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Walking the REDD+ line: Insights from CIFOR's REDD+ Global Comparative Study


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Presented by Arild Angelsen, from the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU), during CIFOR's side event 'REDD+: Where does it stand and what is needed now?' at UNFCCC's COP23 in Bonn, Germany, on November 9, 2017.

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Walking the REDD+ line: Insights from CIFOR's REDD+ Global Comparative Study

  1. 1. Walking the REDD+ line: Insights from CIFOR’s REDD+ Global Comparative Study - incentives, MRV, strategy, government reform COP 23, 9. November 2017, Bonn Germany 1 Arild Angelsen Professor, School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU), Ås, Norway & Senior Associate, CIFOR , Bogor, Indonesia
  2. 2. GCS REDD+ Research modules & partner-centered knowledge-sharing Project phases
  3. 3. REDD+ today • UNFCCC Policy framework (Warsaw, Paris) • An umbrella term for: 1. Efforts at all scales where a primary objective is to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and carbon stock enhancement 2. Have some elements of result-/performance-based payment Variations in interpretations; 1. Limit to international level (a UNFCCC mechanism) 2. Include plantations 3. REDD+ = PES ? 4. Include non-carbon objectives 5. Mitigation and adaptation 3
  4. 4. Q1: How can REDD+ contribute to trans. change at national level? 4
  5. 5. Governance • Key aspects – Structures: Institutions – Agents: interests, information, ideas/discourses (4I) • Trajectories of transformational change – Shifts in: • Discursive practices • Incentive structures • Power relations • Methods: policy, media discourses, networks analyses Key finding: • Powerful discourse coalitions talk BAU 5
  6. 6. Discourse coalitions 0.68 0.65 0.64 1 0.27 0.51 0.32 0.35 0.36 0 0.73 0.49 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Indonesia Vietnam Brazil Cameroon Nepal PNG Power index of discourse coalition BAU Trans.change 6 Business as Usual (BAU) coalitions: - Strong emphasis on global financial support/global solutions - Not talking and tackling drivers - Dominate in most countries Transformational change (TC) coalitions: - Rights, empowerment, domestic drivers, non-carbon objectives - Limited involvement of state actors
  7. 7. What brings about Trans. Change? OUTCOME: Comprehensive policies for TC Institutional setting Forest scarcity (PRES) Effective leg., policy & gov. (EFF) Initiated pol. change (CHA) Policy arena National ownership (OWN) Inclusive pol. process (INCL) REDD+ perfor.- based funds (PERFO) 7 6 of 13 countries had successful outcomes (2014): Brazil, DRC, Guyana, Indonesia, Tanzania, Vietnam 7 have not so far (2014): Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal, Peru, PNG Results: CHA, even on its own, is sufficient under inst.setting PERFO can make a difference, but only if combined with OWN
  8. 8. Q2: Is REDD+ “lost in translation” – or “improved by translation”? • What happens when top down meets bottom up? • Actor Network Theory – Ideas don’t simply spread, but do so by network • Central Kalimantan, Indonesia – Pilot province (2010) – Many actors & funding sources 8
  9. 9. STRADA – Regional Strategy and Action Plan for REDD+ The actors: • International actors (foreign donors) – Viewed themselves as basic supporters of REDD+, transferring knowledge, skills and Rupiahs • National governments – Sought to establish themselves in charge, in collaboration with foreign donors • Provincial governments – Establish themselves as obligatory passage points (OPP) • Local NGOs – Partially-aligned positions: advocacy & community engagement 9
  10. 10. Local communities • Seeking to redefine REDD+ as community development, poverty reduction, welfare, dignity and local rights • Major problems to understand and participate, in part due to the uncertainty about REDD+: “The principle of REDD+ is that you will be paid not to cut down trees. We do not know how much you will be paid, when you will be paid, or even whether you will in fact be paid, and, if so, the money will be paid directly or if the local community will be rewarded in other forms such as the provision of a school, a clinic, a new road or whatever. Do you agree to accept this scheme?” (Howell, 2014) • Would you sell you car based on this? • Strong hostility towards UNDP as the fund manager – Selection of UN organizations – Bamboo climate communication centre 10
  11. 11. Lessons • Is the project addressing the drivers? – “The STRADA document illustrates this tension; it identifies policy and commercial causes of deforestation, but maintains that Central Kalimantan ‘as the first pilot province for REDD+ implementation in Indonesia is based on the principle of community’” • “We don’t want to be a guinea pig for their tests” (villager) – “Local actors tended to see themselves as subjects of controlled lab experiments, or guinea pigs, rather than as having agency and control of their options—as pioneers chartering the local terrain of REDD+ on behalf of Indonesia and the world.” • REDD+ in the social context – “Successes …are not outcomes of singular efforts, but negotiated through ‘lengthy social processes to build linkages and foster learning’” 11
  12. 12. THINKING beyond the canopy Studies of sub-national REDD+ initiatives 1. round: 23 sub-national initiatives (projects) 2. round: 17
  13. 13. THINKING beyond the canopy Comparison (Control) REDD+ site (Intervention) Before After IMPACT Intervention After Control After Intervention Before Control Before Method: BACI  Sampled 150 communities and ~4,000 households  Combined measures of tree cover change (Global Forest Change 2000-2014) and socio-economic variables (collected through field surveys in 2010 and 2014) using BACI approach
  14. 14. Q3: Is BACI (= the gold standard) feasible? • Initial matching of control and intervention villages based on Rapid Rural Appraisal • At hindsight (with detailed household and village level data): How good was the matching? 14
  15. 15. Results • Significant initial different in many respects – Intervention villages generally poorer (assets, infrastructure), but not in average income – Intervention villages have more forest • Not all everyone in interventional villages are subject to treatments, and some in control villages • Implications: – Need to take those differences into account in analysis, e.g. matching methods – Also analysis at household level 15
  16. 16. The value of BACI • The value of baseline data – Compare initial differences, and control for them • Reluctance among conservation org. to implement rigorous impact assessment (BACI) – High costs – Work in non-intervention villages – Risk of documenting no-success • Impact evaluations generates knowledge that is a public good – Donors to sponsor explicitly 16
  17. 17. Q4: Did REDD+ projects reduce forest loss? (and does the answer depend on the method?) • Landsat/Hansen data: tree cover change – Forest: >10% tree cover • Change in relative, annual forest loss (percentage points) 17
  18. 18. 18 BACI score BA score
  19. 19. 19
  20. 20. Findings • BACI shows better results than BA – Comforting as BACI is superior (it corrects for higher scale trends or drivers) • Better performance at micro (village) than at meso (project/district) level – Higher local treatment intensity – Leakage • Overall performance – 9 (out of 16) sites with BACI at village level with positive performance, and average BACI result good – No obvious explanation why some more successful than others 20
  21. 21. Q5: What does REDD+ cost? • Focus on opportunity costs and how it varies across income groups (low, middle, high) 21
  22. 22. COST 101 • Opp.cost: best alternative use of one ha of forest – Agric rent (profit), minus (sustainable) forest income • Annual or NPV? Per ha, C, CO2, household … 22 Actor 1. Oppor- tunity costs (OC) ( 2. Implem./ Transaction costs (TC) 3. Transfers 4. Net direct benefit (1+2+3) Forest user 1 -50 75 25 Forest user 2 -50 -50 Forest user 3 75 75 Village -40 30 -10 NGO (prop.) -60 80 20 Local govt. -60 20 -40 Nat. govt. -20 50 30 Foreign donor -10 -330 -340 Sum -100 -190 0 -290
  23. 23. Efficiency: Opp.costs (OC) per tC • 𝑂𝐶 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝐶 = 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑎 𝑡𝐶 𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑎 • OC varies considerably: – USD 0.61 – 84.29 (6.89) (annual) – USD 6.83 – 943.90 (77.15) (NPV) – CO2 : x 3.67 – Highest in Tanzania due to low tC/ha • OC below voluntary market price (USD 3.30/tCO2) in 6 out of 17 sites – And well below Social Costs of Carbon (SCC, USD 36/tCO2) in all sites except one (so, REDD+ is cheap in terms of OC) 23
  24. 24. Equity: Opp.costs (OC) at household level • 𝑂𝐶 𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝑂𝐶 𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑎 ∗ 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 (ℎ𝑎) How much forests will be cleared in BAU? – Reference level or additionality – Lower bond: recent forest clearing (historical ref.level) – Upper bound: current agric land 24
  25. 25. • In general: much higher OC for rich households Options: 1. Differentiated PES pay (efficiency): Most to the richest 2. Flat pay (equity): Higher ‘rent’ to the poorest Efficiency - equity tradeoffs! 25
  26. 26. Q6: Did REDD+ projects comply with safeguards? • Change in 3 aspects: 1. Rights (tenure security) 2. Participation (knowledge and participation) 3. Social co-benefits (SWB) • Does the impact vary by type of intervention? –Incentives –Sticks –Both + 26
  27. 27. Type of interventions 27 Incentives: conditional & non-conditional livelihood enhancement Disincentives: restrictions on forest access & conversion
  28. 28. Tenure insecurity 17 13 17 21 23 17 11 13 32 22 - 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 All None Incentives Disincentives Both Percent Perceived tenure insequrity (%) Phase 1 (before) Phase 2 (after) 28 - CAC measures tend to reduce tenure security - Positive incentives tend to increase it - Country variation: - Tanzania: 6 -> 0 % - Indonesia: 17 -> 11 % - Vietnam: 12 -> 20 % - Other 3: slightly up
  29. 29. Knowledge and participation 55.5 89.9 80.8 94.9 24.4 57.9 33.5 74 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 None Incentives Disincentives Both Knowledge and participation (%) Knowledge Participation 29 - Nearly 80 % aware of the local REDD+ initiative - Ca. 50% participated in design and/or implementation - Some expected variation across intervention type - Brazil: Only 14% participation for disincentives (CAC), while 62% for incentives
  30. 30. Subjective well-being (SWB) • Q1: How has SWB changed past 2 years? – More report (34-48%) positive change than negative change (20- 28%) – Small difference between type of intervention (‘disincentives’ do not report worse off) • Q2: How has intervention affected SWB? – Overall, weakly positive (score ca. 3.5 on Lickert scale) – Disincentives slightly more negative; In Brazil: 3.94 30
  31. 31. Forest clearing • Evidence of effectiveness of disincentives in reducing clearing (except Indonesia) • Trade-off carbon effectiveness and tenure security and well-being • Inherent tension between carbon and non-carbon values 31
  32. 32. Q7: Why has REDD+ not met our initial (optimistic) expectations? 32 0 2000 2005 2010 2015 year loss25_brazil loss25_drc loss25_indonesia
  33. 33. A1: REDD+ is too small • Not implemented at a scale needed to make a difference • Initial proposals: USD 10-15 billion/year • Actual international transfer: ca. USD 10 billion so far, and declining (< 1 billion/year) • “It will, however, be possible to achieve large-scale and sustainable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries only if these emissions are included in a global post-2012 climate regime.” (Erik Solheim, 2008 in “Moving Ahead with REDD”) • Still waiting for that climate regime => Simply not enough funding to make conservation more profitable than forest clearing! 33
  34. 34. A2: Strong Business-as-Usual (BAU) interests continue to dominate • Linked to A1: not enough funding to change basic equation – REDD was (to some) supposed to buy out BAU interests • Powerful BAU coalitions, as seen – Indonesia – Brazil • Some local successes – Indonesia: statutory community ownership 34
  35. 35. A3: No national policies nor PES, only ineffective ICDP • Integrated Conservation and Development Projects/Programmes (ICDPs) – Alternative livelihoods – Extension and education – Enforcement • Textbook PES with hard conditionality not common – “Unconditional PES” – a contradiction • Strong projectification of REDD+ – NGOs ready to relabel projects to tap into new funding – REDD+ marginalized to “harmless” (to BAU projects? – Projects win battles, policies win the war 35
  36. 36. A4: PES is flawed • The Fletcher et al. (2016) argument of PES being flawed and a contradiction • True, PES is challenging – Costly – Selecting and measuring performance indicators – Counterfactual: Targeting, additionality, ref. level – Assigning rights, attribution • But: – Misunderstandings, e.g. pay in excess of revenue – ‘Crowding out’ of intrinsic motivation? • Not if economic considerations already there • PES as ‘crowding in’ and norm-confirmation • And, since few, large PES examples, cannot explain REDD+ failure 36
  37. 37. My grades (to the question: “why has not REDD+ achieved more?” Answer Grade Comment 1. Not enough money B True, but would big money have solved it? 2. BAU interests dominate A True, but how to change? 3. No PES or national policies B Cannot be sure PES would have worked; Nat.pol. are key 4. PES is flawed D PES not implemented, so cannot explain failure. Rhetoric still matters? 37
  38. 38. REDD+ as a learning experience • The question is not: “Should we continue with REDD+ or not”? • But rather: “What have we learned that can make our current and future effort to reduce forest emissions more effective, efficient and equitable?” • Dismissing REDD+, or telling unfounded success stories, prevent that learning • The writing of lessons learned has just begun • … and some ‘lessons learned’ are still ‘lessons to be learned’ 38
  39. 39. Thanks … for valuable inputs and discussions in preparing this presentation: –Astrid Bos –Maria Brockhaus –Amy E Duchelle –Martin Herold –Amy Ickowitz –Anne Larsson –Christopher Martius –Erin Sills 39
  40. 40. Principal papers • Angelsen, A., Brockhaus, M., Duchelle, A. E., Larson, A., Martius, C., Sunderlin, W. D., Verchot, L., Wong, G., Wunder, S., 2017. Learning from REDD+: a response to Fletcher et al., Conservation Biology. 31, 718- 720. • Bos, A. B., Duchelle, A., Angelsen, A., Avitabile, V., De Sy, V., Herold, M., Joseph, S., de Sassi, C., Sills, E., Sunderlin, W., 2017. Comparing methods for assessing the effectiveness of subnational REDD+ initiatives, Environmental Research Letters, 12. • Brockhaus, M., Di Gregorio, M., Mardiah, S., 2014. Governing the design of national REDD+: An analysis of the power of agency, Forest Policy and Economics. 49, 23-33. • Brockhaus, M., Korhonen-Kurki, M. K., Sehring, J., Di Gregorio, M., Assembe-Mvondo, S., Babon, A., Bekele, M., Gebara, M. F., Khatri, D.B., Kambire, H., Kengoum, F., Kweka, D., Menton, M., Moeliono, M., Paudel, N. S., Pham, T.T., Resosudarmo, I. A.P., Sitoe, A., Wunder, S. & Zida, M., 2017. REDD+, transformational change and the promise of performance-based payments: a qualitative comparative analysis, Climate Policy. 17, 708-730. • Duchelle, A., de Sassi, C., Jagger, P., Cromberg, M., Larson, A., Sunderlin, W., Atmadja, S., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Pratama, C. D., 2017. Balancing carrots and sticks in REDD+: implications for social safeguards, Ecology and Society. 22. • Ickowitz, A., Sills, E., de Sassi, C., 2017. Estimating Smallholder Opportunity Costs of REDD+: A Pantropical Analysis from Households to Carbon and Back, World Development. 95, 15-26. • Sanders, A. J., da Silva Hyldmo, H., Ford, R. M., Larson, A. M., Keenan, R. J., 2017. Guinea pig or pioneer: Translating global environmental objectives through to local actions in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia’s REDD+ pilot province, Global Environmental Change. 42, 68-81. • Sills, E. O., de Sassi, C., Jagger, P., Lawlor, K., Miteva, D. A., Pattanayak, S. K., Sunderlin, W. D., 2017. Building the evidence base for REDD+: Study design and methods for evaluating the impacts of conservation interventions on local well-being, Global Environmental Change. 43, 148-160. 40
  41. 41. Financial support for GCS REDD+