Peter Larmour                 Crawford SchoolThe Australian National University
   Corruption regular feature of forestry    ◦ Hard to supervise remote areas (The Forest      Ranger)    ◦ Local politic...
   multiple meanings of corruption   several distinct types   diagnoses imply cures (theory to practice)   three broad...
   Standard ‘use of public office for private    gain’, but    ◦ private to private corruption?    ◦ other family, party ...
Type    Visible Legal Examplepetty   YES    NO    Small payment to                     local forestry officialgrand   NO  ...
   Expectancy    ◦ rational choice to commit crimes    ◦ motivation, opportunity, risk of detection   Equity    ◦ sense ...
   Firm Structure/Boundaries    ◦ C= Monopoly + Discretion - Accountability (Klitgaard)    ◦ impact of boundary changes i...
   Constitutional    ◦   post hoc checks and balances    ◦   ‘system better than individuals in it’ (Euben)    ◦   guardi...
   Diagnoses imply cures (implicit or explicit)   Risks of certain types of corruption seem    high   Popular definitio...
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Corruption in REDD schemes

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Presentation by Peter Larmour,
Crawford School
The Australian National University,
Corruption in REDD schemes: A Framework for Analysis
The 14th International Anti-Corruption Conference,
Thursday, 11 November 2010,
Queen Sirikit National Convention Center, Bangkok, Thailand

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Corruption in REDD schemes

  1. 1. Peter Larmour Crawford SchoolThe Australian National University
  2. 2.  Corruption regular feature of forestry ◦ Hard to supervise remote areas (The Forest Ranger) ◦ Local political support for land clearance ◦ Windfall profits fund corruption Some REDD host countries have poor reputations for corruption ◦ TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index So do companies from some regional countries ◦ TI’s Bribe Payers Index How design a system to reduce corruption?
  3. 3.  multiple meanings of corruption several distinct types diagnoses imply cures (theory to practice) three broad types of theory about corruption ◦ behavioral/individual ◦ structural/organisational ◦ political
  4. 4.  Standard ‘use of public office for private gain’, but ◦ private to private corruption? ◦ other family, party or regional gains? better use principal/agent framework ◦ ‘unauthorised receipt of benefits’ in Hong Kong ◦ in ‘secret commissions’ laws eg in Samoa ◦ in UK proposals to reform corruption legislation But popular conceptions suspicious of elites ◦ TI focus group research in PNG ◦ Mistrust and corruption accusations (Uslaner)
  5. 5. Type Visible Legal Examplepetty YES NO Small payment to local forestry officialgrand NO NO Large payment to HQ officialpolicy NO YES Change law to suit political leaders’ business interests
  6. 6.  Expectancy ◦ rational choice to commit crimes ◦ motivation, opportunity, risk of detection Equity ◦ sense of unfairness justifies corrupt behaviour ◦ perceptions of corruption in unequal societies Social Acceptance ◦ power of norms/organisational culture ◦ culture of existing vs new institutions in REDD ◦ Source: Waldersee
  7. 7.  Firm Structure/Boundaries ◦ C= Monopoly + Discretion - Accountability (Klitgaard) ◦ impact of boundary changes in privatization ◦ Exit or Voice as response to corruption Internal Structures ◦ complexity and confusion creates opportunity ◦ informal system bypasses formal Process ◦ risks at each point in value chain ◦ US Sarbanes Oxley law sets audit requirements ◦ risks involved in cash payments ◦ Source: Waldersee
  8. 8.  Constitutional ◦ post hoc checks and balances ◦ ‘system better than individuals in it’ (Euben) ◦ guarding the guards (police, forestry inspectorate) ◦ capacity of existing ‘National integrity system’ (TI) Democratic ◦ perceptions independent of experience of corruption ◦ Norm of inclusion of those affected by decisions ◦ Corruption = ‘duplicitous exclusion’ (Warren) Government/Business relations ◦ dependence on private initiative in mixed economy ◦ government anticipation of business needs ◦ place of ‘politician-businessmen’ in REDD system
  9. 9.  Diagnoses imply cures (implicit or explicit) Risks of certain types of corruption seem high Popular definitions matter in democracies Three frameworks are ideal types ◦ actual policies combine and mix ◦ broad menu Some measures already in place/available ◦ Integrate REDD with national and international systems No single solution/discipline sufficient

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