AIChE Annual Meeting 2013
November 7, 2013

LLNL-PRES-XXXXXX
This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Depart...
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

2

LLNL-PRES-xxxxxx
Risk Analysis

Potential
Events/Failures

Likelihood/Probability

Reduce
Threats &
Vulnerabilities

Potential
Consequences...
Integrated Approach
Pr
o
Pr tec
ev tio
en n/
tio
n

Threat
Critical Asset

n/
tio se
ga
iti pon
M s
Re

Lawrence Livermore...
KEY ELEMENTS OF RISK MANAGEMENT	

Planning and Preparation	

Risk
Identification	


Mitigation	


Risk Transfer	


Response...
§  Multiple hazards!
•  Natural disasters!
•  Technological failures!
•  Human malevolence!
§  Multiple assets/targets!
...
Unacceptable Risk

Resources
Options
Technologies

Potential Losses
Operations
Performance

Minimum Risk

Lawrence Livermo...
C

Threats

Consequences

Resources
Options
Technologies

C
C

F

Losses
Operations
Performance

Barriers for Safety and S...
§  Establish problem domain, major goals, and organizational

space !

§  Take an inventory of existing capabilities, re...
Risk Zone Process

Plant Boundary

Plant Boundary

Road Network

+

Plant Boundary + Road Network

Transmission Lines

+

...
RISK ZONE AREAS

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

11

LLNL-PRES-xxxxxx
Frequency of Fatalities Due to Man-Caused Events
Framework for hazard detection and
judgment of evidence
Quantitative dominance of PPV and NPV by
low frequency of hazard occurrence
Insensitive to false positive or false negativ...
§  For low frequency hazards, a large number of false

positives can lead to ʻcomplacencyʼ!

§  For low frequency hazard...
(NuClean) Risk and Response Management
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(NuClean) Risk and Response Management

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Ed Jones of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) presents on risk and response management both in general and with regards to nuclear waste.

The NuClean Kick-Off workshop was held on Nov. 7, 2013 at the Handlery Union Square Hotel in San Francisco, CA, co-located with the AIChE 2013 Annual Meeting.

For more information on NuClean, visit: http://www.aiche.org/cei/conferences/nuclean-workshop/2013.

For more information on AIChE's Center for Energy Initiatives (CEI), visit: http://www.aiche.org/cei.

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(NuClean) Risk and Response Management

  1. 1. AIChE Annual Meeting 2013 November 7, 2013 LLNL-PRES-XXXXXX This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC
  2. 2. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 2 LLNL-PRES-xxxxxx
  3. 3. Risk Analysis Potential Events/Failures Likelihood/Probability Reduce Threats & Vulnerabilities Potential Consequences Mitigate/ Reduce Consequences Response Management Security and Protection Emergency Response/ Consequence Management Risk Reduction: Safety & Security Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 3 LLNL-PRES-xxxxxx
  4. 4. Integrated Approach Pr o Pr tec ev tio en n/ tio n Threat Critical Asset n/ tio se ga iti pon M s Re Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Consequence 4 LLNL-PRES-xxxxxx
  5. 5. KEY ELEMENTS OF RISK MANAGEMENT Planning and Preparation Risk Identification Mitigation Risk Transfer Response and Reconstruction Preparedness Emergency Response Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Hazard assessment (frequency, magnitude and location) Physical/structural mitigation works Insurance/ reinsurance of public infrastructure and private assets Early warning systems. Communication systems Humanitarian assistance Rehabilitation/ reconstruction of damaged critical infrastructure Vulnerability assessment (population and assets exposed) Land-use planning and building codes Financial market instruments (catastrophe bonds, weather-indexed hedge funds) Contingency planning (utility companies/ public services) Clean-up, temporary repairs and restoration services Macroeconomic and budget management (stabilization, protection of social expenditures) Risk assessment (a function of hazard and vulnerability) Economic incentives for pro-mitigation behavior Privatization of public services with safety regulation (energy, water, transportation, etc.) Networks of emergency responders (local/ national) Damage assessment Revitalization for affected sectors (exports, tourism, agriculture, etc.) Hazard monitoring and forecasting (GIS, mapping, and scenario building) Education, training and awareness about risks and prevention Calamity Funds (national or local level) Shelter facilities Evacuation plans Mobilization of recovery resources (public/ multilateral/ insurance) Incorporation of disaster mitigation components in reconstruction activities Building and Strengthening National Systems for Disaster Prevention and Response: These systems are an integrated, cross-sectoral network of institutions addressing all the above phases of risk reduction and disaster recovery. Activities that need support are policy and planning, reform of legal and regulatory framework coordination mechanisms, strengthening of participating institutions, national action plans for mitigation policies and institutional development. 5 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory LLNL-PRES-xxxxxx
  6. 6. §  Multiple hazards! •  Natural disasters! •  Technological failures! •  Human malevolence! §  Multiple assets/targets! •  Facilities! •  Extended infrastructures! •  Urban-scapes! §  Multiple consequences! •  Safety and security! •  Economics! •  Societal integrity! §  Risk management objectives! •  Save lives and property! •  Effective resource allocations! •  Strategies for protection and response! Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 6 LLNL-PRES-xxxxxx
  7. 7. Unacceptable Risk Resources Options Technologies Potential Losses Operations Performance Minimum Risk Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 7 LLNL-PRES-xxxxxx
  8. 8. C Threats Consequences Resources Options Technologies C C F Losses Operations Performance Barriers for Safety and Security Develop protective concepts and management strategies Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 8 LLNL-PRES-xxxxxx
  9. 9. §  Establish problem domain, major goals, and organizational space ! §  Take an inventory of existing capabilities, resources, and management options ! §  Decision framework: logical relationships of general management objectives to technical risk! §  Define management objectives, values and preferences! §  Determine the risk ʻlandscapeʼ! Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 9 LLNL-PRES-xxxxxx
  10. 10. Risk Zone Process Plant Boundary Plant Boundary Road Network + Plant Boundary + Road Network Transmission Lines + Plant Boundary + Road Network + Transmission Lines + Plant Boundary + Road Network + Transmission Lines + Visibility + Plant Boundary + Road Network + Transmission Lines + Visibility + Slope Visibility Slope Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 10 LLNL-PRES-xxxxxx
  11. 11. RISK ZONE AREAS Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 11 LLNL-PRES-xxxxxx
  12. 12. Frequency of Fatalities Due to Man-Caused Events
  13. 13. Framework for hazard detection and judgment of evidence
  14. 14. Quantitative dominance of PPV and NPV by low frequency of hazard occurrence Insensitive to false positive or false negative rates, the number of false positives will overwhelm the false negatives as the frequency of hazard decreases
  15. 15. §  For low frequency hazards, a large number of false positives can lead to ʻcomplacencyʼ! §  For low frequency hazards, false negatives may be rare and difficult to detect, but consequences can be extremely severe! §  When false positives or negatives are found, structured tests need to be performed to determine their causes! §  Dominance of false positives over false negatives argues that trying to get to ʻzero riskʼ is destabilizing: rather, risk tradeoffs are inevitable! §  False positive and false negative rates, and frequency of hazard are initially uncertain: there must be constant iteration and feedback among the data and these factors! These issues entail the importance of the interplay and feedbacks among data and models to manage uncertainty Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 15 LLNL-PRES-xxxxxx

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