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Coming To America2004


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Coming to America, The Threat of IED\'s and Unconventional Tactics

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Coming To America2004

  1. 1. Coming to America The Threat of Improvised Explosive Devices November 8, 2004 November 8, 2004 Presented At the “Countering IED Conference,” Washington D.C. By: C. L. Staten, CEO and Sr. Analyst Emergency Response & Research Institute © Copyright, Emergency Response & Research Institute, 2001-2004. All rights reserved. Materials within this presentation may be “military/law enforcement sensitive” or For Official Use Only (FOUO) and NOT for general public presentation. Contact ERRI for permission, before any usage or redistribution of this presentation
  2. 2. Lecture Agenda Lecture Agenda I. Nature of the Threat I. Nature of the Threat II. General Assessment of Threat II. General Assessment of Threat III. Suicide Bombers III. Suicide Bombers IV. VBIEDS IV. VBIEDS V. Other Considerations V. Other Considerations
  3. 3. Presentation Perspective Presentation Perspective • While it is certainly a cliché and something we are taught to avoid in a formal presentation…it is also true… “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” it. -- George Santayana, philosopher, The Life of Reason, Volume 1, 1905
  4. 4. Nature of the Problem #1 Nature of the Problem #1 • U.S. troops and especially their leaders must realize that they are now fighting an ideology… one that is only being manifested by car bombs and other IEDs.
  5. 5. Nature of the Problem #2 Nature of the Problem #2 • This ideology has even allegedly convinced disillusioned Americans and citizens of country we consider allies to participate in this jihad.
  6. 6. The Nature of the Problem III… The Nature of the Problem III… American law enforcement officers, firefighters, and EMTs are not trained to deal with assaults that employ these types of weapons…now the favorites of the terrorists: • Belt-fed Light Machineguns • RPGs • AK-47s, • Grenades • IEDs/VBIEDS • Information about these weapons and tactics is exclusive within the purview of the United States Military…we need to change that now.
  7. 7. ERRI General Assessment of Threat • The present ERRI assessment would respectfully suggest that the near term threat to Americans and our country's security may bring: • -- a confusing mix of quot;stateless actors,“ • -- separatist and fringe quot;independence movements,quot; • -- insurgency operations, • -- terrorist attacks, • -- the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), • -- Information Warfare (IW), and • -- other unconventional tactics and threats. • The nature of our defense thinking, training, weapons, equipment, intelligence operations, and national emergency response systems must be redefined and redirected in order to meet these threats that are concurrently both devolving and evolving.
  8. 8. What to Expect… What to Expect… • The latest ERRI assessment would suggest that the tactics/techniques/ materials and methods of deployment of I. E. D.’s being used in other parts of the world will eventually find their way to the continental United States. Therefore, it is incumbent on military, emergency service and intelligence personnel to gain an understanding of the problems faced elsewhere…before they happen here.
  9. 9. Source of our troubles…Who are the Terror- Source of our troubles…Who are the Terror- Trainers of Yesterday and Today? Trainers of Yesterday and Today? • Yesterday’s Jihadist bombers learned their skills during an extended conflict with the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan…they became the teachers and tacticians who taught the future Al-Qaeda fighters • Many of today’s bombers were trained in Afghanistan camps run by Al-Qaeda, et al. • These Afghan-Arabs are now the trainers of the newest insurgents in Iraq. • Consequently, we should study tactics, techniques, and devices used against the Soviets in the 80’s for clues about what will happen in the future in America
  10. 10. Modus Operandi • Suicide bombs can be delivered by multiple means, complicating security measures Vehicle bombs: USMC barracks in – Beirut, 1983; Embassy attacks in Africa, 1996 Boat bombs: USS Cole, 2000 – Individual-borne bombs: the primary – method of attack in Israel since 2000 Terrorists will choose whichever method • is most likely to succeed against a particular target
  11. 11. General Categories – IEDs 101 General Categories – IEDs 101 • IEDs fall into three general types of categories: • Package Type IED • Vehicle-Borne IEDs (VBIEDs) • Suicide Bomb IED • Though they can vary widely in shape and form, IEDs share a basic and common set of components and consist of the following: • An initiation system or fuse; • Explosive fill; • A detonator; • A power supply for the detonator; and • A container.
  12. 12. Inquiring Minds Want to Know… Inquiring Minds Want to Know… • Why haven’t we already seen multiple improvised explosives devices being used in the continental United States?? Let’s examine the scope of the problem…
  13. 13. The Threat Is Spreading The Threat Is Spreading • 1990-2002: 1990-2002: • During the 1980s: 1980s Israel India Lebanon Pakistan Kuwait Yemen Algeria Sri Lanka Chechnya Kenya Tanzania Panama Argentina Croatia Australia Turkey Saudi Arabia Afghanistan
  14. 14. Recent Attacks in Iraq Recent Attacks in Iraq
  15. 15. Some VBIEDS in Baghdad, Iraq Some VBIEDS in Baghdad, Iraq Jordanian Embassy Blast – Iraq: 07 Aug 2003 U.N. Compound Blast – Iraq: 19 Aug 2003
  16. 16. History of Some Significant Car Bombs in 2004 History of Some Significant Car Bombs in 2004 Mass car bombings (by date) Location Dead Device September 18, 2004 Kirkuk, Iraq 23 car bomb September 14, 2004 Police station, Baghdad, Iraq 47 car bomb September 9, 2004 Australian Embassy, Jakarta, Indonesia 9 car bomb September 4, 2004 Police academy, Kirkuk, Iraq 20 car bomb July 28, 2004 Police station, Baquba, Iraq 70 mini-bus bomb June 26, 2004 Hilla, Iraq 23 car bombs (2) June 24, 2004 Police stations, Mosul, Iraq 62 car bombs (5) June 17, 2004 Iraqi army recruitment center, Baghdad, Iraq 35 car bomb April 21, 2004 Police stations, Basra, Iraq 74 car bombs February 11, 2004 Iraqi Army facility, Baghdad, Iraq 47 car bomb February 10, 2004 Police Station, Iskandariya, Iraq 53 truck bomb January 18, 2004 Coalition Headquarters, Baghdad, Iraq 31 truck bomb
  17. 17. Suicide Bombers Suicide Bombers • The Implications of Suicide Bombers are just becoming known • Have been repeatedly been shown to cause mass casualty incidents • Worse-case scenario suicide bomber + WMD (See handout and later slide)
  18. 18. Why Suicide/Homicide Bombers? Why Suicide/Homicide Bombers? • First, suicide attacks generally result in a larger number of casualties on average than do other types of terrorist attacks. From 1980 to 2001, suicide attacks reportedly represented only 3%of all terrorist attacks but accounted for 48% of total deaths due to terrorism. • Second, suicide attacks usually attract more publicity than do other types of attacks. The fate of the bomber him- or herself is part of the story, and the large number of victims, again, ensures public attention. • In cost/benefit terms, suicide attacks are financially inexpensive: according to one expert, the price of materials used in a suicide attack in Israel is about $150.46. Rewards for terrorist organizations, on the other hand, can be large. • Fourth, the use of suicide operatives helps to control the timing and placement of attacks. If there is no need to provide an escape route for the attacker, the complexity of the plan is greatly reduced. • Finally, suicide attacks can be especially intimidating for the target population and contribute greatly to the main intent of the act itself…named to cause fear and undermine public confidence in the government being targeted.
  19. 19. Basic Dress and Behavioral indicators of Basic Dress and Behavioral indicators of Suicide/Homicide Bombers Suicide/Homicide Bombers • Unseasonable dress or conspicuous, bulky clothes • Obvious or awkward attempts to “blend in” to a crowd • Repeated and nervous handling of parts of clothing • Profuse sweating, slow-paced walking while focusing on sides • Attempts to stay away from security personnel • Hesitant, nervous muttering (praying etc.) • Perfumed, recently shaved
  20. 20. Recent Electronic Initiators - Iraq Recent Electronic Initiators - Iraq • Electronic Initiation of I.E.D. – Some examples of previous devices
  21. 21. Communication Initiators Communication Initiators Communication devices have also been used to initiate explosions…
  22. 22. Madrid Train Bombing Madrid Train Bombing
  23. 23. Simple Alarm Clock Initiator Simple Alarm Clock Initiator • And there are various kinds of timing devices used to initiate devices…
  24. 24. Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) (VBIEDs) Dhahran Barracks Bombing 14 Sep 04 - Baghdad
  25. 25. VBIEDS VBIEDS • Vehicle borne IEDs (VBIEDs) are devices that use a vehicle as the package or container of the device. These IEDs come in all shapes, colors, and sizes which vary by the type of vehicles available — small sedans to large cargo trucks. There have even been instances of what appeared to be generators, donkey drawn carts, and ambulances used to attempt attacks on Coalition Forces and the New Iraqi Government. • Larger vehicles enable larger amounts of explosive that can be used, resulting in a greater effect. Functioning of devices can vary within the same methods as the package types and can have the same common characteristics or indicators as other IEDs. • VBIEDs have increasingly used larger amounts of explosives, and the explosive charge has ranged anywhere from 100lbs to well over 1000 pounds. The explosive charge has included items such as mortar rounds, rocket motors, rocket warheads, PE4 explosives, and artillery rounds. • A growing technique in VBIED attacks in Iraq has involved the use of multiple vehicles. In such instances, the lead vehicle is used as a decoy or barrier buster. Once stopped or neutralized and with coalition forces starting to move to inspect or detain – the main VBIED comes crashing though and into the crowd before detonating; thus resulting in an increase of the casualty ratio.
  26. 26. Frequency of VBIEDs… Frequency of VBIEDs… • quot;We focus a lot on IEDs, but probably the most significant problem, and the one that concerns me the most is car bombs. While we have an idea of what we need to do with IEDs, car bombs are much more difficult. Any vehicle on the highway or on the road can be a car bomb. And how do you tell one from the other?quot; Maj. Gen. John Doesburg, commander of Research, Development and Engineering Command said in an Oct. 21 interview with “Inside the Army.” • During the first 15 days of October, troops in Iraq reported at least 30 car bomb incidents, according to The Washington Post.
  27. 27. Tactics Used in the 12 May 2003 Riyadh Tactics Used in the 12 May 2003 Riyadh VBIED Attack VBIED Attack • Multiple targets • Simultaneous attacks • Multiple vehicles per target • Assault/breaching cadre accompany the VBIED to clear security personnel and gain access to the Riyadh Attack on Housing compound. Compounds – 12 May 2003 Additional Reference:
  28. 28. Some Potential VBIED Indicators: Some Potential VBIED Indicators: • Theft of explosives, blasting caps, or fuses, or certain chemicals used in the manufacture of explosives. • Rental of self-storage space for the purpose of storing chemicals or mixing apparatus. • Delivery of chemicals directly to a self-storage facility or unusual deliveries of chemicals to residential or rural addresses. • Chemical fires, toxic odors, brightly colored stains, or rusted metal fixtures in apartments, hotel/motel rooms, or self-storage units. • Rental, theft, or purchase of truck or van with minimum (1) ton carrying capacity. • Modification of truck or van with heavy duty springs to handle heavier loads.
  29. 29. Surveillance of Targets Surveillance of Targets • It is likely that “bad guys” involved with executing several recent attacks conducted extensive preoperational surveillance of the compounds selected. • Meticulous planning, to include extended pre- operational surveillance, is a hallmark of Al-Qaeda (or associated) terrorist attacks.
  30. 30. Recent Car & Truck Bombs… Recent Car & Truck Bombs… • Beware of secondary vehicles and personnel clearing the way for the actual VBIED. On several occasions, dating back to Australian Embassy the African embassy Blast, Jakarta, Indonesia bombings, a primary Sep 09, 2004 vehicle tried to clear barricades/ obstacles and gate guards just prior to the onslaught of the vehicle containing the bomb…
  31. 31. Some Respectfully Suggested Solutions… Some Respectfully Suggested Solutions… • Better HUMINT • Better analysis of the enemy and the devices • Rapid dissemination of technical info. concerning IED/VBIED to the street/ field (“technical bulletins”?) • “Mutual Aid”
  32. 32. Some Suggested Solution II… Some Suggested Solution II… Now is the time to find a way to work together…to do less will undoubtedly result in the unnecessary injuries and deaths of American citizens…
  33. 33. Some Specific Counter-Measures/Solutions -- III Some Specific Counter-Measures/Solutions III • Ensure a knowledgeable, and aware public, emergency responders, and troops • Better/More Armor Protection For All Vehicles to be used in the hostile zone Vehicles • New and Better IED jamming and sensor technology • Robots to disarm and detonate the devices before they explode • Manned (Heliborne) Unmanned aerial vehicles to recon areas before travel • Analysis of data that should be gathered and shared from each attack: a. Common database, to be shared with Homeland Security Forces b. Attack information is also fed into intelligence databases (i.e. Pathfinder and Starlight) c. “Activity and association” analysis of events as they happen, with rapid dissemination of terrorist tactics and techniques…
  34. 34. And, don’t forget Improvised WMDs… And, don’t forget Improvised WMDs… • One more note before concluding… We should not forget the possibility that improvised devices of the future will contain chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological materials materials. • May be used as primary or secondary devices • It is one of the few ways that the terrorists could potentially increase the death toll of one of their attacks…something that they have vowed to do. (see hand-out supplied with presentation)
  35. 35. It Ain’t Over…Until It’s Over… It Ain’t Over…Until It’s Over… • IOHO: This is not a problem that is not going to go away. It is a potentially burgeoning issue that we believe is “Coming to America” and one that we (collectively) must address before it becomes the “life and death” situation that we have seen elsewhere… • We welcome your comments, questions, recommendations, suggestions and criticism.
  36. 36. Additional Military References Additional Military References • TC 20-32-5 Commander's Reference Guide: Land Mine and Explosive Hazards (Iraq) • 1st Infantry Division Soldier’s Handbook To Iraq 1st Infantry Division November 2003 [PDF 3.66 Mb] • Iraq Purple Book - Operational Support Guide for Joint Service EOD for Iraq Area of Operations NAVEODTECHDIV November 1, 2002 • CALL Handbook 03-33: Convoy Leader Training Handbook Center for Army Lessons Learned November 2003 -- The purpose of this handbook is to provide a quick-reference TTP guide for convoy commanders and their subordinates on how to train for and conduct tactical convoy operations on the asymmetric battlefield in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. [PDF 1.68 Mb] • Convoy Leader Training Handbook: Revision I 32nd Transportation Group KUWAIT 8 August 2003 -- The purpose of this handbook is to provide a field guide for convoy leaders conducting long haul operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The focus is on planning, preparing and executing operations to counter level I and II threat. [PDF 388 Kb] [MSWord Version 871 Kb]
  37. 37. ERRI ERRI Emergency Net News Emergency Net News We Monitor the World for You! We Monitor the World for You! • More Information?? EMERGENCY RESPONSE & RESEARCH INSTITUTE (ERRI) EmergencyNet News Service ERRI Threat Assessment Services 6348 North Milwaukee Avenue - #312, Chicago, Illinois 60646, USA Voice/Voice Mail: 773-631-ERRI Fax: 773-631-4703 Internet E-Mail: Web Page: © Copyright, 2004, Emergency Response & Research Institute and the author. All rights reserved. This presentation contains military and law enforcement sensitive information and should not be distributed to the general public. Contact ERRI/EmergencyNet News for more information about any usage of this presentation.