Various Open Source Cryptographic Libraries are being used these days to implement the
general purpose cryptographic functions and to provide a secure communication channel over
the internet. These libraries, that implement SSL/TLS, have been targeted by various side
channel attacks in the past that result in leakage of sensitive information flowing over the
network. Side channel attacks rely on inadvertent leakage of information from devices
through observable attributes of online communication. Some of the common side channel
attacks discovered so far rely on packet arrival and departure times (Timing Attacks), power
usage and packet sizes. Our research explores novel side channel attack that relies on CPU
architecture and instruction sets. In this research, we explored such side channel vectors
against popular SSL/TLS implementations which were previously believed to be patched
against padding oracle attacks, like the POODLE attack. We were able to successfully extract
the plaintext bits in the information exchanged using the APIs of two popular SSL/TLS
libraries.