Us Role in Israeli Conflict White Paper


Published on

The Israeli – Palestinian conflict will be examined in how the U.S. policies and involvement has contributed to issue management resolution. This case is no so unique that a general model of the de-escalation of protracted conflicts cannot be applied to a wider range of cases as the Israel and the PLO straddle the conceptual boundaries of internal and external actors.

Published in: News & Politics
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Total views
On SlideShare
From Embeds
Number of Embeds
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide

Us Role in Israeli Conflict White Paper

  1. 1. Managing Conflict 1Running head: THE U.S. ROLE IN THE MEDIATING THE ISRAELI – PALESTINIAN CONFLICT Managing Conflict By Andrew Ciccone Baruch College Professor R. J. Meyers Independent Study - Summer 2008 Communication 9900
  2. 2. Managing Conflict 2 AbstractThe U.S. Role in the Mediating the Israeli – Palestinian ConflictShocks are transitional situations or events that can instigate a major period of change in adversarialrelations by altering key expectancies. If shocks reinforce existing notions, actors are unlikely to adjusttheir strategies and actions accordingly. Should an event or shock challenge preconceived expectationson a subject, actors are more likely to reassess the validity of their orientations and if necessary revise orabandon them. Shocks can be transforming events if they cause adversaries to realize that their paststrategies cannot triumph, or there is less to be gained by maintaining a position. An event may alsoaccommodate a differing strategy that promises to offer a better alternative or favored outcome(Kriesberg, 1998; 217).Shocks can be either exogenous. or endogenous.; neither is assumed to have a more important impact thanthe other. Exogenous shocks emerge from the environment that is external to the protracted conflict(changes in the international or regional distribution of power; global war; etc.). While endogenousshocks occur within the domestic contexts of the adversaries such as leadership changes (Goertz & Diehl,1997). The more entrenched the expectations and the deeper the strategic inertia, the stronger the shocksmust be in order to shift expectations into a new direction (Thompson, 1998; Young, 1998). Criticalevents (or potentially significant transforming events) can be policy windows that allow proponents ofchange to assert their political leadership by advancing new alternatives to old problems.Third party pressures on the principal adversaries can play a significant role on resolving conflicts.External mediation (U.S. involvement) is helpful in bringing about de-escalation, but is unlikely to besuccessful in the absence of expectancy revision by either one or both adversaries or policy entrepreneurs.Shock events can play an important role here in creating opportunities for change. External mediators are
  3. 3. Managing Conflict 3 Abstractwell aware of the fact that certain periods are more propitious (or ripe) for bringing about de-escalationthan at other times. Therefore, shocks are likely to stimulate or renew third party efforts in coordinatingpeace efforts, encouraging innovative initiatives by adversaries, providing incentives for settlements, andcontributing to the implementation and durability of the agreements (Kriesberg, 1998; Hartzell, 1999;Walter, 1999). Although third party pressure is neither a necessary nor sufficient factor for de-escalation,its presence in the context of a shock event is more likely to reduce intractability than at other times.Third party pressure also needs to be considered in the context of triangular relationships. If third partieshappen to be regional hegemony (such as the U.S.A in the Middle East), bilateral relations can betransformed into triangular situations where the behavior of local actors to each other is a response toactions directed towards them. Triangular responses can be either reciprocal or inverse.The Israeli – Palestinian conflict will be examined in how the U.S. policies and involvement hascontributed to issue management resolution. This case is no so unique that a general model of the de-escalation of protracted conflicts cannot be applied to a wider range of cases as the Israel and the PLOstraddle the conceptual boundaries of internal and external actors.
  4. 4. Managing Conflict 4The U.S. Role in the Mediating the Israeli – Palestinian Conflict I. Historical Background of the Region II. Nation Boundaries III. The Expectations Created by the Media IV. Instant Access in a World of Transparency V. Managing the Flow and Control of Information VI. The Gap between the Promise and Results VII. Transformative Events Contributing to Crisis Resolution - Shock EventsVIII. Situational Crisis Communication Theory IX. Assessing the Conflict X. Conflict Resolution Strategies XI. The U.S. Role as a Stakeholder, Mediator & Facilitator XII. A Durable and Lasting ResolutionXIII. Analysis of the Impact of Shock EventsXIV. Conclusion
  5. 5. Managing Conflict 5 Managing ConflictProtracted conflicts de-escalate when adversaries assume new interpretations, understandings, andexpectations of their opponents (Adler, 1991). Changes in opinion occur when external and internalenvironmental events bring about the realization of other conceivable expectations. The gradual changesin a collective group‟s reality may occur after one defining event. The defining event that radicallychanges the public‟s attitudes is more than likely a culmination of a series of events that may have shapedopinions for a period of time spanning a number of years. Crises hasten the re-evaluation process,stakeholders move from one set of collective understandings to another. Progress is contingent upon thedirection of the public‟s shift in reality. A desired opinion on an issue is more likely to produce fruitfulnegotiations. Past history on the evolutionary framework of U.S. intervention in the Israeli – Palestinianconflict is analyzed to learn how conflict is resolved and to provide a better understanding of crisismanagement.The de-escalation of protracted conflicts ultimately depends on favorable background conditions thatencourage adversaries to believe in settlement of a desired shared vision. De-escalation may arise fromdomestic conditions, international relations, and the relations between the adversaries themselves.Protracted conflicts are evolutionary processes that are subject to change in the context of environmentalchallenges. Any resolution is doomed to failure unless there is a willingness to acknowledge and considerdiffering policies and ideologies.The Israeli– Palestinian case is not so unique that a generic model of the de-escalation of protractedconflicts cannot be applied. Since this case is neither strictly a civil war nor an interstate war, itdemonstrates that rivalry, intractable conflicts, or rivalry de-escalation do not reside exclusively in thetheoretical domain of either domestic or international conflict (Thompson, 1998). There is no reason toassume that this model is context-specific and cannot be applied to a wider range of cases.
  6. 6. Managing Conflict 6Historical BackgroundThe roots of Arab–Islamic disaffection with the West go back to the last years of the 18th century, whenNapoleon‟s armies landed in Egypt. The inception of Western colonialism imposed the Arabs andMuslims to religious reform and distinctly foreign cultural values that Arabs and Muslims ferventlyembraced medieval Islam in the hope that it would save their cultural identity. It has in many wayshardened their unfavorable views of Western culture.Some regard the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as emerging in the late 1800s, when Jewish immigration tothe Palestinian portion of the Ottoman Empire began to increase. Others date the conflict‟s start with theestablishment of the British mandate for Palestine after World War I, dated from the establishment of theState of Israel formed as a Jewish state in 1948 (Khouri, 1985) through a UN General AssemblyResolution. Israel has been attacked by surrounding Arab countries resisting its acceptance in the regionfor decades over major differences in ideological and beliefs of the origins of civilization. Theestablishment of Israel precipitated 80% of the Palestinians either fleeing or being driven out of theirhomes to refugee camps (Arzt, 1997; Morris, 1987). Arab nationalism emerged as a response to theBritish and French colonialism as well a broken promise after WWI to assisting in achieving Arabnational independence and the growing Zionist movement.Today, Zionism and Palestinian nationalism are the two main contending ideologies that encompass thestruggle over power, control of the water and land, and ethnic survival. Between 1949 and 1967,Palestine was effectively divided between Israel and Jordan, as the West Bank was incorporated intoJordan (Shlaim, 1992). After the 1967 war, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were ruled by Israel asoccupied territories. Both movements claim to represent a dispersed people - the Jews having lived inDiaspora for 2000 years, the Palestinians increasingly expelled from Palestine as a result of Jewish
  7. 7. Managing Conflict 7Historical Background (Cont’d)colonization during the last hundred years. The Palestine conflict is a conflict between two nationalmovements, Zionism and Palestinian nationalism. Both movements are involved in a state formationprocess basically concerning the territory of the former 1922 British Mandate of Palestine.Nation BoundariesA ‟nation‟ is a group whose members place loyalty to the group as a whole over any conflicting„loyalties‟. What constitutes the group, then, is a mixture of some common basic ‟social properties‟ suchas history, culture, religion, language and affiliation to a limited geographical area (IESS, vol. 11-12, p.7). The formation of Israel, the migration of Jews, the growing determination of the Jews for a nation,and the Zionist movement all contributed to the Palestinian‟s realization that they had no sense of self andthe formation of the Palestinian national movement. The concept of ‟nation‟ generally has a territorialdimension, a matter of gaining control over the area they inhabited and lost upon the formation of Israel, anew entity in the Arab world. Although of differing ideologies, Palestinians and Jews separately as anation share religion, language, history and culture; and they do so in relation to a certain geographicalarea. This struggle has developed in the context of traditional Islamic concepts of loyalty, and itsmethods for fighting Israel, and the Western nation-state concept. The common threads of home andfamily are the ideals that polarize the Jewish and Arab cultures. In Islamic culture „wantan‟ meanshomeland and „quam‟ means family or tribe (Joffé 1982).Zionist leader Arthur Ruppin has estimated the population in Palestine in 1880 to have roughly 35,000Jews, which was 7% of the total population. Jewish Emigration to Israel over the past 100 years of re-settlement as of 1946 has resulted in 608,000 Jews or 33% of the total population of Israel (Persson 1980,p. 40). The Zionist movement to create a society ‟secured by public law‟ based on the 1897 BaselProgram of The First Zionist Congress represented a real threat to the interests of the Palestinians. Bothparties want to establish independent states and both movements are still today are in a state formation
  8. 8. Managing Conflict 8Nation Boundaries (Cont’d)process. Although Israel is recognized by many states, and is a member of the UN, its many wars withsurrounding states indicate that the state formation process is unresolved. Today, there is no agreementover the boarders between Palestine and Israel and its neighbors.The Expectations Created by the MediaThe media plays an important role in the complex dynamic relationship between the policies‟ enacted andthe assessment of any crisis. The “CNN effect” or classic „watchdog journalism‟ acknowledges themedia‟s influence on governmental policy-making process. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Riceviews the media as “a problem in policymaking” because “the media wants to know what the presidenthas done for world peace today,” while implementation often takes consistent long-term effort, “and ifyou are out there, having to report every day what you are doing is not very helpful” (Kralev 2000a: 88).Conversely the media can fully support and serve policy known as the “manufacturing consent” theoryand the “news management” function. Secretary of State Colin Powell has argued that “live televisioncoverage doesn‟t change the policy, but it does create the environment in which the policy is made”(McNulty 1993: 80).It is important to identify the major constraints of real-time coverage: shortening of the time available forpolicy making and demanding immediate response to crises and events, excluding experts and diplomats,facilitating diplomatic manipulations, creating high expectations, broadcasting deficient reports, andmaking instant judgments. Real-time television coverage is able to constrain the policy process primarilybecause of the high speed of broadcasting and transmission information reducing the time of informationtransmission from weeks to minutes. The time to officially respond to the construction and destruction ofthe Berlin Wall clearly demonstrates this constraint. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy waited eightdays before making an official statement on the construction of the Wall. In 1989, President George Bushcommented after less than eight hours on the destruction of the Wall. The artificial construct of time is
  9. 9. Managing Conflict 9The Expectations Created by the Media (Cont’d)now compressed, shortening the time available for policy making and demanding immediate response tocrises and events, creating high expectations, broadcasting deficient reports, and making instantjudgments.Many policy-makers acknowledge the effects of the twenty-four-hour global news coverage on policymaking. Former secretary of state James Baker has acknowledged the effects of twenty-four global newscoverage on policy identifying three factors, two negative and one positive. Baker references the negativeeffects manifested from the need to respond quickly to events without sufficient time to consider optionsand the need to maintain control over an issue as television does subtly shape the public‟s nationalinterest. Baker also mentioned the positive impact of using global television for fast and directcommunication with foreign leaders (Kalb 1996: 7). During the 1991 Gulf War, Baker used CNN toquickly communicate the last U.S. ultimatum to Saddam Hussein (Neuman 1996:2). Tactically using themedia however, is a double- edged sword in that adversaries can also wield its power to advance theirends. Former secretary of state Madeleine Albright noticed this duality; global television coveragecontributes to policy making “because you know what‟s going on and there is a real-time sense aboutthings – “but she added that it makes you have to respond to events much faster than it might be prudent,because facts may come in incorrect, but you don‟t have time to put them in context, so you respond justto a little nugget of fact, and when you learn the context later, things change.” (Kralev 2001: 105)Scholar Beschloss (1993) has argued that the speed of this coverage may force hurried responses based onintuition rather than on careful extensive policy deliberation, and this may lead to dangerous policymistakes. In our real-time twenty-four-seven world of transparency; would President Kennedy have hadthe time to carefully consider options to resolve the Cuban missile crisis? Kennedy had thirteen days tonegotiate an acceptable agreement with the Soviets, ending the crisis. Dee Dee Myers, President BillClinton‟s press secretary also contrasted the time Kennedy had to make decisions in the Cuban crisis with
  10. 10. Managing Conflict 10The Expectations Created by the Media (Cont’d)the immediacy of today‟s reality of transparency. She contends that Bill Clinton would have about 30minutes. Meyer‟s worries that the time allowed to make an informed decision is compromised during acrisis, that‟s a troubling development. (Patterson 2000: 130–31)Former secretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger said, “The public hears of an event now in real time,before the State Department has had time to think about it. Consequently, we find ourselves reactingbefore we‟ve had time to think.” (Pearce 1995: 18) Journalists Daniel Schorr agrees with both scholarsand public officials: Think about the communication age we live in and the way nail-biting officials must make fateful decisions without time to think. And, if you are like me, you will worry a little bit when powerful people make snap decisions, trying to keep up with the information curve.In most cases, the more the time decision makers have for collecting information, consultation, andthinking, the greater is the probability of making strategic smart policies. He who hesitates is lost. Theparadox of timely responses versus careful consideration of policy options may create the impression bothat home and abroad of confusion or not being in control over events. President Jimmy Carter‟s counsel,Lloyd Cutler (Gilboa, 2003), explained that if a president does not respond quickly to a crisis, thenetworks may report that his “advisers are divided, that the president cannot make up his mind, or thatwhile the president hesitates, his political opponents know exactly what to do.” Leaders and CEO‟s alikecontinue to face the dilemma of living in a world of immediacy that the pressures of time create. Todeliberate or respond in real-time posses potential problems, a statement on television becomes acommitment to a policy that leaders may find difficult to reverse or even change.
  11. 11. Managing Conflict 11Instant Access in a World of TransparencyThe revolution in communications and Internet technologies poses new challenges and opportunities forreal change to improve the global community transcending boundaries and boarders. We are bombardedwith an enormous multitude of information streaming from channels outside the traditional sources ofcommunication. Before the global communication revolution, a message sent via a traditional media wastargeted and exclusive. Messages required either local, national, and or international channels to reachthe intended audiences. This is no longer the case; the Internet reaches everyone, everywhere, messagessimultaneously in real-time reach local and foreign audiences, including enemies and allies. Instantaccess to information anywhere-anytime creates new audiences internationally to disseminate informationand messages, and the potential to transmit misleading or outright lies that can damagereputations and further contentious relations involving governments.Reporters are expected not only to report what they see and hear but also to understand and explain eventsto audiences around the world, albeit in a manner consistent with the time constraints of television. CBS‟sLesley Stahl (Gilboa, 2003) admitted “our time to reflect on the events we covered, to put them intocontext, and figure out what was important and was not, was disappearing. This was obviously amomentous change, but little thought was given to the consequences.” Because of technologicaladvances, it is possible today to carry in a few suitcases all the equipment needed to broadcast, and ittakes only minutes to prepare for live reporting. Yet fast reporting may be incomplete at best and veryinaccurate at worst (Seib 2002: 13).Managing the Flow and Control of InformationThe “mutual exploitation” model, suggests that “policymaking cannot be done without the media, nor canthe media cover international affairs without government cooperation.” Consequently, the governmentand the media incorporate each other into their own existence, “sometimes for mutual benefit, sometimesfor mutual injury, often both at the same time” (O‟Hefferman 1993, 189). The impact of the fundamental
  12. 12. Managing Conflict 12Managing the Flow and Control of Information (Cont’d)framework of “news management” refers to the control of information and leveraging the power of themass media, demonstrated in recent wars and military operations such as the 1991 Gulf War, Kosovo, andAfghanistan (Carruthers 2000). The American employment of “embedded journalism” in the 2003 war inIraq is also a dramatic example of this mode of media-policy relationship. “News management” meansthat the media primarily functions as a tool in the hands of policymakers. Conversely, commentators andscholars refer to the CNN effect to explicate television coverage, primarily of horrific humanitariandisasters, that forces policymakers to take actions they otherwise may not have, such as militaryintervention (Robinson 2002). Critics may deliberate the extent that the media shapes our nation‟sinterests and perhaps usurps policy making from elected and appointed officials.War, diplomacy, and other international crises are complicated, it takes time to resolve this conflicts. Thepublic‟s expectation of instant results is an unrealistic expectation that the media in many ways amplifiesthis mentality. Failure to meet these expectations may result in huge disillusionment with theestablishment and may damage or complicate international diplomacy.CNN‟s Wolf Blitzer‟s reports from the Pentagon of the 1991 Gulf War troubled Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff Colin Powell, (Gilboa, 2003) “it seems as if all that remained was to organize the victoryparade.” Powell prompted the Pentagon‟s spokesperson to advise Blitzer “this is the beginning of a war,not the end of ball game.” Blitzer understandably modified the content and tone of his reports on the war.This exchange exemplifies these challenges and how to manage this situation in a positive, ethicallyresponsible manner.During the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein released a statement intended to create the impression that hewas ready to accept the allies‟ terms to end the war. News agencies around the world intimated that thewar might be over, heads of state and diplomats around the globe jammed up the White House
  13. 13. Managing Conflict 13Managing the Flow and Control of Information (Cont’d)switchboard to learn what the United States intended to do. (Gilboa, 2003) President H.W. Bush andSecretary of State Baker and he felt Hussein‟s peace plan was false and determined they had less thanthirty minutes to dismiss the Iraqi deal or risk the disintegration of the coalition fighting Hussein. Thistactic of playing out a power move via the media on a world stage is not often been employed, but it waseffectively used here to limit Hussein‟s adverse affects of television coverage. Audience multiplicitynecessitates a global response with one voice that addresses competitors and primary stakeholders alike,thus necessitating transparency.Communications professionals can no longer rely solely on the written word to conger positive imagessavvy communicators integrate site, sound, and motion in a carefully orchestrated performance to conveycomplicated ideas and issues. Images can create the intended message perhaps better than any othermode of communication. We need only remember the Kennedy – Nixon televised debate to explicate thispoint. Surprisingly many CEO‟s and leaders forget or have not fully realized the impact the media has onkey stakeholders. Before making important policy statements and pursuing significant actions,communications experts must prepare key leaders to anticipate questions the media are likely to ask andmore importantly prepare in advance responses to potentially damaging issues with persuasive strategicresponses.The Gap between Promise and ResultsThe global twenty-four-hour broadcasts create information “vacuums” that create an environment forimmediacy. Journalists, commentators, and opponents feel the pressures to speculate and interpretpolicies beforehand creating a dangerous prescient. Diplomatic transcendent events, celebrations ofbreakthroughs in negotiations between combatants, are significant as there is an opportunity to change thepublics‟ opinions (Dayan and Katz 1992). The drama and excitement of these events create highexpectations for rapid and efficient progress toward peace. Upon reflection, past American- Israeli-Arab
  14. 14. Managing Conflict 14The Gap between Promise and Results (Cont’d)peace processes clearly demonstrate that; even after significant initial breakthroughs and emotionalspeeches, difficult and long negotiations are needed to conclude agreements. The gap between thepromise of media events and the actual results often creates confusion and disappointments, as there arethose who become restless for change (Gilboa 2002b: 204–7). Clinton‟s adviser Dick Morris (Gilboa,2003) observed that policy and process are developed by the interplay of public officials, the media, andthe voters. Each has its role; each has its limitations. But none of the players recognize their limits and allare constantly trying to transcend them. Communications experts need to be involved not only in theplanning phase, but in every aspect of crafting of the policy. James Rubin‟s participation in policymaking during the Kosovo crisis and Ari Fleischer‟s presence in White House policy making in theaftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States can not be overestimated; as their effective mediarelations clearly explained very complex and potentially confusing interpretations of policy.Situational Crisis Communication TheorySituational crisis communication theory develops a prescriptive system for matching crisis responsestrategies to the crisis situation. An organization‟s reputation is recognized as a valued resource(Winkleman, 1999). Communicative response to a crisis can serve to limit and even to repair thereputational damage. Apologies require an organization to publicly accept responsibility for a crisis,thereby weakening its legal position in the event of a lawsuit (Fitzpatrick, 1995; Tyler, 1997). Asituational approach to selecting crisis response strategies as to what an organization says and does duringand after a crisis to protect the organizational reputation (Benson, 1988). The success of diffusing a crisisis married to identifying the crisis type or situation that influenced the selection of crisis responsestrategies. Situational crisis communication theory SCCT builds upon Coombs‟s (1995) previousresearch and other crisis management scholars on matching crisis response strategies to the crisissituation. Research suggests that communicators that provide instructing information, what publics needto know and do to protect them selves from the crisis, is necessary before addressing reputational
  15. 15. Managing Conflict 15Situational Crisis Communication Theory (Cont’d)concerns (Coombs, 1999a; Coombs & Holladay, 2001; Sturges, 1994). The crisis manager mustconceptualize the frame that publics use to interpret the event in order to evaluate the attributions ofpersonal control, or the organization‟s ability to control the event, and crisis responsibility, or how muchthe organization is to blame for the event. The crisis manager should select a crisis response strategyappropriate for the amount of potential reputational damage a crisis may inflict. The stronger thepotential reputational damage the more the crisis response strategy must try to accommodate the victim orvictims adversely affected by the crisis. Publics will expect an organization to do more for victims of thecrisis when the organization is held more accountable for the crisis (Coombs, 1995). The crisis responsestrategies should then mitigate reputational damage demonstrating that the organization cares for thevictims, thereby meeting public expectations.Coombs (1999b) synthesized eight crisis response strategies: 1. An attack on the accuser, in which the crisis manager confronts the group or person that claims a crisis exists; 2. Denial, in which the crisis manager claims that there is no crisis; 3. Excuse, in which the crisis manager attempts to minimize organizational responsibility for the crisis; 4. Victimization, in which the crisis manager reminds stakeholders that the organization is a victim of the crisis as well; 5. Justification, in which the crisis manager attempts to minimize the perceived damage inflicted by the crisis; 6. Ingratiation, in which the crisis manager praises stakeholders and reminds them of the past good works done by the organization;
  16. 16. Managing Conflict 16Situational Crisis Communication Theory (Cont’d) 7. Corrective action, in which the crisis manager tries to prevent a repeat of the crisis and/or repair the damage done by the crisis; 8. Full apology, in which the crisis manager publicly accepts responsibility for the crisis and requests forgiveness from the stakeholders.A basic assumption underlying much of crisis management planning is that “crises can be groupedaccording to their underlying structural similarity” (Mitroff, 1988, p. 16; see also Marcus & Goodman,1991; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). Cluster analysis s aids in simplifying and categorizing the severity ofissues to assess a crisis or crises. Preparing a crisis portfolio in anticipation of potential crisis shouldreasonably prepare organizations for most crises (Mitroff, 1988; Mitroff et al., 1996).Crisis types form three distinct clusters: the victim cluster, the accidental cluster, and the preventablecluster. The victim cluster involves crisis types in which harm is inflicted on the organization as well ason stakeholders. The accidental cluster involves unintentional actions by an organization. In these crisistypes the organization does not intend for the crisis to occur; rather, the crisis situation results from adanger associated with the organization‟s operation. The preventable cluster, on the other hand, involvesintentionally placing stakeholders at risk, knowingly violating laws or regulations, or not doing enough toprevent an accident or a defective product from reaching the market.
  17. 17. Managing Conflict 17Situational Crisis Communication Theory (Cont’d)CRISIS TYPES 1. Rumor: circulation of false information designed to harm an organization. 2. Natural disaster: a naturally occurring event (act of God) that damages an organization. 3. Malevolence/product tampering: damage by an external agent against an organization. 4. Workplace violence: an attack by an employee or former employee on current employees on the job. 5. Challenge: confrontation by disgruntled stakeholders claiming an organization is operating in an inappropriate manner. 6. Technical breakdown accident: an industrial accident caused by technology or equipment failure. 7. Technical breakdown product recall: the recall of a product because of technology or equipment failure. 8. Mega damage: a technical breakdown accident that produces significant environmental damage. 9. Human breakdown accident: an industrial accident caused by human error. 10. Human breakdown product recall: a product recall because of human error. 11. Organizational misdeeds with no injuries (to external stakeholders): management knowingly deceives stakeholders but without causing injury. 12. Organizational misdeed management misconduct: management knowingly violates laws or regulations. 13. Organizational misdeeds with injuries (to external stakeholders): management knowingly places stakeholders at risk and some are injured. Source: Coombs (1999b)Conflict Resolution MethodsThe methods change as the course of the conflict moves from one stage to another. At some point in a de-escalating conflict, negotiations may come to be regarded as an attractive way to conduct and to concludea conflict. During conflict negotiations communication with disparate ideas is often lacking asnegotiators sequester themselves from outside distractions, those who may benefit from diverse views areoften the ones most difficult to engage. Outside influences are perceived as untrustworthy or antagonisticand unacceptable negotiating partners. Problem-solving workshops can lay the preparatory groundwork
  18. 18. Managing Conflict 18Conflict Resolution Methods (Cont’d)for official negotiations. A workshop usually goes on for several days, moving through a few stages ofdiscussion and generally do not attempt to negotiate agreements. The Jews and Palestinians in Israel andin the Diaspora have engaged in ongoing dialogue groups, workshops, and encounter groups. InSyracuse, New York, a small dialogue group consisting, in equal numbers, of U.S. citizens of Palestinian,Jewish, and „other‟ communities have met since 1981 (Schwartz, 1989). To offset the asymmetry in theIsraeli – Palestinian relations balancing the numbers of each side and balancing the members‟presentations, workshop facilitators may create an environment conducive to substantive talks. No singlemediating method is completely adequate in conflict resolution, combinations of approaches arenecessary, sometimes and sometimes sequentially.Unofficial groups may also aid in generating significant social movement action that supports the workneeded to construct and sustain a just and abiding mutual accommodation between adversaries (Saunders,1985). The focus of these meetings should include sub-groups with little representation on each side torecognize how the other side sees the conflict and consider possible re-conceptualizations of the conflictso that shared gains become feasible. The process of reaching an agreement is important, but that alonedoes not determine the viability or the fairness of the agreement reached. The content of a peaceagreement also requires great attention.Convenors and facilitators of interactive problem-solving workshops, dialogue groups, back-channelmeetings between adversaries, and other official and nonofficial meetings usually play a mediator role.These settings tend to be particularly useful in preparing the groundwork for official negotiations,reviving stalled negotiations, and developing support for negotiated agreements. Interested externalstakeholders such as the United States can play a role in affecting talks and aid in problem solving. Pastexperience indicates that lower-level officials have greater success initiating dialogue for conflictresolution. Upon attaining a shared point of view, high-ranking officials often apply coercive pressure or
  19. 19. Managing Conflict 19Conflict Resolution Methods (Cont’d)promise great rewards that may bring about an accord. Un-official emissaries are have a high success ratein eventually engaging high level officials in exploratory discussions with one or more of the parties inthe conflict to be mediated. Point of fact, had the U.S. governmental contacts not met indirectly with thePLO, many experts believe that the open dialogue with the Israelis would not of been possible at thattime.Utilizing secret back channel negotiations (van der Merwe, 1989), both the Palestinian and Israelileaderships were able to explore alternative options and construct a framework for substantivepeacemaking measures without the predictable internal resistance until a deal had been struck. Both sideshave clear biases and factions within each party hold hostile views of the other side; however this stealthtactic did in fact engage Jewish and Islamic religious leaders in dialogue and in developing shared ideas(Gopin, 2001). The „Jerusalem Religious Peace Agreement‟, was drafted as a result of back channelnegotiations, We also express our wish for greater harmony and understanding between the believers – Muslims and Jews. We the descendents of Ishmael and Isaac, the children of Abraham, are united today to offer our prayers from the heart to G-d. We pray for the end of all enmity and for the beginning of an era of peace, love and compassion (Gopin, 2001).The pace of the peace process is dependent on internal and external events that impact and are beyond thecontrol of both parties. This incremental process resulted in the 1994 Cairo Agreement for Palestinianself-rule in the Gaza Strip and Jericho in May; the August 1994 agreement for the „Preparatory Transferof Powers and Responsibilities in the West Bank‟; and in September 1995 the agreement to transfer civilcontrol of the Palestinian population centers.
  20. 20. Managing Conflict 20Conflict Resolution Methods (Cont’d)A neutral mediator that is not perceived by either party as a vested stakeholder, with limited politicalpower was utilized in informal but intensive discussions, using a problem-solving approach (Holst, 1994).This tactical approach was initiated via the Norwegians, who facilitated the meetings, logisticalarrangements, and assisted in communications between negotiating Israeli – Palestinian talks (Savir,1998); both sides perceived the Norwegians as neutral, objective, and in good faith to engage both sidesin conflict resolution (Aggestam, 1999: 183). Unlike some interactive conflict resolution workshops,both sides agreed to avoid delving into old grievances (Rothman, 1997; Rouhana, 1995) which may beconsidered to be a significant factor in these meetings.Intermediaries such as the United States, using the problem-solving approach to mediation have madeimportant contributions in the de-escalation and transformation of the Israeli – Palestinian conflictproviding adversaries with the opportunity to explore substantive avenues for negotiation. The U.S.primarily assisted each side to accurately “hear” the other side‟s position; while being sensitive to avoidusing words or making references that would be construed as unintentionally provocative.Assessment of the Israeli – Palestinian ConflictThe U.S. role in the creation of Israel in 1948 was decisive (Truman, 1956: 143-169; Campbell, 1975),and alienated much of the Arab world. The Palestinians began to embrace a nationalistic movement afterthe culmination and actualization from the conflicts dominated from the Arab states and Israel, spanningfrom 1948 to 1967. The Six Day War of 1967 marks the end this intermediate phase of Israel –Palestinian conflict. The insurgent phases lead by the Palestinian Liberation Organization PLO, from1967 and onwards mark the rise of the conscious military and non-military resistance to undermine theZionist movement. The Pan-Arabic motive is reduced and the territory of Palestine, as are the cultural
  21. 21. Managing Conflict 21Assessment of the Israeli – Palestinian Conflict (Cont’d)affiliations to it (Jureidini & Hazen 1976). Religiously, the Palestinians are divided into Muslims andChristians.In 1956, the Eisenhower Administration was instrumental in securing U.N. condemnation of the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt and the passage of the resolution calling for the troops of these countries towithdraw from Egyptian territory by Eisenhower‟s pressure on the Jewish state to force compliance(Eisenhower, 1965).A key component of this protracted conflict is the Palestinians „intractability‟ or their resistance toconflict resolution (Kriesberg, Northrup & Thorson, 1989). Such intransigence results from theentrenched expectations that each side has of the other in terms of their strategies, tactics, and past actions(Modelski, 1996: 333–334). The Israeli position on the Arabs over the years has on occasion beenseemingly irrational and insensitive; at times they have exercised remarkable humility and common sense.Since June 1967 enlightened self-interest has been Israel‟s guiding principle. In the past the Arabposition on Israel has been characterized as fanatical, self-deceptive, inflexible, and morallyreprehensible. The primary barriers to a peaceable accord are the Palestinian‟s historical to takeresponsibility for past terrorist acts of violence and their rigid position on any possibility of reconciliation.Historically the Israeli government would not deal directly with the PLO, and Arab governments wouldnot directly negotiate with Israel. Given the mistrust between the two parties, the Jordanian governmentgave legal cover in 1991 to PLO in negotiations with Israel by including Palestinians approved by thePLO and by Israel in the Jordanian delegation at the Madrid conference. Anticipating the destructiveimpact terrorist acts, negotiations are predicated on a continuous step by step process as both sides share amutual expectation for the establishment of a Palestinian State. This crisis is complicated, on the surfacethe Israelis clearly have superior military capabilities, arguably a moral justification, the economic
  22. 22. Managing Conflict 22Assessment of the Israeli – Palestinian Conflict (Cont’d)resources to finance, and protect their nation, strong allies (such as the U.S.) and legal claims (U.N.resolution for the nation of Israel). The dynamics of the entire region must be considered in order torealistically assess the Israeli – Palestinian (Arab) conflict as bordering neighbors indirectly influence thissituation. Let‟s be clear the Palestinians, like the Jews have been forcibly ousted from their homes andland. The larger Arab nations in many ways have influenced this unacceptable and troubling situation forthe Jews and the Palestinians. The Israeli view is that the PLO wants to ‟annihilate the State of Israel‟(Medzini 1981, p. 547), based on article 15 in the Palestine National Charter, which speaks of theelimination of Zionism in Palestine. The PLO has argued that it does not mean a physical destruction ofpresent Israel but rather a transition process similar to the change of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe.Transformative Events Contributing to Crisis ResolutionCritical events or shocks play a critical role in transforming intractable conflicts, if they influence the keystakeholders to re-evaluate their prior expectations. A decidedly new consciousness must be realized,furthering a desire to engage in negotiations. De-escalation occurs when actors question the viability ofexisting conflict patterns and most importantly adopt new ways of thinking about their adversaries.Shock events can have escalatory or de-escalatory effect; their impacts are highly contingent on thetiming, context, and changes in a leader‟s expectations or his constituency. Jervis (1997: 126) suggestsenvironmental stimuli that set off positive feedback at one point in time can also set off negative feedbackat another as the state of a system changes. The randomness and unpredictability of shock events makesit difficult to posit a deterministic outcome; consequently, shocks are „necessary but insufficient‟ triggersfor de-escalation.Despite this variability, it is reasonable to hypothesize that shocks and expectancy changes are morelikely to bring about de-escalation when they converge with three other variables: Policy power brokerswho have been bestowed political clout to overcome the various internal factions that embrace positions
  23. 23. Managing Conflict 23Transformative Events Contributing to Crisis Resolution (Cont’d)that prohibit any substantive dialogue; External third-party pressures such as the United States who haveplayed a role as a mediator with motivations to foment a de-escalation regarding this conflict; Andreciprocity. All of these variables contribute to aiding in the initiation of de-escalation and also sustainthe process through continual reinforcement. The connections between shocks, power brokers,reciprocity, and third-party pressure are based on the expectations of the actors predicated on theresponses that are strategically formulated to address the (internal or external) forces.The actor‟s responses interpret their opponent‟s behavior, within the context of other environmentalconsiderations such as other threats and opportunities, domestic coalitions, allies, capability calculations,and competing demands for resource allocation (Thompson, 1998). During protracted conflicts, asexpectations among the adversaries become entrenched and intractable over time, strategies and policyactions become routinized. A shock event may disrupt key power brokers of their constituencies‟ notionsand expectations on critical issues resulting in actors to re-assessing previous positions validity that maylead to engaging in renewed negotiations. Conversely shocks may not alter expectancies, and maycorroborate current orientations on issues barring any substantive progress of the crisis (Kriesberg, 1998:217).Shocks can be either exogenous or endogenous, although either is more important, and one may have agreater impact on a conflict towards resolution or further diminish any desire to engage in discourse(Thompson, 1998). Exogenous shocks emerge from the environment that is external to the protractedconflict (e.g. changes in the international or regional distribution of power; global war), while endogenousshocks occur within the domestic contexts of the adversaries (e.g. leadership changes, polity alterations)(Goertz & Diehl, 1997). The more entrenched the expectations and the deeper the strategic inertia, thestronger the shocks must be in order to tip expectations into a new direction (Thompson, 1998; Young,1998).
  24. 24. Managing Conflict 24Transformative Events Contributing to Crisis Resolution (Cont’d)Disruptive transformative shock events may produce expectancy revision and eventual de-escalationsummarized as follows: 1. The emergence of external threats from a new actor(s) that downgrade the threats posed by old adversaries (Thompson, 1998); 2. Changes in domestic political leaderships and/or institutions that either increase the perception of value and goal compatibility or alter preference structures that emphasize the management of domestic problems at the expense of foreign policy problems (Bunce, 1981; Evangelista, 1991; Licklider, 1993; Lebow, 1995; Bennett, 1997; Thompson, 1998); 3. Significant decreases in the availability of economic resources that are perceived as current or impending (shadow of the future) (Stein, 1993a; Haggard & Kaufman, 1995; Dogan & Higley, 1998); 4. Or, catalytic events that cause adversaries to reconsider their assumptions about their rivals or change their ability to compete with them - e.g. military defeat, collapse and/or occupation, loss of external patronage, civil war (Tilly, 1978; Leng, 1983; Reiter, 1994; Lebow, 1995; Lichbach, 1995; Oberschall, 1996; Goertz & Diehl, 1997; Dogan &Higley, 1998).Theoretically, transformative events can have short-, medium-, and long-term effects. Beyond theimmediate impact, shocks can have a delayed effect as a result of their influence on other interveningfactors. Discerning the time frame of a transformative act makes it difficult to causally attribute thedefining event from the probable other interrelated factors that bring about change. Distance often lends aclearer assessment of what transformative act affected the significant change in attitudes and how this actbrought about that change. The complex Arab–Israeli conflict has undergone a profound de-escalation;many partial settlements have been reached:
  25. 25. Managing Conflict 25TRANFORMATIVE SHOCK EVENTS & ACCORDS 1974 – 20001974, November The Arab states at Rabat declare that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people.1976, April Palestinian nationalists win municipal elections on West Bank.1978, September A Framework for Peace in the Middle East signed at Camp David.1985, February The Jordanian–PLO accord on negotiations with Israel.1987, December Palestinian uprising (Intifada) begins.1988, July King Hussein announces Jordan‟s disengagement from the West Bank.1988, December U.S.A and PLO enter into direct communications.1991, October Middle East Peace Conference, Madrid1993, January Secret meetings initiated in Oslo, Norway, between PLO officials and unofficial Israeli representatives.1993, September The PLO and the Israeli government sign the Declaration of Principles; Arafat and Rabin shake hands.1994, May Cairo Agreement for „self-rule‟ in Gaza and Jericho.1994, August PLO and Israeli government sign „Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities in the West Bank‟.1994, October Israeli–Jordanian peace treaty signed.1995, September Israel and PLO sign interim agreement to transfer control of major Palestinian-populated areas in the occupied territories.1998, October Wye River Memorandum signed by Netanyahu and Arafat.1999, September Barak and Arafat agree to revision of Wye Memorandum and its implementation and to resume Permanent Status negotiations in an accelerated manner.2000, July Camp David II negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian delegations, mediated by Clinton.Durable SolutionsRecently U.S. peace envoys appear to be focused on resolving uncontrollable outbursts of violence thanon achieving enduring peace. One should bear in mind that even a well-founded resolution and just goalmay not automatically become the best basis for a durable settlement. As with any crisis, a successfulresolution must realistically consider the long-term prognosis for an enduring and durable settlement.
  26. 26. Managing Conflict 26Durable Solutions (Cont’d)Conflict research purports four main precepts that have a high level of success for a lasting and durablesolution: The parties‟ subjective conflict definitions are employed in a proposal; If a proposal regulates basic and/or indivisible values; If a proposal is realized at a low military level and; If a proposal promotes the realization of Human Rights.Each of the adversaries‟ opposing values creates incompatibility that is an impediment to finding apeaceable resolution to protracted conflicts. Values can be material or immaterial, divisible/indivisible,relative/absolute etc. There are also values common to each party that may be referred to as ‟central‟values. Conflicts over basic and/or indivisible values are more difficult to solve than conflicts overcentral and/or divisible values. A durable conflict solution is more likely if the proposal regulates thedistribution of basic and or indivisible values in a conflict. In Israel, a „Jewish state‟ citizens areregistered according to three criteria: citizenship (Israeli), nationality (Jewish, Arabic, British, Frenchetc.) and religion (Jewish, Christian, etc.). The main common trait of Arabs is the language, but also to alarge extent history and religion (Persson 1980, Ch. 1). Parties joining a conflict confront each others‟value hierarchies. The value among states is, ‟sovereignty‟ is a common thread between the Palestiniansand the Israelis, while ‟peace‟ is aptly associated with the Jews from the ever present threat of terror fromfactions in the region. The conflict is also regarded as an inherent difference in ideology of religionbetween the parties.
  27. 27. Managing Conflict 27Durable Solutions (Cont’d)„Peace‟ and ‟security‟ are key words in Israeli security policy. Foreign minister Yitzhak Shamir presentedthe Israeli position in the following way in 1982: Peace is fundamental to Israel‟s way of life, and Israel‟s determination to achieve it is permanent. Security is a vital guarantee of the viability and maintenance of peace. Together these two objectives provided the conceptual framework that produced the Camp David accords, and the march along this road must continue unabated. A program for continued action to secure regional stability and peace must originate from the countries and governments that will have to implement the peace and live by it.The majority of Israelis believe any peace accord should include the following elements: Negotiations between Israel and each of its neighbors, aimed at agreement on a just and lasting peace, laid out in formal peace treaties, would provide for the establishment of normal diplomatic, economic and good-neighborly relations. Recognition of the sovereignty and political independence of all existing states in the region, and of their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force, including terrorist activity of any kind. Autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district for a five year interim period, as set forth in the Camp David accords, and deferment of the final determination of the status of these areas until the end of this transitional period. Restoration of the full independence of Lebanon, through the withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces from the Lebanese territory. Negotiations, among all the states of the Middle East, aimed at declaring the region a nuclear- weapons free zone, for the security and well being of all its inhabitants (Nordquist, 1985).
  28. 28. Managing Conflict 28Durable Solutions (Cont’d)Paramount to the Israeli Jews is security for Jews. Arafat and the PLO leadership presented themselves asable to provide security against terrorism and other kinds of attacks against Israel and Jews. Israeli PrimeMinister Rabin argued that the Oslo Accord would enhance Jewish security. Specifically in regard to theOslo process both the Jews and the Palestinians view the conflict differently: Jews want assurance from the Palestinians that there will be no terror attacks. Extremists view the land as given to the Jews from God. The Palestinians view the land as their (ancestral) and the Jews representing the western (U.S.) influence. Arabs see themselves as Palestinians facing discrimination in a Jewish state. The Jews view the Palestinians as Israelis in a country with a Jewish majority.Largely due to the views listed above, Oslo agreement and „the peace process‟ was rejected. Jewishextremists viewed the conflict in terms of religious nationalism; God had given all the land of Israel tothem irrevocably. Islamic activists and ethno-nationalist Palestinians regarded the existence of a Jewishstate on their ancestral land as an unacceptable Western intrusion. Violence and forms of terror resultedthat disrupted and some believe largely contributed to the demise of the Oslo peace process.The Role of the United States as a MediatorAfter the October 1973 war, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger undertook the role as intermediaryto reach partial settlements between the Israeli and Egyptian governments and between the Israeli andSyrian governments. Kissinger used the U.S.‟s power and resources to minimize the risk for the Israeli‟sand Palestinians to further a peaceable accord. Anticipating that no comprehensive settlement waspossible at that time, Kissinger pursued a step-by-step peacemaking strategy. The adversaries negotiatedthe disengagement of their military forces, and Israel withdrew from some of the territory it occupied as a
  29. 29. Managing Conflict 29The Role of the United States as a Mediator (Cont’d)result of the war (Rubin, 1981). In 1975, Kissinger, attempted to build on the momentum from recentsuccesses of de-escalation of military forces, however, it soon became clear that the Israelis were not asflexible as the Ford Administration hoped or thought they should be. The failure to further peace resultedin President Ford to reassess U.S. policy, in March 1975 clearly straining American-Israeli relations(Sheehan, 1976: 165).Power is not enough to broker a peaceable settlement; then President Jimmy attempted to convene amultilateral peace conference in the Middle East to establish a comprehensive peace. The historic 1978trip of President Anwar Sadat‟s trip to Israel was generally viewed as a dramatic gesture and sinceredesire for peace. In 1978 President Carter invited President el-Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to CampDavid, after 13 days of seclusion mediated two agreements (Quandt, 1986). International expectations forpeace precipitated disagreements between the Carter Administration and the Israeli government.Publically President Carter decision to provide neighboring Middle Eastern nations in addition to Israelwith military weaponry was perceived as a destabilizing action creating accusations of Carter being anti-Semitic or of deliberately distancing the U.S. from Israel (Southerland, 1978). Soon after however, oneof the Camp David accords was the basis for the 1979 Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty and the other thebasis for the failed negotiations concerning the political status and authority of the Palestinians in theIsraeli-occupied territories.After the culmination of secret back channel negotiations from the PLO and Israeli officials in 1980, thePLO outlined a five-point provisional program for Palestine in a diplomatic ‟offensive‟ to Europeancountries (Elon, 1993; Makovsky, 1996). The PLO proposal outlined the Israel withdrawal of occupiedterritories as well as Jerusalem, although not ratified. The Camp David Agreement gives the Palestiniansthe right to participate in the determination of their future through negotiations on the final status of the
  30. 30. Managing Conflict 30The Role of the United States as a Mediator (Cont’d)West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a provision for self-government and participation in the work of thecommittee negotiating a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.President Reagan reaffirmed the Camp David Agreement 1982, as the foundation of U.S. policy in theregion calling upon Israel to make clear that security can only be reached through genuine peace. Furtherthat the Palestinians as well as the Arab states should accept the reality of Israel and recognize Israel‟sright to a secure future. A five-year transition period was outlined in Reagan‟s proposal, for free electionsfor a self-governing Palestinian authority. Followed by the creation d Palestinian self-government on theWest Bank and the Gaza Strip, however Jerusalem should remain undivided; its status to be decided uponthrough negotiations.The transformative event of the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait and the consequent military action bythe U.S.-led coalition forces to drive the Iraqi forces from Kuwait; ultimately lead to the U.S. governmentinitiating comprehensive peace negotiations between the Israeli government and the neighboring Arabstates. Negotiations the ensued honored a commitment made in mobilizing Arab support in the coalitionagainst Iraq. As a result of the military and peace initiatives the PLO was weakened and isolated by thePalestinian failure to join the coalition opposing President Saddam Hussein‟s actions. More than likely,given the Palestinians intolerance towards the Jews, their limited resources, and potential the repercussionfrom the neighboring Iraqis, supports the decision not to support this military offensive. U.S. Secretary ofState James A. Baker developed a complex negotiation formula (Baker & DeFrank, 1995) establishingthree arenas for negotiation: a general conference, bilateral meetings between Israel and each neighboringArab government, and regional meetings on issues of common concern: water, refugees, environment,economic development, and regional security. This engagement addressed the entire region‟s issues andattempted to provide solutions of mutual benefit to the many nations in the Middle East. Of interest here
  31. 31. Managing Conflict 31The Role of the United States as a Mediator (Cont’d)the Palestinians would be represented within the Jordanian delegation, and their relationship to the PLOveiled.Given the Palestinians severely weakened resources and position in comparison to the other neighboringnations‟, the success of the Baker proposal relied primarily on the support of the United States andEurope. The U.S. government was an attractive mediator, as it has the resources to sustain losses fromsuch an endeavor and has a long history of involvement in peacemaking development. Also at the timethe U.S. was regarded as a competent and trustworthy mediator. The Israeli–Palestinian conflictunderwent a profound transformation, proceeding slowly at times with severe disruptions andretrogressions necessitating varying types of mediators at various stages of the process. In 1993, mutualrecognition between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) resulted inIsrael turning over of the administration of the Gaza Strip and Jericho to the Palestine Authority (PA).Comparisons are made regarding the different kinds of contributions made by different kinds of mediatorswho can provide appropriate and effective contributions. Mediators include intermediaries with leverage,such as a United States President, and mediators with few material resources, such as unofficialfacilitators. Mediating effectiveness is constrained by the circumstances of each adversary, the adversaryrelations, and the historical context. Power brokers on both sides are important in bringing about de-escalation. Having the authority to overturn policy, the existing institutional structures which limit accessto the policy process and powerful supporting ideologies that reside within these institutions(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993), leaders must consolidate their political influence by effectively eliminatingor removing their internal opposition and promoting their role as reformers.
  32. 32. Managing Conflict 32AnalysisThe de-escalation of protracted conflicts is characterized by two primary phases: the period that precedesan initial political agreement between the adversaries and the consolidation period that follows the initialsettlement. The initial political agreement represents an important turning point toward conflicttermination. It is a formal recognition that the adversaries accept each other and commit themselves toadjudicating old and new conflicts in restrained, nonviolent ways (Gamson, 1995; Burton & Higley,1998). Given that initial settlements rarely resolve the underlying issues of the conflict, adversariesnegotiate the finer points of the agreement later during the consolidation period.Meanwhile, initial agreements usually exclude some groups from the negotiation process. These groupsand their leaders rarely disappear, often launching actions that will either bring down the existing regimeor undermine the terms of the agreement itself (Burton & Higley, 1998: 59). Therefore, adversaries mustconsolidate their initial settlements by continuing to make concessions and effectively handling theappearance of new shocks. The timing, pace, and quality of the concessions will influence the ability ofleaders to overcome new post-settlement shocks that could otherwise derail the de-escalation process.Moreover, when adversaries work together to overcome these shocks, they deepen their commitments tonew cooperative arrangements.Two types of post-settlement shocks could slow the transition toward greater de-escalation: removal ofthe regime through legitimate or illegitimate means and challenges to the terms of the agreement itselfthrough a continuation of the political conflict. In the former situation, electoral turnovers, rebellions, orcoups figure prominently as shocks.In the latter, radicals who reject the initial settlement made by moderates will attempt to undermine theprocess through terrorism. Both types of shocks can slow the transition process as leaders of both sidestry to deal with the security issues involved before further agreements are made. Shocks could also harden
  33. 33. Managing Conflict 33Analysis (Cont’d)the positions of the public or ruling groups against implementing the initial agreement, constrainingleaders who are willing to move ahead. In short, post settlement shocks may well change the conditionsthat brought about the initial settlement by altering or undermining the expectations that supported earliercooperative arrangements. On the other hand, a successful response to these challenges by both sidescould expedite the de-escalation process.This protracted conflict‟s resolution has failed in the past due to the positions staked out by the Israelisand Palestinians. The Palestinians insist on statehood and the Israelis offer autonomy. The U.S.‟sinvolvement is viewed by PLO leaders as excluding and opposing Palestinian statehood. Negativeinfluences such as news leaks and press conferences have severely impacted past efforts for substantivenegotiations. Secret back channel for negotiations proves to be an effective method to counterirresponsible acts that attempt to disarm any desire for peace.Three transformative events on the Palestinian side of the de-escalation process between 1979 and 1998are identified to evaluate the resolution process: 1. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, 1982; 2. The Intifada, 1987 Palestinian uprisings against Israeli occupation, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the campaign of disobedience, strikes, and tax revolts included students, teachers, laborers, small businesses, famers and the poor (Hunter, 1993; Robinson, 1997); 3. And the Gulf War, 1991 Israelis endured incessant missile attacks over 40 days resulting in one death and over 200 wounded; property damage totaled several million dollars in spite of the fact that the Israelis were not involved in the Gulf War conflict (Arian & Gordon, 1993: 228).
  34. 34. Managing Conflict 34Analysis (Cont’d)On the Israeli side of the issue resolutions: the Intifada, 1987 and the Gulf War, 1991 figure prominently.Numerous proposals for the solution of the Palestine conflict have been presented over the years bypoliticians, scholars, the military and diplomats. Many of the proposals for the solution of the Palestinianconflict presented by politicians, scholars, the military and diplomats with respect to the focus on theterritory of the former British Mandate (territories within Israel), and the positions of the politicallysignificant parties.The interaction effects between shock impacts, third-party pressure, and reciprocity are evident andsignificant in the long term, but not easily identified in real time. The Israeli invasion reinforced in theminds of the PLO the necessity of continuing a diplomatic strategy initiated in 1970s, which broughtabout changes in the institutional distribution of power within the PLO that supports a de-escalatoryforeign policy. The Israeli invasion and the forced evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon deprived thePLO of its political and military infrastructure to engage Israeli, but as a consequence this action from theIsraelis, none of the Arab states intervened on behalf of the PLO reaffirmed their belief that a nonmilitarypolicy was their best and only option (Tessler, 1994: 612). Consequently, Arafat and significant PLOleaders intensified diplomatic efforts with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the West, notably the U.S.Awhile recognizing Israel‟s right to exist. The intent was to appeal to the West, while exerting pressure onIsrael to make meaningful concessions to the Palestinians (Sahliyeh, 1986: 93; Tessler, 1994: 612–615).This policy was a clear departure from past positions regarding factions within the PLO who employedradical tactics for furthering goals strengthening the more moderate non-militant policies for peace by themid-1980s.
  35. 35. Managing Conflict 35Analysis (Cont’d)Given the proliferation of arms throughout the world, many nations and peoples such as the Afghanishave found sponsors who provide military advice and firepower. It is plausible that the Palestiniansmight find a sponsor that would enable the PLO in engage in a militant offensive. The insurgency in Iraqalso has acquired IEDs and other weaponry. Lasting and durable resolutions are seldom achieved bymilitary occupation. Any resolution that promotes the actualization of basic human rights arguably hasthe greatest chance for lasting peace. Peace requires concessions; historically Israelis have oftenmistreated the Palestinians. The U.S. presence in the Middle East has reinforced the long-standing andpersistent belief in Western imperialism. The Palestinian project this Western view towards Israelis, thequiet expulsion of Palestinians from their land merely confirms this sentiment. There must be a solutionfor the Palestinian people, not only from Israel but a cooperative effort from the neighboring Arab statesto recognize the necessity to preserve Human Rights: every people has a right to remain on land they haveheld as their own. Jerusalem is steeped in religion; preserving the origins of the great religions may beaddressed by modeling the city after Vatican City. Perhaps a permanent, neutral guard much like theSwiss would enforce policy sensitive to the religions that are of biblical relevance within the confines ofJerusalem.The Intifada Palestinian uprisings imposed on Arafat and the PLO the urgency and expectations for newactions to address the interests of local Palestinians sovereignty from Israel in the West Bank and Gazastrip. In order to gain control over the territories, Arafat and the PLO leadership believed that formalmediation with the United States was necessary to bring about negotiations with the Israelis. At theNovember 1988 Palestinian National Council meeting, the PLO formally declared their independence,condemned the use of terrorism. This dramatic announcement committed the PLO leadership supportingthe clear Palestinian boundaries within Gaza and the West Bank, publically recognizing Israel‟s right toexist and a preference for diplomacy for a peaceful settlement with Israel, rather than a military conflict
  36. 36. Managing Conflict 36Analysis (Cont’d)(Muslih, 1997: 46–48). The Intifada‟s actions contributed to bringing about a change in attitude towardsachieving sovereignty with a new strategy emphasizing diplomacy.The 1991 Gulf War and wartime curfews had a devastating impact on the Palestinian economy inside theterritories resulting in an internal power struggle. The 1993 Israeli border closings following Hamasterrorist bombings further punished the Palestinians resulting in sharp drops in employment (Sayigh,1997: 656). The divisions between Fateh and Hamas provoked a series of clashes; Arafat feared thatHamas would leverage its influence in the territories at the expense of the PLO (Sayigh, 1997: 652)potentially undermining any peaceable negotiations. Dissension emerged between Arafat and the „inside‟Palestinians over the terms of a peace settlement (between 1991 and 1993), Arafat undermined theMadrid Conference and secretly sought to deal directly with the Israelis in Oslo (Sayigh, 1997: 654–655).Finally the Arab Gulf states support-declined when the PLO publicly supported the Iraqiinvasion of Kuwait in August 1990.The cumulative effect of these events shaped the change in actions jeopardized the leadership authority ofArafat and the PLO, as a result a dramatic change in policy from being neutral on militant initiatives tostrongly supporting diplomatic policies in their dealings with Israel as factions reached out to the UnitedStates (Sayigh, 1997: 660). Arafat slashed budgets for welfare, PLO institutions, armed forces, anddiplomatic posts abroad. These policies revoked the social contract between the PLO and their traditionalconstituencies in Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria, Yemen, and other Arab countries – constituencies that wereleast likely to approve Arafat‟s 1993 Oslo policies. As Arafat effectively restructured the PLO‟sinstitutions necessitating an „occupied territories first‟ policy (Groth, 1995: 75–76).
  37. 37. Managing Conflict 37Analysis (Cont’d)The immediate impact of the 1992 national election was not only unanticipated, but was considered amajor political turnover (Elazar & Sandler, 1995). The Intifada had indirectly affected the electoraloutcome largely as a result of heightening the public‟s sense of threat and perceptions that a strongmilitary presence was needed to respond to uprisings (Goldberg, Barzilai & Inbar, 1991; Arian, Shamir &Ventura, 1992; Arian, 1996). In the long term, however, the uprising had a steady moderating influenceon the public‟s views about the future of the territories. The combined influence of shocks and powerbrokers had a significant effect, increasing Israeli-to-Palestinian agreements both in the medium and longterm. The Gulf War reinforced Prime Minister Shamir‟s views that the Palestinians were hostile to Israeland that peace was not possible (Aronoff, 1999: 31). The combined influence of shocks with third-partypressure, from the U.S. on Shamir and reciprocity failed to elicit any change in Israeli agreements untilfive years after the shock onsets has a profound influence on future Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Rabinbelieved the Gulf War demonstrated that the Israeli population had little desire to incur more deaths infuture wars and that its willingness to emigrate in order to avoid such losses was a clear indication that ade-escalation strategy was required (Aronoff, 1999: 32).Both the Intifada and the Gulf War played a significant role in bringing Rabin to the realization that thestatus quo in the territories was untenable (Aronoff, 1999; Bar-Siman-Tov, 1999). As past events shapedRabin‟s view that the Palestinian fundamentalists are uncompromising, he decisively acted to effect anagreement via diplomatic channels as opposed to a long drawn out military conflict with heavy casualties(Ben-Yehuda, 1997: 210). In the final analysis, Rabin reached the conclusion that there would not be asolution to the conflict and an end to terrorism, nor would security be enhanced, without a long termseparation between Israel and a Palestinian entity side by side. The debilitating effects of a longprotracted conflict with the Palestinians might undermine the morale and resolve of the Israeli people(Inbar, 1999: 152–162). Privately after the Oslo Accords were signed Rabin intimated the belief that the
  38. 38. Managing Conflict 38Analysis (Cont’d)security risks associated with a Palestinian state, although potentially destabilizing to both Israel andJordan was the best possible solution in the long term. This was a significant change in Israel‟s strategicthinking (Makovsky, 1996: 124; Inbar, 1999: 161).The cumulative affect from the Israeli invasion in Lebanon, the Intifada, and the Gulf War on thePalestinians combined with the U.S.s third party pressure and reciprocity to result in substantive changesin Palestinian agreements within five years of the onset of these transformative events. Similarly, theIntifada and the Gulf War on the Israeli‟s coalesced with third-party pressure and reciprocity yieldingimportant improvements in Israeli agreements toward the Palestinians within five years. Political shockstell U.S. where and what the critical events will be and are; they delineate the moment at which decisionmakers are more likely than at any other time to re-evaluate their expectations, strategies, and policies.Prevailing beliefs often override the inclination of decision makers to pursue new, risky policies thatcould undermine their positions. These study aides in intellectualizing the process and to better respondto future crises.Many Palestinians, especially those outside the occupied territories, denounced Arafat‟s efforts believinghe would become an Israeli agent to suppress Palestinian opposition and would not gain what thePalestinians in the Diaspora needed. Those who rejected the Arafat‟s policies sought to undermine themby acts of violence, often targeting Israeli citizens. The Jews of Israel and elsewhere generally supportedthe agreement. Some Jews rejected Rabin‟s efforts for giving away too much and threatening to give upeven more. The 1995 assassination of Rabin and the suicide bombing of buses in Israel resulted in achange of government in Israel. Benjamin Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister and a Likud-ledgovernment coalition was formed in 1996, greatly slowing the peace process. Netanyahu took severalprovocative actions, such as beginning construction of new homes for Israeli Jews in East Jerusalem and
  39. 39. Managing Conflict 39Analysis (Cont’d)withdrew Israeli military forces from most of Hebron. The peace process was renewed after the electionof Ehud Barak as Prime Minister in 1999. Tragically the Peace Accord reached just one year earlierprecipitated the assignation. Unfortunately this after shock resulted in a very high price to pay to furtherpeace.Empirical research on the connection between realization of basic human rights and the outbreak ofarmed conflict and war is sparse, several scholars have proposed that maintaining basic human rightsreduces tension and thus makes war less probable (see Falk 1980; Eide 1980). The content of humanrights is interpreted within different ideological and religious systems, and this is very muchthe case in the Middle East. It may be premature to assess the after shocks of the U.S. military presencein Afghanistan and Iraq. The strategic importance of Israel is more important today than ever as an ally inthe war on terror in this volatile region of the world.ConclusionsThe central feature of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict is over their claims to the same land. This struggleis often regarded as an identity-based conflict. Indeed, the formulations of the collective identitiesconstructed by leaders of the two peoples and the high degree to which members of each nation share theformulations contributed to the intractability of the conflict (Agnew, 1989). The concept of identity-based conflicts generally refers to collective identities based on ethnic, religious, linguistic, or othercommunal characteristics. Members and non-members often view these identities, alike as shared byevery member of the community. Such qualities tend to perpetuate the differences between communalgroups and to make combatants regard everyone in each group as engaged in the conflict.
  40. 40. Managing Conflict 40Conclusions (Cont’d)Consequently, such collective identities may lead to particularly destructive conflicts. Every conflict hasa course of development: it emerges, escalates, de-escalates, and is settled; each phase may vary in length,and a conflict can regress to a previous stage. The transformation of a protracted large-scale conflictusually is the result of cumulative changes, often with some set backs and dramatic forward progress.Conflict is intertwined with many other crises over time and social space; the Israeli–Palestinian conflictis a culmination of crises from regional, ethnic, and religious communities. The changing salience of oneconflict may significantly affect the salience of the others conflicts. Each isolated conflict has its owninternal course of development; no one crisis is wholly independent of the others.As the Israeli‟s clearly are the stronger party in this conflict, a strong mediator such as the U.S. canbalance inequalities for the Palestinians and help redefine a conflict by reducing its salience relative toother conflicts in which the adversaries are engaged. A principal mediator with leverage, such as the U.S.government, can exercise leverage and used a more directive mediating approaches to produce anagreement more favorable to the PLO (Ashrawi, 1995).The importance of the Middle East in international politics has been widely recognized (Fisher, 1971: 21-22; Glubb, 1971). United States‟ interests in the area are immense and multifaceted. From the early workof the missionaries and philanthropists in the nineteenth century to the present concern about oil andgeopolitics, United States involvements in the Middle East have greatly expanded in number andcomplexity (DeNovo, 1963; American Enterprise Institute, 1968; Congressional Quarterly, 1977). Sincethe end of World War II, the U.S. has emerged as a super power; Britain and France were both greatlyweakened by the war resulting in Europe‟s inability to protect Western interests in the Middle East. As aresult the U.S. aided in containing the Soviet advance there. Since the mid-1960s the Zionist movementhas been astonishingly successful in linking U.S. national interests to staunch support for the Jewish state.
  41. 41. Managing Conflict 41Conclusions (Cont’d)The Zionists purport that the U.S. and Israeli interests are inseparable, successfully tying Judaism andChristianity together.Both the Israelis and Palestinians have formulated goals based on ethno-nationalist thinking.Furthermore, the identity of the people on each side is tied closely to the same land. For the PLO, thegoal of ending the Zionist intrusion gradually changed to become the establishment of an Arab Palestinianstate alongside Israel. These ethno-nationalist formulations were not inherent in the collectiveidentifications of Jews or of Arab Palestinians. They were constructed in the course of the conflictbetween them and against other adversaries.Added to this conflict is the high degree to which the Palestinian–Israeli conflict has been intertwinedwith many other conflicts in the region and in the world affecting the crises; this was particularly evidentduring the Cold War. The pervasive perception of most Arabs in the Middle East has also shaped internaland external opinions; the current Anti-American sentiment from past U.S. Policies from the NixonAdministration reinforces that belief. The massive American airlift of arms to Israel in 1973 and the largeIsraeli aid bill of $2.2 billion proposed by President Nixon prompted the Arab oil embargo against theU.S. After-the-fact-approval is realistic for the direction of governmental policy can be influenced bymass policy preferences, yet the public is absolved from making difficult, complex evaluations of policyimpact; (Weissberg, 1976: 24).A marked shift in U.S. policy regarding the Palestinian – Israeli conflict began during the Carteradministration. President Carter had a balanced approach regarding Israel and the entire Middle East.The basis of his policies in this region viewed the entire Middle East region in efforts to resolve the Israeli
  42. 42. Managing Conflict 42Conclusions (Cont’d)– Palestinian conflict. Any future success in the Middle East depends on viewing the conflict in the entireregion.The 1991 Gulf War aggravated Arabs‟ negative attitudes towards Americans as the U.S. removed theIraqi army from Kuwait after their invasion. The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait ultimately precipitated TheMiddle East Peace Process – Oslo Accords. Saudi Arabia, for a time provided important strategic accessto the Black Sea. This relationship with the Saudi‟s provided access for U.S. Military Ships andfavorable exports of oil and free trade. After the liberation of Kuwait, at the October 1991 Madrid PeaceConference, then President H.W. Bush could not bring about a peaceable resolution to the Arab – Israeliconflict, reinforcing prevailing opinions that the U.S. favors Israel and can not to be trusted. Theunpredictability of the region and other nation‟s who could assume the role of peacekeeper is suspectgiven the advantage to the favorable cost and supply of oil exports. Perhaps the U.S. should neithersupport Saudi royals, nor meddle in the country‟s political ecology by obstructing the forces of change toensure that the production and supply of oil are not endangered. Peace and stability in the region can bestbe fostered through the promotion of a community of Middle Eastern countries brought together bymutual bonds of cultural and economic interests.The failure of the 1991 Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid, did lead to back channel negotiations,utilizing a problem solving approach, yielding a signed agreement. It can be argued that bettercommunication between all parties with their stakeholders could have furthered the peace process. YossiBeilin (1999: 3) concluded that the Israeli officials engaged in the peace process should have workedharder to explain to the public what they envisaged at the end of the process. Perhaps a more activist roleby the U.S. government, particularly in assisting the Palestinians to develop the territory under theirauthority, would have helped sustain the implementation.
  43. 43. Managing Conflict 43Conclusions (Cont’d)Mediation between members of the opposing sides at the sub-elite and the public at large levels can helpin preparing the adversaries for taking de-escalating steps, making agreements, and implementing them.Non-official dialogue groups and other forms of people to- people exchanges are likely to be especiallyimportant in such conflicts. In any event, many mediators using various methods helped the governmentof Israel and the PLO to construct and agree on terms. The participants developed the idea of a jointDeclaration of Principles (DOP); envisaging free elections in the occupied territories and the gradualestablishment of Palestinian authority within borders to be determined later. The mutual recognition ofthe PLO and the government of Israel was an important step on the path to peace and constituted anirrevocable move towards a mutual accommodation. Symbolically the signing of the DOP and thehandshaking was perceived as a positive step forward towards peace. A growing number of Palestiniansbegan to feel that Israeli Jews recognize their existence as a people, and the Israeli Jews also feel thatthere is hope that Palestinians at last will accept their Jewish State.Conditions affecting Israelis and Palestinians would have to significantly change for any mediatingactivity to be effective. Several changes occurred in Israeli–Palestinian relations prior to the transformingOslo process (Kriesberg, 1992). At the Middle East Peace Conference, held in Madrid in October 1991,Israeli and Syrian officials met face-to-face, and Israeli officials met with Palestinians approved by thePLO, albeit indirectly and within parameters set by Israel. The 1993 Israeli – Palestinian would not havebeen reached if there were a lack the authority to lead or control their constituents.Then President Bill Clinton mediated a U.S. team at the July 2000 Camp David II negotiations betweenthe Israeli and Palestinian delegations led by Barak and Arafat, respectively. In part the success of the2000 Camp David Accord was due to having both parties take control over the process, certainly allprevious efforts contributed to the success of this accord as well.
  44. 44. Managing Conflict 44Conclusions (Cont’d)Globalization does not just mean the elimination of barriers on trade, but on terror as well. Thecommunication revolution has blurred the boundaries between nations, peoples, and cultural ideologies.We must not close our minds or our boarders to our neighbors and friends around the globe. Makingpeace like war is complicated and the results are often unpredictable and risky. Communication iscomplicated as it delves with mankind. Cultures and individuals have differencing ideologies, belief, andgoals using diverse methods. Achieving peace is messy and requires perseverance, thoughtfulness, andgood fortune. It requires a wide variety of appropriate and complementary actions by many kinds ofpeople to be effective. No single method of crisis resolution or of mediation is effective for every actor inall circumstances. Different methods are appropriate as a conflict de-escalates, is transformed, and peaceis built. Identifying when a crisis arises is half the battle, finding methods to resolve these conflicts in atimely manner, with durable long-term solutions is difficult, but prudent. Peace is never fully and finallyrealized; it is not a static condition, but an ongoing process of evolving relations that must be nurtured andfought for.
  45. 45. Managing Conflict 45ReferencesBen-Dak, J. D. (1970). Time for reorientation: a review of recent research on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14; 101.Coombs, T. W. & Holladay, S. J. (2002). Helping Crisis Managers Protect Reputational Assets: Initial Tests of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory. Management Communication Quarterly, 16; 165.Gilboa, E. (2003). Television News and U.S. Foreign Policy: Constraints of Real-Time Coverage. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 8; 97.Hansen, L., Ikeda, D., Khashan, H., & Sauer, T. (2002). Viewpoints. Security Dialogue, 33; 109.Iyengar, S. & Suleiman, M. (1980). Trends in Public Support for Egypt and Israel, 1956-1978. American Politics Research, 8; 34.Kriesberg, L. (2001). Mediation and the Transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 38; 373.Nordquist, K. (1985). Contradicting Peace Proposals in the Palestine Conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 22; 159Rasier, K. (2000). Shocks expectancy Revision, and the De-escalation of Protracted Conflicts: the Israeli- Palestinian Case. Journal of Peace, 37; 699.