Climate change, hydro-conflicts and human security


Published on

Published in: Technology
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Total views
On SlideShare
From Embeds
Number of Embeds
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide
  • In form of crime and straggle between groups and rapid urbanization counter argument that Abundance can induce conflicts often because of the looting of the resources is used for buying arms - Reverse causal relationship: security infrastructure such as defense wall that affect the environment or just spending the tax payer money on security instead on the environment- unfortunately in Israel we have them both- can result in severe disagreements between groups Envi threat again can be scarcity such as a drought of abundance such as floods Often causes a common environmental threat that Requires collective action (building a dam., developing a peace park) Here it always asked the question of is it genuine cooperation and peace building or “dressing up dominance as cooperation”
  • It seems that the environmental language is now saturated by security jargon To be more blunt, it seems that the envi and security high jacked each other October 2003 a report to the Department of Defense (Schwartz and Randall, 2003- from occ -10) . The report recommends that the United States commit ‘‘to a stronger national and international role to help stabilize climate change at levels that will avoid significant disruption to global security and stability’’ (CNA Corporation 2007).
  • Based on these premises and nexsus between the env and security mapes were prodiuced
  • What resources we often securitize and their nature There are dozens definitions of energy security, but most of them will stress the need for reliable supply.. The storyline is (that has started to develop) during the 1973 oil crisis often securitized the availability of extractive resources particularly oil at an affordable price.or in other words, securing the ability to gap between the incline in the demand to the harm in the supply ability. Otherwise we may face economic recession and some argue that it may lead to political unrest Solution : diversifying the resources portfolio, using less energy and advancing demand management
  • Because we can survive without our life supporting system's that are based on things such as the biodiversity and the integrality if our atmosphere. The ozone depilation ad its affect on our public health is often given as an example This existential implications of climate change is in addition to climate change other implications such as to the supply reliability of different resources and to stability of regimes,
  • First, it was defined (in the world food conference in 1974) as a world constant supply of basic food products often as a result of raise in the price food in many plaxes in the world. . A During the dacades latter (In the World Food Summit in 1996) its meaning was expanded and included securing the condition which all the people, any time and anywhere have physically and economically accessibility to safety food, nutritious and in sufficient amount to they're dietetic needs and that will provide the basis to healthy and active life (. In other words the shift has changed to the question of entitlement and the ability of the society to provide basic rights Water : the story line is similar of a shift from securing the expensation of the economy to nowadays to the concept of water as the human right that is nowadays promoted by _______ Solution:
  • Most importantly, this meant that agreements which focused only on navigation, border delineation and fishing rights (as distinct from water as a provider of habitat for fish) were excluded Next, we built a data base and conduct a textual analysis to identify the commonality of the mechanisms I mentioned.
  • Exogenous uncertainties can be divided into two categories. Exogenous Resource Uncertainties refer to perceived uncertainties related to the material nature of shared water resources. They can originate from uncertainties around variability in water quality and quantity, or from uncertainty in the vulnerability of resource systems to those variabilities. The possible occurrence of drought and flood is an example of the former while the general lack of knowledge about the impact of climate change on basin ecosystems is an example of the latter. Another set of exogenous uncertainties results from the social surrounding and the global system into which states, and their agreements, are embedded. These exogenous Background Uncertainties include political uncertainties, like the eventuality of war in the extreme case, or economic uncertainties as for example the risk of price shocks that impact demand for grain and therefore water. We can of course get In the context of this paper, double exposure is the occurrence of both resource and background uncertainties . For example, in the case of the Nile River, uncertainties over future flow regimes due to changes in rainfall and land cover combine with political uncertainties over Egypt’s possible reactions to upstream water development. If uncertainties re not addressed there is a danger that resource and background uncertainties will be manifested in overuse, degradation, and even conflict. Yet, the creation of an agreement to address resource and background uncertainties can itself create new uncertainties, uncertainties endogenous to the agreement design. This endogenous uncertainty can manifest itself as uncertainty about the implementation of a treaty by one or more parties, uncertainty about the validity and/or interpretation of collected data, or uncertainty about treaty finance. there is a general trade-off between the management of exogenous uncertainties and the manufacture of endogenous uncertainties through the management process. For example, when states try to deal with flow variability in water sharing agreements by basing allocations on percentages of river flows, uncertainty about treaty implementation can arise if insufficient data about the hydrological flow are available or if these data are or could be disputed by either party. Many of the disputes around the Ganges Water Treaty signed between Bangladesh and India in 1996 can be attributed to this scenario.
  • . exogenous resource uncertainties were most common, For example the Agreement between Portugal, Mozambique and South Africa relative to the Cahora Bassa Project signed in 1984 that the parties shall review the situation and agree on measures to be taken in case force majeure occurs. The only exogenous background uncertainty referred to in agreements is political uncertainty,. For example the Convention for the Management of the Hydraulic Power of the Rhone signed between France and Switzerland in 1913 states in article 9 that the two governments explicitly reserve for themselves the freedom to undertake any measures necessary for their national defense . Endogenous uncertainties For example the Convention between Mexico and the US on the Distribution of Water signed in 1906 states in article 2 that in case of serious accident to the irrigation system, the water delivered to the Mexican canal shall be diminished in the same proportion as the water available to the US. There was no visible trend in the frequency with which uncertainties in general were mentioned over time nor was there a visible trend in the specific types of uncertainty mentioned.
  • We found that just 60% explicitly mention uncertainties in some form Of the agreements which mention uncertainty, more than 60% mention only one form of uncertainty. Another 19% mention 2 different forms of uncertainty and the remaining 21% mention 3 or more One, the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine signed in 1998, mentions 6 uncertainties related to variability, general environmental uncertainty, scientific uncertainty, uncertainty about treaty implementation, about treaty effectiveness and infrastructural uncertainty. .
  • For most types of uncertainties, we could not identify a visible trend in the frequency with which they were mentioned in treaties across time (table 2). The three exceptions are General Environmental Uncertainty, which experienced a marked increase from the period of 1900-1949, when it was mentioned in only 2% of the treaties, to the period of 1990-2007, when it was mentioned in 24%. Secondly infrastructural uncertainty rose from 10% in the 1900-1949 to 28% in 1990-2007. Finally, political uncertainty declined from 17% in 1900-1949 to 4% in 1990-2007.
  • there has been a sharp increase in the use of mechanisms associated with the open-ended strategy, while the complete contracts approach decreased somewhat to the 70s, before increasing in frequency again. The reducing uncertainty strategy does not manifest any marked changes, except for a slight increase in its use since the 1970s. The increase in open-ended approaches can be attributed to simultaneous increases in the use of mechanisms to establish joint management institutions and the conceptually related employment of mechanisms to encourage consultation between parties and increase communication through prior notification of activ The lesser rise in uncertainty reduction strategies is due almost entirely to increased deployment of data exchange mechanisms the growing use of open-ended strategies has not resulted in a tradeoff between the open-ended and complete contracts approaches. Instead, both are often employed simultaneously
  • So this brings us to the formulation of our research question, which is to see which mechanisms are available, which are adopted, what affects their choice and what constitutes a barrier to its adoption Since we know that there is a gap between the mechanisms available and the ones adopted, we suppose these mechanisms come at a certain cost ---> which brings us to our research aim ---> of examining the costs attached to conflict resolution AND examining the indicators we selected to assess these costs So we formulated a series of assumptions or hypotheses connecting the available CRM, the costs of it and the indicators to assess the cost and verify these through a regression analysis Ultimately we aim to provide a strong incentive and a tool to negotiate more flexible and sustainable agreements
  • Climate change, hydro-conflicts and human security

    1. 1. Climate change, hydro-conflicts, and human security (CLICO) Itay Fischhendler Hebrew University EU Israel Climate Change Workshop University of Haifa
    2. 2. Introduction: CLICO <ul><li>Collaborative 3-year research project </li></ul><ul><li>Funded : EC FP7 Co-operation Work Programme: SSH (2009) </li></ul><ul><li>Led by ICTA , Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (Spain) </li></ul><ul><li>14 partners in Europe (EU +non-EU), Middle East, and Sahel </li></ul><ul><li>Area of study : med-Eur, Maghreb, Middle East, and Sahel </li></ul>
    3. 3. Focus <ul><li>Explore social dimensions of climate change: conditions under which hydro-climatic hazards infringe upon security of human populations </li></ul><ul><li>focus on water-related events (droughts, floods and sea level rise) that are expected to intensify </li></ul>
    4. 4. The causality between environment and security environment security conflicts scarcity supply demand abundance weak society legitimacy security security conflicts environmental scarcity Environmental threat collective action and trust security peace building
    5. 5. Securitizing the environment “ We have to prevent further environmental degradation. If we fail these problems will cause terrorism, tension and war” (Clinton, 1994) “ The next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not politics” (Egyptian Foreign Minister, and later UN Secretary General, Boutrous Ghali) “ The Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change.” (UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, 2007) “ climate change &quot; would challenge US national security in ways that be considered immediately&quot; ( Schwartz and Randall, 2003)
    6. 7. What are we securitizing: Reliable supply Energy security is “reliable and adequate supply at a reasonable price&quot; (Bielecki, 2002) Energy security
    7. 8. What are we securitizing: our existence Ecological security Climate security Climate security is &quot;stable climate or maintaining a rate of change below the dangerous levels for human and ecological systems&quot; (Stripple 2002)
    8. 9. What are we securitizing: our values Water and food security Food security is access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life (World Bank, 1986)
    9. 10. <ul><li>climate change –> social impacts –> security issue </li></ul><ul><li>The chain has rarely been substantiated with reliable evidence </li></ul>Motivation
    10. 11. Aim & objectives <ul><ul><li>Why some countries and communities are more vulnerable to natural hazards </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Under what conditions vulnerability becomes a security matter? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>What policies and institutions are necessary to ensure adaptation, security and peace in the face of climatic change? </li></ul></ul>
    11. 12. RESEARCH BLOCK 4 : the affect of uncertainty on the climate/security nexus adaptive capacity mechanisms Conflict Resolution Mechanisms How uncertainty is embedded Into agreements mechanisms embedded into the agreements What affect their choice What affect their performance type of uncertainties their commonality in agreements The affect of Uncertainty
    12. 13. Methodology <ul><li>A content analysis of all available agreements signed since </li></ul><ul><li>1980 was undertaken </li></ul><ul><li>Only treaties concerning water as a scarce or consumable </li></ul><ul><li>resource, or an ecosystem to be improved, are included in </li></ul><ul><li>the analysis </li></ul><ul><li>The Trans-boundary Freshwater Dispute Database was used </li></ul><ul><li>as the database </li></ul><ul><li>A total of 289 basin specific agreements signed after 1900 </li></ul><ul><li>were left for analysis </li></ul><ul><li>In each agreement we identified the uncertain language, </li></ul><ul><li>mechanisms employed to deal with uncertainties and </li></ul><ul><li>classified them according to the uncertainty management </li></ul><ul><li>strategies </li></ul>
    13. 14. treaty design resource degradation scarcity inequitable distribution Risk of uncertainty reducing uncertainty open-end approach complete contracts ignoring uncertainty treaty effectiveness + ratification internal politics global economy Exogenous background uncertainties high politics resource variability and quality resource vulnerability Exogenous resource uncertainties induced endogenous uncertainties
    14. 15. Uncertainty Language in Transboundary Water agreements, 1857-1999 Nature of Uncertainty % of sample in which mentioned Exogenous Resource Uncertainties Flow variability 49% General environmental uncertainty 13% Scientific uncertainty 4% Exogenous background uncertainties Political uncertainty 8% Endogenous uncertainties Uncertainty about treaty implementation 7% Uncertainty about data 1% Uncertainty about treaty finance 6% Uncertainty about treaty effectiveness 4% Uncertainty about treaty created infrastructure 18%
    15. 16. Frequency of Uncertainty Language
    16. 19. Change in the composition of uncertainty strategies over time
    17. 20. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms
    18. 21. RESEARCH QUESTION <ul><li>Research question: </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>What mechanisms available? </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>What mechanisms adopted in real life? </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>What affects their choice? </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>What constitutes barriers to its adoption? </li></ul></ul></ul>
    19. 22. Conceptual Model: a TC approach to CRM adoptuoon
    20. 23. box - dependent variable elipse - independent variable bold line - highly significant positive correlation thin line - significant positive correlation dotted line - significant negative correlation dashed line - highly significant negative correlation legend