After the Catastrophe: IP Resiliency In the Post-Disaster Environment

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This slide deck examines the effect that recent disasters had on Internet routing and availability including the September 11, 2001 attacks and the Japan earthquake and tsunami of 2011.

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  • Source: http://www.renesys.com/tech/presentations/pdf/renesys-030502-NRC-911.pdf
  • Source: http://www.renesys.com/tech/presentations/pdf/renesys-030502-NRC-911.pdf
  • Sources: http://conferences.sigcomm.org/co-next/2011/workshops/SpecialWorkshop/papers/1569500743.pdf Photos: NOAA, US Navy
  • Source: http://conferences.sigcomm.org/co-next/2011/workshops/SpecialWorkshop/papers/1569500451.pdf
  • San Bruno photo by Andrew Oh
  • After the Catastrophe: IP Resiliency In the Post-Disaster Environment

    1. 1. After the Catastrophe:IP Network Availability and Resiliency In ThePost-Disaster Environment.Rakesh BharaniaNetwork Consulting EngineerCisco Tactical Operationshttp://www.cisco.com/go/tacopsE-Mail: rbharani@cisco.comTwitter: @densaer
    2. 2. Agenda – After the Catastrophe The Need for Information In A Post-Disaster Environment Questioning Assumptions The role of Cisco in the Infrastructure picture Examples: 1. September 11, 2001 attacks 2. 2011 Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 3. 2010 San Bruno, CA gas pipeline explosionABAG – IP Resiliency © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 2
    3. 3. The Fundamental Problem… NGO / International Orgs Public Safety In complex disasters with multiple National, State &Transportation response organizations … Local Government How to deliver the right information in the right format to the right person at the right time? Critical Infrastructure Healthcare Defense 3 ABAG – IP Resiliency © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 3
    4. 4. Changing Technologies Affect Mission Success Evolution in People, Process and Technologies to support Disaster and Humanitarian relief Radio, Phone Integrated Mobile/Fixed Single Device Any Device Goal: Mission workflow and productivity Voice only Voice, Video, Data benefits that save lives Closed Teams Open Collaboration and speed recovery. Command&Control Centric In the field, social media, public Fixed Locations Deployable anywhere ABAG – IP Resiliency © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 4
    5. 5. Mythbusting Assumption: “When a disaster happens, telecommunications will go down.” Reality: Not always. About 60% of Haiti telecom stayed operational after quake. Other examples: Chile Quake, Japan. Assumption: “I have a cellphone, an ordinary telephone line, a PBX (etc). Why should I care about the IP network?” Reality: Everything is IP now –and has been for some time. Assumption: “The Internet is an optional luxury for public safety.” Reality: Not anymore – just as critical as radio communications. Haiti was a data- driven response.ABAG – IP Resiliency © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 5
    6. 6. Cisco’s Role in IP Resiliency As a vendor, Cisco doesn’t have direct responsibility for the health of the national telecommunications infrastructure (owned by the Service Providers such as AT&T, Verizon, etc.) But our products constitute a large part of the national communications infrastructure, We have an obligation to produce secure, reliable products and to assist where appropriate with our expertise. We participate in the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (DHS) – http://www.ncs.gov/ncc/ - ongoing public/private coordination for tech companies, service providers, Federal gov. agencies. Cisco has aggressive customer support available for crisis situations: CAP, Cisco Tactical Operations, etc.ABAG – IP Resiliency © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 6
    7. 7. September 11, 2001 Infrastructure to note: WTC 1/2: below-ground fiber from transatlantic cables & Telehouse and 60 Hudson St. 60 Hudson St: termination point to many transatlantic cables NYIIX at 25 Broadway Telehouse: peering site for 40 ISPs from NY, Europe South America and South Africa. WTC 2 collapse severed fiber between 60 Hudson and 25 Broadway Reachability disruption to <1000 BGP prefixes (less than 1% of advertised prefixes globally) No global Internet routing instability occurred (But there was with Nimda worm on 9/18/2011) Global Internet routing continued normally.ABAG – IP Resiliency © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 7
    8. 8. Location of Critical Internet Infra on 9/11/2001ABAG – IP Resiliency © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 8
    9. 9. 2011 Japan Quake and Tsunami M9.0 quake/tsunami on March 11, 2011 Internet impact: Both IIJ redundant backbone fiber links Tokyo/Sendai were severed. 20% of Japan’s total traffic dropped immediately due to outages. 3 of 8 fiber links failed to USA, but good links remained available. Japanese ISPs: “outside of immediately affected areas, no region was disconnected from Japan or the world.” Internet was used heavily by the Japanese public for streaming video, social media, etc. Rapid recovery from the event: One of the major Tokyo/Sendai fibers restored by March 12 All three trans-Pacific fibers restored by T+28 hrs ISPs reported 85-90% normal traffic T+10 days after quake Were we lucky? Most of Japan’s core Internet infrastructure was outside of the affected region. ABAG – IP Resiliency © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 9
    10. 10. Example: SINET4 Japan’s Science and Information Network (SINET4) links 700 universities, colleges, and national laboratories. While there was some network disruption (Sendai), restoration was rapid. Network continued to work normally outside of immediate area and was used for emergency information use (heavy ustream traffic, etc)ABAG – IP Resiliency © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 10
    11. 11. San Bruno CA Explosion Local communications disruption to cellphones, mobile data services immediately around the affected neighborhood. Cisco TacOps mutual aid request via NCRIC in support of San Mateo County OES. Provided communications support to Incident Command Post. GIS support through Google disaster response team for NTSB. Extensive After Action: “San Bruno Fire Technical Debrief” from CMU-SV DMIABAG – IP Resiliency © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 11
    12. 12. Conclusion Internet infrastructure in developed countries is highly resilient to disasters at a macro scale – redundant links + dynamic routing. Local disruptions are possible – prepare redundancy into your organization. Recent Internet history in disaster demonstrates it is reliable and indispensable in a crisis. ABAG – IP Resiliency © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 12
    13. 13. Questions?ABAG – IP Resiliency © 2012 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 13

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