Global Futures and Strategic Foresight Project Policy, Institutions and
Markets CRP
Cassava Value Chains Workshop
CIAT, Cali, Colombia
August 24-26, 2016
BERNARDO OSPINA PATIÑO
Executive Director - CLAYUCA Corporation
b.ospina@clayuca.org
WHY ISN´T COLOMBIA THE LAC VERSION
OF THAILAND FOR THE CASSAVA CROP?

THAILAND – A CASSAVA KINGDOM
Source: Klanarong Sriroth, (SCST). Kasetsart University & BIOTEC. 2013,

CASSAVA – A CASH CROP FOR THAILAND FARMERS
Source: Klanarong Sriroth, Outlook of Thai Tapioca Industry, World Tapioca Conference, 2013,

CASSAVA – AN INDUSTRIAL CROP
Source: Klanarong Sriroth, Outlook of Thai Tapioca Industry, World Tapioca Conference, 2013,

Source: Thai Tapioca Starch Association, TTSA (2010)
CASSAVA IN THAILAND: CONSOLIDATED MARKET STRUCTURE

Thailand: World N. 1 Cassava Exporter
Cassava Exports
Source: Klanarong Sriroth, Outlook of Thai Tapioca Industry, World Tapioca Conference, 2013,

Thailand Cassava Sector
Source: Klanarong Sriroth, Outlook of Thai Tapioca Industry, World Tapioca Conference, 2013,

Cassava in Latin America and the Caribbean:
Maize and cassava plants
Mochica culture – Peru
Museum Amano, Lima, Perú
1300 AC
An ancient culture

Cassava Innovation in Colombia:
1980´s
First public sector-initiated effort to
promote cassava agroindustrial development
with small-scale farmers

The North Coast of Colombia, 1980´S
• Population poor by national standards
76% vs. 64% with unsatisfied basic needs
55% vs. 36% in misery
• Semi-arid region with few crop alternatives:
cassava : one of the most popular crops
• Important for food security and cash income
40% of small farmers income
• Employment generator:
7.3 million wage-days per year

Colombian Political, Economic and Social Environment in 1980s
• Import-substitution policy to protect national
production
• Integrated Rural Development (IRD) approach:
(subsidized credit, land reform, research, technical
assistance )
• External donor support: CIDA, WFP
• Organizational processes in place as a result of social
struggles to secure access to land
Agricultural Development Model

The Challenge
• High cassava production as a result of
land reform and DRI-program credit
• Stagnant demand for fresh cassava:
depressed prices
• Massive credit default
• Failure of initial DRI-program basic
premise
• CIAT help requested to find a solution

CIAT in the 1980s
 Commodity-based Program with multi-disciplinary
research
 Lack of adoption of cassava technologies in Latin
America created doubts about the impact of cassava
research
 Demand studies identified new market opportunities for
cassava (animal feed)
 Internal planning exercises led to a change in strategy:
 research only to R&D
 primary production to agri-food chain

ICRDP Methodology
Planning at the macro level
Commercial expansion
Planning at the micro level
Pilot project
INTEGRATED
CASSAVA
RESEARCH &
DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS
(ICRDPs)

Best-bet Solution
 Experience on cassava drying
related to Asia (Thailand)

Public-sector Initiated Innovation Process
Technological
prototype simple,
small-scale and with
low investment
requirements
Organizational
prototype based on
small-scale farmer
groups of 25-30
farmers to manage the
emerging rural
agroindustries

Research
Technical
Assistance
Marketing Organization Credit
Strong Public Sector Involvement
Small Cassava Farmer Organizations
DRI-Program
CIDA WFP
 CORFAS
 ICA
 Caja Agraria
 INCORA
 CIAT
 SENA
 DANCOOP
 CECORA
 CORFAS
 Caja
Agraria
 CORFAS
 ICA
 CIAT
 CORFAS
 CECORA

Private Sector participation in the Innovation Process
• Private sector role : end-user; the market

Out scaling of dry-cassava agroindustries: (1981-89)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
ProcessingCapacity(MT)
Year
Cooperatives Private Entreprenuers

Trends in cassava prices paid to producers in the North Coast of
Colombia, 1975-90
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
Year
Fresh Market Dry-cassava Plant
- 6.2 3.5
0.03
Start of
the ICRDP
Period
Col $ / kg (1998)

Trends in Cassava Area and Yield in the North Coast of Colombia,
1975-93
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
(kg/ha)
(ha)
Year
Area Yields
-0.4
-2.1
0.6
7.0
Start of the
ICRDP
Period

“Before, we didn’t eat three meals per
day… if we had breakfast; we didn’t have
lunch. And now… I said that there was a
change. When we got this land in 1971,
we used to plant a quarter or half of an
hectare… and now we even plant 5
hectares with cassava. Therefore, things
have improved.
Don Carlos, cassava farmer and member of COINPROSAN, Segovia, Sampués, Sucre
“I was able to support my family, educate
my children… Since these programs came,
my life has changed from a poor peasant
who didn’t have anything to a peasant who
has enough to eat... I have already told you
that all my children are professionals… all of
them because of the land reform and the
DRI-program.
José Ortega, cassava farmer and member of COAPROBE, Montañita, Betulia, Sucre
Voices of Impact

The Political, Economic and Social Environment in the 1990s
• Free market policies, economy open to to external competition
• Massive imports of grains to attend the growing demand of the
feed industry in Colombia (1 million TM per year)
• Donor and public sector support reduced to a minimum
• Competitiveness based on lower wages and only marginally on
innovation
• Limited access to credit

The new macro-scenario, 1990s
• Public sector: reduced support to a minimum and
places policies that affect the agroindustry
negatively
• Donors: absent
• Local support organizations: replaced public sector
and donor support
• Private sector: continued to act only as end-user

Trends in Cassava Area and Yield in the North Coast of
Colombia, 1975-99
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
(kg/ha)
(ha)
Year
Area Yields
-0.4
-2.1 0.6
7.0
-0.2
-1.3
Start of ICRDP

0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
(1998$Col/Kg)
Year
Fresh Market Dry-cassava Plant
- 6.2 3.5 - 5.0
11.2
0.03
- 4.4 0.01
Start of the
ICRDP Period
Start of
CLAYUCA Period
Trends in cassava prices paid to producers in the North Coast of
Colombia, 1975-99

Trends in cassava prices and dry cassava production in the North Coast of
Colombia (1981-2001)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
400000
450000
500000
Production(MT)
Prices(1998$Col/Kg)
Year
Dry-cassava prices Cassava roots prices Dry-cassava production
-0.02
-5.5
62.4 -11.3
Start of the
CLAYUCA Period
74.8
1.6

 Small-scale
 Mostly land renters
few landowners
 No inputs
 Organized into
associations
 Yield = 10-12 MT / ha
 0.5-1.0 ha
SMALL-SCALE CASSAVA FARMERS –COLOMBIA NOTH COAST, TODAY

CASSAVA VALUE CHAIN DYNAMICS
(SMALL-SCALE, LANDLESS FARMERS); 12 MT / ha
Dry cassava chips offers negative return
to farmers and processors
11.3
9.2
11.3
21.8
14.9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
USD/MTofcassavaroots
Dry Cassava Chips Production costs
(Share of production costs for dry cassava chips
Harvesting
Weeding
Land rental
Planting
Land preparation
172.5
-13.1
3.4
23.7
-15
35
85
135
185
Farm gate price
cassava roots
Transport Processing cost Producer margin
USD$/MTdrycassavachips
Value distribution
(Relative costs of producing 1 ton of dry cassava chips from
2,6 t of fresh cassava roots)

 Small- to médium-scale
 Mostly land renters , few
landowners
 Use modern inputs (fertilizers,
herbicides, credit, technical
assistance, administration)
 Organized into primary- and
secondary-degree associations
 Yield= 20 MT / ha
 Yield = 8 MT dry cassava chips /ha
FARMERS ASSOCIATION (Producers and Processors, dry cassava chips)
chips processors)

FARMERS ASSOCIATION (Producers and Processors, dry cassava chips)
chips processors)

CASSAVA VALUE CHAIN DYNAMICS
(Farmers Association, Commercial Scale); 20 MT/ ha; 8 MT dry cassava chips / ha
Dry cassava chips offers a fair return to
farmers and processors
Source: ANPPY, 266 hectáreas Project; 2013.
11.9
24.3
23.3
61.9
41.4
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
160.0
180.0
US$tondrycassavachips
Dry Cassava Chips Production Costs
(Share of production costs)
Land preparation
Hand Labor
Inputs
Harvesting &
Drying
Indirect Costs
162.7
20.3
50
70
90
110
130
150
170
190
cus$/tonofdrycassavachips
Value distribution
(Relative costs of producing 1 ton of dry
cassava chips from 2,6 t of fresh cassava
roots)
Production costs Farmers marginn
costs

CASSAVA VALUE CHAIN DYNAMICS
(COMMERCIAL-SCALE FARMER, PROCESSOR, COMMERCIALIZER); 25 MT / ha
 Commercial-scale
 Mostly land renting
 Use modern inputs (fertilizers, herbicides,
credit, technical assistance, administration)
 Yield= 25 MT / ha

CASSAVA VALUE CHAIN DYNAMICS
(COMMERCIAL-SCALE FARMER, PROCESSOR, COMMERCIALIZER); 25 MT / ha

6.8
5.7
9.1
17.0
6.1
14.0
10.8
5.4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
US$/MTfreshcassavaroots
Fresh cassava roots production costs
(Share of production costs)
Contingencies
Land Renting
Harvest
Pest & Disease
Control
Fertilizer & Lime
Application
Weed control
Planting &
Seeds
Land
preparation
CASSAVA VALUE CHAIN DYNAMICS
(COMMERCIAL-SCALE FARMER, PROCESSOR, COMMERCIALIZER); 25 MT / ha
FRESH CASSAVA MARKETS OFFERS THE HIGHEST RETURN
(FRESH; FROZEN; PARAFFIN-COATED)
75
67.8
30.5
98
170
237
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Production Costs Processing costs Transportation Producer margin
fresh roots
Producer margin
frozen cassava
Producer margin
paraffin-coated
cassava roots
US$/tonfreshcassavaroots
Value distribution
Relative costs of producing 1 ton of fresh cassava roots

CASSAVA VALUE CHAIN DEVELOPMENT IN COLOMBIA
PRODUCTION
PRODUCTS
PROCESSING

CASSAVA VALUE CHAIN DEVELOPMENT IN COLOMBIA
PRODUCTION
PRODUCTS
PROCESSING
POLICY

GRACIAS!
BERNARDO OSPINA PATIÑO
Director Ejecutivo – Corporacion CLAYUCA
b.ospina@clayuca.org
THANK YOU!