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14-338-cr
United States v. Levy
1
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2
 3
August Term, 2014 4
 5
(Arg...
14-338-cr
United States v. Levy
2
Before trial, Levy moved to suppress the photocopy of the notebook.  The 1
United States...
14-338-cr
United States v. Levy
3
BACKGROUND 1
On December 17, 2011, following a business trip to Panama, David 2
Levy ret...
14-338-cr
United States v. Levy
4
business contacts, bank and trading account data, and limited details of 1
Levy’s person...
14-338-cr
United States v. Levy
5
entrant’s documents goes beyond the general searching one expects at a 1
point of entry”...
14-338-cr
United States v. Levy
6
unindicted co‐conspirators who participated in the securities fraud 1
schemes.  The Gove...
14-338-cr
United States v. Levy
7
area of an international airport is the functional equivalent of a border for 1
purposes...
14-338-cr
United States v. Levy
8
because the record of the Government’s criminal investigation of Levy 1
prior to the ins...
14-338-cr
United States v. Levy
9
ongoing criminal participation in securities fraud schemes.  In fact, the 1
level of sus...
14-338-cr
United States v. Levy
10
“frequently assist customs officials in the execution of border searches.”  1
Ali v. Fe...
14-338-cr
United States v. Levy
11
crime.  They have the authority to search and review a traveler’s 1
documents and other...
14-338-cr
United States v. Levy
12
Neither our case law nor the applicable regulations relating to CBP officers 1
or borde...
14-338-cr (L)
United States v. Donna Levy et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULIN...
2
For Defendant-Appellant David Levy: MARC FERNICH, New York, NY.1
2
For Appellee United States: HOWARD S. MASTER (Carrie ...
3
579 F.3d 214, 217 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 663 (2d Cir.1
1997)). Before authorizin...
4
Donna Levy challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions, under1
Rule 10b-5, for market manipula...
5
manipulation—“artificially affecting market activity in order to mislead investors,” Santa Fe1
Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S....
6
detail”). We reject Defendants’ attempt to distinguish the district court’s reasonable doubt charge1
here from that appr...
7
reasonable approximation of losses supported by a sound methodology.” Gushlak, 728 F.3d at1
196.2
We have considered Def...
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United States v. Levy, __F.3d__(2d Cir. 2015) No. 14-338 Sept. 29, 2015 and summary order

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United States v. Levy, __F.3d__(2d Cir. 2015) No. 14-338 Sept. 29, 2015 and summary order -- CBP can help unrelated law enforecemt agencies during border search.

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United States v. Levy, __F.3d__(2d Cir. 2015) No. 14-338 Sept. 29, 2015 and summary order

  1. 1. 14-338-cr United States v. Levy 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2  3 August Term, 2014 4  5 (Argued: February 2, 2015     Decided: September 29, 2015) 6  7 Docket No. 14‐338‐cr8 9 _____________________________________10 11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 12  13 Appellee, 14  15 v. 16  17 DAVID LEVY, 18  19 Defendant‐Appellant.* 20 21 _____________________________________22 23 Before:   24  25   HALL and LOHIER, Circuit Judges, and MEYER, District Judge.** 26  27   A United States Customs officer at Miami International Airport 28 examined and photocopied a hardcopy notebook belonging to defendant‐29 appellant David Levy, who had arrived at the airport from a trip abroad.  30 * Although the initial caption on appeal identified the Government as an  “Appellee‐Cross‐Appellant,” the Government is not pursuing a cross‐ appeal. The Clerk of Court is therefore respectfully requested to amend  the case caption as set forth above.    **  The Honorable Jeffrey Alker Meyer of the United States District Court for  the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.  United States v. Levy, __F.3d__(2d Cir. 2015) No. 14-338 Sept. 29, 2015 and summary order (United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP))
  2. 2. 14-338-cr United States v. Levy 2 Before trial, Levy moved to suppress the photocopy of the notebook.  The 1 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Crotty, 2 J.) denied the motion on the ground that the officer’s search, though not 3 routine, was based on reasonable suspicion of Levy’s participation in 4 criminal activity.  Because the District Court properly denied the motion to 5 suppress, we affirm.  6 7 MARC FERNICH, Law Office of Marc Fernich, for 8 Defendant‐Appellant.  9  10 HOWARD S. MASTER (Carrie H. Cohen, Brian A. 11 Jacobs, on the brief), for Preet Bharara, United 12 States Attorney for the Southern District of New 13 York, New York, NY, for Appellee. 14 15 LOHIER, Circuit Judge:16 The principal question presented is whether United States Customs 17 officers at an international airport may lawfully and without a warrant 18 examine and photocopy a document that belongs to a traveler entering the 19 United States if the officers have reasonable suspicion on the basis of 20 information supplied from another federal agency that the traveler is 21 engaged in criminal activity unrelated to contraband, customs duties, 22 immigration, or terrorism.  We hold that such a search is lawful under the 23 border search doctrine and that the District Court properly denied the 24 defendant’s motion to suppress.  We therefore affirm.  25 We dispose of Levy’s remaining claims on appeal in a separate 26 summary order filed simultaneously with this opinion. 27 (ATTACHED)
  3. 3. 14-338-cr United States v. Levy 3 BACKGROUND 1 On December 17, 2011, following a business trip to Panama, David 2 Levy returned to the Miami International Airport to face criminal charges 3 that he expected would be leveled against him.1  By then, Levy was the 4 target of a criminal investigation into a series of stock manipulation 5 schemes that nearly a year earlier had resulted in the indictment of Levy’s 6 wife.  At the airport, United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 7 officers detained Levy and escorted him to a holding area without 8 interrogating him.  The officers apparently had received information about 9 the investigation of Levy from a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 10 task force,2 which for reasons not relevant to this appeal was primarily 11 responsible for looking into Levy’s role in the manipulation schemes.  12 Outside of Levy’s presence, the officers inspected Levy’s luggage, focusing 13 on a spiral‐bound notebook that contained eighteen pages of Levy’s 14 handwritten notes on various subjects, including travel information, 15 1 Levy’s lawyer had previously contacted federal prosecutors to discuss the  potential charges against Levy.    2 Although the task force appears to have been under the control of the  DEA, it included agents with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs  Enforcement.   
  4. 4. 14-338-cr United States v. Levy 4 business contacts, bank and trading account data, and limited details of 1 Levy’s personal affairs.  One of the CBP officers examined and 2 photocopied the notebook.  After about two hours, the CBP officers 3 returned the original notebook and other items to Levy, who was still in 4 the holding area, and allowed him to leave the airport.   5 Less than seventy‐two hours later, on December 20, 2011, Levy was 6 indicted on charges of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities 7 fraud and wire fraud.  In a superseding indictment filed June 28, 2012, 8 Levy was also charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering, as 9 well as other crimes in which the Government claimed he was engaged at 10 the time Levy’s notebook was examined and photocopied.  All of the 11 charges arose from Levy’s participation in the stock manipulation 12 schemes.   13 Before trial, Levy moved to suppress the photocopy of the notebook 14 that the CBP officer had inspected.  The District Court denied the motion 15 under the border search doctrine.  As relevant here, the District Court 16 agreed with Levy that the search of the notebook was a “non‐routine” 17 border search because “[t]he close reading and photocopying of an 18
  5. 5. 14-338-cr United States v. Levy 5 entrant’s documents goes beyond the general searching one expects at a 1 point of entry” and may “intrude greatly on a person’s privacy.”  United 2 States v. Levy, No. 11‐cr‐62‐PAC, 2013 WL 664712, at *6, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3 25, 2013).  But it held that the search was still justified under the Fourth 4 Amendment because the CBP officers reasonably suspected that Levy was 5 “engaged in a stock fraud conspiracy.”  Id. at *12.   6 In denying the motion, the District Court also rejected Levy’s 7 argument that CBP officers could not search material unless it related to a 8 crime that CBP is authorized by regulation to investigate – that is, a crime 9 relating to contraband or dutiable merchandise.  To the contrary, the 10 District Court determined, none of the cases upon which Levy relied in 11 advancing this argument “limit[ed] the crimes for which customs agents 12 may conduct non‐routine searches if they have a reasonable suspicion.”  13 Id.   14 At trial, the parties stipulated that a photocopy of the notebook 15 could be introduced as evidence.  The Government relied on the evidence 16 with some effect.  Among other things, it used the names listed in the 17 notebook to tie Levy both to various illegal trades and to certain 18
  6. 6. 14-338-cr United States v. Levy 6 unindicted co‐conspirators who participated in the securities fraud 1 schemes.  The Government also referred to the notebook in closing 2 argument, pointing out that Levy’s forgery of certain relevant documents 3 could be proven by the handwriting in the notebook.  4 Levy was convicted of all the counts against him and sentenced 5 principally to a term of 108 months’ imprisonment.  This appeal followed. 6 DISCUSSION 7 In evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review 8 the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law 9 de novo.  United States v. Foreste, 780 F.3d 518, 523 n.3 (2d Cir. 2015).  10 When the evidence at issue derives from a border search, we recognize the 11 Federal Government’s broad plenary powers to conduct so‐called 12 “routine” searches at the border even without “reasonable suspicion that 13 the prospective entrant has committed a crime.”  Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 14 F.3d 89, 97‐98 (2d Cir. 2007); see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 15 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (“Routine searches of the persons and effects of 16 entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, 17 probable cause, or warrant . . . .”).  It is well established that the Customs 18
  7. 7. 14-338-cr United States v. Levy 7 area of an international airport is the functional equivalent of a border for 1 purposes of the border search doctrine.  See, e.g., United States v. Irving, 2 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006). 3 Had the CBP officer merely skimmed the notebook and returned it 4 to Levy without copying it, we have no doubt that the inspection would 5 have been routine.  Cf. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th 6 Cir. 2008) (holding border search of an electronic device permissible even 7 without reasonable suspicion where “CBP officers simply had [the 8 traveler] boot [the laptop] up, and looked at what [he] had inside”).  9 Whether searching and copying the notebook here constitutes a “routine” 10 border search that could be conducted without reasonable suspicion is 11 somewhat more debatable.3  But for now we avoid resolving that question 12 3 We question whether a Customs official’s inspection, copying, and  subsequent return of a document in a traveler’s luggage at the border can  be so “intrusive” that it becomes a “non‐routine” search requiring  reasonable suspicion.  Like the Supreme Court, see United States v. Flores‐ Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004), we have suggested that the label “non‐ routine” should generally be reserved for intrusive border searches of the  person (such as body‐cavity searches or strip searches), not belongings, see  United States v. Charleus, 871 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1989); see also United  States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123‐24 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that routine  searches may include searches of a person’s luggage, personal belongings,  outer clothing, and the contents of a purse, pockets, and shoes, but 
  8. 8. 14-338-cr United States v. Levy 8 because the record of the Government’s criminal investigation of Levy 1 prior to the inspection of his notebook supports the District Court’s ruling 2 that the inspection was justified by reasonable suspicion.   3 The Supreme Court has instructed that “the level of suspicion the 4 [reasonable suspicion] standard requires is considerably less than proof of 5 wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than 6 is necessary for probable cause.”  Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 7 1687 (2014) (quotation marks omitted).  Reasonable suspicion requires only 8 “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person 9 stopped of criminal activity.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  10 The CBP officer had such a basis in this case.  Although Levy 11 disputes this conclusion, a review of the allegations in the initial 12 underlying indictment against Levy (filed within days of the search) and 13 the allegations in the subsequent, superseding indictment confirm that the 14 search was justified by the CBP officer’s reasonable suspicion of Levy’s 15 declining to decide whether searches of computer diskettes found within  luggage were routine or non‐routine); United States v. Grotke, 702 F.2d 49,  51‐52 (2d Cir. 1983) (routine search includes search of luggage and  personal belongings, among other items).      
  9. 9. 14-338-cr United States v. Levy 9 ongoing criminal participation in securities fraud schemes.  In fact, the 1 level of suspicion was so high that Levy himself was aware of his status as 2 a target of an ongoing federal investigation even prior to arriving at the 3 airport, and his lawyer previously had contacted federal prosecutors about 4 the investigation.   5 We also conclude that the CBP officer was entitled to rely on 6 information provided by the DEA task force to justify the border search in 7 this case.  Official interagency collaboration, even (and perhaps especially) 8 at the border, is to be commended, not condemned.  Whether a Customs 9 official’s reasonable suspicion arises entirely from her own investigation or 10 is prompted by another federal agency is irrelevant to the validity of a 11 border search, which we have held “does not depend on whether it is 12 prompted by a criminal investigative motive.”  United States v. Irving, 452 13 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006); see United States v. Schoor, 597 F.2d 1303, 1306 14 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J.) (“That the search was made at the request of 15 the DEA officers does not detract from its legitimacy.  Suspicion of 16 customs officials is alone sufficient justification for a border search.”).  We 17 note, for example, that DEA or Federal Bureau of Investigation agents 18
  10. 10. 14-338-cr United States v. Levy 10 “frequently assist customs officials in the execution of border searches.”  1 Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 232 (2008) (Kennedy, J., 2 dissenting) (citing United States v. Gurr, 471 F.3d 144, 147‐49 (D.C. Cir. 3 2006); United States v. Boumelhem, 339 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir. 2003); 4 Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United States, 777 F.2d 822, 824 (2d Cir. 5 1985)).  We see no constitutional reason to prevent these and other federal 6 law enforcement agents from also supplying information to Customs 7 officials in aid of a border search.  Nor are Customs officials prevented by 8 the Fourth Amendment from conducting such a search merely because it 9 furthers another federal agency’s criminal investigation.     10 Levy argues that border searches conducted by the CBP, even at the 11 prompting of another federal agency, should at least be confined to crimes 12 that a statute or regulation specifically authorizes CBP to investigate.  We 13 recognize that CBP officers focus primarily on contraband, dutiable 14 merchandise, immigration fraud, and terrorism.  See United States v. 15 Flores‐Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004); Tabbaa, 509 F.3d at 93.  But (like 16 other federal law enforcement officers) CBP officers are neither expected 17 nor required to ignore tangible or documentary evidence of a federal 18
  11. 11. 14-338-cr United States v. Levy 11 crime.  They have the authority to search and review a traveler’s 1 documents and other items at the border when they reasonably suspect 2 that the traveler is engaged in criminal activity, even if the crime falls 3 outside the primary scope of their official duties.  United States v. Gurr, 4 the only other circuit court decision to have resolved this specific issue, is 5 in accord.  In Gurr, the D.C. Circuit explained:   6 We recognize that the primary purpose of a border search is to 7 seize  contraband  property  unlawfully  imported  or  brought 8 into the United States.  However, where customs officers are 9 authorized to search for material subject to duty or otherwise 10 introduced illegally into the United States and they discover 11 the instrumentalities or evidence of crimes, they may seize the 12 same. 13  14 471 F.3d at 149 (quoting Schoor, 597 F.2d at 1306); cf. United States v. 15 Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“Seljan has not cited 16 authority under the Fourth Amendment that required the agents to 17 disregard evidence of other unlawful activity, even if the unlawfulness 18 had nothing to do with transporting unreported monetary instruments.”). 19 Because their conduct was fully supported by reasonable suspicion 20 that Levy was engaged in a financial crime, the CBP officer in this case was 21 entitled to inspect and copy the notebook as evidence of that crime.  22
  12. 12. 14-338-cr United States v. Levy 12 Neither our case law nor the applicable regulations relating to CBP officers 1 or border searches is to the contrary, and the District Court correctly 2 denied Levy’s motion to suppress the photocopy.   3 CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in the accompanying 5 summary order, we AFFIRM the judgment of conviction of the District 6 Court.  7
  13. 13. 14-338-cr (L) United States v. Donna Levy et al. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the1 Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the2 29th day of September, two thousand fifteen.3 4 PRESENT:5 PETER W. HALL,6 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,7 Circuit Judges,8 JEFFREY ALKER MEYER,*9 District Judge.10 _____________________________________11 12 DONNA LEVY, DAVID LEVY,13 14 Defendants-Appellants,15 16 v. Nos. 14-338-cr17 14-614-cr18 19 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,20 21 Appellee.22 _____________________________________23 24 For Defendant-Appellant Donna Levy: MATTHEW W. BRISSENDEN, Garden City, NY.25 26 * Hon. Jeffrey Alker Meyer, District Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.
  14. 14. 2 For Defendant-Appellant David Levy: MARC FERNICH, New York, NY.1 2 For Appellee United States: HOWARD S. MASTER (Carrie H. Cohen and3 Brian A. Jacobs, on the brief), for Preet4 Bharara, United States Attorney for the5 Southern District of New York, New York,6 NY.7 8 Appeals from judgments of the United States District Court for the Southern District of9 New York (Crotty, J.).10 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND11 DECREED that the judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED. We have resolved12 Defendants-Appellants’ border search challenge in an opinion, issued simultaneously with this13 summary order, and we address here the remaining arguments raised on appeal.14 Defendants-Appellants David and Donna Levy, husband and wife, appeal from final15 judgments, following a jury trial, entered by the United States District Court for the Southern16 District of New York. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the17 procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.18 Defendants challenge, inter alia, the district court’s denial of their motion to suppress19 evidence obtained from a wiretap authorized under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and20 Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (“Title III”). They contend that the wiretap21 application and supporting affirmation did not contain a sufficient showing of necessity.22 “When considering a challenge to the resolution of a suppression motion, we review23 findings of fact for clear error and legal questions de novo.” United States v. Stewart, 551 F.3d24 187, 190-91 (2d Cir. 2009). “[W]e grant considerable deference to the [issuing] court’s decision25 [of] whether to allow a wiretap, ensuring only that ‘the facts set forth in the application were26 minimally adequate to support the determination that was made.’” United States v. Concepcion,27
  15. 15. 3 579 F.3d 214, 217 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 663 (2d Cir.1 1997)). Before authorizing a wiretap under Title III, a judicial officer must find that “normal2 investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to3 succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c).2 4 In this case, the wiretap application and supporting affirmation contained a sufficient5 showing of necessity, outlining the traditional investigative techniques that had been tried and6 explaining why further traditional techniques would likely fail. The supporting affirmation noted7 that prior to the application the investigators: reviewed documents generated by TD Ameritrade8 and consulted with a TD Ameritrade fraud investigator; consensually recorded calls between a9 confidential witness and the wiretap target; had the confidential witness wear a body wire and10 make a controlled payment of $5,000.00 to the wiretap target; and analyzed the wiretap target’s11 cell phone records. The affirmation also explained that: consensual monitoring of the12 confidential witness’s phone would be insufficient to further the investigation because the witness13 was viewed as a mere investor and would not be privy to conversations between the wiretap target14 and the third parties perpetrating the fraud; traditional surveillance was insufficient because the15 scheme was occurring online and over the phone; and grand jury subpoenas would only capture16 historical records and would not reveal ongoing fraud. These representations were at least17 “minimally adequate to support the determination that was made.” Concepcion, 579 F.3d at 217.18 2 We have previously found insufficient a wiretap application that did “not reveal what, if any, investigative techniques were attempted prior to the wiretap request . . . [and] merely asserted that ‘no other investigative method exist[ed] to determine the identity’ of individuals who might have been involved . . . .” United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1983).
  16. 16. 4 Donna Levy challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions, under1 Rule 10b-5, for market manipulation. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. “A defendant challenging the2 sufficiency of the evidence bears a heavy burden,” United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 139 (2d3 Cir. 2011); a jury verdict must be upheld if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential4 elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 105 (2d5 Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). In considering the sufficiency of the evidence6 supporting a guilty verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the7 Government, see United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 136-37 (2d Cir. 2006), and sufficiency8 must be assessed with respect “to the totality of the government’s case and not to each element, as9 each fact may gain color from others,” United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir.10 1999). “The gravamen of manipulation is deception of investors into believing that prices at11 which they purchase and sell securities are determined by the natural interplay of supply and12 demand, not rigged by manipulators.” Gurary v. Winehouse, 190 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1999)13 (citing Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 12 (1985)).14 Donna Levy contends that there was no evidence linking her to deceptive market15 transactions; instead, the stock price increases were solely the result of her promotional activities,16 which she characterizes as disseminating high volumes of truthful information to potential17 investors. Cooperating witness testimony at trial, however, established that Donna “would use18 people to prebuy stock before the promotion would go out.” Trial Tr. at 598. The goal of the19 “prebuys” was to show a consistent pre-promotion pattern of buying so that potential investors20 who received her promotions “would check the activity and it would entice [them] to buy the21 stock.” Id. at 599. These coordinated “prebuys” fall within the classic definition of market22
  17. 17. 5 manipulation—“artificially affecting market activity in order to mislead investors,” Santa Fe1 Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977)—and Donna Levy has thus failed to meet her “heavy2 burden” of demonstrating insufficiency of evidence supporting her conviction. See Kozeny, 6673 F.3d at 139.4 Defendants also challenge the district court’s jury instruction on reasonable doubt, which5 they acknowledge comes from Judge Sand’s Modern Federal Jury Instructions. 1 Leonard B.6 Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 57-20. “We review legal challenges to a7 district court’s jury charge de novo.” United States v. Shamsideen, 511 F.3d 340, 345 (2d Cir.8 2008). “Where[, as here,] an alleged charging error goes to the burden of proof, we will reverse a9 conviction if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to permit a10 guilty verdict based on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks11 omitted). “[N]ot every unhelpful, unwise, or even erroneous formulation of the concept of12 reasonable doubt in a jury charge renders the instruction constitutionally deficient.” Id. (internal13 quotation marks omitted). We therefore review “the charge in its entirety to determine whether,14 on the whole, [it] provided the jury with an intelligible and accurate portrayal of the applicable15 law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).16 Seizing on a single word in the district court’s charge—“suspicion”—in contravention of17 our mandate to review the charge in its entirety, Defendants contend that the district court18 materially understated the prosecution’s burden of proof. We have, however, previously19 approved of a charge based on Judge Sand’s model instruction that also contained the word20 “suspicion.” See id. at 348 (noting that a reasonable doubt instruction based on Judge Sand’s21 model “clearly and accurately instructed the jury on the reasonable doubt standard in some22
  18. 18. 6 detail”). We reject Defendants’ attempt to distinguish the district court’s reasonable doubt charge1 here from that approved in Shamsideen on the ground that the district court’s charge was not2 “ameliorated” by a proper instruction on the presumption of innocence. Defendants have thus3 failed to show that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to4 permit a guilty verdict based on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 345 (internal5 quotation marks omitted).6 Defendants also challenge the district court’s restitution orders. “[We] review an . . .7 order of restitution deferentially, and we will reverse only for abuse of discretion.” United States8 v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107,9 113 (2d Cir. 2006)). “[T]he Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”) . . . provides10 . . . that a sentencing court ‘shall order, in addition to . . . any other penalty authorized by law,’11 defendants convicted of specified crimes to ‘make restitution to the victim of the offense.’” Id. at12 190 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1)). “[T]he MVRA requires only a reasonable approximation13 of losses supported by a sound methodology.” Id. at 196. Defendants contend that the district14 court erred both in calculating the amount of restitution without the aid of expert testimony and in15 finding them liable for the total amount of investor losses. We have observed, however, that the16 entire amount of investor losses may be attributed to a defendant who “promoted worthless stock17 in worthless companies . . . .” United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 180 n.4 (2d Cir. 2007)18 (quoting United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005)). Here, sufficient evidence19 presented at trial demonstrated that the stock of the companies affected by Defendants’ fraudulent20 schemes was left effectively worthless. The amount of restitution ordered thus constitutes “a21
  19. 19. 7 reasonable approximation of losses supported by a sound methodology.” Gushlak, 728 F.3d at1 196.2 We have considered Defendants’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.3 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above and in the accompanying opinion, we AFFIRM the4 judgments of the district court.5 6 FOR THE COURT:7 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk8 9

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