It started out as a beautiful day, the kind of day that I wish I was out playing golf rather than working. The Austin Fire Department was having a meeting for all the chief officers just south of downtown Austin. We have these periodic work sessions to discuss new programs or do some group problem solving.
We would soon find out that it was going to be anything but a normal day.
Incident # 10013603 At 9:18 am a light box was dispatched to 1827 Dapplegrey. A light box alarm is two engines, an aerial and a command unit. It is roughly half of what we normally dispatch to a structure fire. The reason it started as a light box alarm was because the time delay for dispatching a full box alarm was unacceptable. We found that when we first dispatched a light box we got units out the door an average of 40 seconds faster. So as soon as the light box was dispatched it was upgraded to a full box alarm. As the first unit left the station they saw the column of smoke. The first unit on the scene was Engine 28, reporting fire throughout the entire structure. There was glass found in the back yard well away from house indicating a possible explosion. Within a few minutes of arrival, an Austin Police officer reported there was a woman by the name of Sheryl Stack on scene stating she was the homeowner and that she believed her husband was inside the structure, possibly attempting to commit suicide. She asked that we check the garage to see if her husbands truck was there. The house was almost fully involved, we were in a defensive mode, and we were hoping there was no truck in the garage. The garage was checked and there was no truck. The wife immediately stated that her husband has a plane and that we need to check to see if it is still in the hangar at Georgetown municipal airport. Things are beginning to get a little strange.
Sheryl Stack actually arrived on scene before the first fire unit arrived. She called 911 to report the fire a few minutes after the first 911 call. Investigators looked hard at her to make sure she was not involved with the arson. To this day it is not believed she was involved. Mrs. Stack told the dispatcher her husband had gone crazy the night before and that she and her daughter had left the house to stay in a nearby hotel. The Stacks were having marital problems and had already privately decided to get a divorce. The argument was so bad Sheryl Stack did not feel it was safe for her and her daughter to stay in the house.
Joseph Andrew Stack III was a software engineer. He started two software companies in California that ultimately failed. According to his 3200 word manifesto, a 1986 tax law made it difficult for people in his profession to work independently rather than for a corporation. He moved to Texas around 2003 and started up another software company. He played bass guitar for a local band called the Billy Eli Band. Joe Stack had at least two tax issues that did not go his way. According to Stack’s Father-in-Law, Jack Cook, Stack had a hang-up with the IRS that strained his marriage. Joe Stack’s friends and neighbors have reportedly told media outlets that they never saw any kind of deep seated anger in Joe Stack. In the first hour or so after the Stack home was burning, Sheryl Stack stated to law enforcement that Joe Stack internalized everything. When they had arguments he would just shut down and stop communicating. All indications are he was a ticking time bomb.
This aerial view of the Stack home shows the close proximity to exposures.
This photo shows what it looked like as Austin Firefighters first arrived on scene at the Stack house. One of the first actions taken by fire crews was to protect the exposure on the “B” side of the structure. Dapplegrey Command called for an investigator early into the incident because they were suspicious about how the fire progressed so rapidly prior to their arrival.
Georgetown airport is approximately 20 miles north of the Dapplegrey house. Law enforcement went to check to see if the plane was still at the airport.
Georgetown Municipal Airport is a general aviation airport. It primarily serves the owners of private aircraft. The airport has seen an increase of activity since Austin closed its old airport in 2000. However, it is still fairly quiet during the week and there are two self serve fueling stations available 24-7.
Joe Stack owned a Piper Cherokee PA-28-236 Dakota. It is a four-seater aircraft that carries a maximum of 72 gallons of fuel.
This is an animation of Joe Stack’s Flight path. It is a little slow so I’ll just talk over it a bit until we get to the last 30 seconds or so. The day of the incident it is believed that Stack rigged his house to burn, wrote his manifesto, drove to the Georgetown airport. Loaded a 55 gallon drum into his aircraft and filled the drum with as much fuel as he could. The FBI has not yet released any information regarding Stack using his credit card to purchase aviation fuel at the self serve pump in Georgetown. The FBI did tell us that Stack purchased two 55 gallon drums a few months before the incident. One of those drums was found next to his truck at the airport. It was made to look like a bomb, however it was just a fake. He also left a note addressed to the IRS in his vehicle. The information in that note has yet to be released. Joe Stack took off in his Piper Cherokee Dakota at approximately 940 am. If you’ll remember from an earlier slide, the first 911 calls reporting the fire on Dapplagrey were at approximately 9:15 am. It is highly unlikely that Joe Stack set the fire at his home, drove to Georgetown airport, and then took off in his aircraft. The time to drive to Georgetown airport from his house on Dapplegreay is almost 30 minutes. By looking at the flight path, Joe Stack flies directly over his neighborhood before taking a hard right bank straight at the Echelon Building. It was reported a few days after the incident that they believe they found the remnants of the second 55 gallon drum in the Echelon fire debris.
It just so happened that one of our smaller local fire departments was training across the highway from where the aircraft flew into the Echelon Building. Next is a little montage of media reports about the incident.
Upper and lower flanges are consistently under protected or unprotected while the web appears to have been consistently coated. Some areas look like there is physical damage to the coating but the obvious damage seems to be related to the protection of the web and does not appear to be related to the flange conditions.
Engine 604 is a unit from a neighboring jurisdiction in the same county. On arrival, engine 604 saw there were employees attempting to evacuate the structure so they focused their initial efforts on rescue.
Engine 21 arrived a minute or so after Engine 604, only because they were dispatched on a medical call – a report of a burn injury. We’ll talk a little more about that later. Engine 21 worked with Engine 604 to evacuate people from the 2 nd floor, and then began a search of the second floor. They were unable to complete that search before being order out of the building due to changing from an offensive attack to a defensive attack.
As Engine 604 and 21 began rescue efforts, a 28 year old employee of a glass company was driving by. He saw the folks near a broken window on the second floor and stopped to help. He assisted five people to safely evacuate the building.
Command 901 arrived and assumed Command of the incident.
Quint 19 took up position on the “Charlie” side of the building and was first given instructions to search the 3 rd and 4 th floors. Just after entering the building Q19 received the order to exit the building for a change in tactics. Quint 19 then set up for defensive aerial operations. After achieving partial knockdown, defensive tactics were halted and offensive operations began again. Quint 19 assisted with extinguishing the fire on the second floor.
Engine 33 supplied the Fire Department Connection for the sprinkler system.
Engine 44 laid a supply line to Engine 33 as engine 33 supplemented the sprinkler system. Engine 44 also used its deck gun during defensive operations to knock down exterior fire from the “Alpha” side of the building.
Engine 16 assisted Engines 44 and 33, by going to the hydrant Engine 44 first connected to and maximized the hydrant by accessing all three hydrant outlets.
Rescue 14, a two person unit, was assigned as water supply due to the difficulties Engines 33 and 44 were having with low water pressure.
Engine 31 responded on 2 nd Alarm. Engine 31 laid a line to support Ladder 31’s defensive aerial operations.
Ladder 31 took position on the “David” side of the building and used its aerial nozzle to knock down a great deal of fire on that side of the building. After the fire was extinguished, Ladder 31 used its aerial to look for a missing person on the second floor. After the fire was knocked down, all engines were order to stop flowing water to give the building time to drain. There was concern about the stability of the building.
Engine 38 was assigned as the Rapid Intervention Crew, what we call the RIC Team. Their job was to stand by and be prepared to assist or rescue any fire fighter that got into any kind of trouble. Another way to put it is to rescue the rescuers.
Engine 2 positioned at a hydrant, maximized it, and supplied Quint 19 for aerial operations.
Engine 23 supplied water Ladder 18. Engine 23 also assisted with primary and secondary searches after the fire was extinguished. Engine 23 located the missing victim.
Ladder 18 positioned on the “Alpha” side of the building for defensive aerial operations.
This was the initial Command Post
Status and Benchmark clipboard used by Westlake Fire Department.
The City of Austin has a Command vehicle that was utilized for this event. The following pictures show the results of the work conducted by unified command. The Initial objectives included maintaining the perimeter, Rehab, extinguish the fire, maintain the traffic flow, and be aware this is a criminal investigation so we have to protect the scene as much as we possibly can.
Resources were tracked, radio channels were designated, and the players in the Command and general staff were identified.
The next action plan was built for the next operational period.
The incident was documented on scene with the use of laptops in the mobile command vehicle.
City Leaders walk to the media briefing. Next is a few observations of the incident from AFD Chief of Staff Harry Evans.
Notification and response were exceptional given the fact we had firefighters from an adjoining jurisdiction training across the highway from the incident. We have been training with our adjoining jurisdictions for years, plus we have automatic aid agreements, which has created familiarity. Everyone flowed into the command and response structure with few issues which I will detail in the lessons learned area. The EOC was staffed and functioning quickly. That is another area we are comfortable. The EOC is activated almost monthly due to large incidents or weather related events. All agencies are familiar with the surroundings and the processes of the EOC. Thanks to Law Enforcement connecting the dots we knew we would be inundated with media and we prepared accordingly. We established a Policy group and took over a classroom in another Echelon building. We literally crafted the first, very simple media release approximately and hour and a half after the aircraft struck the building. Since we knew we had an intentional act early on, we had to pressure the FBI to join us at the Command Post. The ranking agents on scene were still a little overwhelmed trying to get organized and account for their people since they were in the building next door to Echelon 1. There were over a dozen law enforcement agencies on site, or officed in the area, but we knew the FBI would be the lead on the criminal investigation because of a MOU between the NTSB and the FBI stating the FBI would lead the investigation into intentional aviation events. Next is an interview with Austin Battalion Chief Warren Weidler discussing his initial concerns.
As I stated earlier, we had fast notification and response. One of the pleasantly surprising events about this tragedy was the evacuation plan that had been practice and well executed by the IRS. There were approximately 190 IRS employees officed in Echelon 1. They evacuated, reported to their meeting sites, and completed their accountability in about ten minutes. Before we had our first alarm companies on scene and committed, we knew the first head count had one person missing. The IRS worked hard on their occupant evacuation plan and practiced it often enough to be very proficient. Several law enforcement agencies were used to assist with traffic. We were located next to a major north-south thoroughfare and we needed to keep traffic moving as best possible. Another fortunate aspect to assist our organization and response was the fact that the FBI and the Joint Terrorism Task Force had their offices in the building next to Echelon 1.
There were several factors as to why we had unified command up and running almost immediately, one – we had another jurisdiction that was first to respond to the event, two – the FBI was literally on site, and three – we are very comfortable operating in unified command in Austin with the weather events and so forth. Partly because it was a major event, it seemed all of the senior staff for most of the responding organizations were on scene and participating. The mobile command post is highly visible and helps incoming senior staff to find their check in point. Having the policy group on site assisted with fast decision making and helped the PIOs with their media briefings.
This little meeting happened within 20 minutes of the start of the incident. Here we are organizing into the Policy group, intel group, and command and general staff.
Activation of the EOC was essential. We now had three sites involved with this incident – The Dapplegrey fire, the Echelon fire, and now Joe Stack’s vehicle at the Georgetown Airport which initially appeared to have an IED. It was much easier to order resources from the EOC rather than through fire dospatch.
Electronic documentation used at the Emergency Operations Center.
Because we had information that this was an intentional event, it allowed us to coordinate the Public Information and craft the message. We felt like we had a little advantage because normally the media digs up some information before we us, but in this instance we were a little ahead of the media. It felt like we being proactive rather than reactive.
We had time to meet with the policy group and craft the message. The Policy group, who delivered some of the briefings, were literally on top of the information and that allowed us to better manage the event.
After consulting with most of the federal agencies on scene, we decided to have APD continue as the lead agency within unified comand. Even though the AFD had more personnel involved initially, we knew this was a criminal investigation and we needed to coordinate our efforts with law enforcement as much as possible. The FBI relied on Austin Police to handle many aspects of the investigation until they could assemble enough personnel to work the scene. From my vantage point is was a very collaborative process.
We struggled with accountability, especially with Law Enforcement. When major event occur on the fire ground we take a par (personnel accountability Report) of all our personnel. Changing tactic from offensive to defensive is a major event. We took a par after the first change in tactics and it was difficult to get an accurate par. At that point there was no handle on law enforcement and we had no clue who was there and what they were doing.
Law Enforcement needs to work on accountability. Another issue was the folks on scene from the nearby jurisdiction that responded from their training across the street. Some had unit designations with both personnel and their vehicle, and some were calling themselves by a unit designation but they had no vehicle. That was a challenge for Operations to overcome when they were moving people in and out of rehab and also trying to move assets.
7 different fire/EMS departments working the incident.
15 different law enforcement agencies.
Six other agencies either involved or affected by the event.
8 different agencies or city departments working in the EOC.
We have an expectation that the home lead agency take command of incidents in its jurisdiction. The first five or six AFD units that arrived on scene did not assume command or unified command. The Fire Chief of the Westlake Fire Department was in Command for about the first 15 minutes before and AFD Battalion Chief assumed fire command in a unified command structure. The first in units were have a great deal of difficulty getting any talk time on the fire ground channel. Some were self assigning while others were positioning where they though appropriate and the officer was going to the command post for a face to face. Sectors were not initially set up which added to the confusion of arriving units. With over 24 years of experience Incident Management we feel we still have more training to accomplish, especially for our chief officers in dealing with large incidents. There were a couple of instances where the EOC was not utilized to access resources, which ultimately slowed down the process.
With an influx of so many agencies we have to be able to respond quickly with identifying who needs to be on site and who we need to hald at bay. Without vests it was impossible to tell who belonged and whether they were involved with the incident or not. Law Enforcement needs more training and experience in incident management. Even though we seemed to be well organized at the top end of the management structure, we were not communicating well enough. We need to force ourselves into planning and briefing meetings to foster communication.
We were cognizant to the fact we had an intentional event, and we were actually trying to address secondary hazards, but we did not set up a group to deal with that until hours into the incident. We did not request for our engineers until into the incident. Law Enforcement was in charge of perimeter control. We clearly need to work on it. We continue to struggle with accountability.
We discovered that the first AFD resource sent to this incident was Engine 21 on a medical – burn injury. Apparently, an IRS employee called in the event on 911 and was directed to EMS for the burn injury. We estimate there was about a 40 second delay in sending the resources needed to handle this incident. When we traced back the history of why the call was handled this way, the 911 center claims that EMS unilaterally made the change without consultation or input from other agencies. EMS denies it went down this way. We are still looking for answers. Even though we had three fire ground channels. Only one was used primarily. We have to practice separating groups for communications. We found that the phone system at the EOC was a little complicated, and we need more instructions and training in their use. We found that we were relying on cell phones too much, and need to have standard numbers to the command post.
Supporting the sprinkler system was critical. It saved the building. We are not confident in the use of private (on ground fire hydrants). We had major water pressure problems early on. We need to look hard at our requirements, training, testing, and maintenance of private hydrants. We are finding that when we work closely with neighboring jurisdictions we do not always speak the same language. (bundle, high-rise pack) Again, we need to add CBRNE concerns to our checklists for certain incidents. We had a little freelancing on the fireground when officers could not give or receive orders.
Discussed Discussed Discussed The Intel group morphed into the Policy group and we lost some communication there. Engine 2 – How did they get assigned? They heard the call and decided it was too cool to miss, so they drove to the northern end of their territory so that locution would pick them for the call. Discussed
The first arriving Engine (21) has to move a cruiser and a motorcycle to get access. The cops parked and locked most of their vehicles and then walked closer to the incident to get a look. Discussed We did not call for the coroner until we found the body 6 hours later, We should have notified them sooner. Handling traffic around the incident was taxing on law enforcement. They needed help, probably from the EOC. We need to discuss this type of situation with our neighboring jurisdictions. Especially personnel without apparatus. Very confusing. Discussed
Excellent evacuation procedures. 112 personnel evacuated and accounted for in less than 10 minutes. Why? Because they have a plan that is practiced with clear responsibilities for managers.
Review procedures Teach evacuation routes Assign roles (special needs) Update information Set Meeting place Update changes
Practice. Practice. Practice.
Here is the website for what we consider to be a best practice in evacuation procedures.
These are representative flows with the maximum number of sprinklers open. Early in the fire progression individual sprinklers likely were flowing at greater rates and would explain the retention of the end sprinklers on branches 28 and 29 (4.3 and 4.0 gpm respectively) above. Flow was interrupted at least once and Engine 33 was at times unable to maintain pressure on the riser. This could explain the loss of end sprinklers on branches 22 and 23 (9.0 and 9.5 gpm respectively) above. Flows could have been smaller by about 1 gpm depending on the actual pressure and flow provided by Engines 16, 44, and 33.
Echelon Plane Crash
Echelon I Plane Crash February 18, 2010 Austin, TX City of Austin Fire Department Austin, Texas
<ul><li>This presentation and its contents may not </li></ul><ul><li>be reproduced, in part or in entirety, without </li></ul><ul><li>the express written consent of the </li></ul><ul><li>Austin Fire Department. </li></ul>
<ul><li>February 18, 2010 </li></ul><ul><li>Clear skies, light winds, mid 50’s </li></ul><ul><li>Just a normal day… </li></ul>
9:18 a.m . 1827 Dapplegrey Lane – house fire 09:18 Structure Fire- Residence 1827 Dapplegrey Lane, Austin TX Engine 28 reporting smoke can be seen from station upon departure. 09:24 Engine 28 on scene reporting fire throughout the house with one exposure. A woman reporting her husband was possibly inside, possibly part of a suicide attempt. 09:30 Battalion 3 changes strategy to defensive attack only. 10:21 Fire under control.
February 18, 2010, Austin, TX – clear skies, light winds, mid 50’s 9420 Research Blvd – Echelon I Building 09:56 Structure Fire – Large explosion, unsure what it is. 10:00 Engine 604 on scene requesting next unit report to parking lot side of building. ESD units at training exercise across the highway. 10:02 Witness reports plane crashed into building. Numerous reports to Dispatch—large explosion, plane crash, huge fireball, smoke and flames visible. 10:04 AFD Quint 19 on scene. 10:07 Unified Command established on west side of building. 10:11 Triage setup on west side of building. 10:11 Staging area for AFD 2 nd alarm units: parking lot on Jollyville Road side of incident. 10:13 CV1 vehicle dispatched for CP.
9420 Research Blvd – Echelon I Building (timeline cont’d) February 18, 2010, Austin, TX – clear skies, light winds, mid 50’s 10:47 EOC activated. 10:55 Primary search 2 nd floor complete. 10:56 No-fly zone requested around incident site. 11:00 Offensive fire operations re-initiated. 11:21 Building power cut. 11:23 Fire knocked down. 13:50 Fire under control. 16:34 Missing employee found in structure.
Incident Planning Takes Time and Commitment! 7. GENERAL SAFETY MESSAGE: Maintain personal accountability. Wear PPE appropriate to the situation. Maintain hydration. Report all injuries to Safety. 6. WEATHER FORECAST FOR OPERATIONAL PERIOD: Today: Sunny with highs in lower 60's. South winds at 5mph becoming SE 10-15 in the afternoon. Tonight: Partly cloudy lows in mid 40's, south winds at 5-10 mph 5. GENERAL CONTROL OBJECTIVES FOR THE INCIDENT (INCLUDE ALTERNATIVES) Maintain perimeter Provide for rehab of responders Complete fire suppression Maintain traffic flow Transition to Law Enforcement event Complete ICS organization Maintain communications with key agencies/persons Ensure safety of all Responders 4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD (DATE/TIME) 2/18/2010 event-1900 3. TIME PREPARED 1400 2. DATE PREPARED 2/18/2010 1. INCIDENT NAME Echelon Event INCIDENT OBJECTIVES
7. GENERAL SAFETY MESSAGE: Maintain personal accountability. Wear PPE appropriate to the situation. Maintain hydration. Report all injuries to Safety. 6. WEATHER FORECAST FOR OPERATIONAL PERIOD: Today: Sunny with highs in lower 60's. South winds at 5mph becoming SE 10-15 in the afternoon. Tonight: Partly cloudy lows in mid 40's, south winds at 5-10 mph 4. OPERATIONAL PERIOD (DATE/TIME) 2/18/2010 1900- 0700 5. GENERAL CONTROL OBJECTIVES FOR THE INCIDENT (INCLUDE ALTERNATIVES) Maintain perimeter Provide for rehab of responders Continue fire overhaul Provide for evidence preservation Maintain traffic flow Complete transition to Law Enforcement event Maintain communications with key agencies/persons Ensure safety of all Responders 3. TIME PREPARED 1600 2. DATE PREPARED 2/18/2010 1. INCIDENT NAME Echelon Event INCIDENT OBJECTIVES Incident Planning Takes Time and Commitment!
City Leaders Convene at the Echelon I Building
Aftermath <ul><li>Andrew Joseph Stack (pilot) departed Georgetown Municipal Airport at 09:40 in a single engine Cherokee Piper aircraft and crashed into Echelon I at 09:56 </li></ul><ul><li>1 fatality (Vernon Hunter, IRS employee) and 2 civilian injuries </li></ul><ul><li>5 civilians rescued by passerby Robin DeHaven with extension ladder from 2 nd floor </li></ul><ul><li>Over 300 responders, including: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>37 front line fire apparatus and over 125 firefighters </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Over 150 law enforcement vehicles and over 250 law enforcement personnel </li></ul></ul>
Summary of Incident and Significant Findings <ul><li>Notification and Response </li></ul><ul><li>Interagency Cooperation and Unified Command </li></ul><ul><li>EOC Coordination </li></ul><ul><li>Joint Information Center </li></ul><ul><li>Criminal Investigation </li></ul>
Notification and Response <ul><li>Nearly immediate response </li></ul><ul><li>County Fire Departments training within city limits </li></ul><ul><li>Evacuation plan and procedures practiced and well executed </li></ul><ul><li>Law enforcement integration for traffic management </li></ul><ul><li>Local FBI offices and JTTF next door </li></ul>
<ul><li>Unified Command established very early </li></ul><ul><li>High degree of familiarity with Unified Command concept and key public safety personnel </li></ul><ul><li>Assignment of senior personnel with advanced incident management skills training to key Command and General Staff positions </li></ul><ul><li>Use of City of Austin Command Vehicle as highly visible Command Post </li></ul><ul><li>On-site policy group and JIC </li></ul>Inter-Agency Cooperation and Unified Command
Joint Information Center <ul><li>Established early </li></ul><ul><li>City of Austin maintained lead </li></ul><ul><li>Co-located with policy group on site </li></ul><ul><li>Split between on-site (local media) and EOC (national/international) </li></ul><ul><li>Scripted releases and scheduled briefings with policy group </li></ul>
City Leaders Convene at the Echelon I Building
Criminal Investigation <ul><li>Austin Police maintained lead </li></ul><ul><li>Communication, coordination, information sharing occurred without delay </li></ul><ul><li>Proximity and relationship among FBI, JTTF, and Austin Police facilitated investigation </li></ul>
Accountability <ul><li>Law enforcement needs systems for rapid personnel tracking and accountability for overwhelming response and integration into an incident </li></ul><ul><li>Personnel operating under company radio designators without actual corresponding apparatus </li></ul>
Austin Fire Department ESD 2 Pflugerville FD ESD 3 Oak Hill FD ESD 6 Lake Travis Fire Rescue ESD 9 Westlake FD Austin/Travis County EMS Williamson County EMS Participating Fire Departments and EMS Agencies
Austin Police Department Travis County Sheriff Williamson County Sheriff FBI Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives TX Dept. of Public Safety Texas Rangers Federal Protective Services AFD Arson Investigations Univ. of Texas Police Dept Austin Community College Police Department St. Edwards University Police Department Secret Service Transportation Security Administration US Treasury Participating Law Enforcement Agencies
Texas Division of Emergency Management Texas Commission on Environmental Quality US Army 6th Civil Support Team Federal Aviation Administration National Transportation Safety Board Other Participating Agencies
Austin Homeland Security Emergency Management Austin PIO Austin Fire Department Austin/Travis County EMS Austin Police Department Austin/Travis County Health and Human Services Department Austin Emergency Operations Center Participants Travis County DEM ESD 9
Command/Management <ul><li>Expectations on transfer of command when operating in another jurisdiction </li></ul><ul><li>Central check-in location </li></ul><ul><li>Inadequate ICS structure below C&G staff </li></ul><ul><li>Advanced IMT training for personnel </li></ul><ul><li>Review EOC notification </li></ul>
<ul><li>Need for rapid credentialing plan </li></ul><ul><li>ICS vests </li></ul><ul><li>Continued training of law enforcement in NIMS/ICS concepts </li></ul><ul><li>Establish clear planning and briefing schedules </li></ul>Command/Management
<ul><li>Need cogent plan for addressing CBRNE </li></ul><ul><li>Request engineers early </li></ul><ul><li>Perimeter control </li></ul><ul><li>Accountability systems </li></ul>Safety
Communications <ul><li>Undocumented change in 911 call-taking process </li></ul><ul><li>Multiple talk-groups not used effectively </li></ul><ul><li>Timely notifications of critical partners </li></ul><ul><li>Complex EOC phone system </li></ul><ul><li>Dedicated numbers at command vehicle </li></ul>
Firefighting/Response <ul><li>FDC support critical </li></ul><ul><li>Private water systems </li></ul><ul><li>Need for common terminology </li></ul><ul><li>Need for SOG to address CBRNE at certain incidents </li></ul><ul><li>Company officers employing sound tactics and strategies </li></ul>
Areas for Improvement <ul><li>Automatic Aid inside another jurisdiction and the transfer of command </li></ul><ul><li>“ Who’s Who” in law enforcement </li></ul><ul><li>ICS structure/vests </li></ul><ul><li>Law enforcement intel/information sharing </li></ul><ul><li>Freelancing/call-jumping </li></ul><ul><li>Resource Request Process </li></ul>
Areas for Improvement <ul><li>Law enforcement vehicles impeding access </li></ul><ul><li>Criminal/terrorist act necessitates sweeps for additional hazards/devices </li></ul><ul><li>Coroner’s office notification </li></ul><ul><li>Traffic signal coordination </li></ul><ul><li>Neighboring jurisdictions assistance/communication </li></ul><ul><li>Joint information coordination </li></ul>
IRS Evacuation Procedure <ul><li>102 employees (193 assigned to building) and 10 visitors were rapidly evacuated, accounted for, and reported to Command in less than 10 minutes after impact </li></ul><ul><li>Keys to Success </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Detailed Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Clear manager responsibilities </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Clear employee responsibilities </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Annual drill </li></ul></ul>
IRS Evacuation Procedures <ul><li>Management Responsibilities </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Review OEP procedures periodically with employees </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Ensure employees know evacuation routes/assembly areas </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Assign monitors to employees requiring special assistance </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Maintain and update employee emergency information </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Account for assigned employees after evacuation </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Coordinate team member changes </li></ul></ul>
IRS Evacuation Procedures <ul><li>Employee Responsibilities </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Know your OEP </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>When alarm sounds, evacuate building </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Know your evacuation routes </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Follow instructions of security and OEP officials </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Move at least 300 feet from building </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Gather in the pre-determined location for accountability </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Do not re-enter building until instructed to do so </li></ul></ul>
IRS Evacuation Procedures <ul><li>Can be viewed as “best practice” for public and private sector office environments </li></ul><ul><li>Copy of IRS Occupant Emergency Planning: </li></ul>http://www.irs.gov/irm/part10/irm_10-002-009.html
February 18, 2010 Echelon Building I Installed Fire Protection and Sprinkler Performance Issues
<ul><li>Building permit issued June 1982 </li></ul><ul><li>Four-story office building without fire sprinklers </li></ul><ul><li>Minimum construction (for four stories): Type II-H </li></ul><ul><li>Maximum area without sprinklers: 72,000 sq. ft. 1979 UBC/UFC were the applicable code </li></ul><ul><li>Reported total area: 66,440 sq. ft. </li></ul><ul><li>Sprinkler design submittals: February 1990 </li></ul><ul><li>Sprinkler design basis: Light Hazard (Office) </li></ul><ul><li>UBC allowed sprinkler substitution for one hour </li></ul>A Retrofit System
Courtesy Structures PE, LLP, 1018 W. 11th ST Austin, Texas
Courtesy Structures PE, LLP, 1018 W. 11th ST Austin, Texas Courtesy Structures PE, LLP, 1018 W. 11th ST Austin, Texas 40x Magnification
Courtesy Structures PE, LLP, 1018 W. 11th ST Austin, Texas
Reference: http://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/melting-temperature-metals-d_860.html Melting Points of Metal Elements Symbol(s) Melting Point ° C Melting Point ° F Aluminum Al 660 1218 Brass (85/15) Cu/Zn 900-940 1650-1720
Melting Point ~ 1220 ° F (660 ° C) Aluminum Window Frames
At least 62 sprinklers operated Noted Point # 4 Floor Plan: Noted Point #4 Partially Melted or Destroyed Destroyed/Melted Out Operated & Intact Did Not Operate Unknown – Not Seen or Not Recognized
14 sprinklers operated First Floor Sprinkler Operation
Third Floor Sprinkler Operation Secure Area Not Accessible 13 sprinklers operated ( > 80 total)
<ul><li>~250 to 300 gpm - 3 rd floor (13 sprinklers) </li></ul><ul><li>575-700 gpm on the second floor to the 62 sprinklers </li></ul><ul><li>~300 to 350 gpm - 1 st floor via 14 sprinklers </li></ul><ul><li>600-800 gpm to 3” break at the coupling (requires 120 to 150 psi at Engine) </li></ul><ul><li>FL ~95 psi in 70+/- ft of 4” thin wall piping at 2000 gpm </li></ul><ul><li>1800 to 2000 gpm total estimated flow (maximum 2150 due to FL) </li></ul>Approximate Flows
<ul><li>KXAN-TV (NBC, Austin) </li></ul><ul><li>Erik Vasys, Federal Bureau of Investigation </li></ul><ul><li>Willie Oliverez, Internal Revenue Service </li></ul>Special Thanks To
IRS Evacuation Procedures <ul><li>Can be viewed as “best practice” for public and private sector office environments </li></ul><ul><li>Copy of IRS Occupant Emergency Planning: </li></ul>http://www.irs.gov/irm/part10/irm_10-002-009.html