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Heartbleed Bug Vulnerability: Discovery, Impact and Solution

Join the CASC Wednesday April 30 for a Google+ hangout on the Heartbleed Bug. We’ll cover everything from what the bug does to how to tell if your site is at risk and how certificate authorities are responding.

Panel of CASC members:

• Robin Alden- Comodo
• Jeremy Rowley- DigiCert
• Bruce Morton- Entrust
• Rick Andrews- Symantec
• Wayne Thayer- Go Daddy

Watch the recording:

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Heartbleed Bug Vulnerability: Discovery, Impact and Solution

  1. 1. Heartbleed Bug Vulnerability: Discovery, Impact and Solution Robin Alden, Rick Andrews, Bruce Morton, Jeremy Rowley, Wayne Thayer
  2. 2. The Experts Rick Andrews Senior Technical Director, Symantec CASC Member Jeremy Rowley VP of Business Development, DigiCert CASC Member Bruce Morton Director, Certificate Services, Entrust CASC Member Robin Alden Chief Technology Officer, Comodo CASC Member Wayne Thayer VP & GM, Security Products, GoDaddy CASC Member
  3. 3. Join the Conversation #CASChangout
  4. 4. About the CA Security Council • Comprised of 7 leading global Certificate Authorities • Committed to the exploration and promotion of best practices that advance trusted SSL deployment and CA operations • The CASC works collaboratively to improve understanding of critical policies and their potential impact on the internet infrastructure •
  5. 5. Topics • What is Heartbleed? • Who is/was affected? • How can I tell if I’m at risk? • What steps should I take? • How have Certificate Authorities responded? • Conclusions
  6. 6. What is Heartbleed? • Technical description • Origin of the name • Protocol bug or Implementation Error? • Did the NSA create this or exploit this?
  7. 7. Technical description • TLS Protocol extension ‘Heartbeat’ (RFC6520) • Heartbeat messages used to check a TLS server is reachable and alive • Message says ‘Send me these N(=5) bytes “#CASC” if you’re there’. Server replies “#CASC” • The vulnerability (Heartbleed) occurs when the ‘N’ doesn’t match the length of the message. E.g. ‘Send me these N(=500) bytes “#CASC”’ • A vulnerable server sends back “#CASC” followed by 495 bytes of internal information, which could include the servers private key, someone else’s password and credit card number. • The bad guy gets to try for as many chunks (of 495 bytes) as he likes.
  8. 8. Origin of the name Heartbleed • The vulnerability was discovered at around the same time by Google (1st April) and Codenomicon (3rd April) • Codenomicon gave Heartbleed its name and logo in order to contribute to public awareness of the issue. • It worked!
  9. 9. Protocol bug or Implementation Error? • RFC6520 specifies the Heartbeat message to have separate length and payload fields. This is not unusual in such protocols. • The implementation doesn’t check that the length of data it is to return is the same as the length of the data that was supplied to it in the first place (i.e. 500 <> length("Hello")). • It accepts the (short) inbound message ("Hello"), and then replies with 500 bytes inadvertently revealing some of its internal state. • It is an implementation error.
  10. 10. Did the NSA create this or exploit this? • We don’t know! • A couple of reports of logs showing abuse of Heartbleed before its announcement, but none of these seem to have been substantiated. • There is currently no public evidence that the NSA (or anyone else) created this vulnerability. • Human error seems the most likely explanation for it. • Although we don't think Heartbleed was exploited before it was discovered (around 1st April 2014), to be safe we are acting as if it may have been exploited and that leads us to some of the recommendations we will be presenting later in this hangout.
  11. 11. Join the Conversation #CASChangout
  12. 12. Who is/was affected? • Web sites large and small • Smart phones • CDNs • Internet Routers • Apps and Games • Wifi Routers • Embedded devices
  13. 13. Web sites large and small • Netcraft reports ~17% of all web sites • Google – Search, Gmail, YouTube, Wallet, Play, Apps, App Engine, AdWords, DoubleClick, Maps, Maps Engine and Earth • Yahoo • Dropbox • Wikimedia (including Wikipedia) • Intuit TurboTax
  14. 14. Web sites large and small Social Networking: •Facebook •Twitter •Tumblr •Pinterest •Reddit •Instagram Tech sites: •Amazon Web Services •Ars Technica •GitHub •Sourceforge
  15. 15. Smart phones and tablets • Android version 4.1.1 (Jelly Bean) – ~34% of Android installed base – Requires updates from device manufacturers and carriers – Mostly HTC Evo, One S and One X • Mobile apps – Bank, payment and shopping apps – Blackberry Secure Work Space and BBM Chat for iOS and Android
  16. 16. CDNs • Akamai • EdgeCast • Limelight • Fastly • CloudFlare • Incapsula
  17. 17. Internet Routers • Cisco: – Unified Communication Manager (UCM) 10.0 – MS200X Ethernet Access Switch • F5 • Juniper’s SSL VPN software • OpenVPN • Tor Project
  18. 18. Apps • Password Managers including LastPass • LibreOffice • LogMeIn • McAfee anti-virus • Blackberry Link for Windows and Mac OS • Webex Messenger Service • Cisco Registered Envelope Service (CRES) • Games: Steam, Minecraft, Wargaming, League of Legends, etc.
  19. 19. Wifi Routers • Apple AirPort Extreme and AirPort Time Capsule base stations, only if they have Back to My Mac or Send Diagnostics enabled (Mac OS X, iPhone, iPad not directly affected)
  20. 20. Miscellaneous • Several Cisco Unified IP Phones • Industrial Control Systems • Embedded devices
  21. 21. Join the Conversation #CASChangout
  22. 22. How do I tell if I’m at risk? • Check your website: • Was my website ever at risk? – Check with you hosting provider – Is it running Apache or Nginx? • If so, is it still at risk? – Did you rekey your certificate after the site was patched?
  23. 23. How do I tell if I’m at risk? • Your Certificate Authority: – Since Heartbleed is a vulnerability in the protocol, it did not directly affect CA’s certificate issuing systems or their root certificates – Some CA’s websites were affected • Check your CA’s website for information • If affected, they will have patched and rekeyed the certificate used on the site • If their website was affected, they may ask you to change your password • Browsers and other Clients: – Mainstream browser not affected – Check with your vendors – Scrutinize any in-house software that uses OpenSSL – Test at
  24. 24. Does PFS Prevent Heartbleed? • Perfect Forward Secrecy – Attribute of ECDHE cipher suites • Session keys never sent across the network with PFS – Archives of encrypted traffic can’t be recovered • But – Not all clients support PFS ciphers! – A compromised private key can still be used to intercept traffic in real time!
  25. 25. Join the Conversation #CASChangout
  26. 26. What steps should I take to address the bug? If you are running a web server, then inform, fix, rekey, reissue, revoke, re-inform •Inform users of your status •Fix the OpenSSL problem •Rekey server •Reissue install new certificate, revoke old certificate •Re-inform users and request passwords be changed •Perfect Forward Secrecy, Second–factor authentication, end-to-end encryption, hardening
  27. 27. What steps should I take to address the bug? If you are a client (application or browser user) •Does your client software need an update? •Check for updates of software •Change passwords on sites that have been patched •Check for Heartbleed • CASC - • Netcraft plugin - releases-heartbleed-indicator-for-chrome-firefox-and- opera.html
  28. 28. What steps should I take to address the bug? Configure your browser to check for revoked certs
  29. 29. Response • CAs received same-day notice of the vulnerability as customers (April 7, 2014) – CA keys are stored offline and not subject to Heartbleed • Support increase to cover the extra volume • Outreach program to assist in corrective action • Most CAs offered a free revoke and replace plan to account for the vulnerability • A lot of over-time with double the volume
  30. 30. Updates • Updated documentation, knowledge base articles, etc • Email blast and telephone calls to customers • Enhanced tools to detect vulnerabilities – vulnerability.htm#getaccess – iews/certCheck.jsp – –
  31. 31. Noteworthy • No Internet Slow Down – CRLs v. OCSP – Edge-based delivery • Importance of Revocation – – – Coordinated Effort among Community – Accurate information – Remediation assistance – Positive feedback
  32. 32. Looking Ahead • Work with remaining web server operators • Push for MUST-STAPLE and turn on revocation • Continued outreach with device makers and others
  33. 33. Conclusions • Heartbleed is not an issue with the SSL/TLS trust system, but a problem of trust in a single software source • OpenSSL has since received additional funding, but no software system is ever 100% secure • Guidance on password policy still stands: don’t reuse passwords, change them often, etc. • Revocation is a critical part of the SSL/TLS infrastructure
  34. 34. Join the Conversation #CASChangout
  35. 35. Contact Information @CertCouncil Security-Council-4852478/about