analysis followed by its timely dissemination to officers making deci- sions on the ground, such as the eligi- bility for crossing of a person or cargo. Illegal entries represent a small per- centage of the overall flow across a border. Nevertheless, in real numbers it is a massive flow. That’s why the concept of a “virtual border” is so important, because the management of a border starts even while gathering intelligence or issuing a visa in a third country. The physical borderis,sotosay,the“lastborderline”. The next part of the puzzle is the phys- ical security of the border. Operational efficiency can be achieved only through coordinated actions, not only between countries but also internally among agencies securing the flow of people and cargo. Border management agen- ciesshouldbealignedaroundthesame mission and should ensure consistent strategic coordination among them. To complete the picture it should be stressed that all these activities have to be ensured through adequate re- sources. Constant updating of infra- structure, equipment and investments in training activities is a sine qua non condition if we want to effectively safe- guard tourists and European citizens while at the same time not harming their privacy. All new technologies, such as biometrics, unmanned aerial vehicles or entry-exit systems are ex- pensive, but they will allow Europe to remain open and be to ready for a fast responsetoconstantlychangingthreats. SHAPING EUROPEAN SECURITY IlkkaPerttiJuhaniLaitinen FrontexExecutiveDirector With security screening, the physical borders of Europe are now becoming the “last border line”.
  9. 9. 09 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008MARITIMESECURITY Implementing the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code in Rotterdam was quite a job. Although over 150 port facilities had to be as- sessed, audited and certified within approximately a year, Rotterdam was able to report 95% of all terminals ISPS compliant by July 2004. Certifica- tion proved to be only the first hurdle, since we are now finding that a well- organised system of inspections and enforcement is just as important. Every month, specially trained Port Authority personnel perform approxi- mately 40 unannounced ISPS inspec- tions in the port of Rotterdam. Supply Chain Security At an operational level, ISPS will con- tinue to require a commitment from port authorities. But in terms of policy, the focus is swiftly shifting towards Supply Chain Security, especially con- tainer security. Although there have been numerous developments in this area for some years, many of them originating in the US, it seems that the transport world is only now appreciat- ing their full value. A global under- standing of and approach to transport security is on the horizon, providing a business case for investments in supply chain security. Worldwide Security Language This global approach to supply chain securitycanbeseeninthe“Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade” introduced by the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the new ISO standard for security mana- gement: ISO 28000. These systems of certification allow logistics operators to communicate their proven status of trustworthiness. With these new and widely accepted standards, a common security language can finally be spoken worldwide. Besides certification, technology plays an important role in securing freight transport. We see two major develop- ments in this field: / Firstly, the introduction of so-called Container Security Devises (CSD) that monitor container integrity and offer tracking and tracing; / Secondly, we see advanced scanning technology, making it feasible to scan large volumes of containers without disrupting the logistical process. Going Further To prepare the port of Rotterdam for the security demands of tomorrow we are seriously investigating the possi- bility of cargo scanning at a central pre-gate facility. At this facility, all ex- port containers would be subject to electronic data exchange, damage in- spection, non-intrusive inspection and nuclear detection. The scanning done at the pre-gate facility is expected to provide advantages over decentralized scanning. Optimal Security Optimalsupplychainsecuritywillnot,of course, be limited to action in seaports. Allelementsinthetransportchainmust participate, starting with the shipper. Since most of these logistics service providers are not subject to mandatory regulations,theyshouldcriticallyassess their facility’s security and seek an in- ternationally accepted security certifi- cate. This will not appeal to all ope- rators, but companies involved in inter- national supply chains should seriously consider it. ISPS: New Requirements for Security / The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code was adopted by the members of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2002. Among them are the 108 Contracting Governments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS). / This new, comprehensive security regime for international shipping entered into force in July 2004. The code contains detailed security- related requirements for govern- ments, port authorities and shipping companies in a mandatory section, together with a series of guidelines about how to meet these require- ments in a second, non-mandatory section. ROTTERDAM: ENHANCING SECURITY WITH TECHNOLOGY PeterMollema DirectorPortPlanning&Development forthePortofRotterdamAuthority Heading the IAPH Safety and Security Committee, Peter Mollema explains how Rotterdam is preparing for the security demands of tomorrow.
  10. 10. 10 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008MARITIMESECURITY “A global understanding of transport security provides a business case for investments” MARITIME SECURITY PaoloNeri VicePresidentLargeArchitectureSystems, SelexSistemiIntegrati The European Commission (EC) has a vision for an integrated maritime policy. This vision emerged as a result of the consultation process which started with a debate on the Green Paper and led to the Decision N 527/2007. The action plan linked to Decision N 527/2007 highlights the mainguidelinesthattheECiswillingto undertake to implement an ambitious work programme in marine security, for the coming years. The need for a “European Network for Maritime Surveillance” – has emerged, this is viewed as paramount in contributing to the improvement of maritime safety and security. One relevant outcome of the consulta- tion process is the need for better co- ordination and integration between the different stakeholders and agencies in charge of the maritime operations. The complexity of the legal framework and the variety of procedures and means available at European county level can cause a fragmented response in the above-mentioned context. Hence, as the need to reduce fragmen- tation and improve coordination bet- ween all actors emerges, the question arises,howisthisachieved?Oneanswer being primarily with the high quality data sharing of different fields both at horizontal level (i.e. adjacent national coastguardcansharedata)andvertical level (i.e. vessel traffic data can be shared with the environmental agency to determine the environment impact on critical areas). Because of the specific area of mari- time security, it is now clear that any effective response can only be achieved through an integrated approach, look- ing at the problem as a whole, paying attention to the mix of social, cognitive, informative and physical domains. Clearlythisprovidesgreatopportunities for companies such as SELEX Sistemi Integratioperatinginthedeploymentof worldwide scale solutions with special focus on maritime security. SELEX Sistemi Integrati has developed the Italian Vessel Traffic System and border control: the largest VTS system intheworldwithsimilarbutcustomised versionsimplementedinYemen,Poland and St. Petersburg. The company has therefore the knowledge and the skill tomanagetheevolutionofsuchsystems. Moreover, SELEX Sistemi Integrati has already carried out, within its system architecting activities, the shift towards network centric architecture, namely the enabling approach to achieve the required data sharing between diffe- rent maritime sectors. The need for a European network for maritime surveillance has emerged.
  11. 11. MARITIMESECURITY 12 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008 Lastbutnotleast,becauseofitsfavour- able geographical position in the Mediterranean Sea, Italy is mandated to play a major role in the implementa- tionoftheEuropeanpoliciesonmaritime matters. The challenge for SELEX Sistemi Inte- grati and the other European major playersistodevelopacapabilitytoman- age a wide variety of evolving require- ments in an ever changing scenario. The viable approach will be to design flexible, loosely coupled system of systems, able to dynamically adapt to the different situational needs. To achieve this goal SELEX Sistemi Integrati has developed valuable skills to manage the complexity of System on System Engineering methods. In particular, the application of capability basedmethods(CBM)providesameans to capture real mission needs and develop a spiral understanding process to validate, step by step, the solution adoption. The way to reach this end is to develop a network enabling capability solution centred on data sharing that can guar- antee the exchange of timely informa- tion to solve critical issues. Validated data and network, open architecture, service-based system development, ability to exploit the current system functionalities are key drivers for success. A key point will be represented by the ability to manage the maritime security infospace as resulted from the fusion of a variety of data sources. The right approach will be to develop an upper level set of enabling func- tionalities leveraging from the current system availability and progressively filling in the gap with appropriate new technologies. EU Country #1 / Coast Guard / Navy / Customs / Anti-fraud / Law Enf. Agency EU Country #3 Coast Guard / Navy / Customs / Anti-fraud / Law Enf. Agency / Control Immigration Control Fishing Control Environment Control Maritime Traffic Perform SAR Control Illegal Goods Trafficking Info Space Management A Mission Capabilities View for Maritime Surveillance & Security Suggested approach for Maritime Info Space exploitation FRONTEX EMSA EDA REMPEC CFCA EU Country #2 / Coast Guard / Navy / Customs / Anti-fraud / Law Enf. Agency EU Country #4 Coast Guard / Navy / Customs / Anti-fraud / Law Enf. Agency / M ember state org Acces s Mar itime Data InfoSp ace EU LevelledAcc ess It is now clear that any effective response can only be achieved through an integrated approach. Maritime Surveillance & Security
  12. 12. 13 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008ICT/BIOMETRICSECURITY In a globalised world with highly interdependent infrastructures, internal security is becoming more and more important. With many government and business organisations being linked across national borders in a globalised world with highly interdependent infrastruc- tures, internal security is becoming moreandmoreimportant.Inthiscontext, efficient information and identification systems such as biometric systems can play a significant role. Siemens IT Solutions and Services has extensive experience in implementing security solutions in the public sector, ranging from national identification documents,suchaselectronicpassports and ID cards, to access and border control systems. One Single Solution Given the need to protect sensitive data and facilities, access controls for public buildings are an important component of internal security. That is why the Dutch Ministry of Defence is putting its faith in Siemens technology with its “Defence ID Card”. By the end of this year, all military and civilian employees of the ministry will be issued chip cards thatwillcontroltheiraccesstobuildings and computer systems, and as well as allow them to encrypt their e-mail messagesanddigitallysigndocuments. Siemens is responsible for integrating the entire system, operating the card management software and linking the solution to existing IT systems. E-passports Germany has been a trailblazer in the introduction of digital passports in Europe, issuing these since 2005. Since November 2007 Germany’s E-passport also includes a second required biometric feature, the finger- print of two fingers. Since 2006, Swiss citizens have been able to apply for passports that include a digitally stored passport picture identifying their holders without the possibilityoferror.Thesystemcompares those features that do not change with facial expressions, such as the upper edges of the eye sockets, the cheek- bones and the sides of the mouth. The data is stored on a chip that is em- bedded into the passport and protected against unauthorized access. Siemens IT Solutions and Services supplied the full-service solution with which the Swiss passport authorities record and process the biometric data. Prof.JoergSauerbrey HeadofPublicSecurity atSiemensITSolutionsandServices The Czech Republic began issuing biometric passports in 2007 and Siemens is involved in the system implementation and the production of these passports. The solution has already been designed to accom- modate the planned addition of digital fingerprints, an EU requirement due to come into effect on May 1, 2008. Upgrading Controls Tobeabletoreadthebiometricpassport data, border control systems must be upgraded accordingly. In February of last year, Croatia was the first country in Europe to take this step. At Zagreb Airport and the Bajakovo border cros- sing, Siemenshasimplementedaborder control system capable of reading the new biometric EU passports. In the future, the procedure may beco- me even more efficient, for example, with so-called ‘registered traveller programmes’ (RTPs) for automated biometriccontrols. With its new border security system, Croatia meets the requirements of the Schengen Agree- ment, which is a prerequisite for the country's application for EU member- ship in 2009. What the Future Will Bring For the medium term, IT service provi- ders such as Siemens IT Solutions and Services are working to standardize the systems of the various countries and authorities in order to consolidate them into a single system. In the not too distant future, the biometric EU visa for controlling travellers and immigrants from non- EU countries will be a genuine possibility. Based on current develop- ments, a global identity management system and electronic documents with biometric functions may also become an everyday reality. The market will continue to grow until a level of security has been reached that meets citizens’ requirements. As a leading supplier of infrastructure equipment, Siemens is well equipped to meet this challenge. DEVELOPING A EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY
  13. 13. 14 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008ICT/BIOMETRICSECURITY Biometric solutions were already mak- ing inroads as early as the mid-1990s, although in Europe we were not neces- sarily aware of this trend. The initial ap- plications were for healthcare in the United States, pension management in Africa and ID cards in Asia. These uses reflectthetwodistinctcontextsinwhich biometric solutions began to be deplo- yed.Foremergingcountrieswithoutthe systems needed to manage public records,biometricswasawayofquickly setting up a reliable citizen identifica- tion system. For developed countries, mainlyinEurope,biometricswasapart of “e-government” initiatives. In these countries, the primary issues were the relationship between the State and its citizens, protection of personal data and confidentiality, and trade-offs between security and comfort. Since 2004, countries have teamed up to ensure identification system interoperability through work carried out by the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization). This is actually a remarkable trend, since it reverses the usual process; that is, countries are seeking solutions for problems facing people around the world, before addressing issues concerning ID man- agement for their own citizens! This situation obviously impacts the timetable for the deployment of natio- nal solutions. However, these national projects will undoubtedly rebound very quickly, all the more so since countries can call on infrastructures and procedures that have been deployed in the meantime for cross-border e-passports and/or e-visas. Today, one thing is sure: when a coun- try undertakes the modernization of its national ID system, biometrics will be part of the recipe. In the commercial market, as opposed to federal applications, biometric applications are developing in the bankingindustry,aswellasforphysical access control. Company heads have seen the advantages brought by bio- metric passport or airport control ap- plications, and are ready to apply them within the corporate world. For instan- ce, office entrance sensors made by Sagem Sécurité alone have already performedmillionsofbiometricchecks. Sagem Sécurité has carved out a po- sition as supplier of a range of identi- fication solutions, including of course biometrics. Its solutions are used for a number of rights management appli- cations, including State-citizen (border crossing, driver licenses, healthcare system access, voting rights, etc.), company/employee (physical access control, connection to information sys- tems) and service provider/user (transport access, etc.). The distinguishing characteristic of Sagem Sécurité is that it is the only prime contractor to cover all con- stituent components in a complete identificationsystem:tokens,terminals, encryption devices, biometrics, etc. This means that the company can offer customers – generally the State – solutionstailoredtotheirspecificneeds. Because of this unrivaled capability, Sagem Sécurité systems are now deployed in 70 countries and support 160 different types of ID solutions worldwide. Its priority markets are those in which security factors are decisive, with stringent standards, and governed by extremely demanding assessmentandcertificationprocesses. In practice this means government markets, or commercial and industrial applications subject to governmental regulations. Sagem Sécurité is the world leader in this growth sector, with more than 100 million biometric ID documents delivered around the world. At Sagem Sécurité, we explain the technical possibilities so that the au- thorities can make informed decisions. Biometrics use is growing rapidly, especially for control functions in the civil sector. High-value sites such as airports, nuclear power plants and ports are all equipped with effective ID systems. It’s been democratised, even gadgetised, in applications where fa- cility takes precedence over security. For example, we may now use biomet- rics in so-called logical control appli- cations, to unlock a PAD or mobile phone, instead of the usual password or code. Note: Sagem Sécurité offers proven expertise in fingerprint, facial and iris recognition technologies. BIOMETRICS; THE CITIZEN & THE STATE “Today when a country undertakes the modernisation of its national ID system, biometrics will be part of the solution” Biometrics use is growing rapidly, especially for control functions in the civil sector. BernardDidier SeniorVP, R&T-BusinessDevelopment atSagemSécurité
  14. 14. 15 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008ICT/BIOMETRICSECURITY Threats to security are of growing concerntoallEuropeancitizens.Thelat- est of these many threats, the planned terror attacks in Germany, were luckily discovered in time. This situation con- firms that it is of crucial importance to better coordinate our efforts to increase security, so as to be better able to prevent such attacks. Security research on this issue is one important way to bring about cooperation. Research Cooperation Through increased research coope- ration, collaborative projects and activities, duplication of efforts can be avoided and synergies reached. Furthermore, by networking with key security stakeholders in Europe, we can also promote a common European approach to dealing with this issue. On the so called ‘demand-side’, this pro- motes the creation of common and compatible standards and procedures, while on the ‘supply-side’, it helps to create a European market for security equipment. The objectives of research at the Euro- pean level are to respond to political needs and to the needs of European citizens, as well as to increase the competitiveness of the European in- dustry. The European security industry must convert this challenge into an op- portunity to become the leader in the emerging worldwide market for secu- rity equipment and solutions. Joint Security Research Agenda The newly established European Se- curity Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) will contribute to meeting this challenge. ESRIF will help increase transparency and joint planning in security research programmes and activities in Europe, with a view to enhanced cooperation between the various security stakeholders. It will support civil security policy with the appropriate technology and knowledge base by establishing and carrying forward a mid- and long-term Joint Security Research Agenda, involving all European stakeholders, from both the supply and the demand sides. The Lisbon Strategy Research has also been recognized as playing a key role in achieving the goals of the Lisbon strategy in the EU, and in making Europe the most com- petitive economy in the world by 2010. Members States have therefore been urged to increase their R&D spending. The EU has also drastically increased its spending on R&D: the budget of the Seventh Research Framework Pro- gramme (FP7) 2007-2013 is more than 40% higher budget than the previous FP6 (some €54 billion in total). For the first time FP7 also includes se- curity research as one of its ten key themes under the largest Specific Pro- gramme “Cooperation”, with a budget of €1.4 billion, which will be used in a complementary way, with different types of projects and coordination and supporting activities. In the first call for proposals, 325 eligible proposals were received. We have now started the preparation of “grant agreements” for 44 of them. REAPING THE BENEFITS OF EUROPEAN R&D PaulWeissenberg DirectorAerospace,GMES, securityanddefenceattheDGEnterprise andIndustry,EuropeanCommission “Through the Development of a European Security Identity” FP7 in a Nutshell FP7 is the EU's main instrument for funding research in Europe. This framework identifies 10 thematic areas, corresponding to major fields in science and research, including 5 fields of direct interest for ASD: / Information and Communication Technologies; / Nanosciences, Nanotechnologies, Materials and new Production Technologies; / Transport (including Aeronautics); / Space; / Security. The identified “missions” for security researcharerecognisedasbeinghighly relevant in addressing threats to secu- rity in Europe. Ensuring the ‘Security of citizens’, the ‘Security of infrastruc- tures and utilities’, ‘Intelligent surveil- lanceandbordersecurity’,and‘Restoring security and safety in case of crisis’ re- main the key ones, while due attention will also be given to ‘Security and So- ciety’ issues. Research in these areas should deliver the needed knowledge and technologies in Europe. European Security EU investments in R&D for security must be coordinated with national and private investment. By combining efforts in Europe we can effectively increase the security of citizens and industry. R&D, therefore, in many ways, is the buttress of European security. Security Research on the Web / The DG Enterprise and Industry website dedicated to Security Research with useful links for SMEs: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ security/index_en.htm
  15. 15. SergeLebourg DassaultAviation Safety objectives as they are defined for civil aircraft (FAR/CS 25, FAR/CS 23) are aimed at the protection of people on board the aircraft. As there are no humans on-board the UAV, the safety objectives must be reoriented to the protection of people on the ground. This explains why the UAV safety objectives must be "a priori" different from the safety objectives used on civil aircraft. These safety objectives are closer to those of military aircraft than to civil ones. To operate a UAV in airspace you need, as a minimum (depending on the type of airspace), to obtain a Certificate of Airworthiness and approval to operate in the airspace. Dassault Aviation has proposed a method based on kinetic energy to allow determina- tion of UAV categories and associated safety objectives. This method is published as part of the report of the "JAA Eurocontrol UAV task force". The reorientation of the safety objec- tives towards the protection of people on the ground of course has conse- quences: Firstly, there are no reasons to justify the use of different safety objectives for military UAVs operating in the same airspace as civil ones. Secondly, the risk for “over flown” population must be the same whatever the certification authority, this means that there is a need for a worldwide agreement on UAV safety objectives. Most of the key elements of future UAV certification regulations are now available. National regulations are developing. In France the DGA (Délégation Générale de L'Armement) has published an airworthiness code named USAR, for military UAVs. In addition, the NATO FINAS group has amended and published its code under USAR4. All airspace users believe that UAVs operate in the air-space just as any other aircraft would. While this is indeed a given, it has to be recognized that UAVs do have specificities, as do all other types of aircraft, and these specificities must be considered. Detection of other users and conse- quent separation from other users is a specific & difficult task for UAVs. Initial operations of UAVs have so far been made in segregated airspace, efforts are now focusing on operations in controlled airspace, this is airspace where all aircraft are cooperative (Transponder mode S) and where ATC is in charge of traffic separation. With this evolution, rules of the air (as published by ICAO or FAR91) will have to be updated. Operations in Controlled Airspace Currently, conditions exist which allow for UAV operations in controlled airspace. However, in order to convince the aeronautical community of this fact, it is now time to develop a comprehensive UAV demonstration programme. New developments in technology in the CNS domains will both facilitate and improve the safety of UAV operations in a controlled airspace. Currently airspace collision avoidance is covered by the agreement with the ICAO rule And based on the "see & avoid" principle. Fortunately, to impro- ve the safety of operations, regulations have introduced the requirement that aircraft above 5700 kg must install TCAS / ACAS. Communications: ATC can commu- nicate with the UAV pilot (ground based) through the UAV or better still, through a direct phone line. Thus, UAVs benefit from safer means of communication between ATC & the pilot than aircraft do. Contrary to aircraft, UAVs need a communication data link between the UAV pilot and the machine. When such data link is UAV OPERATIONS IN FUTURE ATM “Safety objectives as they are defined for civil aircraft are aimed at the protection of people on board the aircraft” 16 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008UAVs There are no reasons to justify the use of different safety objectives for military UAVs operating in the same airspace as civil ones.
  16. 16. ATC can communicate to the UAV pilot based on the ground, through the UAV or better still through a direct phone line. lost then UAVs have the option of flying in an autonomous mode (similar to aircraft operation following loss of communication). ATC might be infor- med by a specific XPDR code set by the UAV. Navigation: The location of a UAV can be determined by the UAV pilot independently of an on board UAV navigation system by using radar or a multilateration system. Surveillance: Separation is achieved through the communication of instruc- tions to pilots by the ATC. The UAV pilot might have in front of them the same tactical situation as the ATC, a display that an aircraft pilot does not have today. The UAV pilot is thus in a better position than an aircraft pilot to understand the situation. UAVs can address Collision Avoidance in two ways, first by using the ATC tactical situation,andsecondbyinstallingTCAS equipment on UAV. It will be possible to demonstrate an equivalent level of safetyforUAVsascomparedtoaircraft. Improving Safety CPDLC (Controller Pilot Data Link Communications): Data link will improve communications between ATC & the "UAV pilot" and will allow partial automation of UAV answers (this will improve safety in case of loss of communication between the "UAV pilot" and UAV). CPDLC also gives the UAV the capacity to operate in full autonomous mode (in cases of loss of data link between the UAV pilot and the UAV) and so any drawback due to loss of data link between the pilot and the UAV is eliminated. ADS-B (Automatic Dependence Surveillance-Broadcast): will allow all aircraft, including UAVs, to have a perfect knowledge of the tactical situation before them. Operations in Non-Controlled Airspace Such operations require that all aircraft have a means to locate and separate from all other traffic. Two different technologies might be used. Cooperative technologies Most aircraft are equipped with transponders. Yet, very light machines which have no on board power supply source cannot be equipped with these devices. Therefore, there is a need for technology developments. Certain technologiesusedbytheglidercommu- nity, such as FLARM, can be candidate. Other technologies such as those based on a combination of cellular phone GPS and TIS are also affordable candidates. Non-cooperativetechnologies:Mature solutions in the area of non-coopera- tive technologies need to be developed. It can be difficult to cover detection in all directions, some UAV systems have a field of detection similar to the aircraft cockpit field of view. Although such a system might provide a level of safety equivalent to the "see & avoid" principle, it still might not provide a level of safety acceptable for future operations. It might be difficult to develop and certify a system which will be able to detect and allow collision avoidance in only 80% of the conditions. Presently, cooperative technologies seem to be more promising. However, this does not mean that development efforts in non-cooperative technologies must be slowed down. Europe, with the help of SESAR, and the US with the help of NextGen, are developing large programmes to update their ATM systems. In order to be successful in integrating all users into the same airspace,theseprogramsmustaddress theconcernsandneedsofall,including UAVs - whenever this is possible. At Dassault Aviation, our knowledge of air transport, business aviation and military and UAV operations allow us to fully understand the synergies and to promote solutions for the benefit of all new concepts. Insertion of UAVs into the controlled airspace will help ATM stakeholders (pilots, controllers, authorities) to identify the remaining ATM safety issues and to fix them. UAVs will not be a security risk for other users, but will point the way towards ATM safety. See & Avoid: an Inadequate Principle? UAV specificity paves to the way to better safety principles. Human eye limitations, limited field of view (blind zones), weather conditions, light conditions, collision speed, as well as many other factors, explain why the see & avoid principle is considered by most safety authorities as inadequate. Suggestion: Collision avoidance must no longer be based on this principle, or on the application of operational rules. It is recommended that "Aircraft separation and collision avoidance" be validated by a method similar to the method used for certification of aircraft systems (CS/FAR 25 or CS/FAR 23 paragraph 1309). This method is based on "safety targets" validated by "safety analysis". Communication: a deficient tool? UAV specificity can be used for the development of the future ATM. Controllers and pilots use voice communications in order to commu- nicate with each other. This type of communication carries with it high risks, which include: - loss of critical communications (due to improper frequency setting or wrong squelch setting) - transmission of misleading information (risk of mix-up of aircraft identification by pilots or ATC) - misunderstanding (due to the use of non mother tongue language). Suggestion: Develop communication systems based on data link using standard messages and used as the primary means of communication. 17 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008UAVs Europe with SESAR and the US with NextGen are developing large programmes to update ATM.
  17. 17. 18 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008UAVs EUROCONTROListhejointcivil/military European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, in which role it regards unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) as legitimate airspace users. EUROCON- TROL focuses on an ATM-driven pers- pective of the UAS airspace integration issue. Airspace requirements should thus form the basis for UAS perform- ance standards/specifications, to be developed by appropriate bodies with the support of EUROCONTROL. The integration of UAS into the pan- Euro-pean ATM network requires that similar performance considerations be afforded to UAS as to manned aircraft. EUROCONTROL therefore supports the integration of UAS with due considera- tionoftheevolvingrequirementsofother civil and military airspace users. EUROCONTROLalsoconsidersthatUAS can provide a foundation for improve- ments to manned aviation (e.g.: safety enhancing sense and avoid systems) andfutureATM(e.g.autonomousflight). UAScanonlybeintegratedintotheATM network through effective working arrangements between all partners in European aviation. EUROCONTROL is therefore coordinating with organisa- tions such as ICAO, State aviation au- thorities, EUROCAE, EASA, JAA, RTCA, FAA, as well as ASD. Moreover, since civil UAS MASPS/MOPS (Minimum Avi- ation System Performance Standards/ Minimum Operational Performance Specifications) and military UAS certifi- cation standards will provide the basis for compliance with the ATM network airspacerequirements,EUROCONTROL is active in the NATO FINAS Task Force where military UAS certification specifications are under development. In addition, EUROCONTROL was ins- trumental in the establishment of the EUROCAE Working Group 73 on UAS (WG73 UAS) where MASPS for civil UAS are being actively developed. EUROCONTROL provides the chairman for WG-73 and other expert support. EUROCONTROL has produced a set of “ATM Specifications for Military UAVs as Operational Air Traffic outside Seg- regated Airspace”. Based upon com- mon acceptance that UAS operations outside segregated airspace should be conductedatalevelofsafetyequivalent to that for manned aircraft, the specifi- cations follow three basic principles: / Firstly, UAS operations should not increase the risk to other airspace users; / Secondly, ATM procedures should mirror those applicable to manned aircraft; and, / Thirdly, the provision of air traffic services to UAS should be transparent to ATC controllers. The specifications are also innovative insofar as they are not constrained by limitations in current UAS capability such as sense-and-avoid. The specifi- cations will therefore only be practica- ble once industry develops this and other necessary technologies. The EUROCONTROL Agency has re- cently established an internal “UAS ATM Integration Activity”, consisting of a coordinated agency work program- me intended to support all facets of UAS ATM integration issues. In a first work stream, the drive will be to accommodate,an integration of UAS into non-segregated airspace on the basisofa“phasedintegration”approach (possibly supported by restricted UAS type certificates and/or UAS permits to fly).Suchphasedintegrationwillprovide the important first steps from which critical operational experience and lessons-learned can be derived. EU- ROCONTROL will work closely with specific national authorities in sup- porting phased integrations of indivi- dual UAS systems as well as undertaking airspace studies and UAS real-time ATM simulations. The Agency’s UAS activity will interface closely with civil and military stake- holders as well as other international and national organisations dealing with UAS. The area of activity will also link with the FAA in the frame of the EUROCONTROL-FAA Memorandum of Cooperation, where a dedicated UAS Action Plan has been established. A second work stream will focus on providing deliverables to, and interfac- ingfully with, SESAR to ensure full con- siderationofUASaslegitimateairspace users during the SESAR development and deployment phases. SESARmustbeaffordedtheopportunity to assess the technological enhance- ments emerging for UAS, and their possible application to manned aviation for building overall ATM network im- provements.Theworkstreamwillseek to coordinate the work necessary to develop a complete set of UAS certifi- cation specifications as a basis for full integration to the pan-European ATM network, consistent with the SESAR ATM Target Concept. As regards interface with industry, effective formal working relationships have already been established between ASD and EUROCONTROL. This will fa- cilitate solutions to areas such as sense and avoid and radio frequency standardisation for communications, command and control. Finally, EUROCONTROL supports the recently established ICAO UAS Study Group. This global technical UAS body aims to entrench the regulatory re- quirements of civil UAS into the ICAO Standards and Recommended Prac- tices (SARPs) contained in the 18 An- nexes to the Chicago Convention. The process will be a complex yet key ele- ment of the complete UAS integration issue. SUPPORT UAS ATM INTEGRATION MikeStrong EUROCONTROL MilitaryExpert HolgerMatthiesen EUROCONTROL ATMExpert EUROCONTROL will work closely with specific national authorities in supporting phased integrations of individual UAS systems.
  18. 18. 19 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008UAVs Most UAS experience has been gained through military missions achieved in segregated airspace over battlefields or in training areas, with UAS ranging from light systems operated at very short range to High Altitude Long En- durance (HALE) systems operated through a satellite data-link. These military operations, like the SAFRAN SagemDéfenseSécuritémadeSperwer UAS operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, have confirmed UAS as increasingly valuable assets. They have also underlined a key challenge around drastically extending their use for more efficient governmental and commercial applications: including routine access to civil airspace. UAS access to civil airspace, com- monly called non-segregated airspace to illustrate the capability to fly both manned aircraft and unmanned air- craft in the same airspace area, is a new type of challenge for the aviation community: How to manage the inte- gration of a new family of aerial sys- tems in the very mature and structured manned aviation system? And how to ensure these are accepted by manned aviation stakeholders such as airlines, pilots, air traffic controllers and the general public? Safety First The first consideration has to be the safety of air transport, particularly manned aviation, must not be affected in any negative way by UAS operations. This is of paramount interest in defin- ing and regulating UAS operations in non-segregated airspace. Quantified safety objectives need to be defined by the relevant regulatory bodies at the European (Eurocontrol, EASA) and na- tional (CAAs) levels. The fulfilment of these safety objectives will have to be demonstrated as part of the certifica- tion and flight authorisation process. Safety simulations and real flight demonstrations will be required to support this safety process. Many issues must be addressed to demonstrate the safe integration of UAS into civil airspace. All that is con- tributing to the safety of manned avia- tion will have to be reviewed and adapted for the specific case of UAS: airworthiness/certification, operational approvalitems,maintenance,UAScrew qualification and training and aero- drome operations. All of these issues encompass technical, safety and regu- latory aspects but have different levels of complexity. For example, the appli- cation of the ICAO annex 2 regulations relative to the rules of the air (the com- monly called UAS Sense and Avoid concept) makes that the scenario of an Unmanned Aircraft (UA) flying accord- ing to Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) with Air Traffic Control providing sepa- ration from other aircraft is easier to address compared with flying the same UA according to Visual Flight Rules (VFR) in non-controlled airspace. FLYING UAS IN CIVIL AIRSPACE GérardMardiné Programmemanager, UASinsertionprojects “Do you really think there is a need for UAS Collision Avoidance systems?” Moreover, the less complex, the shorter is the resulting timeframe to establish the suitable regulations and for industry to develop adapted techni- cal solutions. A Step-by-Step Approach The goal is to provide UAS users with significant additional operational ca- pabilities (when compared with flight in segregated airspace) in a medium- term timeframe. Routine UAS IFR op- erations in controlled airspace will most probably be part of this first step, offering a cruise flight capability in non-segregated airspace. This first step, which could be achieved by 2015, would be to operate UAS for border surveillance and maritime sur- veillance missions. Standards have also to be developed step by step in order to ensure UAS compatibility with manned aviation and to provide UAS manufacturers with agreed requirements to support the development of UAS. European standardisation efforts have been achieved in the framework of the EUROCAE Working Group 73 . These efforts must be supported by the defi- nition of a common UAS concept of op- eration in non-segregated airspace and of a pertinent safety case. The group also benefits from the participa- tion of all the aviation and UAS stake- holders (regulatory bodies, Air Naviga- tion Service Providers, pilots, industry, research lab) to generate widely agreed material suitable for future regulatory endorsement. A significant and coordinated effort is required to progressively and safely in- troduce UAS into civil airspace. This will lead to major positive repercus- sions for manned aviation as it will benefit from the technological progress and will also develop European aero- space industry leadership. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) have demonstrated in recent years a growing potential to fulfil a wide range of missions for both governmental and commercial applications.
  19. 19. “European policy makers need to ensure that aviation security measures are efficient and risk-based” UlrichSchulte-Strathaus SecretaryGeneral,AssociationofEuropeanAirlines Aviation security, although high on the agenda of governments, European institutions, airlines and airports alike, still suffers from a lack of efficiency and an excess of complexity. Security rules are often audit-driven rather than based on policy, foresight or real, on-the-ground expertise. Duplication and lack of international harmoni- sation – even within the European Union – are a real challenge to airlines’ and airports’ operations. The costs of the current system are shared by airports and airlines, with a direct impact on passengers. These various challenges caused the Association of European Airlines (AEA) and the European branch of Airports Council International (ACI Europe) to join forces in 2006 to set up ESPAS, the European Strategic Partnership for Aviation Security. ESPAS aims to remedy some of the current shortcomings of the security system,bysettinglong-termprinciples, in cooperation with European policy- makers,toensurethataviationsecurity measures are efficient and risk-based, and by providing a platform for joint AEA/ACI positions to be presented to European Institutions. Itisintheinterestofairlinesandairports to have security rules developed on the basis of, on the one hand, the assess- ment of the risk or threat, and, on the other, of the impact that they will have on operations. The overall objective must be to deliver proactive, customer- focused, sustainable security in an efficient manner. ESPAS is an innovative venture which will regularly propose ‘green field’ approaches to reviewing the system, getting rid of unnecessary duplications and building a system in which indus- try, regulators and passengers can have faith. This approach will not only strengthen deterrence, but it will also drive costs down as resources are pooled to core priorities. ESPAS operates on a series of basic principles, which drive all its activities. Assessing the Risk of Each Element in the Overall System Europe’s aviation security system has been built incrementally over recent decades, starting from the ECAC Document 30 which was adapted to become an EC Regulation on the eve of the 9/11 attacks. The main elements of today’s aviation security system are centralsearch(passengerandbaggage screening), access control, the setting up of critical parts at airports and the protection of cockpit doors in the aircraft. Anynewlegislationshouldmeanadding elements wherever necessary and reinforcing these general, cornerstone rules, rather than creating multiple A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO AVIATION SECURITY 20 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008TRANSPORTSECURITY
  20. 20. layers of measures to compensate for previous, unsatisfactory ones. In the current setup, however, attention has been focused on accumulating responses to possible scenarios on an arbitrary basis, without reviewing the overall system, risk and existing mitigations. In practice, some areas seem subjected to a disproportionate amount of measures (e.g. protection of aircraft).Undera'greenfield'approach, we might expect some reapportioning to better address the broader risk. Security Layers in theory Security Layers in practice Prioritise and Focus Resources on where the Risks are Resources dedicated to counter terrorist threats in air transport are not only financial but also human, physical and spatial (notably at the airport), technological, and operati- onal. Such resources are necessarily limited. Airports’ security infrastruc- ture cannot be stretched to infinity, nor can passenger fares be increased continuously to cover increasing secu- ritycosts.Securityisaconstraintwhich must be adapted to, and integrate in, the very specific environment that is civil aviation. Eliminating 100% risks and threats to air transport is not possible if airports and airlines are to continue to open their doors to pas- sengers.Instead,prioritiesmustbeset, and we must find the most effective waytocounterthemainrisks.Similarly, giventhesefiniteresources,timeshould be spent to re-balance the overall setting and to re-allocate resources where the main vulnerabilities are. This is all the more relevant as the industry and its passengers are cur- rently asked to bear the costs of nearly all of aviation security in Europe. Research into new technologies is essential for producing more efficient andmoreeffectivesecuritysolutionsto counter significant threats to civil aviation.Technologydeployedtoprotect the air transport infrastructure must fulfill complex technical and operati- onalcriteriathatmustworkinharmony with air transport operations to secure passenger and freight facilitation processes, not to paralyse them. Defining future research and deve- lopment priorities must be dependent on the need to minimise or eliminate vulnerabilities that pose a significant risk to the air transport industry. Prio- rities must also take full account of emerging and evolving threats to air transport. The backing of European Community and national government resourcesiscriticalfordefining,stimu- lating and co-ordinating initiatives in the European Union. Industry stake- holders should be fully involved in the process. Distinguish the “Possible” from the “Probable” Too often today, European aviation security is either rule-based or audit- based. Rather than addressing what is likely to happen (what is “probable”), it addresses everything that can theore- tically happen (what is “possible”). The difference between what is possible and what is probable is assessed not only by knowing about the threat, but also by looking at the wider context and at existing mitigations. Measure the Relative Effectiveness of Security with the “3 Ds” of Detection, Denial and Deterrence Any given security measure should aim to address at least one of the following objectives: detect, deny, and deter (the 3 Ds”). However, strengthening one may lead to the cancellation of the others, and that must be put in the balance. A series of security measures to counter the same threat might increase detection but will also give a signal to possible terrorists that secu- rity is poor and needs to be compen- sated(therebydecreasingthedeterrent effect). Similarly, a fourth element which must be taken into account is the passenger’s perception or feeling of security. Taking the example of baggage reconciliation, it is likely that this added measure to baggage scree- ning adds to actual security (by preven- ting unaccompanied baggage from being placed on board aircraft); however, it also adds to the passen- ger’s perception that the central search was weak and that s/he is at risk, as the captain communicates to passengers that the said baggage must be offloaded. A measure applied 100%, i.e. syste- matically, is also 100% predictable, which risks diverting potential terro- rists to a different target. As a rule of thumb, unpredictability and random- 21 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008TRANSPORTSECURITY Aviation security, although high on the agenda of governments, European institutions, airlines and airports alike, still suffer from a lack of efficiency and an excess of complexity. nessshouldthusbefurtherintroduced, both for their facilitation effect (the need for fewer resources) and for their deterrent effect. They are also able to match the threat if percentages are adaptable. It should be noted however that deterrence should only be used when security is visible or procedures known (by passengers or staff). It applies, therefore, mainly to people screening and access control but much less to cargo or catering. To set these principles into action, ACI and AEA are committed to long-term cooperation. This implies continuous joint identification of problems and priorities, but also a regular exchange of information on ongoing operational issues, such as the differing levels of security according to shifts, lack of synchronisation between the shifts and volume of traffic, etc. To convey this strategic vision to the regulators, ESPAS representatives regularly meet with the European Commission and national authorities to set common priorities. The work of ESPAS does not stop there: ultimately, it aims to associate all relevant stakeholders, institutional or economic players, to counter the threat tothe European aviation industry from international terrorism.
  21. 21. 22 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008TRANSPORTSECURITY As it is unlikely that we will see a re- duction in the threat level posed to air travel in the foreseeable future, Smiths Detection has looked toother avenues- to technology advancements - to assist in smoothing our passage through the security channel. Screening Procedures The checkpoint security procedure has two main targets: the screening of passengers and of their carry-on bags. For both of these areas, new technolo- gies promise to address the extra re- quirements that recent events have imposed. Screening activity is stan- dardised by regulation and generally resultsinauniformconfigurationofX-ray andmetaldetectorequipment,together with their associated procedures. aTiX Deployment Worldwide With the recent development by Smiths Detection of the HI-SCAN 6040aTiX system, which is now being deployed, a quiet revolution is occurring in the area of carry-on baggage screening. Tech- nologies that have previously been the preserve of sophisticated hold baggage screening methods are now finding their way into the passenger check- point. The multi-view X-Ray aTiX sys- tem offers the screener several perspectives of a scanned bag and thus assists greatly in the resolution of suspicious objects in a carry-on item. ALLEVIATING THE SECURITY BOTTLENECK StefanAust DirectorofProductManagement SmithsDetectionEMEA “Recent technical advances from Smiths Detection offer improved security and more efficient processes at airport checkpoints worldwide” Moreover, adding threat detection ca- pabilities to this multi-view approach leads to the real breakthrough of pro- viding automated detection of explo- sives – both liquid and solid – as well as other substances of interest. By providing the system operator with alarm prompts in the displayed image, the detection performance and time taken in clearing bags are greatly enhanced. The ability of this Smiths Detection technology to distinguish between benign and dangerous liquids holds out the promise of a return to the days before the term 3:1:1 entered the airport lexicon. Additional inspection angles and the tomography capability of the multi-view aTiX system already permit passengers at UK airports, including London Heathrow and Glasgow, to leave laptops in the bag on a trial basis. Passenger Flow = Passenger Convenience Throughput performance depends on various aspects such as equipment balance, alarm resolution and tray re- turn. Here, technical enhancements that assist the procedures can greatly boost the efficiency of the overall checkpoint operation. Observations of the flow process through the security channel have identified where en- hancements to the checkpoint infra- structure can make significant differences to the throughput and op- erational costs. Bottlenecks such as divestment of personal items onto the X-Ray conveyor offer an example of how small changes can make a big dif- ference. Lengthening the loading con- veyor so that several people can simultaneously off-load their personal items turns a sequential – one at a time – process into a parallel operation where a slow passenger does not delay the whole line. Motorized ramps now are used to transport empty trays from the end of the channel back to the start, saving on operator time while also ensuring continuous supply of trays to passengers entering the secu- rity lane. Reconfiguring the balance between people and baggage screening proces- sesreduceslabourandequipmentcosts and at the same time harmonises the movement of people and their bags, as they move through the checkpoint. Smiths Detection has encapsulated these operational improvements to the checkpoint flow into an integrated handling system concept – iLane. iLane facilitates the passenger to pass quickly through the channel. It’s first major application is at London Heathrow’s new Terminal 5. Increased Security Plus Improved Passenger Convenience at a Checkpoint Near You! Using an integrated automation ap- proach, the Smiths Detection iLane concept incorporates a sophisticated tray handling system, with sensors identifying empty trays which auto- matically return to the beginning of the checkpoint for passengers entering the lane. Extended entry conveyors allow several passengers to load bags and personal items at any one time. Bags that are deemed suspicious by the X-ray screener are automatically diverted by the conveyor system into the secondary search area for follow- up inspection. Cleared bags carry straight through for reclaim by the passenger. By incorporating these pro- cedural approaches into a single han- dling system, the overall efficiency of the checkpoint has been dramatically improved.
  22. 22. 24 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008TRANSPORTSECURITY FranckGreverie VPStrategy,BusinessDevelopment&Marketing Thales–SecuritySolutions&Services Freedom of movement is the lifeblood of modern European economies and is one of the founding principles of the European internal market. But con- straintsremain.Today,travelisimpeded notonlybytransportefficiencyproblems and by the lack of trans-European net- works, but also by the myriad security checks that passengers must go through, and by the plethora of obsta- cles they encounter – such as different ticketing systems – every time that they switch between transport operators. The response to these challenges is twofold.Itinvolvesfindingwaystomake public transport easier to use, and it meansdeployingsecuritysolutionsthat enhancepassengersafetywithoutbeing obtrusive. This applies to travellers at airports,ontrains,onroads,ferries and sea transportation. So what are the key technologies that should be deployed to address public transport security is- sues? And what can be done on a Euro- peanleveltofosterinnovativesolutions? Enhancing Transport Security Public transport systems face a wide range of safety and security threats. These cover a broad spectrum, from low-probability, high-impact events such as terrorist attacks, to everyday anti-socialandpettycriminalbehaviour. The traditional solution has been the widespread deployment of CCTV sys- tems monitored by operators and recorded for evidential purposes. Often these have been isolated systems under local control. But systems of this type depend on the vigilance of individ- ual operators – and the limitations of this approach are widely recognised. Furthermore, conventional on-board systems – such as CCTV on trains and buses–areessentiallypassive.Theout- put is often simply recorded and cannot beviewedinreal-timeaseventsunfold. Dealing with the increasing amounts of information generated by security systems – such as CCTV networks – presents a major challenge. But smart technology can help. The latest inno- vation in integrated operation control comes with intelligent data processing performed by advanced security sys- tems. Major developments in this area include the integration of data to en- able rapid situation assessment and response planning, support for control operators, and forensic tools for evi- denceextractionfrommassiveamounts of data. Key features of today’s advanced systems include facial recognition, behaviour recognition, automatic tracking of suspicious individuals, INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT SECURITY “Developing an integrated security approach to intermodal transport systems”
  23. 23. 25 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008TRANSPORTSECURITY automatic detection of suspect objects and detection of overcrowding. Other technologies that have an impact on transport security include access control to secure public spaces and geo-localisation for vehicle tracking systems. Technology can also be used to reduce fiscal risks: transactional security plays a key role in ensuring the security of revenue collection for transport operators. Integrated Solutions Smart technologies like these bring major benefits and can be applied on all modes of public transport. But ratherthan deploying them in isolation, the trend is now to integrate these technologies to create truly intermodal systems. In recognition of this fact, Thales offers ground transportation operators solutions that integrate both security and safety dimensions to de- liver improved passenger comfort. Intermodality occurs when public transport users are able to easily switch between modes of transport and between transport operators in the course of the same trip. The main area for improvement lies in ensuring thattheswitchoverhappensassmoothly as possible. Innovation in the sphere of intermodality is being led by European countries. For public trans- port, there are certain areas where intermodality should be improved to increase safety, security and competi- tiveness.Forinstance,whilemosturban and interurban systems are now physi- cally interconnected, the ticketing systems that they use are not. But that is beginning to change. Seamless Travel Several countries are adopting an in- tegrated, national approach to their public transit systems. In the Nether- lands, Thales and its partners have paved the way for a national, fully in- teroperable secure e ticketing system to be used by multiple transport oper- ators throughout the country. When fully operational, the system will allow more than two million passengers daily to use a single ticket on the com- muter trains, subways, buses and fer- ries of all major operators nationwide. Thales is providing know-how in the design and implementation of large- scale, secure and integrated fare col- lection systems based on contactless smart cards. These are easy to use, create smooth passenger flows and offer very high security – three critical success factors for the deployment of integrated ticketing systems. This experience is now being repli- cated in Denmark and is heralding an age of seamless intermodality. ‘Park & ride’ projects, where a single ticket can be used to pay for parking and travelling on public transit systems, offer similar benefits. A system of this sort was successfully implemented in Turin by Thales for the Winter Olympics in 2006. Fostering Security Innovations For now, intermodality is still ham- pered by national regulations and standards that limit the interoperabil- ity of transport systems across bor- ders. But much more could be achieved if travellers in Europe’s trans-regional border areas could move swiftly from one country to an- other. In this context, initiatives aimed at abolishing the ‘border effect’ be- tween European member states would have a significant positive impact. Anumberofexistingprogrammeshave proved to be highly successful in pro- moting enhanced transport integra- tion. These include the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS), an initiative set up to enhance cross- border interoperability and signalling procurement by creating a single Eu- ropean standard for train control. The Galileo programme should also be a source of inspiration for policy mak- ers looking to foster public security re- search and innovation. Similarly, the Security Research Programme estab- lished and funded by the European Commission with a cross-border scheme that brings together opera- tors, academics and industry, paves the way for the next generation of safety and security systems. These provide for the detection of abnormal situations in an aircraft cabin (SAFEE), railway explosives detection and re- sponse to luggage NRBC alerts (TRIPS), integrated passenger inspec- tions (EFFISEC) and resilient au- tonomous transmission means for disaster response (ASPIS). Advanced integrated technologies – from smart ticketing to intelligent se- curity systems – have the capacity to transform transport networks, making them easier to use and safer than ever. Fostering these innovations, with the help of increased co-ordination at the European level, will play a pivotal role in turning the dream of free movement into a reality. Initiatives aimed at abolishing the “border effect” between European member states would have a significant positive impact.
  24. 24. 26 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008 Valère Moutarlier, head of the European Commission’s GMES Bureau explains the security dimensions of the GMES programme GMES CONTRIBUTION TO SECURITY ValèreMoutarlier HeadoftheEuropeanCommission'sGMESBureau ASD: Can you explain what GMES is and what it will provide, in a nutshell? V.Moutarlier:GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment & Security) aims at coordinatingexistingobservationsystems, producing services of guaranteed vali- dity and, crucially, ensuring their sus- tainability. As many of these systems already exist, GMES is meant to make best use of the existing (civilian or dual) capabilities, but also to develop new systems filling the observation gaps. The challenge for an operational serv- ice is the guarantee of service provi- sion at European level. This requires homogeneity of the coverage (in par- ticular in new member states), access to data from non-European infrastruc- ture for addressing global issues, and harmonisation of technical standards for data exchange. Finally, efficient data management and information sharing is a prerequi- site for GMES services. In that respect, the INSPIRE (Infrastructure for Spatial Information in Europe) Directive will contribute to facilitating access, use and harmonisation of geospatial infor- mation at a pan-European level. What is the security dimension of this programme and what is the budget dedicated to this area? GMES will ensure a continuous moni- toring of the main Earth elements for purposes mainly linked to environ- mental policies but also to security issues. For the latter, different imple- mentationapproachesarerequiredand different partners involved, i.e. the Member States and the Council, as well as their agencies and bodies, e.g. EDA and EUSC. For the development of the GMES services security components, the European Commission uses its R&D programmes, and especially the FP7 Space thematic programme. For the period 2007-2013 GMES will benefit from about 85% of the FP7 Space budget, which amounts to €1,2 billion. Do you have some indication of the industrial input of aerospace and defence industries in this initiative? For several years the EC and the Eu- ropean Space Agency (ESA) have been supporting projects aimed at integrat- ing existing information systems for security applications. Industry is deeply involved in these projects, which are the real test beds of GMES service components. Successful re- sults have been and are being achieved through ESA or FP6 and now FP7 proj- ects. These will now pave the way to future GMES Services in the security domain.1 1) For more information: www.gmes.info Considering the increasing number of risks and threats, how will the GMES programme address security concerns in the future? The concept of security has evolved since the end of the Cold War and the term “security” is now used in a variety of contexts. In its wider definition, se- curity refers to combating all threats that might affect our population, our institutions, our environment, our in- frastructure,oursocio-economicworld etc. Many threats are man-made, but the impact of major natural catastro- phes should not be underestimated. The memory of the Asian Tsunami of December 2004 or the dramatic fires in Greece during the summer of 2006 showed that the use of early warning and crisis management tools for natu- ral disasters is crucial. A society that lives in, and takes for granted a secure environment, de- mands action from its authorities to maintain this level of security, no mat- ter what threats may arise in a chang- ing world. In this environment, no single country is able to tackle such complex problems on its own. Through its Earth observation operational capability, GMES will contribute to the answer given at the European level. A continuous research effort (within GMES and within the security research in FP7) will also guarantee that serv- ices are state-of-the-art.
  25. 25. 27 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008 GMES will ensure a continuous monitoring of Earth for purposes mainly linked to environmental policies but also to security issues. Could you give some examples of how GMES has contributed to the security field? The security domains relevant to GMES include: "Homeland" security address- ing the security of the citizen and of in- frastructures and utilities; Border and "deep border" security including land border security and maritime surveil- lanceandsecurity;and"Global"security, including global situation awareness and EU external interventions. For all these domains, observation in- frastructure (especially through high spatial resolution optical or radar in- struments) and derived service com- ponentscouldenablepatternrecognition (e.g. detection of vessels, buildings, vehicle) as well as mapping, e.g. refer- encemapping,rapidmappinginsupport to intervention or damage assessment incaseofemergencyorcrisissituations. These products should be combined or merged with information derived from othersystemssuchaspositioningones. Moreover, this data and these products should also be combined with other in- formation provided by GMES, such as land cover and use, sea state, air qual- ity, as well as with information external to GMES (e.g. meteorological fore- casts, maps provided by National Map- ping Agencies). To what extent will GMES contribute to building a significant security capability in Europe? Taking into account the particular ins- titutional framework around security, the work on the "S" part of GMES was kickedoff with a seminar in Paris orga- nised by the Institute for Security Stud- ies (ISS) on 16 March 2007. The con- clusion that was derived from this seminar is clear: we need to work to- gether among institutions and across pillars, driven by operational security needs and not hindered by administra- tive procedures. Through its security component, GMES will contribute to existing and future security activities in Europe. These ac- tivities are undertaken by pan-Euro- pean and national authorities which have a specific mandate in this area. It is hoped that by adding a European di- mension and by reinforcing an appro- priate Earth Observation capacity at the service of these authorities, a truly European capability in security will be gradually built up. An European di- mension also implies that synergies between defence, security and civilian needsandcapacitiesregardingobserva- tion infrastructure and derived informa- tion services should clearly be explored. The Community Research programme has set up GMOSS - Global Monitoring for Stability and Security. What is the purpose of this project and how does it work? GMOSS is a network of excellence financed under the 6th EU Research Framework Programme managed by DG Enterprise and Industry. The aim of GMOSS is to integrate Europe’s civilian security research, through the involvement of entities addressing both technical and political issues, in order to acquire and enrich the au- tonomous knowledge and expertise base of Europe needs, and to foster the transfer of knowledge and methodolo- gies to the service developers and op- erators, including industry. In addition to the security-dedicated FP6 and FP7 projects, GMOSS is an important pre- cursor of the future GMES security components. Are you already working with future end-users in the field of security? The GMES Bureau is working both within the EC and with the Council and its agencies and bodies (such as EDA and EUSC) in order to identify the users' needs in the field of security. In order to make sure that the invest- ment that we are creating at the Euro- pean level has the best added value, we need to listen to all EU users. In this context, existing forums of experts in security are being screened and mo- bilised in a phased approach. First, GMES is presented to them; then they are asked to reflect on what contribu- tion GMES could bring to their activi- ties; finally, their feedback is used in order to shape the GMES service requirements. The GMES action plan runs from 2004 to 2008 and a first set of operational GMES services is scheduled for 2008. How far has this programme progressed and where are we now in the agenda? Since the Bureau was created, impor- tant progress has been made towards achieving key goals in 2008. Through projects co-funded by the Eu- ropean Framework Programme for Research and Development, there have been precursors for the first GMES services that will be demonstrated this year, covering marine, land and emer- gency response. In the last years, Expert User Groups have prepared the ground for a defini- tion of the scope and architecture of the GMES operational services. They have delivered strategic implementa- tion plans which, following consulta- tion with Member States and other stakeholders, are now the main guide- lines for validation of the first services to start through FP7 projects. While the current phase of moving towards real services is of course an exciting development, it is important to under- stand that what we are preparing with thefasttrackservicesisonlyafirststep. Later on, these services will have to evolve, and service evolution will also be a function of evolving user needs. Moreover, other services are following a similar path and should become available shortly after 2008. Work has started for a GMES atmospheric serv- ice, while, as already explained, the Bureau is working with its Council counterparts to define users’ needs in the security field. In parallel, the Bu- reau is progressing in defining with stakeholders the overall architecture for GMES and in preparing proposals for GMES governance. So, when serv- ices are ready to become operational, the necessary financial and institu- tional framework should be available. I think the most challenging task for the Commission in order to meet our political commitment to establish an autonomous and operational capability is three-fold: to successfully validate the first operational services; to en- dorse a common programmatic vision for GMES and to propose an institu- tional framework for governance and funding that enables this common vi- sion to be operational and sustainable. We are firmly committed to progress onalltheseissuesinthecomingmonths.
  26. 26. 28 ASDFOCUS02/SUMMER2008 Kathleen Barthe of Airbus explains how the Simplified Technical English initiative is an essential tool for aircraft manufacturers. KathleenBarthe FormerChairoftheASDSimplifiedTechnical EnglishMaintenanceGroup Airbus ASD: STE is the acronym of Simplified Technical English. What is the purpose of this project? K. Barthe: STE is a set of writing rules and basic vocabulary for writing tech- nical documentation. Why is it needed? Well, aerospace technical documenta- tion is provided in English. But it is read by people in many countries, and by people whose mother tongue is not necessarilyEnglish.So,inorder to avoid the risks that can arise due to misun- derstandings, the documentation has to be easy to understand for all users. When was this initiative launched and why? It all started way back in 1979. You have to remember that at that time, there were far more aircraft manufacturers than there are today, and although they all wrote in English using the same ATA Specification (known as ATA 100 at the time), their writing styles were very dif- ferent. There was documentation writ- ten in American English (Boeing, Douglas, Lockheed…),inBritishEnglish (Hawker Siddeley, British Aircraft Cor- poration) and by companies whose na- tive language was not English (Fokker, Aeritalia, and some of the companies that formed Airbus at the time, for ex- ample). On top of that, some European airlines had to translate parts of their maintenance documentation into their local language so that their mechanics could understand it. This was a source of problems for the European airline industry, and is what led them to approach AECMA in 1979 to ask the manufacturers to investi- gate the possibility of using a con- trolled form of English – and of course, for all manufacturers to use this same form. After investigation into the types of controlled languages that existed in other industries, AECMA decided to produce its own controlled English, and in 1983, set up a project group, under the leadership of Fokker. The project was not limited to the Euro- pean industry, however. The American Aerospace industry, through the AIA (Aerospace Industries Association of America) was invited to participate, especially as some AIA companies had already done some standardization along the same lines. Is STE a new technical jargon for a happy few? On the contrary. STE is not a “technical jargon”. It does not controlwhatwecall “Technical Names” (for example, words such as “bolt”, “grease”, and “corrosion”),or“Technical Verbs” (such as “drill”, “anneal”, and “upload”). It will not tell you whether you should use “landing gear” or “undercarriage” to name the element that the aircraft stands on when it’s on the ground. That’s a question for each company to decide. But it does tell you which MAKING IT SIMPLE general words you can use, “general” meaning words such as “disconnect”, “hold”, and “sharp” – the sort of words you need to have in order to make sen- tences with the Technical Names and Technical Verbs. What criteria are used in choosing words for STE? The criteria used to choose these gen- eral words were simplicity, flexibility andfrequencyofuse.Forexample,“do” issimpler,moreflexibleandmuchmore frequent than “achieve”, “carry out”, or “accomplish”. In most cases, the general words that are approved only have one approved meaning and one part of speech. This is to avoid misunderstandings. For ex- ample “about” is only approved with the meaning “concerned with”. You cannot use it to mean “approximately” or “around” (these words are them- selves approved). “Check” is only ap- proved as a noun (as in “do a check”), not as a verb (as in “check the lights”). So you will see that, as I explained above, STE is designed to help authors write in simple English, to make their documentation understandable to as many readers as possible.

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