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Pes cambodia chervier


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This presentation was given by Colas Chervier from CIRAD on the “Regional workshop on Payment for Environmental Services” on November 20 2014 in Hanoi, Vietnam. The overall aim of the workshop was to enhance the understanding and capacity of policy makers, PES practioners, and researcher communities on the topic of payments for ecosystem services and ecosystem-based approaches and also to increase dialogue between them on latest lessons learned and recommendations for effective, efficient and equitable implementation of PES.

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Pes cambodia chervier

  1. 1. A review of payments for environmental services (PES) experiences in Cambodia Sarah Milne, Colas Chervier Colas Chervier PhD student CIRAD
  2. 2. Content: 4 topics 1. Role and extent of diffusion of PES concept 2. Definition of PES in the Cambodian context 3. Performance of Cambodian PES 4. Emergence and design of PES
  4. 4. « Soft » diffusion of the PES concept • In official documents – LIMITED to some government-endorsed strategies as “innovative financing mechanisms” or as “redistribution mechanisms” for REDD+ money – NO specific legal framework for PES, but some attempts to develop one (watershed PES) • As ideas and discourses – BROAD diffusion: from the international sphere (INGO) and through key officials and up to very high ranking government sphere (PM) – CONTRASTING opinions and views (opposed, skeptical, promoters)
  5. 5. « Hard » diffusion (1/2): small-scale pilot projects 3 types of PES schemes with: • different overall characteristics (ES, buyer) • different levels of implementation: some processes are frozenES type Project Implementer Payee Payer Biodiversity PES Community-based Ecotourism WCS Village fund Tourists Agri-environment Payments WCS Individual farmers Urban consumers, hotels and restaurants Direct payments schemes for bird nest protection, WCS, WWF, Birdlife Individual villagers NGO Direct Contracts for Turtle Nest Protection CI Individual villagers NGO Conservation incentive agreements CI, Poh Kao Commune fund and individual villagers NGO Watershed PES NB. not yet operational Payments for fresh water provision Wildlife Alliance / MoE Not determined Not determined Watershed protection for hydro-power in Cardamom Mountains FFI / MoE & FA Not determined Not determined REDD pilots NB. not yet operational Oddar Meanchey Community Forestry REDD+ Project PACT / FA Stopped Voluntary Carbon market (certified) Seima Protection Forest REDD+ Pilot WCS / FA CF and the RGC Voluntary Carbon market (certified)
  6. 6. Biodiversity PES Watershed PES REDD+ demonstration activities Village within 5Km buffer PES area (5 Km buffer) PA boundaries PA 5km buffer « Hard » diffusion (2/2): low significance  Located around some PAs  Low diffusion as compared to CF and PAs  Target small-scale threats associated with family agriculture Inland core Cardamom landscape CCPF Area inside protected area (Ha) 1193088 401313 Area under PES contract (Ha) 35500 35500 % area 3,0 8,8 Population within a 5km buffer (# households 2011) 36182 2132 Population receiving PES (# households 2011) 1119 1119 % population 3,1 52,5
  8. 8. In discourses: no common understanding • No common understanding of the concept of PES – BROAD: any scheme that entailed a monetary transfer for the purposes of conservation from an ‘innovative’ or non-public source of financing – NARROW: PES to exist only in the context of watershed management schemes (user-pay) • Limited links with any “written” references – NO legal framework – LIMITED knowledge of the scientific literature on PES
  9. 9. In practice: a broad “church” Scheme Directness of transfer Level of commodification Importance of the economic incentive vs. other interventions Conservation agreements (2006 - ) + CI  Commune & CBOs  individual farmers (Non-voluntary) + Compliance with land-use, non- logging & non-hunting rules (livelihood, law)  Level of payment do not depend on level of ES / effort + Mix of communal in-kind and individual in-cash payments Community-based institutions Strong law enforcement Turtle nest direct payments (2008- ) +++ CI  individual farmers (voluntary) ++ Stop harvest eggs & protection of nests (tradition)  # hatchlings +++ Monetary and individual payment • Diversity of ES and institutional arrangements (see the 3 types of PES) • 2 main and quite different approaches amongst existing schemes (see below) • One common point: they do not correspond to the Coasean bargaining mechanism although they involve some levels of conditionality and the transfer of incentives
  11. 11. Quantitative impact assessments • Several attempts to implement rigorous methods, only one succeeded: – Rigorous = counterfactual methods such as matching – Reason = lack of appropriate data, evaluation design is not built in (project-based approach and financing), costly • Results of Clements et al. – Positive environmental outcomes which depend on whether the “outcome that is rewarded actually reflects conservation needs” – Neutral or positive social impacts, depending on the scheme and the level of individual payment
  12. 12. Governance and institutional evaluation • Transaction costs: – Different levels according to the type of scheme (individual vs. collective) and the stage of implementation – Investment in setting up local institutions may have longer term effects • Property rights: – Not a prerequisite but necessary on the longer run • Impact on local governance: – Strengthening collective action vs. strengthening preexisting power asymmetries • Distributive fairness: – Generally not equal even for collective schemes which are supposed to reach more people – Lower access to the poorest – This is a problem because it is linked to environmental outcomes.
  13. 13. Sustainability: an emerging field • Overlooked issues although it makes sense as the funding sources for these types of schemes are not ensured • Emerging evidences (now these schemes are older): – Long term impact evaluation and impact heterogeneity over time (e.g. interactions with the last land titling program) – Impact on motivations and crowding out
  15. 15. Re-conceptualizing PES design (1/2) • Design framed by a donor-funded project designed and coordinated by an international conservation NGO – SPES project / FFI / EU – Cardamoms conservation / CI/ AFD • PES project as a way to engage other stakeholders in conservation • Works as a negotiation arena aime at dealing with a number of controversial questions: – The “distribution of economic burdens and benefits” from the use and conservation of NR (e.g. who pays in watershed PES) – Rarely about the choice of PES vs. another instrument or about the social optimum (see how CBAs are designed)
  16. 16. Re-conceptualizing PES design (2/2) • Different positions / interests of « negotiators » – Not based on a simple maximization of personal benefits or the benefits for the society – Rather influenced by: • Many ideas and discourses (e.g. different views about the conservation- development nexus) • The institution’s mission and strategy (e.g the NSDP of the RGC) • Several hierarchical and financing « patrons » interests (e.g. voters, donors) • Importance of power relations in influencing the compromise: – The Prime Minister’s public speech  hierarchy linked to position and legal framework – NGO power to maintain PES in the negotiations  financial and network resources
  17. 17. Different types of decision situation • Level of “politics”: – number and nature of government agencies involved • Level of legalization: crafting PES in preexisting legal framework – Beyond links with land policies • Level of Transaction costs: influenced by the type of scheme and influence the pace of negotiations, justify the project-based approach. – Production of data (ES, CBA); gathering people – Setting up local institutions  Probably explain the “duration of negotiations”
  18. 18. CONCLUSION
  19. 19. Gap between theory and practice: • PES do not naturally come into being, driven by supply and demand • but rather require considerable political and discursive work, institution-building and donor funding to become established • PES originates from reaching a compromise out of contrasting interests Implications & risks associated with the nature of the emergence processes • Process can be slow and inefficient (cost a lot of money for nothing), particularly when many parties and interests are involved. • The environmental effectiveness and efficiency promises of PES may not be met (not ideal targeting and arrangement) • On the other hand, decisions may benefit a few, reinforce wealth inequalities. Different requirements in terms of political and financial inputs • depend on the type of scheme negotiated: • how the distribution of costs and benefits from the use and the conservation of NR is envisioned • how large these changes are. Possible levers are: • Filling gap of knowledge regarding the effect of PES (upstream and downstream) and clarifying its definition • Focusing on diffusing supporting ideas and discourses (“lobby”)