Successfully reported this slideshow.
We use your LinkedIn profile and activity data to personalize ads and to show you more relevant ads. You can change your ad preferences anytime.
11-797-ag         Weng-Lin v. Holder                                                                                      ...
1       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 2   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is h...
1   Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 2   1158(b)(1)(B)(i).    See Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 3...
1   political opinion.     See Beskovic, 467 F.3d at 227; Yueqing 2   Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 2005)....
1   103, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2010); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).       The 2   BIA may “not engage in de novo review of finding...
1   Weng-Lin “enjoys a regulatory presumption that ‘internal 2   relocation would not be reasonable.’”     Kone v. Holder,...
1   acquiescence or involvement.”       C.A.R. 4.    The IJ found Weng- 2   Lin’s testimony that he was arrested and beate...
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in …5
×

Weng-Lin v. Holder 2nd Cir 5-3-12 remand to BIA due to insufficient analysis

658 views

Published on

Published in: News & Politics
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

Weng-Lin v. Holder 2nd Cir 5-3-12 remand to BIA due to insufficient analysis

  1. 1. 11-797-ag Weng-Lin v. Holder BIA Chew, IJ A098 350 935 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan 3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of 4 New York, on the 3rd day of May, two thousand twelve. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 JON O. NEWMAN, 8 ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,10 Circuit Judges.11 _____________________________________1213 QIHUI WENG-LIN,14 Petitioner,1516 v. 11-797-ag17 NAC18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,20 Respondent.21 _______________________________________2223 FOR PETITIONER: Dehai Zhang, Flushing,24 New York.2526 FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney27 General; Linda S. Wernery, Assistant28 Director; Theodore C. Hirt,29 Attorney, Office of Immigration30 Litigation, United States Department31 of Justice, Washington, D.C.
  2. 2. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review 4 is GRANTED. 5 Petitioner Qihui Weng-Lin, a native and citizen of the 6 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a February 11, 7 2011 order of the BIA, reversing the December 11, 2008 8 decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”), which granted his 9 application for asylum. In re Qihui Weng-Lin, No. A098 35010 935 (B.I.A. Feb. 11, 2011), rev’g No. A098 350 935 (Immig.11 Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 11, 2008). We assume the parties’12 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history13 in this case, which we reference only as necessary to14 explain our decision.15 Where the BIA does not adopt the IJ’s decision in any16 part, we review only the decision of the BIA. See Yan Chen17 v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The18 applicable standards of review are well-established. See 819 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510,20 513 (2d Cir. 2009).21 The BIA failed to sufficiently articulate its reasoning22 for concluding that Weng-Lin failed to establish membership23 in a “particular social group” as required under the 2
  3. 3. 1 Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 2 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). See Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 3 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (requiring a certain minimal level of 4 analysis from agency decisions denying asylum to enable 5 meaningful judicial review); Ucelo-Gomez v. Gonzales, 464 6 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2006) (requiring the agency to make a 7 particular social group finding with “sufficient clarity”). 8 In Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 72-73 (2d Cir. 9 2007), we upheld the BIA’s three-part framework for10 assessing the validity of a particular social group under11 the INA. However, the BIA failed to evaluate Weng-Lin’s12 social group under this three-part framework or offer more13 than a cursory analysis of his claim. As a result, we14 remand to the BIA so that it may provide a meaningful15 analysis of Weng-Lin’s social group claim. See Gonzales v.16 Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186-87 (2006) (per curiam);17 Ucelo-Gomez, 464 F.3d at 170.18 Similarly, the BIA failed to address the IJ’s finding19 that Weng-Lin established a well-founded fear of persecution20 based on his political opinion, and failed to sufficiently21 state its justification for finding that Weng-Lin failed to22 show that he feared persecution on account of an imputed 3
  4. 4. 1 political opinion. See Beskovic, 467 F.3d at 227; Yueqing 2 Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 2005). We 3 have held that “determining whether a given individual’s 4 attempt to oppose or alter a government’s economic practices 5 manifests a political opinion requires examination of the 6 ‘political context’ in which the dispute took place in order 7 to determine whether the dispute bears a ‘political 8 dimension.’” Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 547. In reversing 9 the IJ’s grant of asylum, however, the BIA noted only that10 “[Weng-Lin] has not established that he retaliated against11 government corruption.” Certified Administrative Record12 (“C.A.R.”) 4. Because the BIA’s finding is devoid of any13 reasoning, we remand to the BIA so that it can provide a14 meaningful analysis of Weng-Lin’s political and imputed15 political opinion claims, as this Court is unable to16 determine whether substantial evidence supports BIA’s17 determination. See Beskovic, 467 F.3d at 227; Tian-Yong18 Chen v. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 127-28 (2d Cir. 2004).19 In addition, the BIA erred by failing to apply clear20 error review to the IJ’s factual findings concerning the21 adequacy of the consideration promised in exchange for Weng-22 Lin’s family’s land. See De La Rosa v. Holder, 598 F.3d 4
  5. 5. 1 103, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2010); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). The 2 BIA may “not engage in de novo review of findings of fact 3 determined by an immigration judge. Facts determined by the 4 immigration judge, including findings as to the credibility 5 of testimony, [are] reviewed [by the BIA] only to determine 6 whether the findings of the immigration judge are clearly 7 erroneous.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). Although the IJ 8 found Weng-Lin’s testimony – that the Chinese government 9 promised to pay his family only one-tenth of land’s fair10 value – credible, the BIA nevertheless determined, without11 identifying any error in the IJ’s analysis, that Weng-Lin’s12 “claim that local official offered his family less money13 than their land was worth [was] not substantiated in the14 record.” C.A.R. 4. Accordingly, we remand to the BIA to15 review the IJ’s factual findings under the deferential clear16 error standard of review. See Fen Yong Chen v. Bureau of17 Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 470 F.3d 509, 515 (2d18 Cir. 2006).19 Because the BIA also erred in placing the burden of20 proof on Weng-Lin to demonstrate that he could not relocate21 within China to avoid persecution, the BIA’s relocation22 finding cannot support the denial of asylum. Where, as23 here, the alleged persecution is government-sponsored, 5
  6. 6. 1 Weng-Lin “enjoys a regulatory presumption that ‘internal 2 relocation would not be reasonable.’” Kone v. Holder, 596 3 F.3d 141, 150 n.8 (2d Cir. 2010); 8 C.F.R. § 4 1208.13(b)(3)(ii). The BIA thus erroneously concluded that 5 Weng-Lin could reasonably relocate to Fuzhou because he 6 “[was] unable to show that his risk of persecution is 7 countrywide.” C.A.R. 4. While the BIA did note that 8 Weng-Lin managed to live in Fuzhou without harm for two 9 years, “the government cannot satisfy its burden to10 demonstrate that [Weng-Lin] will not be threatened simply by11 showing that [he] enjoyed periods with no new persecution or12 that [he] will not perpetually be persecuted in [his] native13 country.” Kone, 596 F.3d at 150. Accordingly, we remand to14 the BIA to properly apply the regulatory presumption that15 internal relocation would not be reasonable in evaluating16 Weng-Lin’s petition. On remand, we encourage to the BIA to17 articulate its justification for any relocation finding with18 reference to the factors listed in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3).19 Finally, with respect to Weng-Lin’s claim for relief20 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), the BIA21 improperly determined that Weng-Lin “[had] not established22 the existence of any past torture, or fear of future23 torture. Nor is there any indication of government 6
  7. 7. 1 acquiescence or involvement.” C.A.R. 4. The IJ found Weng- 2 Lin’s testimony that he was arrested and beaten by Chinese 3 police credible. The BIA’s determination that “there is no 4 indication of government acquiescence or involvement,” id., 5 without identifying any error in the IJ’s analysis, 6 constitutes an impermissible alternative factual finding. 7 See De La Rosa, 598 F.3d at 107-08; 8 C.F.R. § 8 1003.1(d)(3)(i). Accordingly, on remand, the BIA should 9 review the IJ’s factual findings under the deferential clear10 error standard of review. See Fen Yong Chen, 470 F.3d at11 515.12 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is13 GRANTED and the case is REMANDED to the BIA for further14 proceedings consistent with this order. As we have15 completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of16 removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending17 request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in18 accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure19 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).20 FOR THE COURT:21 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk22 7

×